

THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
FROM
1799 TO 1818.

“ Monumentum ære perennius.”

THE DISPATCHES

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS

IN

INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, ~~SPAIN, THE LOW~~
~~COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE.~~

FROM

1790~~7~~⁷ ~~1810~~¹⁸¹⁰.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AN KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

VOLUME THE EIGHTH.

A NEW EDITION.

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THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
IN
THE PENINSULA,
IN
1811 AND 1812.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 11th June, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th June.

‘ I do not exactly understand what orders have been given to General Pack, and in what manner affairs are situated at Almeida.

‘ My memorandum to you of the 15th May was founded on a supposition that it might be necessary for you to retire from the frontier, and I expressed a particular anxiety “ that that place (Almeida) should not be abandoned till it should be necessary.”

‘ My letter to you of the 1st instant was founded on a supposition that the enemy were about to move through the mountains towards the Tagus; and, after having requested you to make a corresponding movement, I requested that General Pack’s brigade might remain at Almeida, and in the neighborhood, till relieved by the militia.

‘ I did not think it probable that, if you should make the movement to the south directed by my letter of the 1st instant, there could exist any necessity for abandoning and destroying Almeida, and I did not advert to it in that letter. But it appears by your letter of the 8th instant,

which I received yesterday, that you had directed General Pack "to consider his secure retreat as a primary object, and that, upon evacuating the place, he should blow up the remainder of the fortifications, and destroy the military stores," adverting, of course, to my memorandum to you of the 15th May. According to this memorandum, Almeida should not have been abandoned till it was necessary; and yet it appears, by your letter of the 9th instant, to have been so little necessary, that General Pack left in that neighborhood one regiment of his brigade, which is there still.

'There can be no reason whatever why that regiment should now remain at Almeida. The place, and everything it contained, are destroyed, and the regiment should be directed to join the brigade; but as I have had a good deal of correspondence with the Government upon the subject of Almeida, and they have taken some pains and incurred some expense in preparing to repair the place, it is desirable that I should have a copy of the orders sent to General Pack, and his official report of the mode in which he executed them; and that the necessity for abandoning and destroying the place should be made clear. Upon this last point, it would be desirable to have in detail the reports of the enemy's situation on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, and the situation of Barbacena's cavalry and of our posts.

'I requested Colonel Murray to write to you yesterday respecting the passage of the Tagus by the troops under your command; since which I have received Captain Grant's letter of the 7th, from the enclosures in which it would appear that the passage of the Tagus by the army of Portugal, although a probable operation, is not absolutely decided. I request, therefore, that the following disposition may, for the present, be made of the troops under your command, instead of that directed in Colonel Murray's letter of yesterday: the Light division, and one brigade of cavalry, at Niza, as therein directed; the 1st division, the right at Villa Velha, the left in the villages between Villa Velha and Castello Branco, and one brigade of cavalry in front of Castello Branco, towards Salvaterra; the 5th division in the cantonments, as directed in Colonel Murray's letter of yesterday.

'I have seen Mr. Kennedy regarding your supplies.

From your letter, I understand that the whole have, or will have, bread to the 15th inclusive; 100,000 rations of bread have been ordered to Castello Branco, which it is apprehended may not arrive there. But there are 50,000 rations at Villa Velha, and the magazine is at Abrantes, about nine leagues from Niza.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘ Quinta de Granichia, 12th June, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your two letters of the 10th.

‘ You had better send the sick you may have to Abrantes, but not by water from Villa Velha. The Portuguese should also go from Castello Branco to Lisbon by Abrantes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

To Colonel Austin.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granichia, 12th June, 1811.

‘ In consequence of the expected early collection of the enemy’s whole force in Estremadura, I think it probable that General Blake’s corps will return to the Condado de Niebla, and that they will pass through Portugal on their way thither. I have desired the Commissary General to prepare for their passage with provisions at Beja and at Villa Viçosa; and I request you to have from 12,000 to 15,000 rations of bread and meat, and 1500 rations of forage, prepared for them at Mertola, and boats collected at that place, in order to transport them across the Guadiana. I cannot say exactly when they will march, but it is desirable that all the preparations should be made immediately; and I will give you the earliest intimation of the movement.

‘ I will pay any expense that may be incurred to collect the rations or boats.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Austin.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don Joaquín Blake.

‘Quinta de Granicha,
ce 12 Juin, 1811.

‘MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘J’ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m’a fait l’honneur de m’écrire le 11, et je conviens avec vous que vous ferez bien de porter les opérations du corps d’armée de votre Excellence dans le Condado de Niebla, en cas qu’il devienne nécessaire pour l’armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise de se porter sur la Caya.

‘Je vous envoie une route par laquelle seule votre artillerie pourrait marcher, et vous verrez à la note la provision qu’on aura faite pour votre marche. J’ai donné ordre qu’on fasse provision pour 12,000 hommes et 1500 chevaux, et je vous prie de me faire savoir s’il vous en faut plus.

‘Le siège de Badajoz sera entièrement levé cette nuit.

‘Je n’ai pas encore de nouvelles du mouvement du Maréchal Soult; mais je crois qu’il aura été joint par le corps de Drouet aujourd’hui, et probablement qu’il se mettra en mouvement demain. Son premier mouvement sera, il y a apparence, vers Hornachos, ou même plus à sa droite, pour éviter toute affaire avec nous, jusqu’à l’arrivée de l’armée de Portugal. Je suppose que votre premier mouvement sera sur Valverde pour attendre celui de l’ennemi. Celui de nos troupes en avant sera sur Albuera.

‘Les 3^{me} et 4^{me} divisions de l’armée de Portugal, sous les ordres du Général Regnier, sont arrivées à Plasencia le 9 de ce mois. C’est un jour plus tard que je n’ai compté, mais elles pourront toujours arriver à Merida le 16; et si elles font la jonction par le pont de Medellin, elles la feront le 15.

‘Je vous prie, Monsieur le Général, de donner ordre qu’on conserve la discipline en passant par le royaume de Portugal.

‘Je suis bien fâché que je n’ai pas eu le plaisir de faire la connaissance de votre Excellence; mais j’espère que l’occasion est seulement retardée pour le moment.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘*Le Capitaine Général*
Don Joaquín Blake.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 12th June, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th.

‘ I was allowed by the Commander in Chief to recommend for brevet promotion a certain number of Officers ; and I was under the necessity of course of taking them from all parts of the army. I was also obliged to attend to the claims of seniority in instances in which the senior Officer had besides the claim of merit. Under these circumstances, although the light regiments had their proportion of this promotion, I was not enabled to recommend your brother, Captain J. Stewart, although I certainly wished it.

‘ General Craufurd has since proposed to me a plan, under which I could have got him the rank of Major, if that plan had been practicable ; but the Spaniards were to be concerned ; and if the plan was practicable, so much time must elapse before they can be brought to consent to it, that it is useless to undertake it.

‘ I assure you that it will give me great satisfaction to have it in my power to forward the views of your brother in the service, not only for his advantage, but for that of the public.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘ Quinta de Granicha,
12th June, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received your letter of the 17th May, and I am much obliged to you for the desire you express to render your department useful to us in this country.

‘ The Portuguese commissariat, and all the departments attached to that army, are in a miserably inefficient state from two causes : the want of authority to enforce obedience to order and regulation ; the want of money to defray the necessary expenses.

‘ The departments attached to the army are not liable to the military law ; we therefore have no power to punish those guilty of any offence ; and, as for expecting punishment from complaint to the Government or to the civil tribunals, it

would be just as reasonable to expect the coming of the Messiah, or the return of King Sebastian.

‘ These unfortunate Governments in the Peninsula had been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partizan. Those malversations in office; those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partizans, are passed unnoticed; and notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office.

‘ The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the Government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity, of which the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and scrapes, of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this bubble the Government of Portugal, as well as the successive Governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all Governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.

‘ The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The Government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man’s job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favorites with the mob. They have a general income tax called ten per cent., and in some cases twenty per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, from want of money, they can pay nobody, and of course have not even the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments.

‘ The hire of mules and carts, the food for the animals and drivers, are never paid ; and of course the animals die, and the people desert the service.

‘ The Commissaries have no money to purchase anything in the country. I will not allow the soldiers to pillage. The Government have no money to pay for the transport of provisions from the magazines on the coast to the army, and are bankrupt in credit, and are unwilling to execute their own law to force means of transport ; and the result is that the troops get nothing, and every department and branch of the service is paralysed.

‘ The remedy which has been proposed from England has been that we should take the commissariat upon ourselves. I have already done as much as I could in this way ; that is, under an arrangement which provides for the expense being subtracted from the subsidy. I have arranged that the Commissary General shall provide for those parts of the army serving with the British divisions. I know that we cannot do more without failure.

‘ In addition to embarrassments of all descriptions surrounding us on all sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than anything else, of which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or anything, can get the better, even in individuals.

‘ Our transport, which is the great lever of the commissariat, is done principally, if not entirely, by Spanish muleteers ; and, to oblige Mr. Kennedy, they would probably once or twice carry provisions to a Portuguese regiment, but they would prefer to quit us, and attend the French, to being obliged to perform this duty constantly.

‘ When a Portuguese brigade is in a British division the muleteers do not inquire, and do not know, for whom they carry the supplies ; and the Commissary with the division issues to the Portuguese Commissary what is required for the Portuguese troops, taking his receipt for the quantities, and a charge is made against the subsidy for the actual cost, including a certain sum for transport from the magazines.

‘ There are but few Portuguese troops not serving in our divisions ; but there is the militia, there are the forts, and other establishments, to be provided for, into which we could

not enter without involving ourselves in inextricable details and an enormous expense.

‘ The remedy for the existing evils is simple, and has been repeatedly recommended by me as far back as November, 1809, at the period of the Austrian peace. It consists in the following measures :

‘ First, to make the disposable income of the State more nearly equal to the expenditure, by reforms, improvements in collection, and some increase of taxation. Something has lately been done in this way, and I understand with very considerable success ; but, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, and telling the Government over and over again that money (that is, specie) could not be got for their expenses in England, and that they must look to the produce of their own exertions alone for that necessary, it is only lately that they have done anything.

‘ Secondly, to make all Officers and departments connected with the army liable to the military law of the country.

‘ Thirdly, to alter the military law of the country so as to render it more conformable to the circumstances of the present day.

‘ Fourthly, to appoint a Commissary General, with a sufficient number of deputies and assistants, to perform the duty of the army, instead of what is called a Junta, consisting of merchants of Lisbon and their clerks, who have no responsibility, and know nothing of provisioning an army, excepting the profitable jobs they themselves derive from it, and to regulate the duties of the Commissary General’s office, in the manner the details of which have been proposed to them.

‘ Fifthly, to regulate the medical department, and render it liable to military law. You will scarcely believe that the office of Physician General is a sinecure, held for life, with a right to appoint a deputy, likewise a sinecure held for life, and at the same time a right to interfere in the medical department, and to prevent anybody else from doing any good.

‘ Sixthly, to regulate the department of the arsenal, and render its officers liable to the military law. This is a department connected not only with army and military stores, but with the clothing and appointments of the army,

and this also is managed by a Junta, responsible to nobody, and who do nothing.

‘ It may be observed that all these improvements would do very well, but still that a British Commissary or two might be of use. So they might if they were worth having; but if they are worth having, I cannot spare them; and if they are not, they will do no good to the Portuguese concerns. In fact, there is no want of ability in the country or of good will. The wants consist in what we cannot give them, unless more disposition is shown to attend to our counsel, and the local Governments determine to alter their system, and really to do their duty by their country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Gordon,*
Commissary in Chief.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Charles Asgill, Bart.

‘ Quinta de Granicha,
12th June, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th May, and I shall be very happy to give you every assistance in my power, in carrying into execution the charitable intentions of the people of Ireland. That which the people of Portugal have lost, from the want of which they are likely to suffer most, is their laboring cattle, bullocks: Ireland could supply many; and cows with calf would be very acceptable. Building materials, such as planks, nails, and bar iron, would be very useful; large casks with iron hoops would also be desirable, particularly at an early period, as the French destroyed their casks, and they will find it difficult to replace them in time to receive the wine harvest of this year. Blankets, and coarse woollen in the piece, might be sent with advantage.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir Charles Asgill, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Officer commanding His Majesty's Troops at Niza.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

‘ I request that the brigade of cavalry under Major General Anson, which I understand arrived at Niza on the 12th,

and the Light division of infantry under Major General Craufurd, which I understand arrived at Niza on this day, the 13th, may march to Portalegre on the morning of the 15th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Officer commanding
H.M. Troops at Niza.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Officer commanding the 1st Division of Infantry.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

‘ I request that the 1st division of infantry, with the artillery attached, or marching with it, which I understand arrived this day at Villa Velha, Sarnadas, and the villages between Villa Velha and Castello Branco, may cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, on the morning of the 15th instant, and proceed to Niza, and on the 16th to Portalegre.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Officer commanding
the 1st Division of Infantry.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 13th June,
1811, 7 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ I have received your letter of 10 A.M., and if you have no authority, excepting — — —’s report, for saying that the enemy were in Los Santos, I should be inclined to doubt it. However, I have ordered General Hamilton’s division to Albuera this night; and if I should not receive a contradiction of the report before the moon rises I shall go there myself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 13th June,
1811, 7 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I enclose some letters just received. I doubt the enemy being in Los Santos, although, as Drouet joined either last night or this morning, they will probably move to-morrow. I have ordered Hamilton to move to Albuera, and I shall go

there to night if I should not receive a contradiction of ~~the~~ report before the moon rises.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811,
20 minutes past 8 P. M.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ I have just received your letter of yesterday evening; and I request that the blankets, which the Commanding Officers of regiments may be desirous of getting rid of, may be sent by return mules to the Commissary’s stores at Abrantes, if any should be sent there. A mule will not carry more than about forty, and they should be made up in packages of twenty each. The Commanding Officers of regiments should report to the Quarter Master General the number they send into store, and to what place.

‘ I send directions to General Craufurd to march with the Light division, and to General Anson to march with his cavalry, to Portalegre on the 15th, and to the 1st division to march on the same day to Niza, and on the 16th to Portalegre; and I request you to order General Campbell and General Pack to move on the 15th to Villa Velha and Sarnadas, and on the 16th to Niza. The other brigade of cavalry may move into Castello Branco on the 15th, keeping still a look towards Salvaterra.

‘ I beg that the 9 pounders, the reserve artillery, &c., may move with any division with which they may be.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

‘ I beg leave to inform your Lordship that, since the commencement of the siege of Badajoz, fifty two of the Chasseurs Britanniques have deserted, notwithstanding that we have with the army only a selection of that corps; 686 who are suspected being left behind at Lisbon. The inconvenience of the desertion of the soldiers of this army is very great,

because it is almost the only mode by which the enemy can acquire intelligence; but, besides the inconvenience which all must feel, the disgrace is no trifle, and it would be very desirable if these corps could be relieved by others.

‘ I much fear from all that I hear that the recruiting of these corps has not been conducted as Government intended, and that prisoners have been enlisted, as well as deserters, into the Chasseurs Britanniques and the Brunswick Legion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

‘ In consequence of a report from the Chief Engineer, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, that the fire from San Christoval might occasion the loss of many lives in the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and the breach in that outwork having been apparently much improved by the fire throughout the 6th, I directed that an attempt might be made to carry San Christoval by storm that night. Major General Houstoun, who conducted the operations of the siege on the right of the Guadiana, accordingly ordered a detachment under Major Macintosh, of the 85th regiment, to make the attempt. The men advanced under a very heavy fire of musketry and hand grenades from the outworks, and of shot and shells from the town, with the utmost intrepidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the breach; the advanced guard being led by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st regiment, who volunteered to perform this duty; but they found that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp; and, notwithstanding that they were provided with ladders, it was impossible to mount it. They retired with some loss.

‘ The fire upon San Christoval, as well as upon the place, continued on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, on which day the breach in the wall of San Christoval appeared practicable, and I directed that a second attempt should be made on that night to obtain possession of that outwork. Major General Houstoun ordered another detachment for this service, under the command of Major M‘Geechy, of the 17th Por-

tuguese regiment, who, with the Officers destined to command the different parties composing the detachment, had been employed throughout the 8th and 9th in reconnoitring the breach and the different approaches to it.

‘They advanced at about 9 at night, in the best order, though opposed by the same means, and with the same determination as had been opposed to the detachment which had made the attempt on the 6th.

‘Ensign Dyas again led the service, and the storming party arrived at the foot of the breach; but they found it impossible to mount it, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp. The detachment suffered considerably, and Major M’Geechy, the Commanding Officer, was unfortunately killed, and others of the Officers fell; but the troops continued to maintain their station till Major General Houstoun ordered them to retire.

‘When the reinforcements had arrived from the frontiers of Castille, after the battle of Albuera, I undertook the siege of Badajoz, entertaining a belief that the means of which I had the command would reduce the place before the end of the second week in June, at which time I expected that the reinforcement for the enemy’s southern army, detached from Castille, would join Marshal Soult. I was unfortunately mistaken in my estimate of the quality of these means.

‘The ordnance belonging to the garrison of Elvas is very ancient and incomplete; unprovided with the improvements adopted by modern science to facilitate and render more certain the use of cannon; and although classed generally as 24 pounders, the guns were found to be of a calibre larger than the shot in the garrison of that weight. The fire from this ordnance was therefore very uncertain, and the carriages proved to be worse even than we supposed they were; and both guns and carriages were rendered useless so frequently by the effect of our own fire as to create delay, in consequence of the necessity which existed for exchanging both in the advanced batteries.

Those who are accustomed to observe the effect of the fire of artillery will be astonished to learn that fire was kept up from the 2d to the 10th instant from fourteen 24 pounders, upon the wall of the castle of Badajoz, constructed

of rammed earth and loose stones, of which the foot was seen at the distance of from 400 to 600 yards, and that it had not at last effected a practicable breach. It was impossible to estimate the length of time which would elapse before a practicable breach could have been effected in this wall; and, even if one had been effected, it was the opinion of the engineers and others, as well as my own, that although the breach could have been stormed, we could not have formed our troops to attack the enemy's intrenchment within, unless we had possession of Fort San Christoval.

' We had failed in two attempts to obtain possession of Fort San Christoval, and it was obvious to me that we could not obtain possession of that outwork without performing a work which would have required the labor of several days to accomplish it.

' On the morning of the 10th instant I received the enclosed intercepted dispatch, from the Duke of Dalmatia to the Duke of Ragusa, which pointed out clearly the enemy's design to collect in Estremadura their whole force; and I had reason to believe that Bonet's corps, which had marched from Toledo on the 28th and 29th of May, and was expected at Cordova on the 5th and 6th instant, would have joined the southern army by the 10th; and it was generally expected in the country that the southern army would have moved by that time.

' The movement of this army alone would have created a necessity for raising the siege; but on the same morning I received accounts from the frontiers of Castille, which left no doubt of the destination of the army of Portugal to the southward, and gave ground for belief that they would arrive at Merida on the 15th instant.

' I therefore ordered that the siege should be raised.

' I am concerned to add that this measure was rendered expedient, not only by the military considerations to which I have above referred, but by others relative to the security of Elvas.

' If the siege had been continued only for two days longer there would have remained in Elvas only 10,000 24 pound shot; a quantity by no means sufficient for its defence, if the course of events should enable the enemy to attack that place; and I learn that there are none at Lisbon, and if

there were any, the Government, under present circumstances, have not the power of procuring means of transport to send it up.

‘ Since the troops under Sir William Beresford have been in this part of the country, General Hamilton’s division of Portuguese troops, consisting of three brigades, had been supplied with provisions generally from the stores of Elvas, as well as the troops of the garrison; and the stores of Elvas had been very inadequately, if at all, upheld to answer these demands.

‘ The consequence is that there are not at this moment in the fort supplies for the garrison for one fortnight.

‘ All the means of transport which could be collected in this neighborhood were employed in aid of the operations of the siege, from which they could not be relieved till the siege should be raised, and the ordnance and stores returned to Elvas.

‘ The application of these means of transport, to bring a supply to Elvas from the British magazines at Abrantes (which is the resource from which at last it must be drawn), and the eventual safety of that place, depended upon the early discontinuance of the operations against Badajoz; and this, independent of the circumstances above referred to, and the military considerations resulting from them, was a principal motive with me for raising the siege on the 10th instant.

‘ From this circumstance your Lordship will see additional reason to lament the state of inefficiency of all the Portuguese departments attached to the army. It affords an additional proof of the embarrassments which meet me at every turn, from wants and deficiencies for which the Portuguese Government ought to provide, but which invariably at last fall, at the most critical moments, upon the resources which have been provided, with great difficulty and labor, and at great expense, by the departments of the British army.

‘ I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the Officers and troops employed at the siege of Badajoz, whose labors and exertions deserved a very different result.

‘ Major General Picton directed the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Major General Houstoun on the

right; and I am much indebted to those Officers, as well as to Major General Hamilton, and the other General and Staff Officers, and the Officers and troops under their command respectively. Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, of the Royal engineers, was the directing engineer, and immediately superintended the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and Captain Squire those on the right of that river; and these Officers, and the corps of Royal engineers, have, by their conduct on this occasion, augmented their claims to my approbation.

‘Lieut. Colonel Framingham commanded the artillery, having under his orders Major Dickson, attached to the Portuguese service, who, during the absence of Lieut. Colonel Framingham with the troops which were employed to cover the operations, conducted all the details of this important department. I had every reason to be satisfied with these Officers, and most particularly with Major Dickson, from whose activity, zeal, and intelligence, the British service has derived great advantage in the different operations against Badajoz.

‘Captain Cleves, of the Hanoverian artillery, conducted that department on the right of the Guadiana with great success.

‘The service of the batteries was performed by detachments from the 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments of Portuguese artillery, who conducted themselves remarkably well. They were aided by Captain Rainsford’s company of the Royal artillery, who were indefatigable; some of them having never quitted the batteries.

‘I am much indebted to General Leite, the governor of the province of Alentejo and of Elvas, for the assistance which he again afforded me in this operation.

‘I enclose a return of the killed and wounded throughout the siege, from which your Lordship will observe that, excepting in the attempts to obtain possession of San Christoval, our loss has not been severe. We still maintain the blockade of Badajoz; and I know from an intercepted letter, that the enemy had in the place, on the 28th of May, only three weeks’ provisions.

‘I have not yet heard that the enemy have moved from their position at Llerena, and I imagine that the arrival of

the 9th corps has been delayed longer than was expected; and it is probable that Soult will be unwilling to move till he hears of the movements of the army of Portugal. They broke up from the Tormes on the 3d, and their advanced guard arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo on the evening of the 5th. They moved forward again on the 6th, and Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer withdrew the advanced guard of the troops under his command, first to Nave d'Aver, and thence to Alfayates; having his main body on the high ground behind Soito; and on the following morning he retired behind the Coa at Sabugal.

‘The enemy patrolled on the 6th into Fuentes de Oñoro and into Nave d'Aver.

‘I enclose Sir Brent Spencer's report of these operations, from which it appears that the Royal dragoons, under Colonel Clifton*, and a squadron of the 14th, the whole directed by Major General Slade, distinguished themselves.

‘I imagine that the enemy's march in this direction was intended as a reconnaissance, and to cover the march of a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, as on the following day, the 7th, the whole moved from thence to Morasverdes, in the direction of the Puerto de Baños; near which pass General Regnier had been with two divisions of the army of Portugal since the 5th. On the 8th, in the evening, one division of General Regnier's troops had come through Baños; and I expect that those divisions will have arrived at Plasencia on the 9th, and the whole army on the 10th.

‘I had directed Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer to make a movement corresponding with those of the enemy, if they should move to the southward; and the greatest part of his corps is now at Castello Branco and Villa Velha; and a part of it on this side of the Tagus, at Niza.

‘The Commissary General has thrown a sufficient quantity of provisions into all the places on the frontier, and measures are in progress to improve the defence of them all.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. Since writing this dispatch I have received ac-

* Major General Sir Arthur Clifton, K.C.H.

counts that General Drouet's troops joined on the enemy's right at Berlanga and Azuaga yesterday, and a report that their cavalry were in movement towards Los Santos this morning. The British cavalry and the 2d and 4th divisions were about to march from Villa Franca and Almendralejo, towards Albuera; and I have ordered there General Hamilton's division; and I shall proceed there this night myself, if I should find this report confirmed.'

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieut. General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., in the several affairs with the French Army, from the 30th of May to the 11th of June, 1811, inclusive.

Head Quarters, Quinta de St. João, 13th June, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	9	3	106	—	118
Wounded . .	22	17	315	—	354
Missing . . .	3	—	6	—	9

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

' MY DEAR LORD, ' Quinta de Granicha, 13th June, 1811.

' I enclose the weekly state of the 1st instant, from which you will observe that our list of sick and wounded is much increased. We have no sickness of any consequence, but I should think not less than 7000 altogether.

' I likewise enclose the last return from Belem, which will show of what descriptions the men returned sick absent, in the May returns, are composed. There are now at Elvas 300 or 400 recovered, who cannot join for want of arms and accoutrements; our friends the Spaniards having played the usual trick of plundering the arms and accoutrements of the wounded at Albuera, on the field of battle. I am much annoyed about Badajoz, although convinced I could not have

taken the place with the means we had of carrying on the operation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Albuera, 14th June, 1811, 10 A.M.

‘ I find that General Blake is not satisfied with the arrangement made for feeding his troops on their passage through Portugal, and he insists upon having rations at Jurumenha. I beg you to give most particular orders to the governor of Jurumenha, to allow no armed men to go into his fort, and to give rations to nobody not belonging to the garrison, without an order from you.

‘ The French are in strength in Los Santos, and we are not certain of anything on this side of that town; although it has been reported they are everywhere. We could not take the position in front of this for want of water. If what I have heard this morning is true they must be this day at Truxillo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. If our provisions should be sent to Jurumenha they should be well escorted, for fear of outrages, if Blake should be on his march.

‘ W.’

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Albuera, 14th June, 1811.

‘ I learn from General Blake, that his demand in Portugal will be for 13,000 men, and I request you, therefore, to order rations for 26,000 at each of the stations I mentioned to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.,*

Commissary General.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don Joaquín Blake.

‘à Albuera, ce 14 Juin 1811,
à 10 heures du matin.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 13 dans la nuit ; et je suis bien fâché d’être obligé de vous prévenir que les Commissaires ne peuvent donner des rations à vos troupes, après leur entrée en Portugal, que dans les lieux nommés dans la route que j’ai eu l’honneur de vous indiquer. Ainsi il reste à votre Excellence de faire les arrangemens qui seront nécessaires à Olivença ou à Valverde pour empêcher que les troupes ne souffrent l’inconvénient de ne trouver rien à manger le jour qu’elles arriveront à Jurumenha.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Capitaine Général*
Don Joaquín Blake.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Picton.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Albuera, 14th June, 1811.

‘ Colonel Murray has communicated to me your letter to him of last night, in which you have expressed a want of confidence in the Spanish troops (at which I am not astonished), and have desired specific instructions. My object in keeping any troops before Badajoz, just at present, is to maintain the blockade, and prevent the garrison from getting provisions.

‘ Adverting to the disposable strength of the garrison, which may be about 2500 men, and to the description of troops which are co-operating in the blockade, and to the advantage which the enemy would immediately derive from the possession of our advanced batteries and trenches, as cover for their outposts, as far as the range of their guns would reach, I have thought it expedient that we should continue to hold those advanced batteries and trenches. It is not very probable that, as long as we are so forward, the enemy will attempt anything upon the Spaniards ; nor, with 2500 men, are they likely to make any formidable sortie upon us. I do not think it at all necessary to employ 1500 men to guard these trenches : we have nothing in them to guard, and in my opinion, one quarter of the number would be sufficient. If these guards should be attacked by a superior force their retreat is always secure and covered ; and

if they are so attacked, they must be considered as any other advanced guard not able to keep its ground, and must be kept farther back.

‘ In respect to other points, all I wish is to have a strict blockade kept ; the ground favors it, and the Spanish troops who may be employed in it might be encamped so far off as to be out of the reach of sorties by the garrison, and the situation of their piquets altered, in order to prevent the facility of enterprise against them. I have gone thus into details, because you desired it. I think it probable, however, that I shall be obliged to relieve you from this duty before long.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Picton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ *Albuera, 14th June, 1811, 9 P.M.*

‘ I have received your letter of 3 P.M.; and I hope that you will have taken up the position near Solana, keeping your parties of observation out. You will have good cover there.

‘ As for the Spaniards, we must manage them the best way we can ; but as for the Portuguese, they are entirely under your orders, and you must direct Paes what he is to do. I wish you to treat them in every respect as British cavalry, observing always that their horses are of an inferior order.

‘ Are you certain that the enemy are in Villa Franca ?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. The bivouac which Hill quitted this morning appears to be an excellent situation for the cavalry to-morrow. It is in an olive wood, half a league south of Solana.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ *Albuera, 15th June, 1811.*

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

Half past 8 A.M.

‘ A note from you arrived here a little after 5 this morning, which Captain James lost ; and if its contents are important I request that you will repeat them.

‘ General Loy has sent in here to inform me that the enemy were advancing upon S^{ta} Marta, and had already come as far as FERIA about 6 o’clock, and that he intended to retire upon Almendral as soon as he should ascertain the fact. I conclude that I shall hear from the Officer of our cavalry who is at S^{ta} Marta.

‘ I have heard from the north of the Guadiana that the French from Castille were in Truxillo on the 13th. They will therefore be in Merida this night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. The letter that was lost was brought by a man of the 4th dragoons, who takes this back, and who was dispatched at half past 1 this morning. I understand that the letter was not directed for me, but for Murray.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Albuera, 15th June, 1811,
12 at noon.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ As I have not heard from you upon the subject, I conclude that you have not heard that the enemy’s cavalry arrived in S^{ta} Marta* two hours ago. Some Officers whom we had there say that they could see no infantry from the steeple of the church; but a Spanish Officer, sent here by General Loy, reports that there were infantry as well as cavalry, and that the infantry were upon their own right of the great road from Los Santos.

‘ The Portuguese cavalry are now marching from S^{ta} Marta upon this place, and the Spanish cavalry under Loy upon Almendral. I have not heard of the party of British cavalry which was to have been there, and to have reported to me here. You ought to fall back with your cavalry to the wood in front of this place, otherwise you may be too late.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

* A false report.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘Albuera, 15th June, 1811.
12 at noon.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘I think that General Blake will commence his march from Jurumenha for Redondo on the 17th or 18th, and you had better send up, on the receipt of this letter, to have the rations got ready.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*R. Kennedy, Esq.,
Commissary General.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘Albuera, 15th June, 1811.

‘It would be very desirable either to appoint a General Officer to command in Upper Beira, as Le Cor does in Lower Beira, or to extend the powers of Le Cor over Upper Beira; and to have the militia there, if not actually embodied in their towns, which in my opinion they ought to be, at least in such a state of organization as that we can get them for duty when we shall want them. This would relieve me from the necessity of keeping a division of infantry in Beira, at least while the enemy are weak in Castille, which is very desirable in the existing state of our army.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. The Spaniards have sent us word that the French are advancing upon St^a Marta, which however we have not heard from any other authority, and we have Officers at that place: as an Officer, however, has arrived from Truxillo, and reports that the French entered that town on the 13th and they will be in Merida this evening, I shall break up from hence this evening.

‘W.’

To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, Commanding Royal Engineer.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Albuera, 15th June, 1811.

‘As we are not likely to have occasion for the four or five tin pontoons, remaining of the six brought from Lisbon, for

some time; and as we shall have plenty of others by the time we shall have occasion to use them, I am desirous of giving the four or five tin pontoons, now at Elvas, with their carriages and all the equipments belonging to them (excepting the horses), to General Blake; and I request you to deliver them to the person who will give you this letter, or a duplicate of it.

‘As the flying bridge between Elvas and Badajoz can no longer be of any use to anybody, I think it might be as well to take it up, and have the boats, &c., lodged in Elvas, together with the boats, casks, stores, &c., still at Jurumenha. All this should be done as soon as may be in your power.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don Joaquin Blake.

‘MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘à Albuera, ce 15 Juin, 1811.

‘Je viens de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence de midi et demi. Je ne vous ai pas écrit sur les évènements de S^{ta} Marta parceque tout à l’heure, seulement, j’ai reçu des nouvelles du Général Loy qui a dû vous écrire.

‘Je viens de recevoir un rapport du Général Cotton d’Azauchal, qui me dit que l’ennemi a seulement 800 hommes de cavalerie à S^{ta} Marta. Il ne me dit pas où est l’infanterie de l’ennemi; et l’Officier qui est venu de la part du Général Loy m’a dit qu’il y en avait à S^{ta} Marta. L’ennemi n’a pas encore dépassé le bois de ce côté-ci de S^{ta} Marta; et le Général Erskine écrit à 11 heures et demi de Corte de Peleas qu’il allait y envoyer trois escadrons de cavalerie Anglaise. La cavalerie Portugaise est dans le bois en avant d’ici.

‘Vous avez reçu l’arrangement proposé pour la marche de cette nuit. J’ai donné l’ordre à votre cavalerie de se replier au bois qui est en avant d’Albuera, et aussitôt qu’elle arrivera je vous ferai dire l’heure à laquelle je ferai marcher l’infanterie.

‘Si l’infanterie de l’ennemi est campée à Feria,, c’est probable qu’elle marchera à S^{ta} Marta dans l’après midi.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘*Le Capitaine Général*
Don Joaquin Blake.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don Joaquín Blake.

‘ à Albuera, ce 15 Juin, 1811,
5 P.M.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Je viens de recevoir un rapport que l’ennemi a quitté S^{ta} Marta et s’est porté du côté d’Azauchal. Je crois que la cavalerie Anglaise y est maintenant, et que la cavalerie Espagnole y sera retournée.

‘ Le Général Hill se mettra en marche au lever de la lune, c’est-à-dire, vers 1 heure du matin.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Capitaine Général i*
Don Joaquín Blake.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Albuera, 16th June, 1811, 8 A.M.

‘ I was in hopes that the cavalry would have been here some hours ago, in consequence of the orders sent to you yesterday and last night. This movement does not depend solely upon what is passing in your front, but principally upon what is passing upon your left; and you must recollect that from hence you have six leagues at least to Elvas, near which place probably it will be necessary the cavalry should be to-morrow morning. Under these circumstances, I was anxious that you should be here early this morning, in order that men and horses might have time to go to rest and feed, and that your baggage might have time to get off before you in the afternoon.

‘ Your note of 9 P.M. did not arrive till after 4 this morning. The Officer of the 4th dragoons to stay with General Slade did not arrive till the troops had marched, and General Hill was leaving this also, about 4. All this shows how uncertain this description of communication is at night, and how desirable it is that a certain direction given to a particular body of troops, as part of a general combination, should be strictly adhered to.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Albuera, 16th June, 1811.

‘ I am afraid that you are deceived about the bread in possession of the 2d and Light divisions, as I understand they had none yesterday, and the cavalry no corn. I understood from you that all these divisions had their biscuit complete.

‘ I have given an order, which you will see, that the blankets in the possession of the soldiers of the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions should be sent to your stores at Elvas as occasion may offer. It is desirable that they should be sent to Lisbon by the return carriages, and there cleaned and put into store.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ R. Kennedy, Esq.,
Commissary General.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don Joaquin Blake.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ à Albuera, ce 16 Juin, 1811.

‘ L’ennemi n’a fait aucun mouvement encore de ce côté-ci. Ses videttes sont près de FERIA, et à Solana, Azauchal, &c. Nos postes d’observation sont à S^{ta} Marta en avant de Corte de Peleas, &c. Le Général Loy est ici, et je l’ai prié d’envoyer un escadron à Almendral pour y rester, si vous n’y avez pas laissé de la cavalerie. Notre cavalerie est ici.

‘ L’ennemi avait hier 5000 infanterie à Villa Franca; et vers le soir elle est entrée à Almendralejo, mais je ne sais pas en quel nombre.

‘ Je viens de donner ordre pour que l’armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise passe la Guadiana demain matin. Les troupes ici, et les divisions avec le Général Hill, se mettront en mouvement vers 2 heures du matin; et demain nous nous trouverons avec la droite en avant d’Elvas, et la gauche à Campo Mayor, avec nos postes sur la Caya.

‘ Je proposerais à votre Excellence de vous mettre en mouvement à la même heure, et de passer la Guadiana à Jurumenha, laissant le Général Loy comme avant garde à Olivença, ou il pourrait aller en même tems que les autres troupes quitteront cette position.

‘ Si les mouvemens de l’ennemi sur notre gauche vers

Talavera rendent nécessaire quelque mouvement de ce côté-ci, plutôt qu'à l'heure ci-dessus indiquée, j'ordonnerai au Général Cotton de vous le communiquer tout de suite, et de prier le Général Loy de se porter sur Olivença par Valverde jusqu'à ce qu'il puisse recevoir les ordres de votre Excellence.

‘ Je resterai ici jusqu'à vers 2 heures de l'après midi ; et j'irai d'ici au camp du Général Hill, où je resterai vers la nuit ; et j'irai coucher à la Quinta de Granicha, de l'autre côté de la Guadiana.

‘ J'ai fait marcher le Général Giron, sur Villa Real, près Jurumenha, ce matin ; pour qu'il puisse être en mesure de se joindre avec vous sur la marche de demain.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Capitaine Général*
Don Joaquín Blake.'

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For Major Generals Campbell and Slade.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 17th June, 1811, 6 A. M.

‘ I wish the 6th division, and General Pack's brigade, to cross the Tagus to-morrow, the 18th instant, and to move to Niza, and next day, the 19th, to Portalegre.

‘ If this order should reach the rear of these troops so late that they cannot reach Niza on the 18th, they must remain either on the Tagus on the left bank, or on the stream between the Niza and the Tagus, and march on the 19th to Alpalhão, and on the 20th to Portalegre.

‘ I wish Major General Slade's brigade to march to-morrow, the 18th, to Sarnadas and neighborhood from Castello Branco, on the 19th to cross the Tagus and march to Niza, and on the 20th to march to Portalegre.

‘ When the troops cross at Villa Velha they must march on, each regiment of infantry, and each troop of cavalry, as soon as it shall have crossed, and not wait for the others.

‘ Major General Campbell is requested to forward this memorandum to Brig. General Pack without loss of time.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Captain General Don Joaquin Blake.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Elvas, ce 17 Juin, 1811.

‘ J’ai l’honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que les troupes sous mes ordres ont fait ce matin le mouvement indiqué dans la lettre que je vous ai écrite hier d’Albuera.

‘ Je n’ai pas encore des nouvelles positives de l’ennemi. Il y a un bruit que le Général Regnier s’est porté sur Medellín au lieu de sur Merida. Une grande partie de la force ennemie a passé le Tage; et toutes leurs troupes sont en mouvement sur Almaraz, selon les nouvelles que j’ai reçues dans la nuit, de Coria, du 15.

‘ J’ose recommander à votre Excellence de continuer votre marche demain pour arriver bien vite en Andalousie. L’ennemi ne s’attendra pas à ce mouvement; et il est probable qu’il n’en apprendra rien de quelques jours, pendant lesquels vous pourrez avoir le tems de faire un beaucoup.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Capitaine Général*
Don Joaquin Blake.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 17th June, 1811.

‘ I send with this orders addressed to Major General Campbell and General Pack, to march to Niza to-morrow, the 18th, and to Portalegre the 19th; and to Major General Slade to march to Sarnadas the 18th, to Niza the 19th, and to Portalegre the 20th. It is important that these orders should reach them without loss of time, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send them copies of this letter by an Officer, besides my memorandum addressed to each by the guide, who must not be delayed a moment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Elvas, 17th June, 1811, 8 P.M.

‘ Campo Mayor must of course at present be supplied from hence; and, as that place is in the first instance of primary importance, I have desired Mr. Kennedy to settle

with the Superintendent of Viveres, to send there to-morrow morning 20,000 rations, which will last the garrison about a month, which is all we want of them. 14,000 rations were sent to Jurumenha this afternoon at 4 o'clock upon forty mules; and if you will let Mr. Kennedy know immediately what ammunition you wish to have back, he will bring it back upon these mules as far as they will go. Our ammunition has already been brought here, I understand from Colonel Framingham.

'In respect to the wounded of the French army, I know nothing of them, as General Leite and the Portuguese departments have had charge of them from the beginning: but if we should receive any distinct account of the numbers which require carriages, and what can walk, I have no doubt but that we shall be able to remove the whole.'

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Austin.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Elvas, 17th June, 1811.

'I am much obliged to you for your two letters of the 15th, which I just received.

'General Blake marches from Jurumenha to-morrow, and will arrive at Mertola on the 22d or 23d. He passes by Beja, where he will be on the 20th or 21st, and you will do well to communicate with him at that place.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Colonel Austin.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

'SIR,

'Elvas, 17th June, 1811.

'In the course of the last three months, the British army have had but few men less than 7000 wounded in the service of Portugal; and the hardships and fatigues of the service, and the season, must, of course, have occasioned some sickness.

'I have frequently endeavored to prevail upon the Portuguese Government to allow us to establish the British hospitals in the rope walk at Belem, of which no use can, at present, or indeed ought to be made; and I find that the

convents, &c., which were used as hospitals at Lisbon by the British army heretofore, are now applied to other purposes, and all accommodation of this description is now refused.

‘ I beg you will do me the favor to lay this letter before the Portuguese Government, and to obtain for me a decided answer, by return of post, whether they will or not supply any and what accommodation, at Lisbon, for the British soldiers wounded in fighting the battles of Portugal.

‘ If I should find the Government still disinclined to attend to my requests upon this subject, I propose to send an Officer express to England to apprise His Royal Highness the Prince Regent and his Ministers of this extraordinary circumstance, and I request to hear from you as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 17th June, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 12th, 13th, and 15th; but as I have been forward with the troops for some days, I have not been able to send you answers as regularly as I ought.

‘ I do not recollect to have written to you upon the subject of hay in Lower Beira. If I should want any article of that description, and money is to be laid out in the previous collection of it for a magazine for the British army, I shall employ a British Commissary on the service, as I know from experience what a very good thing it is to give money to have a magazine collected for the British army by the Portuguese. We can scarcely keep them out of the magazines we collect for ourselves, and we should scarcely get into one which they should collect for us.

‘ I shall send Dr. Somers’ memorial home.

‘ If it was not a matter of most serious importance, which may go not only to the safety of the army, but to the fate of the whole cause, I should be highly diverted by the bustle occasioned at Lisbon by the danger of Elvas. All of a sudden the utmost activity prevails, and all means are set at work, to relieve distress which ought never to have existed,

if common precautions had been taken, or if any measures had been adopted to feed General Hamilton's division, excepting to throw their consumption upon the magazines of the fortress. After all, this bustle will produce nothing in time; and if I cannot get up a sufficient supply from our magazines, I shall be obliged to fight a battle to save this place against the whole force of Andalusia, Castille, and the centre of Spain, with diminished force on my side. The enemy will be one fourth stronger than us in every arm, nearly double in cavalry, and we shall not have in the action 14,000 Portuguese troops!!

‘Under these circumstances I should, and shall, avoid a general action if I can; but I must put a countenance upon the state of affairs, and matters must be risked till provisions be placed in Elvas.

‘The Portuguese Government may depend upon my bringing this subject under the distinct consideration of the Regent's Ministers. I have long determined that I will have no discussion with them upon any subject: but I shall report the consequences of their conduct to my own Government, and leave to them to determine what shall be done. I conclude, however, that Lord Wellesley will think it necessary that our Regent should explain himself clearly to the Regent of Portugal on these subjects.

‘I have no objection to agricultural cattle being purchased and distributed to the districts that require them, provided the money which is to purchase them is not to come out of the military chest. I give the same answer about pipes.

‘I also beg that whatever is thus given in charity may be given on the ground of the wants of the several districts, and by no means in reference to the wants of the means of transport for the military operations. The Government have it in their power to collect those means of transport whenever we may require them, and ought to do their duty; and I do not think that the charity of the people of England ought to be laid out to aid in the operations of the war, or to save the Government the trouble of forcing those parts of the people who have not suffered to do their duty by their country.

‘The quantity of 24 pound shot, we understand, that could be sent from Lisbon, was 480, which we fired in about two hours!!! I never heard there were any at Estremoz. This

place, however, has 6000 more shot than it had before we commenced operations against Badajoz; and although we destroyed sixteen miserable guns, it has four more pieces of ordnance, and these sent up are better than those they had. All it wants is provisions.

‘ The state of this place, however, and the means of keeping it hereafter, are subjects of very, very, serious consideration, upon which I shall address Sir William Beresford, and I shall send to you, and to my Government, a copy of my letter. If we save it now, this Government will yet lose it, if they pay the usual attention to it.

‘ Soult has been very cautious in his movements, and has kept clear of us, and has gone to his right. I think he communicated with Regnier yesterday, not by Merida, but by Medellin, as Regnier also does not dash now.

‘ We raised the blockade and crossed the Guadiana this morning.

‘ Blake marches to-morrow to cross the Guadiana again at Mertola, and try something towards Seville.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

‘ Adverting to my letter to you of the 2d instant, regarding two squadrons of the 12th light dragoons expected from England in this country, I have now the honor to enclose the copy of a letter of the 28th May, which I received yesterday from the Secretary of the Commander in Chief, in which I have been informed that the squadrons of the 12th light dragoons are destined for service in Portugal. You will therefore countermand the orders for the disposal of their horses, if you should have given any; and I send orders this day that they may be landed and prepared for the field as soon as they shall arrive.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

SIR,

‘Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

‘The circumstances of this place have been materially altered since the enemy have obtained possession of Badajoz; but they appear to have been but little adverted to hitherto, either by the Governors of the Kingdom or by those charged with its immediate defence, in consequence of a large part of the army having been in this part of the country ever since Badajoz fell into the hands of the enemy. It is obvious that the army cannot always remain in the Alentejo; and yet it is clear, from what occurred in the recent attempts to obtain possession of Badajoz by the allied troops, that there is no time during which the army may be absent so short that the enemy will not be justified in military prudence to make the attempt to obtain possession of Elvas, and that they can raise the siege at any time, and carry off everything in thirty six hours.

‘Of all fortified towns in the world, Elvas therefore ought to be the one in the state best prepared to stand an attack; but I am sorry to observe that, however respectable in itself as a fortification, it appears to me to be the fortified town that I have yet seen that is the least prepared to make a defence.

‘I recommend to you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to the following measures, to put the place in the state in which it ought to be.

‘First, a distinct clear arrangement by the Government to keep the place supplied with the provisions which it will require; to keep up the stock of provisions in the forts to the quantity which it will be deemed necessary to have in them.

‘The Commissary General of the British army is taking measures, as you know, to throw a stock of provisions into Elvas; but these measures will answer only a temporary purpose, if the Government should not take care, by adequate arrangements, to keep up the stock of provisions, and providing for the regular daily consumption of the garrison, as well as for the consumption of those Portuguese troops which may be employed in its neighborhood.

‘The ordnance in Elvas is generally very bad, and in very

bad order; the carriages worn out, and generally unfit for service; the shot does not suit the calibres of the guns, and of course the practice of the artillery must be very uncertain. The ordnance and carriages should be very particularly inspected and reported upon, as well as the shot; and measures should be taken to replace by degrees those guns deemed unserviceable or bad by others of the calibres for which shot can be procured. If there is no good ordnance in the arsenal of Lisbon, it will be necessary to apply for it to England, and I will make the application.

‘As Elvas must now be considered in the light of a real and important *place de guerre*, it is desirable that a sufficient space, from 800 to 1000 yards around it, should be cleared of trees, that walls and fences should be levelled, and all the measures adopted which can increase its security, by exposing to its fire, as far as possible, all the ground within its range.

‘There are some glaring deficiencies and defects in the works, to which, without incurring any large expense, by degrees, improvements might be made.

‘First, the covert way, as well of Elvas as of La Lippe and S^{ta} Lucia, ought to be palisaded.

‘Secondly, the ground over which the road from Villa Boim passes is not seen at all from S^{ta} Lucia, or from the body of the place; and it appears that a redoubt on the rock on the right of S^{ta} Lucia would command that ground, and would aid in the defence of S^{ta} Lucia, and of the body of the place, by both of which its flanks would, in some degree, be protected. A good palisaded redoubt ought to be constructed on that ground.

‘I have no doubt that a closer examination of the place would point out other improvements; and if I saw any desire in the Government to maintain the place manifested by their constant attention to keep it supplied with provisions, ordnance, and ammunition, I would employ our best engineer to examine it, and to make a complete report upon it.

‘In the existing situation of Elvas as a fortified garrison, liable at every moment to be attacked, it is a question whether the head quarters of the province of Alentejo should remain there, and so large a population as there is in it

should be encouraged, or even allowed to remain. At all events, nobody ought to be allowed to remain who has not at all times a supply of provisions for four months.

‘The duty of the garrison, and the discipline of the troops composing it, ought to be most particularly attended to; and the whole system ought to be founded on the situation in which Elvas is placed as a fortified garrison, necessarily left to itself, close to one occupied by an active and enterprising enemy, possessing means of attack at any moment; and the duties ought to be carried on in the most regular manner.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘SIR,

‘Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

‘I request that, when the 12th light dragoons shall arrive at Lisbon, they may be landed and prepared in the usual manner to join the army as soon as it may be convenient.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major General Peacocke.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

‘I enclose the copy of an intercepted letter from Joseph to Napoleon, which appears to me to be as interesting a document as has yet appeared; and you may depend upon it that this is a true copy of the original, which is at Cadiz, in the possession of that Government.

‘It shows that this tyrant does not treat his relations, or even his brothers, better than he does other people; and gives ground for hope that his tyrannical temper will at no distant period deprive him of the advantages which he would derive from the Austrian alliance.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Elvas, 18th June, 1811.

‘Captain ———, of the French service, who was aide de camp to General ———, deserted from the French army about a month ago, when they were at Salamanca.

‘He is desirous of serving in the East Indies, which is, I believe, impossible; or, if that cannot be done, in the service of Russia; and I request your Lordship to facilitate to him the means of arriving in Russia.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Picton.

‘Quinta de St. João, 20th June, 1811,

6 P. M.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘I write to let you know that a body of the enemy’s cavalry, consisting, as is stated, of 1500 or 1600 men, entered Badajoz at half past 4 P. M.; about 300 are said to be encamped upon the Gevora.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General Picton.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Quinta de St. João, 20th June, 1811,

1 P. M.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I have been over the ground behind Campo Mayor, as far as Ouguela. It is very important that this last place, although in a great degree dismantled, should be occupied by about 200 infantry; and I have given orders to General Picton to send there that number this evening, and shall be obliged to you if you will desire General Leite to relieve them in the morning early with 100 of the line and 100 militia: they should take with them provisions for to-morrow and next day; and I will settle with the Commissary General to throw in, for ten days, provisions for them: there will be no difficulty in withdrawing these men, if we should withdraw.

‘I have sent for Dickson to endeavor to get two 18 or 24 pounders for the garrison of Campo Mayor, in order to assist us; and I think it might be desirable to put two iron 6 or 4 pounders in Ouguela, if there are such guns in Elvas.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th June, 1811.

‘ The enemy moved forward his advanced guard, consisting of about 10,000 men, to Los Santos, on the morning of the 13th.

‘ Upon this occasion, Lieut. Strenuwitz, of the 21st dragoons, was sent out by Major General Sir William Erskine to reconnoitre the enemy with a small detachment of the 2d hussars and the 3d dragoon guards, which distinguished themselves in an attack upon a superior number of the enemy, and took some prisoners.

‘ I had arranged that the cavalry, and 2d and 4th divisions of the allied British and Portuguese army, and the corps of Spanish troops under General Blake, should collect upon Albuera, if the enemy should advance to interrupt the siege or blockade of Badajoz; and I went to Albuera on that night to superintend the movements of the troops.

‘ I also moved, on the night of the 13th, General Hamilton’s division from the blockade of Badajoz to Albuera, with an intention to stop the enemy at that place, in case the army of the south alone should have moved forward.

‘ On the 14th, in the night, Lieut. Ayling, of the 40th regiment, who had been employed at Truxillo to observe the movements of the enemy, arrived at Albuera with the account that the advanced guard of the enemy’s army of Portugal from Castille had entered that town (Truxillo) at noon on the 13th, which confirmed the other accounts which I had received of their progress up to the 12th; and as from Truxillo they might have been at Merida on the 15th, and in communication with the army of the south, I determined to raise the blockade of Badajoz, and that all the allied troops should cross the Guadiana on the 17th. This was accordingly effected without difficulty or loss of any description; and General Blake, who it had been settled should cross the Guadiana again at Mertola on the 22d instant, in order to make an attempt upon Seville, likewise crossed with his corps at Jurumenha on the 17th.

‘ Since that period the right of the allied British and Portuguese army have been encamped in the woods upon the Caya, about Torre del Moro, having their right upon

the Ponte de Caya; the 3d and 7th divisions, and Brig. General Madden's cavalry, being in Campo Mayor; and the troops which had been under the command of Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer on the frontier of Castille have crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, in proportion as the enemy have crossed that river at Almaraz; and, with the exception of the 5th division and Colonel Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which I did not order to move from Lower Beira till I was assured that the last of the enemy had moved from Almaraz, the whole are now upon the Caya, between this place and Arronches. I expect that the 5th division will be at Arronches by the 24th instant.

‘The enemy's advance have appeared in the neighborhood of Badajoz this day; and I conceive that their whole army will be collected to-morrow in the neighborhood of Merida.

‘The enemy have collected upon this occasion all their force from Castille, their whole force from Madrid, and what is called their centre army, and all the force from Andalusia, excepting what is absolutely necessary to maintain their position before Cadiz and that held by Sebastiani in the eastern kingdoms of Andalusia. I believe that they have left for these objects about 11,000 infantry, and no cavalry fit for service; and that they have collected in this province from 48,000 to 50,000 effective rank and file of infantry, and about 7000 cavalry, besides artillery, &c.

‘I hope to have to oppose to them about 41,000 or 42,000 effective rank and file of infantry, if the 5th division should be in time, and 4000 cavalry, besides artillery.

‘The diversion made by General Blake upon Seville may possibly have a good effect; and, at all events, the enemy have abandoned Old and New Castille, with the exception of a small garrison in Madrid, and have risked everything in all parts of Spain in order to collect this large army in Estremadura. Under these circumstances, I am inclined not to risk the fate of the cause on the result of one battle, in which I am certain that, with every exertion, the allies must be inferior in numbers, particularly in that description of troops (cavalry) for whose operations this country is favorable. I therefore propose not to risk an action, unless I should find it necessary in order to provision Elvas;

notwithstanding that I have the fullest confidence in the result of any action in which I may deem it expedient to engage the troops.

‘ I am in hopes that, before the 24th, the convoys expected from Abrantes will arrive in Elvas; and your Lordship may depend upon it that I shall not engage in any affair which will involve the safety of the army, or at this moment any serious loss, without evident necessity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st June, 1811.

‘ I have desired that 200 men of the garrison of Elvas might be sent to occupy Ouguela, which is situated about four miles from Campo Mayor. As usual, the Portuguese authorities have no means of providing for these men, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send biscuit, wine, and sheep to Ouguela, either this day or very early to-morrow, to last this detachment for ten days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.,*
Commissary General.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. How are the supplies getting on at Elvas ?

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 21st June, 1811,
Half-past 2 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ I have been so busy that I have not been able to write to you for some days; but I have had no news to tell you.

‘ The French came to Badajoz yesterday; but it appears that the greatest part of their cavalry went back to Talavera this morning.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send Waters and O’Lalor, and any others of the Officers attached to head quarters that you do not want with you. I am only three or four leagues from you, and dine every day at 3, and shall be glad to see you any day that you will come over.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st June, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I wrote on the 10th instant to General Castaños*, regarding the operations of the armies in consequence of raising the siege of Badajoz, with his reply, and that of General Blake; and the copy of a letter which I wrote to General Blake of the 12th instant†, on his route, and his reply; and of one which I wrote to him on the 14th instant‡; and the copy of a letter to General Blake of the 17th instant §, which I beg you to lay before the Spanish Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st June, 1811.

‘ I enclose copies of my last dispatches, which contain all the intelligence I can give you. Matters are in a very critical state just now; but I think I shall carry them through.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Sir William Erskine, Bart.

‘ Ponte de Caya, 22d June, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

Quarter past 5 P.M.

‘ The enemy appear to be withdrawing, and I beg you will order ——— to take up his ground in any convenient situation near Elvas, and that he will attend to the directions he before received from Sir Stapleton Cotton, to throw out *small piquets of observations* on the Caya and Guadiana. If he had had his whole brigade instead of a large piquet on the Caya, he could not have prevented the enemy from advancing, and the difficulty of retiring is increased in proportion to the numbers of which the body which is to retire consists. This principle is well known and understood in this army; and if it had not been acted upon invariably, we should have lost all our cavalry long ago in the way in which ——— lost the piquet of the —th this morning. To crown all, I understand that these large

* See vol. vii., p. 653.

† See this vol., p. 4.

‡ See this vol., p. 20.

§ Ibid. p. 28.

piquets were not able to give sufficiently early intelligence of the enemy, and that the —th dragoons have lost their corn sacks.

‘ Let the piquets of ——— ———’s brigade communicate with those of General Madden, which they have not done yet, and with the piquet of the 28th regiment on the Atalaya, near the Ponte de Caya; and I repeat that they must be very small, being only of observation. They can always retire upon Elvas, and thence join their brigades.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General

Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Let Colonel Murray know where General ———’s brigade will be, and desire General ——— to apply to the Commissary General this evening for corn sacks for the —th dragoons: he is in Elvas.

‘ W.’

To Major General Picton.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 23d June, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

Half past 11 A.M.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send an intelligent Officer, with a glass, to Ouguela, and another to the Atalaya, between Ouguela and Campo Mayor, an hour or two before sunset this evening, in order to reconnoitre well the wood beyond the Gevora, and to see whether the enemy have in it any infantry, and let me know if they should observe any.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General Picton.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 23d June, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

Half past 11 P.M.

‘ I am just come in from Campo Mayor, where all is perfectly quiet. General Picton told me that the governor had informed him that he had sent to Elvas yesterday, by order of General Leite, forty bullocks, which had before been sent to Campo Mayor, as provision for the garrison.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Marshal

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Mr. Kennedy tells me that the governor of Juru-menha has sent his bullocks back, saying that he had no money to pay anybody to take care of them !

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 23d June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th instant, and I am much obliged to you for the arrangement which you have ordered respecting the flat boats in the river Tagus, for the conveyance of the sick, &c. down to Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 23d June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th instant, and I have again communicated to Sir William Beresford the desire of the Portuguese Government that he should recommend the detail of the measures to be adopted in respect to the commissariat.

‘ 1. It appears to Marshal Beresford, as I confess it does to me, that these details have already been fully discussed and recommended by him as well as by me ; by me in my private and public letters to you of the 26th of March and 8th of April, and by Sir William Beresford in his comments upon those letters. It is desirable, therefore, that Sir William Beresford should be informed upon what point the Government wish to have his opinion further in detail.

‘ I have not understood that the Commissary General required hay in Lower Beira, but I will inquire.

‘ 2. It always gives me much concern to make any observation on an assertion made by Dom Miguel Forjaz ; but I must say that the assertion made that the magazines of Elvas supplied the British troops with provisions is without foundation, in the view in which it is made.

‘ It is true that, because the Government will not enforce their own regulations, means of transport could not be procured in Alentejo, and therefore at times the troops serving

on that frontier, during the month of April and part of May, were not very regularly supplied with provisions.

‘ I beg to refer you to a letter which I wrote to you on this on the 31st March.

‘ The troops must have been withdrawn, as I stated they would, if they had not received occasional assistance from the garrison of Elvas ; but the whole amount which they received was trifling, and could not have been the cause of the existing distress, as the whole was repaid.

‘ If assertions of this description are repeated I must be under the necessity of withholding all assistance from the Portuguese Government. I do everything in my power to assist them. At this moment I have provisioned all the forts on the frontier, and the return made is a reproach that our troops have been the cause of the deficiency.

‘ If I were to withhold this assistance our troops would never have occasion to ask for any, even the smallest supply, from any of the Portuguese establishments.

‘ I am apprehensive that the money received from Mr. Sampayo to be laid out in the purchase of cattle and wine pipes will interfere with the supplies for the military chest.

‘ 3. I do not know of any signal being made to prevent the transmission of 24 pound shot. I was informed by Marshal Sir William Beresford that there were no more at Lisbon, excepting 480, which the Admiral was about to send.

‘ 4. I have this day had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st, containing a proposition from Dom Miguel Forjaz for the regulation of the boats on the Tagus. I concur in the propriety of the first two articles of the regulation, and will direct the Commissary General to attend to them. In respect to the 3d article, which regulates a division of the boats between the commissariat establishments of the two armies, I must beg leave to decline to have any concern in such a distribution.

‘ When the troops were on the Mondego such a distribution was agreed upon, and carried into effect ; and the consequence was, that the boats delivered over by the Commissary General, and employed in the service of the Portuguese army, were never paid for, and the British army has since experienced the inconvenience resulting from this loss of credit. The owners of boats on the Mondego were un-

willing to engage to serve us, because they expected to be obliged to serve the Portuguese army without payment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

‘ Au Quartier Général,
ce 24 Juin, 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘ Je suis bien fâché que vous n’ayez pas reçu la réponse que je vous ai écrite à la lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’écrire le 16 Mai, et j’ai l’honneur, à present, d’en envoyer à votre Excellence le duplicata.

‘ Je crois que Mons. Ville sur Ance a été depuis envoyé en Angleterre; mais si votre Excellence consent que Monsieur Gray reste ici, je manderai que Mons. Ville sur Ance soit tout de suite renvoyé en France. Si non, je renverrai Monsieur Gray aux avant postes de l’armée Française demain matin, ou aussitôt que je connaîtrai les désirs de votre Excellence.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Monsieur le Maréchal*
Duc de Raguse.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 24th June, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, directing that you should join this army, leaving Major General Disney in the command at Cadiz, and authorizing me to draw from Cadiz such reinforcements as I might think proper.

‘ Adverting to the return of the troops at Cadiz of the 1st June, which is the last that I have received, I find that you have not at Cadiz nearly so many men as is supposed by the Secretary of State; and I learn from a private letter from Mr. Wellesley, your letter upon that subject not having reached me, that you have detached the 2d batt. 47th regiment; and it appears to me that the only troops that can be spared from Cadiz are one squadron, or the dismounted men of the 2d hussars, with the Major and a proportion of the Officers, and the detachment of the 3d batt.

95th regiment. If you should agree in opinion with me that these troops can, with propriety, be detached from Cadiz under existing circumstances, I beg you to send them to Lisbon without loss of time.

‘I also request you to give such orders and instructions as you may think necessary that General Disney should have, including those which I originally gave to General Stewart, and those which you have received from time to time from the Secretary of State and Commander in Chief; and you will deliver to General Disney the command of the British troops at Cadiz, and proceed yourself to join the army in this country.

‘I beg you to make such arrangements as you may think proper respecting the Staff at Cadiz, bringing with you such of the Officers belonging to it as you may be desirous should accompany you, and leaving to perform the duties, under Major General Disney, those who may be necessary to him.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 24th June, 1811.

‘I have great pleasure in sending you the accompanying orders to join this army. You will find us somewhere in this neighborhood; but I believe you will find it most convenient to join us by Lisbon, particularly if you should have at all a fair wind from Cadiz. Let me know by which road you will come, that I may have arrangements made to facilitate your progress.

‘I do not know whether you have had any communication from England respecting sending troops to Tarragona. If you have not, I should think you had better take advantage of the detachment now drawn from Cadiz to call back the 47th, as, if the Government have not altered their opinion upon this subject, I am apprehensive that they will not approve of your sending these troops.

‘This is, however, only an opinion floating in my mind. I am not at all aware of the circumstances in which Tarragona stands, or of those which induced you to detach these troops, as I have not yet received your letter upon this sub-

ject, and it is not improbable that both may be of that urgent nature to prevent your recalling the troops.

‘Nothing of importance has occurred since I sent my last dispatch to my brother, excepting a great reconnaissance by the enemy the day before yesterday, in which we lost a piquet of the —th dragoons, just arrived, owing very much to the Officer, — — of the —th, having mistaken the French dragoons for ours.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811,
12 at noon.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘About 1600 cavalry, which were at Olivença, have come over to Badajoz, and at half past 9 were still upon the esplanade of the fort on the left of the Guadiana.

‘Send this intelligence to Cotton and Picton, as it is not improbable they may make another reconnaissance upon Campo Mayor.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811,
2 P. M.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I enclose an account of what is already thrown into Elvas by Mr. Kennedy. Would you wish to have any more thrown in by us?

‘You will have seen how well pleased they are in England about Albuera. I wish to see you upon that subject.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Campbell, commanding at Gibraltar.

‘SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, in consequence of which I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send to Gibraltar vessels to convey to Lisbon the 1st batt. 28th

regiment; and beg you to order them to embark as soon as those vessels shall arrive at Gibraltar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

‘ In consequence of the receipt of orders from the Secretary of State I have to request that you will send vessels to Gibraltar, to convey from thence to Lisbon the 1st batt. 28th regiment, which consists of about 600 rank and file.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter for the governor of Gibraltar, which I request you to forward by this occasion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ On the Atalaya of Ponte de Caya,

25th June, 1811, half past 6 P. M.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ The intelligence which I have from Elvas this day states that about 1600 cavalry left Olivença this morning, marched through Badajoz at 10, passed the river, and went into the woods on the Gevora, where I now see them, and that 600 cavalry went from the woods on the other side of Badajoz to Olivença.

‘ I think it possible that there may be a great reconnaissance to-morrow morning at Campo Mayor, and therefore I recommend that General De Grey’s and Anson’s brigades, and Le Fevre’s troop of artillery, should be shortly after daylight behind the hill behind the town.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

To Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811, 8 P. M.

‘ The greatest part of the cavalry which were about Olivença have certainly moved into the woods on the Gevora, where I saw them this afternoon.

‘ I have desired Sir Stapleton Cotton to have De Grey’s

brigade and Anson's on the hill behind Campo Mayor in the morning, as I think it not unlikely that there will be a reconnaissance on that place, and it would be advisable that Sir William Erskine should be desired to have Long's brigade shortly after daylight near the Ponte de Caya, as it is clear that the cavalry are now on this side of the Guadiana, and to the northward of Badajoz.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Colonel Murray,*
Quarter Master General.

' WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM.

' Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

' 1. The *Junta de Viveres* to be abolished, and in lieu of that board a commissariat to be appointed, consisting of a Commissary General, a certain number of deputies, assistants, and clerks, to perform the task of provisioning the Portuguese army.

' 2. For the present it is proposed to appoint a Commissary General, six deputies, twelve assistants, and twenty four clerks.

' 3. The Commissary General to receive possession of all the magazines and stores of the *Junta de Viveres*, and to correspond in the same manner with the magistrates in the different districts.

' 4. The Commissary General should be obliged to give in an estimate, on the 1st of every month, of the articles and their cost required for his department, stating for what purposes required, where to be sent, the expense of transport, &c., for which the Government should be obliged to furnish funds. The Commissary General must show in each estimate the state of the magazines in every part of Portugal, and how far each can be made available for the service.

' 5. The commissariat of provisions and transport to be united.

' 6. The departments of the arsenal to be more distinctly enumerated, and the head of each department to be responsible for the duties of it. Estimates from the arsenal to be furnished every month, of the articles and their cost,

required for each of the departments, and funds to be provided by the Government for the payment of them.

‘ 7. All the civil departments attached to the army (the commissariat arsenal and hospitals) to be placed under military law. All crimes committed by the people employed in those departments to be tried by Courts Martial: the interposition of the civil law in all such cases to be abolished. A code of regulations to be framed, and specific punishments to be decreed, for certain crimes and misdemeanors.

‘ 8. A medical board to be formed, consisting of the *delegado* of the *Physico Mor* and the Inspector of Hospitals, for the general management of the medical department. The *delegado* is more particularly to superintend the physical departments, and the Inspector General the surgical. The hospitals to be under the superintendence of the Inspector General, who will make his report to the board. The medical Officers should, on the 1st of every month, give in an estimate of the expense of their departments, and the Government should be obliged to provide funds for the payment of them.

‘ 9. Though the commissariat and medical departments are to be placed under military law, it is clearly to be understood that the rise of each individual is not to be regulated on any military principle, but that each individual is to be promoted according to his merit.

‘ 10. The military law to be altered according to the suggestions of Lord Wellington and the repeated representations of Marshal Beresford.

‘ 11. The Government to enforce strictly their own laws and regulations respecting the means of transport to be supplied by the country for the use of the army; and specific punishments, whether of fine or confinement, to be decreed against those guilty of withholding their carts, boats, &c., when required in the regular manner for the public service; and against carters and boatmen guilty of desertion and of embezzlement, or destruction of provisions or stores which they are employed to transport.

‘ 12. The odious and oppressive system of *embargo* to be abolished; and any Commissary, or Officer, or other public servant guilty of it to be punished.

‘ 13. The Government to provide funds for the regular

payment of the Officers and troops, regulars as well as militia, of the *Bagajeiros* attached to the several regiments, and of all the departments of the army.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of State, regarding the transmission of prisoners and deserters to England; and I beg leave to recommend that you should send the whole number to England as soon as it may be convenient to you.

‘I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st, upon this subject.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Vice Admiral

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

‘I received this morning your letter of the 30th of May; and I am sorry to say that Mr. Kennedy did apply to me to be relieved from his situation, but I prevailed upon him to allow me to delay the application for some time. I did not understand that his application was founded on his own want of health, but rather upon the anxiety of his wife that he should return to England; and I shall have to thank this lady and her sister, Mrs. Bourke, for having deprived me of the assistance of two very able Officers.

‘I do not know how to fill Mr. Kennedy’s place. Mr. ——— is certainly the best here; but, as I have lately discovered, even he is not entirely fit for such a charge. He certainly did not manage extremely well the duties of the Commissary of the troops which were here under Marshal Beresford. Matters were not going on well when I arrived here in April, or afterwards in May; and the wants of that department, of which, however, I believe that Mr. * * * was the cause, occasioned the fatal delays of the end of March and beginning of April.

‘If therefore I must submit to the misfortune of losing Mr. Kennedy, I believe you had better send out Mr. Bissett.

I hope, however, that Mr. Kennedy, who is as well as I am, will be prevailed upon to stay.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Gordon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

‘ I received this day your letter of the 11th; and I have replied in another letter to what you say respecting the thanks for the battle of Fuentes.

‘ I will communicate the vote to General Blake in the mode which I may think will be the most satisfactory to him. I rather think that I shall send it to my brother, as it will afford him an opportunity of conciliating Blake.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 4th, marked “Private.” Your Lordship may rest assured that I am perfectly satisfied that you acted right in not proposing a vote in Parliament on the battle of Fuentes. The business would have been different if we had caught the garrison of Almeida; but, as it happened, the Government were quite right.

‘ Indeed, people in England appear to me to be so much elated by any success, and so much depressed by any temporary check, that I feel difficulty in describing the state of our affairs, and am always apprehensive that the Government will appreciate too highly what we do.

‘ I have sent for General Graham.

‘ I had a communication with General Abadia, when he was on his way to Coruña, and recommended to him to attend to Santoña. He is certainly the best of all the Spanish Officers that I have seen; but still some time must elapse before he or anybody else can form a Spanish army that will be of much use to us or to themselves.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD, ‘Quinta de St. João, 25th June, 1811.

‘The messenger did not arrive till the day before yesterday with your Lordship’s letter marked “Private,” of the 30th May.

‘Since Beresford has been relieved from the command of the army in this quarter many measures have been adopted to reinforce and recruit the Portuguese troops, which I hope will in a short time increase our numbers for duty; and I have had many conversations with Marshal Beresford and Mr. Sydenham since the latter arrived here, with a view to the arrangement of the civil departments of the Portuguese army, without which I have considered it proper to withhold my consent to the grant of the increased subsidy to the Portuguese Government. When these points are settled here Mr. Sydenham will go to Lisbon to arrange them with Mr. Stuart.

‘The revenue arrangements recently adopted have already had the effect of increasing the pecuniary means of the Portuguese Government, as I was sure they would; and I have but little doubt that they will get on tolerably well in finance. There may be some difficulties in procuring specie; and we may not be able to prevail upon the Government to carry the laws of the country strictly into execution as they ought. But the complaints which I have made of them to your Lordship, and which I have uniformly communicated to them, have had an excellent effect, and are not unlikely to stimulate their efforts.

‘We are, however, suffering much from the misconduct of the Portuguese Government; and I am risking an action at a moment in which it is desirable I should not fight. But, notwithstanding that the French have collected all their troops here, and have left literally nothing in other parts of Spain, and are so much stronger than we, they appear as little inclined to risk an action as we ought to be.

‘The Spaniards have now another opportunity to make an effort to shake off the yoke somewhere; but I am apprehensive that they will not avail themselves of it.

‘I have not heard of, or from, Blake since he left Jurumenha.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 27th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant, regarding certain green barley said to have been consumed near Elvas by the British troops.

‘ I am concerned to observe, in all the complaints of this description which I receive from the Portuguese Government, a want of accuracy of statement, which precludes the successful issue of any inquiry. In this case, the numbers of the regiments to which the persons belonged, who are said to have taken this corn, are not detailed; and, in point of fact, there were no British troops at Elvas on the 11th May, and could be none on the 18th May, two days after the battle of Albuera.

‘ This circumstance having occurred to me, I requested Senhor Sodré to call upon the complainant and mention it to him, and request him to let me know the numbers of the regiments to which the soldiers belonged who cut the barley; and he then sent me the enclosed paper, stating that on the 22d and 23d May the barley was cut. At that period I was at Elvas: but at all events I should think that the governor of the province of Alentejo might have contrived to protect the barley growing under the guns of the fort, without complaining on the subject to Government.

‘ It is impossible for me to give any redress for an evil complained of in such loose terms, and in making which there appears so little adherence to truth.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 27th June, 1811.

‘ I have so repeatedly received anonymous letters from the Patriarch and the Principal, that at last it is necessary to put an end to a practice which is carried on in the most barefaced manner. I now enclose one which I beg you will look at, merely that you may be able to recognize the writing again in case it should come in question; and that you will then forward it, as directed, to the Patriarch. I have not read it.

‘ I have received from Dom M. Forjaz the answer to my dispatch of last week, which contains a paragraph giving great credit to Senhor Cardozo, for throwing supplies into the place of Elvas.

‘ I shall send you to-morrow the return up to yesterday of what had been thrown into Elvas, from which you will see with what degree of justice the merit of provisioning the place is attributed principally to Cardozo ; and then you will not think me unreasonable in declaring that justice to the departments of the British army will prevent me in future from giving the assistance which they are capable of giving ; for you must observe that these efforts, which are entirely gratuitous, and which are even denied by the Government, much less acknowledged and thanked, are not made without considerable inconvenience to the British army.

‘ I am sorry to be again obliged to remark upon Dom M. Forjaz’ want of justice, to say no more ; but these repeated instances of efforts to screen inefficient departments by misrepresentation do not add to my good opinion of that Minister.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 27th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness’ commands of the 30th May, and those of the 5th instant.

‘ I had already drafted the 2d batt. 48th regiment into the 1st battalion, and orders have been given to draft the 2d batt. 7th Fusiliers into the 1st battalion, and the 7th line battalion of the King’s German Legion into the other three line battalions of the Legion ; and the Officers and non-commissioned officers of those battalions which have been drafted will be sent home immediately. The 2d batt. 88th regiment will likewise be drafted into the 1st battalion ; but, as both these battalions are at present almost in sight of the enemy, it will be necessary to delay the arrangement for a short time.

* His Royal Highness the Duke of York had been reappointed to the command of the army on the 25th May, 1811.

‘ I request to have your Royal Highness’ commands whether I am to complete the 1st battalions of the 5th foot, 31st, 38th, 39th, and 42d, to the numbers stated in the memorandum enclosed in your Royal Highness’ letter of the 30th May, from the 2d battalions of those regiments respectively, before I shall send those 2d battalions to England; or whether I am to send those 2d battalions to England when the 1st battalions shall arrive in Portugal, whatever may be the actual strength of the 1st battalions.

‘ I likewise request to have your Royal Highness’ commands whether I am to send to England the 2d battalions of the 24th, 44th, 53d, 58th, 66th, and 83d, and the 85th regiments, when the 1st battalions of the 5th, 31st, 38th, 49th, and 42d, shall arrive in Portugal.

‘ It is impossible to have better soldiers than the real Hanoverians; and it would be very desirable that the 1st, 2d, and 5th line battalions of the Legion, should be reinforced by any men of that description who may be in the depôts.

‘ In consequence of orders from the Secretary of State, of the _____, I have directed General Graham to join the army from Cadiz; and to send to the army the detachment of the 3d batt. 95th regiment, and the squadron of the 2d hussars which are dismounted, which are at Cadiz. The horses expected from England will enable me to mount them.

‘ I have not yet been able to ascertain the exact amount of the final loss of each of the regiments in the late actions, under the command of Sir William Beresford; but I should hope that in a short time so many men will have recovered from their wounds, that it will not amount to more than half the number of killed, wounded, and missing, in the first returns.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness*
the Commander in Chief.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 27th June, 1811.

‘ The enemy made a great reconnoissance with a very large body of cavalry, upon Elvas and Campo Mayor, on the 23d. The cavalry of the army of the south went upon Elvas

from the neighborhood of Olivença, and to the woods between that town and Badajoz; and the cavalry of the army of Portugal upon Campo Mayor, from the neighborhood of Badajoz.

‘ The former succeeded in cutting off a piquet of the —th light dragoons, who had been posted on the Caya, in front of Elvas, under the command of — —. It is understood that the cause of this misfortune was that — — mistook a regiment of the enemy’s hussars for a body of ours sent to his support.

‘ The —d hussars also, which were on the Guadiana, on the right of Elvas, suffered considerably in their retreat towards Elvas.

‘ The enemy were kept in check in the neighborhood of Campo Mayor, by General de Grey’s brigade of British and General Madden’s Portuguese cavalry, and they retired without seeing the position of our troops. Since that day they have made no movement of importance. Their army is along the Guadiana, between Badajoz and Merida, and their principal occupation appears to be to procure subsistence.

‘ They are already beginning to experience in some degree the effects of drawing together in Estremadura their whole force. General Bonet has evacuated the Asturias. Don Julian Sanchez has possession of the open country in Old Castille, and has recently intercepted a valuable convoy of money and provisions, on the road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo; and I learn from Valladolid, that a very valuable convoy has been intercepted by Mina, consisting of the King’s baggage and property, near Vitoria, the whole escort having been put to the sword.

‘ General Blake crossed the Guadiana, as had been arranged, on the 22d instant, and I understand was at Castillejos on the 24th; and I conclude that the enemy, finding that the allied army are in a situation in which the attack of them could not be made without difficulty, will detach towards that quarter.

‘ It is to be wished that the Spaniards would take more extensive advantage of the concentration of the enemy’s forces, and thus oblige them, by the loss of their convoys the danger of their small garrisons and civil departments,

and adherents residing in the large towns, to keep their armies separate, and expose some to our attacks.

‘ The Commissary General has thrown a sufficient quantity of provisions into all the places on the frontier; and measures are in progress to improve the defences of them all.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 27th June, 1811.

‘ I enclose the weekly state to the 25th. The loss of the piquet of the —th dragoons, and that sustained by the piquet of the —d hussars, were disagreeable circumstances; but they tend to show the difference between old and new troops. The old regiments of cavalry, throughout all their services, and all their losses put together, have not lost so many men as the —d hussars, and —th and —th dragoons, the former in a few days, and the latter in a few months. However, we must make the new as good as the old. Our cavalry are just now in very good condition.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don Joaquin Blake.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 28th June, 1811.

‘ When the accounts of the recent battle at Albuera arrived in England all ranks and descriptions of His Majesty’s subjects were eager to manifest their admiration of the conduct of all the allied troops, and their sense of the benefits which had resulted to the common cause, from the cordial union of councils of the Generals in command of the armies of the different nations, and from the gallantry and discipline of the troops.

‘ The Houses of Lords and Commons have expressed these sentiments in resolutions which they have unanimously voted upon this occasion; and they have imposed upon me, as the Commander of His Majesty’s forces in this country, the pleasing task of communicating to the Generals commanding the forces of the several allied nations their unanimous sense of the conduct of the armies under their command respectively.

‘ I have therefore the honor of enclosing to your Excellency the unanimous resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons of Great Britain and Ireland of the 7th, expressing their sense of the conduct of the Spanish army under the command of your Excellency, in the battle fought at Albuera, on the 16th May, 1811; and I beg leave to congratulate your Excellency upon receiving this justly merited honor, which is the highest those illustrious assemblies have to bestow, and which must be esteemed and valued by every friend to the freedom and good order of society.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*
Don Joaquín Blake.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ Quinta de St. João,
29th June, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I have had a conversation with General C. Stewart respecting your wish to quit the army for a short time, and conceived that he had communicated with you, which is the reason that you have not received an earlier answer to your letter.

‘ We experienced so much inconvenience last spring, from the absence of the General Officers from the army, that I have received orders, which leave very little discretion with me to give leave of absence on private concerns. Your case, however, appears to me to be of a different description; for, at the same time that you have private affairs to settle, the state of your health renders your absence desirable; and I think that at this period it will be more convenient that you should absent yourself than it would be at any other. Under these circumstances, I have no objection to your going; but, as I think it not improbable that others will desire the same indulgence, who have neither the same claims nor the same reasons for going as you have, I wish you would send me a certificate, in the usual form, of the state of your health.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Serene Highness the Prince of Orange.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 29th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Highness’ letter of the 27th instant, and I assure you that I shall be happy to see your Highness with the army whenever it will be convenient to you to join it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Serene Highness
the Prince of Orange.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 29th June, 1811.

‘ You must be the best judge of the expediency of applying the money which will come into your hands, as the proceeds of the flour imported from America, to the purposes of the Portuguese charity.

‘ I expected that this money would come into the military chest, upon which the demands are very heavy, and which is at present but ill supplied.

‘ However, as you have received directions from Government on this subject, you must be the best judge in what manner this money shall be disposed of.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 29th June, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter and its enclosures which I have received from the Commissary General, on the subject of a complaint transmitted to me some time ago by you, received from the Portuguese Government, respecting the want of boats on the Mondego.

‘ None of these complaints have ever come under my cognizance, in which the facts were not misrepresented or exaggerated, or in which some facts were not omitted, that were material to a just decision on the case.

‘ There is no British Officer who is not interested to give

every assistance in his power to the officers of the Portuguese Government, because he well knows that the deficiencies resulting from the want of means, or from neglects of the latter, are invariably supplied from the stores of the British army.

‘ But I am sorry to observe that the officers of the Portuguese Government, almost without exception, neglect their duty, in the performance of which there is neither intelligence nor activity; and the excuse of the interference of the British Commissaries is too readily admitted by the Portuguese Government and their Ministers, who prefer anything, even the loss of the Kingdom of their sovereign, to the punishment of those who neglect their duty, although they receive their salaries.

‘ The enclosed letter from Mr. Drake is deserving of attention, as showing how business is carried on by the officers of the Junta de Viveres.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS, ‘ Quinta de St. João, 29th June, 1811.

‘ The last post brought us accounts of the Duke of York’s appointment to be Commander in Chief, at which I assure you I rejoice most sincerely.

‘ The arrangement is not less a matter of justice to him than it is beneficial to the public interests; and it appears to me to have been admirably timed, and that the motion of Lord Milton upon it is likely to be advantageous to the Duke’s character. I would not allow the mail to go without telling you how well satisfied I am with this arrangement; and I beg you to take an opportunity of conveying my congratulations to His Royal Highness.

‘ The dispatches will let you know how we are situated. We have now got upon us the whole disposable force in Spain; and, although we are not quite so effective as I could wish, I entertain no apprehensions for the result.

‘ Blake’s operations in Andalusia, if he can do anything, will immediately relieve us from part of the weight bearing

upon us; and as soon as that is done, I have some operations in view to remove the war from this frontier.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 30th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th June, with its enclosures. I am sorry to say that, under existing circumstances, no confidence can be placed in the parole of any French Officer. I know many who have been allowed to quit England, on their parole not to serve till exchanged, who are now serving in the armies in Spain, although no British Officer, or others, have been sent from France in exchange for them.

‘ This practice will be continued till the allies determine to adopt a system of rigor and punishment towards the prisoners in their power, in proportion to that followed by the enemy, and in reference to the conduct of the prisoners themselves. I have invariably experienced the greatest inconvenience from allowing any persons to return to the enemy’s army.

‘ As nothing is believed in England that is written by persons in authority in this country, it is not believed that the Generals commanding the French armies have no communication with each other, and that they are entirely ignorant of all that is passing around them, and that they have, in fact, no information, excepting what they derive from deserters from the foreign regiments in our service, of whom there are, I am sorry to say, too many, and from the prisoners occasionally sent back to them, in exchange for some of our Officers or soldiers.

‘ Adverting to the superiority of the enemy’s numbers over the allied British and Portuguese armies, and to the inefficiency of the Spanish troops, I attribute the success which we have had hitherto in a great degree to the want of information by the enemy’s General Officers. At this moment, though the whole army are within a few miles of them, they do not know where they are; but, if disabled prisoners are to be sent to them, they will get all the information they require, if not directly from themselves, from

their friends of the French interest at Lisbon, from Portuguese or English newspapers, &c. &c. I am therefore of opinion that the disabled, as well as the other prisoners, ought to be sent to England, and thence to France, if the Government are desirous of getting rid of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor of the City of London.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 30th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 20th May, in which your Lordship has transmitted to me the resolutions of the Court of Common Council of the City of London, of the 9th May, expressing their approbation of the conduct of the army under my command in the late operations in Portugal.

‘ I have communicated the resolutions of the Common Council to the General and other Officers, the non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the allied army.

‘ I beg that the Court of Common Council will accept my thanks for the honor which they have conferred upon me and upon the army under my command; and I trust that, by a continuance of our endeavors to serve His Majesty, and to promote his interests in this country, we shall continue to enjoy the good opinion of the city of London.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

the Lord Mayor of the City of London.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Governor of Coimbra, and the Magistrates of Arganil, Gões, Louzão, Ponte da Murcella, and Foz d’Arouce.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 30th June, 1811.

‘ I have sent Captain Macleod, of the Royal engineers, to look at the state of the bridges on the Alva and the Ceira, and to put them in a state of repair, if they should not already have been repaired. I desire that you will give him every assistance of workmen and materials which he may require for the work upon which he has been ordered, and I hold you responsible to attend to his requisitions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Coimbra, &c.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 1st July, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

Half past 9 P. M.

‘ The priest of La Roca is arrived; but I do not recollect who it was that complained of him, or the nature of the complaint. I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will let me know what you recollect of this complaint.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. the Speaker of the House of Commons.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 1st July, 1811.

‘ In obedience to the orders of the House of Commons, I have communicated to Sir William Beresford, and to Captain General Blake, the resolutions of the House of the 7th June, conveying their approbation of the conduct of the General and other Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the allied armies, which fought the battle of Albuera on the 16th May. It has given me great satisfaction to have been made the channel of communicating to those Officers the high honors which the House have conferred upon them. I have the honor to enclose a letter from Sir William Beresford.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

the Speaker of the House of Commons.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Leite, Governor of Elvas.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 2d July, 1811.

‘ The provisions at Ouguela being almost expended, I request that you will send to that fort, to-morrow morning, provisions for ten days for 220 men; by provisions is to be understood bread, meat, and wine; and you will be good enough to report when this order is executed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Leite,*

Governor of Elvas.’

‘ WELLINGTON

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 2d July, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Major General Howard, enclosing one from Colonel Stewart, of the 50th regiment, regarding the equipments of a detachment of that regiment recently arrived from England. I beg that you will make a requisition upon Colonel Fisher for new arms and accoutrements for this detachment, if upon inspection those which they have in use should be deemed unserviceable.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 2d July, 1811.

‘ Upon considering of the best mode to communicate to General Blake the resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons regarding the Spanish army, I have thought it best to communicate them in a letter from myself, as being the mode most likely to be agreeable to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 2d July, 1811.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 19th of June. I have already informed you that I had had some conversation with General Abadia when he was on his journey to Galicia. That which I recommended to him was, if possible, to retake Astorga, and, if he could not do that, to endeavor to extend himself in the Asturias and La Montaña; but not to venture into the plains of Leon and Castille till he should have formed his army, and, particularly, should have got a body of cavalry.

‘ I believe that the French have evacuated Astorga, as well as the Asturias; so that the first measures I recommended to his attention are already accomplished; and he may now direct his attention to something further, as soon as he shall have an army. Indeed, he might now work on in La Montaña, towards Biscay.

‘ I have also requested General Abadia to endeavor to obtain possession of Santoña, in concert with the Officer commanding His Majesty’s ships at Coruña, and with General Mendizabal, who has been sent by the Spanish Regency to command in Biscay.

‘ When General Walker quitted Coruña he left there Mr. —, a Commissary, who has continued the correspondence with me ; but as I consider that a most important point, and that the supplies of arms, ammunition, &c. to the guerrillas may be best distributed from that quarter, I conceive that it might be convenient to Government, as well as to me, that a person of more respectable station in life than Mr. — should be appointed to reside there. I have no Officers to spare for this service ; and I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will send the gentleman you mention ; and I shall be happy to see him here, or I will send him instructions to Coruña, if your Lordship should think it better that he should go there at once.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 3d July, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th.

‘ I have no doubt but that the letter which I sent to you was written by the Patriarch ; but, as you entertain a doubt upon the subject, I am much obliged to you for stopping it.

‘ To send an anonymous letter to anybody is to accuse him of writing it, the meanest action certainly of which any man can be guilty. It is not very proper, perhaps, to accuse a man in the Patriarch’s situation of being guilty of such an action ; but he positively ought not to be accused of it if there is any, the slightest, doubt of his guilt. I therefore acquiesce entirely in your retaining the letter.

‘ In the account which the Commissary General has made out of supplies to the Portuguese Government he has charged for the articles delivered in kind, at the rate which they cost.

‘ I have given directions that the paper issued to the Portuguese Government shall be taken credit for at the price of the day. For instance, when 100,000*l.* in paper was given

to them, the rate of discount being 18 per cent., the charge against them was to be only 82,000*l*.

‘ If they do not take care to manage the markets they may lose even by this arrangement ; but that I cannot help.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 3d July, 1811.

‘ I enclose Dom Miguel Forjaz’ commissariat regulations, with some remarks upon them. If I had leisure to go minutely through the whole, probably I might out of them be able to form something ; but I have written in the margin the general principles on which the establishment ought to be formed, and that of all the regulations for its guidance, which will probably answer better than to enter into the particulars of the regulations, and, at all events, saves me some time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

Observations by Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., upon the Plan proposed for the Portuguese Commissariat.*

‘ Quinta de St. João, 3d July, 1811.

Page 1.

‘ The commissariat should be composed of a Commissary General, deputies, assistants, clerks, conductors, sub-conductors, treasurer, and accountants.

‘ These denominations of Officers would comprise all the functions required from the other Officers specified in the text.’

Page 2.

‘ The Commissary General, and all the Officers of the commissariat, should be appointed by a Minister of State, or by the Commander in Chief.

* This is a translation from the Portuguese, which was sent to Dom Miguel Forjaz. The original draft is missing from the papers of the Duke of Wellington.

‘Whoever shall make the appointment should be answerable for the selection of competent persons.

‘The inferior clerks might be appointed by the individual under whose authority it is intended they should be employed.

‘The conductors should be appointed by the Commissary General. But whoever may make the appointment should be answerable for the competency of the person to fulfil the duties of his appointment.

‘The continuance of the Officers in their several places should be during pleasure.

‘The establishment must be a military one; the persons of whom it is composed should be liable to trial by military law: but the tenure or title by which they hold their employments should entirely depend on the will of the Government, and so should their promotion.’

Page 4.

‘It is the duty of the Commissary General, and of the persons under his authority, to collect, to preserve in good condition, and to issue, provisions and forage to the troops, and to the horses and mules belonging to them. It is their duty also to provide the means of transporting the several articles from one place to another, and to furnish all other means of transport which the army may require.’

Page 5.

‘The Commissary General should, between the 24th and the 30th of each month, render to the Secretary of State, and to the Commander in Chief, a return of all such provisions as are in being in the different depôts of the Kingdom and belonging to the army; stating what portions he has furnished in the preceding month, and giving in an estimate of the quantities which he thinks may be required of him in the following month, pointing out from whence they should be drawn, and whither they should be transported; and, besides this, he should give in a calculation of the expense likely to be incurred in each of the following articles, viz —

‘Provisions and forage for the troops and their beasts; means of transport also, stating the purposes for which they will be required; and the salaries of the persons employed in the commissariat.

‘These arrangements having been completed, and the funds necessary to meet the expenses of his department having been placed at the disposal of the Commissary General, it will then become necessary to consider in what way he shall make his purchases. These should always be made at the cheapest rate, and should be accompanied with certificates of the price of them. After this, the object will be to ascertain the best way of keeping in good order the several articles, of making his issues to the troops, and of giving an account of the issues which he shall have already made.

‘All these are matters of detailed regulation which cannot fail to exist already in the department of the commissariat; and nothing more will be necessary but to compel obedience to the regulations, whatever the nature of them may be, and to ensure the punishment of disobedience.

‘The estimate by the Commissary General should comprise the value of the provisions, which are to be bought by his deputies attached to the different divisions of the army or stationed in forts. These deputies must render account, in the manner prescribed, and within the time limited, of the money which they have expended; but the Commissary General and all his subordinate Officers must be apprised that they will have to answer for the omissions of their inferiors if they do not give them up to punishment.’

Page 17.

‘Deputy Commissaries must be under the immediate authority of the Commissary General, and must be stationed in those places, and attached to those divisions of the army, which he may be pleased to fix upon. All must be under the direction of a deputy appointed by the Commissary General, and charged with the duty of issuing the necessary orders.

‘They must fulfil that portion of the obligations generally incumbent upon the Commissary General which he shall allot to them; whether it be in making purchases, or looking to the preservation of the articles already purchased, or watching over the transport of the same, the issuing them to the inferior Commissaries for the supply of the troops, and directing the fulfilment of the general engagements of the commissariat, and of the Commissaries attached to any

particular division, or stationed in any fort or district, pursuant to the orders which they shall receive from the Commissary General, and to the general regulations of the service.

‘ Every Deputy Commissary, through whose hands either money or any articles may pass, must be answerable for such money or for such articles, until he shall have been exonerated either by a receipt or some other official document which may be required.

‘ Whenever the articles which shall have been entrusted to any Deputy Commissary General may be considered of a quality unfit for the service, this circumstance must be made known to the Commissary General; but the said articles must not be destroyed until they shall have been first examined by a board of Officers, whose decision must be confirmed by the Commander in Chief.

‘ The Commander in Chief will then direct that the said articles be destroyed in the presence of the board of Officers who had examined them; and nothing short of this order from the Commander in Chief should exonerate the Deputy or other Commissary.’

Page 25.

‘ I do not see that any advantage will result from making regulations for the clerks of this department.

‘ The Commissary General will employ, whenever he may think fit, a Deputy Commissary in each province, and will instruct him as to the nature of the services which will be required of him.

‘ The Commissary General should, nevertheless, place himself in communication with the magistrates in all great cities of the provinces, and by their aid should provide the means of supplying the small detachments of the army which move from one place to another along the high roads, according to routes which the Quarter Master General gives them.’

Page 26.

‘ In those provinces in which corn or any other species of grain may exist, it is clear that the Commissary General must employ some of the deputies to collect this grain; and he must render an account thereof, in his return, of the state

of the depôts, every month, to the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief.'

Page 49.

'The duties of the Deputy or Assistant Commissaries attached to divisions consist especially in receiving or collecting provisions and forage for the use of those divisions; in taking care to preserve those articles in good condition; in effecting the transport of them from one place to another; in issuing them to the troops upon receiving proper documents and receipts; and in rendering an account, as well of the money expended as of the depôts of provisions.

'All these duties necessarily require regulations in detail from the Commissary General; and the Commissaries attached to divisions or brigades must answer for the fulfilment of them.'

Page 59.

'The duty of directing the transports from one place to another, and watching over the transit of the several articles from one Commissary to another, might be fulfilled through the medium of one or more deputies or assistants under the directions of the Commissary General, and in conformity with certain rules and orders, general and particular, established for their government.'

Page 69.

'There ought to be a treasurer of the commissariat; but, as a general rule, no money ought to stop in the hands of the Commissary General. He ought to have a credit opened with the military chest in the beginning of each month, to meet that portion of the amount of his estimate which shall have been granted to him by the Secretary of State and by the Commander in Chief; and he ought to draw bills upon the military chest from time to time for the amount of his payments, never exceeding in any one month the sum total of his absolute necessities, and stating on each bill what head of those services which are specified in his estimate is to be liquidated by the said bill.

'In the same manner the treasurer should keep an account of the payments made by the Commissary General conformably with those heads, setting apart what the esti-

mate of each month consists of; and every Commissary who lays out money should render an account after the same form to the treasurer of the commissariat.'

Page 124.

' I do not possess sufficient knowledge of the Portuguese language, nor have I time, to examine the detail of these regulations, the whole of which may probably be very expedient.

' Nevertheless, the duty of the Commissary General is set forth, generally, in the observations which I have made. This duty both he and his deputies and assistants should fulfil, pursuant to certain convenient regulations.

' In collecting provisions, care should always be taken to select them of the best quality, and at the cheapest rate; and the object of all and every regulation should be to make this certain, as well as to show the sum of money which shall have been expended.

' In receiving the provisions, the object of every regulation should be to obtain the certainty, by means of receipts or some other form, that the provisions have really been received by each of the persons through whose hands they shall have been reported to have passed.

' In keeping the provisions in good condition, whether it be upon the march or in the dépôt, the object of every regulation should be to attach responsibility to the person charged with the care of them, in order to avoid waste or loss through negligence.

' In making issues of the provisions, the object of regulations should be to exonerate the persons who shall have made a just and true delivery of them, and to attach responsibility to the person who shall have received them; further, to ascertain the accuracy of his receipts, and to make him answerable as well for the quantity as the quality thereof.

' In making a detailed issue of provisions, the object of regulations should be to ensure that every individual shall receive what belongs to him, and nothing more; and that the proper requisitions and receipts shall be passed by those who shall receive, and by the Commissary who shall make the issue.

' In procuring transports, the object of regulations should

be to secure that the person who makes requisition for them shall apply to the proper magistrate; and shall not apply for more than is absolutely necessary.

‘ In paying for transports, the object of regulations should be to make it certain that the owner of the transports shall receive the money which is due to him, and which is paid and carried to the account of the public.

‘ The duties of magistrates form another subject, and are entirely distinct from the duties of the Commissary General.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d instant.

‘ I am convinced of the expediency of adopting some measures to stimulate and support the efforts of the inhabitants of Portuguese Estremadura to restore the agriculture of their province; but the circumstances which I am about to state will show you that it is of paramount importance not to deliver any money from the military chest to be employed in that manner.

‘ The pay of the British troops is now nearly two months in arrears, instead of being paid one month in advance, according to His Majesty’s regulations.

‘ The muleteers, upon whose services the army depend almost as much as upon those of the soldiers, are six months in arrears.

‘ There are bills to a large amount, drawn by the Commissaries in the country on the Commissary at Lisbon, still remaining unpaid, by which delay the credit of the British army and Government must be impaired; and you are aware of the pressing demands of the Portuguese Government for specie.

‘ There is but little money in hand to be applied to those several services. There is no prospect that any will be sent from England; and the supplies derived from the negotiation of bills upon the Treasury at Cadiz and Lisbon have been gradually decreasing.

‘ Under these circumstances, it is my duty to object to the application of any sum of money which can be brought into the military chest to any purpose excepting to defray our expenses, which would otherwise fall upon the chest.

‘ Admitting, as I do, the expediency of adopting measures to revive the agriculture of Estremadura, I have reason to believe that matters are not in so bad a state in that province, generally, as they are represented to be in the papers which you enclose in your letter of the 2d; and I cannot admit that, if they were, it would be expedient to encourage an expectation that they would be restored, or wise to endeavor to restore them at once to the situation in which they were previous to the recent invasion.

‘ Time must elapse before the agricultural classes will have in their possession the carriages and other means by which they could render their laboring cattle useful to them, if the cattle could be restored to them; and time also must elapse before the land will produce sufficient food to support all the laboring cattle which they could use.

‘ It would be prudent, therefore, not to distribute in those districts at once too large a proportion of laboring cattle, if the distribution is to be made by degrees; and in the progress of time I see no reason why we should not look to a supply from Ireland and other countries from whence they might be brought, in which the purchase of them would not be a burthen upon the military chest of this army.

‘ I do not foresee any inconvenience from your countermanding the execution of that part of the commission for the purchase of flour in America which may remain unexecuted when your order shall reach America.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON. .

To the Rev. J. Owen, Chaplain General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose letters which Mr. Briscall has put into my hands from Mr. Downes and Mr. Hill, two of the Chaplains attached to this army. I have accepted Mr. Downes’ resignation, and have given leave to Mr. Hill to go to England: the latter gentleman never quitted Lisbon.

‘ I have already, upon a former occasion, made General Calvert acquainted with my opinion respecting the establishment on which the army Chaplains are placed, in a letter which I believe you saw; and I now assure you, that the opinions which that letter contains have been confirmed by the experience which I have since had. The remuneration in the shape of half pay is not sufficient to induce respectable persons in a good state of health, who have any other prospect in the profession, to accept the situation of Chaplains to the army; and advertng to the general expense of the establishment, compared with that of the old regimental establishment, of which, after many years, it is intended to be an efficient substitute, I cannot see why the remuneration, particularly in the shape of half pay, should not be made more liberal. My decided opinion is, that until that is done the Government will not insure a religious establishment for the army on foreign service; and it is obvious that all that could be done in that way would not amount to one third part of the expense of the old regimental establishment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Rev. J. Owen,
Chaplain General.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Aubrey de Vere Hunt, Esq., High Sheriff of the County of
Limerick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th May, in which you have enclosed the unanimous resolutions of a meeting of the county of Limerick, assembled under your auspices on the 16th May. I am much flattered by the notice which the county of Limerick have been pleased to take of my endeavors to serve His Majesty, and by the approbation which they have expressed of the conduct of the Officers and troops which have been placed under my command; and I hope, by the support and assistance of the General and other Officers, and the discipline of the troops, to continue to enjoy the valuable approbation of the gentlemen of the county of Limerick.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Aubrey de Vere Hunt, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent.

‘SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness’ letter of the 9th June; and, in obedience to your Royal Highness’ commands, I have placed Lieut. St. Martin, of your Royal Highness’ regiment, at the disposal of Marshal Sir William Brcesford, to be appointed a Captain of the Portuguese service.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Royal Highness
the Duke of Kent.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th June; and I have desired the Commissary General to give directions that the stores may be placed in the store houses in such manner that the houses may be made to contain the largest quantity they are capable of containing.

‘The large quantities of provisions now at Lisbon are to be attributed to the removal of the magazines from the Douro and the Mondego to the Tagus, in consequence of the change of the seat of operations of the army. These magazines had, immediately previous to their removal, been very much increased by the arrival at Oporto and Figueira of several ships from England laden with provisions, which had been sent to those places by order from the Secretary of State. The quantity of provisions now at Lisbon has also been increased very much lately by the arrival of flour purchased in America for the Portuguese Government, and of provisions from England likewise for the Portuguese Government, to be delivered as subsidy in lieu of money payments, which provisions they have not yet taken from His Majesty’s Minister.

‘These circumstances have occasioned the inconvenience of which you complain, which, however, I hope will be only temporary, as I have requested that no more provisions may at present, be sent from England, and the consumption of the army occasions a constant draw upon the magazines. I am apprehensive that it would not be possible to store our

were at Alosno, in the Condado de Niebla, and his advanced guard, under General Ballesteros, at El Cerro.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to transmit a duplicate of a memorandum of field equipment required for the use of this army, the original of which I forwarded to your Lordship on the 1st of April last ; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct that these things may be sent to Portugal without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘ I send to England by Mr. Sydenham, who leaves this to-morrow, the eagle of the 39th regiment, which was thrown into the river Ceira, near Foz d’Arouce, on the night of the 15th March last, when the 6th corps of the army of Portugal, which formed the rear guard of the army posted on the other side of the river, were driven across that river by the 3d and Light divisions of the British army, under the command of Major General Picton and Major General Sir William Erskine.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 4th July, 1811.

‘ In addition to the intelligence contained in my dispatch, I have reports from Badajoz and from Marmont’s head quarters at Merida, stating that the Spaniards had entered Seville on the 28th. If this should be true, and Blake has, as I advised him, destroyed everything there, it will make a most important alteration in the state of affairs.

‘ First, it will show that the Spaniards can do something,

and we may venture to depend a little upon operations combined with them.

‘ Secondly, it will lead to raising the siege of Cadiz more effectually than any other operation that could be undertaken.

‘ The operations of that siege depend entirely upon the supplies received from the foundry and arsenal at Seville, which the Spaniards contrived to abandon in a complete state of equipment; and, if the stores at Seville should be lost, the siege may as well, and will, be given up, as it is hopeless to endeavor to collect again what would be necessary to carry it on.

‘ If, however, the siege of Cadiz should be given up, we in this country shall have upon us, in addition to what we have already, the small portions of the army still remaining in Andalusia; and I doubt whether the assistance which we might expect to receive from the Spaniards, in consequence of their being relieved from that weight, will compensate for the additional pressure upon us.

‘ The great army in our front must, and will probably soon, separate, having effected nothing excepting the relief of Badajoz; for which object they have weakened themselves every where; have lost Astorga and the Asturias; and the greater number of them would have been destroyed, if all the Spaniards were like the lower orders. However, we must have patience, and we may yet be able to root them out of this country.

‘ I enclose you some copies of Joseph’s interesting letter, certified by Bardaxi.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Quinta de St. João, 5th July, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 5th.

‘ The enemy appear to have drawn off entirely from this neighborhood; and the right of the army of Portugal is at Montanches, the left and head quarters at Merida, the right of the army of the south at Lobon, and the left at Zafra. I believe they have sent one division into Andalusia.

‘ Blake crossed the Guadiana on the 22d or 23d. He failed in an attack upon Niebla, where the French had only 300 men, on the 30th at night ; and he is, I believe, going to embark at Huelva.

‘ I keep our troops still in their camps, meaning, if Soult leaves Marmont alone, to endeavor to give Marmont a blow. However I doubt that Soult will leave that in my power.

‘ The French have taken a great deal of cannon out of Badajoz. They have blown up Olivença.

‘ I have sent to Hamilton about Mr. Charles Monk.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 5th July, 1811.

‘ I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy respecting the store houses. The house you mention would not answer for us, as the communication with it by land is very awkward and inconvenient. I hope, however, that, by the improvements in the mode of stowing the store houses, we shall have no want of store room at Lisbon and the neighborhood.

‘ I hope that we shall have a sufficiency of bridge at Villa Velha. I do not understand what the Portuguese Government want with pontoon boats. We shall have plenty of pontoons for as many bridges as we can require anywhere ; but, as we have already so much bridge there, I do not propose to remove there any of our pontoons ; indeed the Tagus will be very soon fordable almost everywhere.

‘ I congratulate you upon your son’s promotion.

‘ I have not yet heard of March this morning, but will add a line if I should receive any intelligence of him before the post shall go out.

‘ I have omitted to tell you that I have written to my brother regarding the money, and have requested that it may be sent only in the ships which you send for it periodically.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To General Dumouriez.

Quinta de St. João,
ce 5 Juillet, 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 6 Juin ; et je suis bien aise d’avoir l’avantage de votre opinion sur les affaires de ce pays-ci.

‘ Il y a presque trois ans à présent que je conduis les opérations de la guerre la plus extraordinaire qu’il y eut jamais. Quoique les alliés soient chez eux, et que tout le monde (en Portugal sans exception quelconque, et presque sans exception en Espagne) soit ennemi des Français, les alliés ont rarement eu plus que la moitié de la force de l’ennemi, et jamais, même à présent, plus que les deux tiers. A ce désavantage il faut ajouter que nous sommes alliés ; que nous n’avons pas de tête ; qu’il n’y a ni généraux, ni Officiers d’état-major, ni troupes disciplinées, et point de cavalerie parmi les Espagnols : que ces deux Gouvernemens ont commencé la guerre sans magasins ou ressource militaire d’aucune espèce, et sans argent ou ressource de finance ; et que ceux qui ont été à la tête des affaires sont des individus aussi faibles que les ressources à leur disposition sont pauvres ; et vous serez étonné que nous puissions du tout continuer la lutte même avec espérance de succès définitif.

‘ Je crois que ni Buonaparte ni le monde n’ont compté sur les difficultés à subjuguier la Péninsule, étant opposé par une bonne armée en Portugal. Il a fait des efforts gigantesques, dignes de sa réputation, et des forces dont il a la disposition ; mais il n’en a pas fait assez encore ; et je crois que l’ancien *dictum* de Henri Quatre, que “ quand on fait la guerre en Espagne avec peu de monde on est battu, et avec beaucoup de monde, on meurt de faim,” se trouvera vérifié de nos jours ; et que Buonaparte ne pourra jamais nourrir, même de la manière Française moderne, une armée assez grand pour faire conquête des royaumes de la Péninsule, si les alliés ont seulement une armée assez forte pour arrêter ses progrès.

‘ Pour ce qui est d’aujourd’hui, les Français ont réuni en Estremadoure toutes les forces qu’ils avaient en Andalousie, et dans La Vieille et La Nouvelle Castille, pour m’obliger à lever le siège de Badajoz ; à quoi ils ont nécessairement

réussi. J'ai rassemblé mon monde à deux lieues de-là dans une assez bonne position près de Campo Mayor ; et ils n'ont pas voulu me toucher : et j'ai prié le Général Blake avec les Espagnols, 10,000 à 12,000, de repasser la Guadiana à Mertola et de se porter sur Seville, où sont l'arsenal, la fonderie, les magasins, et tout ce qui leur est nécessaire pour le siège de Cadiz, qu'après ce coup ils auraient été obligés de lever. Il passa la Guadiana le 22 Juin, le jour même que Soult et Marmont m'ont reconnu à Campo Mayor. Mais il n'a rien fait jusqu'au 30 au soir, quand il a essayé de s'emparer de Niebla, qui n'est rien comme place forte, et où il n'y avait que 300 hommes de garnison ; mais le coup a manqué. En même temps les Français se sont retirés d'ici. Ils ont envoyé une division d'infanterie et quelque cavalerie en Andalousie ; et je crois que Blake va s'embarquer pour retourner à Cadiz.

‘ On croirait que quand toute la force disponible de l'ennemi est rassemblée en Estremadoure, on couperait la gorge aux Français éparpillés dans les autres parties de l'Espagne ; et que tout le monde étant ennemi des Français (comme je le crois vraiment), il y aurait insurrection générale. Pas du tout ! voilà l'extraordinaire de cette guerre ! Voici la troisième fois, en moins de deux ans, que toute la force disponible Française s'est réunie sui moi ; mais personne n'y gagne excepté les guerrillas, qui pour un moment prennent possession du pays ouvert de la Castille ; les administrateurs Français tenant toujours les grandes villes. Cette fois-ci cependant ils ont été obligés d'abandonner quelques points importans, comme les Asturies et Astorga ; et les guerrillas, ayant plus de force et d'expérience, leur ont portés quelques coups qui doivent leur faire du mal.

‘ Par ce petit exposé des faits vous verrez quel est l'espèce de guerre que nous faisons. Il faut de la patience, de la grande patience, pour la faire ; mais j'attends tout du temps, qui donnera l'expérience, des généraux, et des armées, à mes amis les Espagnols ; et ce n'est pas possible que l'Europe puisse se soumettre bien plus long-temps à la tyrannie dégoûtante dont elle est opprimée.

‘ A moins que Soult et Marmont ne se séparent de manière que je puisse porter un coup à l'un ou à l'autre, je ne crois pas qu'il y a à espérer que les Français se porteront sur

l'Ebre; et si Blake s'embarque, il n'y a pas de raison pour qu'ils se séparent, à moins que ce ne soit que Soult veut tâcher de s'emparer de Cartagena, à quoi il vise, ou veut pousser vigoureusement le siège de Cadiz.

‘ Je suis bien aise d'avoir pu faire ce qui vous était agréable sur le sujet du Comte de —; que j'ai mis au service Portugais, conservant toujours sa commission Anglaise.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Général Dumouriez.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 5th July, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 26th June, and I now enclose my last dispatches to the Secretary of State.

‘ Castaños, in one of his letters to the Spanish Government, says that the armies of the enemy have separated, and so I believed on the 2d. But I have since learned to a certainty that they are still united, but, being at a greater distance from us, they are more extended than they were.

‘ We had a report that Ballesteros had entered Seville on the 28th; but we hear this morning that there is a courier from Blake of the 2d, who does not mention the circumstance.

‘ Colonel Austin had all the means prepared for General Blake to cross the Guadiana, and his infantry crossed on the 23d, and his cavalry on the 24th, at Mertola. Austin tells me that he believes the ships sent to the mouth of the Guadiana are to carry Blake off, which I think not unlikely.

‘ I do not think the French have yet sent more than one division back into Andalusia, and not much cavalry.

‘ Now that Laval is returning I hope that the correspondent will give better intelligence. The disposition of the Spaniards to exaggerate their little successes, and to diminish those of the enemy, and the reports of their numbers, is evident in the last papers which you have sent me. Soult's advanced guard “destroyed near Los Santos,” was a little affair between thirty of our hussars and seventy French dragoons, in which the former had the advantage and took some prisoners!

‘ I do not think that the British Government have set to work in the business of the mediation in the manner in

which they ought, in order to bring it to a successful termination ; and it appears to me that it will never answer any purpose.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Will you mention to General Graham, or, if he should be gone, to General Disney, that I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send vessels to Cadiz for the 95th and the dismounted hussars.

‘ The Admiral has desired me to request that, as he sends a vessel periodically to Cadiz, to bring the money which is procured there for the Commissary General’s bills, you will be so kind as to send the money always in the ship sent by him, and retain the money till this ship shall arrive. I shall be obliged to you if you will give these directions to Mr. Duff.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 5th July, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I find that there is no truth in the report that Blake had got into Seville. He made an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla on the night of the 30th, in which place the enemy had a garrison of 300 men, and he failed ; and I understand that he was about to embark at Huelva for Cadiz, and was going upon some other expedition, the object of which I do not know ; nor indeed does it appear that my brother, from whom I have heard to the 26th June, had any knowledge that Blake was about to embark. I have not heard from General Blake myself, but I have this intelligence from Castaños. ‘ There is an end, therefore, to any expectations from this expedition.

‘ It is reported that the French have retired from Benavente towards Valladolid. However, I have not this report from any of my people on whom I can rely.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 6th July, 1811.

‘ I do not recollect whether I sent you a copy of the enclosed letter to Mr. Stuart at the time I wrote it ; but I shall

be very much obliged to you if you will attend to its contents, and refer to me all applications which may be made by Officers or others for goods to be landed duty free.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Picton.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 7th July, 1811.

‘ I omitted to mention to Pakenham that, in making arrangements for drafting the 2d batt. 88th regiment into the 1st, it would be expedient to leave in the 2d batt. the boys, whose numbers I do not recollect, who were left at Lisbon when the battalion marched, as being unfit, from weakness, to take the field.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Picton.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 7th July, 1811.

‘ I received last night a letter from Austin, enclosing one from Blake, which shows that it is the intention of that General to embark his troops forthwith, having failed in an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla, and having heard of the return of some of Sault's troops to Seville: he does not say how many; but Austin says that he has heard of two columns of 14,000 men. I have heard from this side of only one division and a few cavalry.

‘ The removal of cannon from Badajoz has continued; but yesterday I received a report that troops and cannon were returning this day. It was rather loose, to be sure; but I had it from two different quarters.

‘ I conclude that you have desired Bacellar to have Almeida examined, to see whether anything can be done to render it a post tenable against a *coup de main*. The destruction of this place comes upon us in every way.

‘ I have no account from Salamanca, and therefore nothing that I can rely upon in respect to the enemy's movements in Castille and Leon. The last report was that Bessières was retiring from Benavente upon Valladolid. If this be true, he has been obliged to reinforce that town and

the northern parts of Castille, in consequence of the increased activity of the guerrillas in that quarter; but, if he assembles his force upon Valladolid, he will soon get the better of the guerrillas, and we must eventually look to his threatening the frontier, either of Upper Beira or Tras os Montes; and, although there may be militia in those provinces in sufficient numbers to defend them in the absence of the army, no reliance can be placed on their efforts; nor indeed can they be counted as troops at all, till the regiments shall be embodied, each in its own district.

‘ Then comes the question of finance, upon which I must say, that, from all I hear, we are as badly off as ever; for I understand that, notwithstanding what Mr. Stuart states of the increased receipts, the Officers of the army have not been paid for four and five months. But supposing the money has been collected, and is in the Treasury, like other articles necessary for the army on the frontier, it has not legs, and cannot travel without means of transport, and arrangements made to apply them; and, if it be true that the revenue has risen, the continuance of all the evils of poverty must be attributed to the inefficiency of the civil departments of the army. However, we must watch very narrowly that force of Bessières, and take care to call out the militia of Beira, and Tras os Montes, and the Minho, in time. In the meantime, some intelligent Staff Officer should turn his mind to the means of collecting these regiments in the shortest possible space of time.

‘ I have sent to Mr. Stuart my opinion on the proposed regulations for the commissariat, and have stated generally the principles on which the establishment should be founded, and the objects of the regulations for its guidance. This being done, it will be easy to draw up the regulations, which ought to be few and simple, and applicable to general circumstances. It is very obvious that the various duties, at different times, of the several Officers of the commissariat must be the subject of particular directions from the Commissary General, and cannot be that of general regulations, which can apply only to general circumstances. On this ground, I conceive that nearly the whole of the compilation which I read is useless, and, a great deal, much worse.

‘ I find that we are drawing like cart horses upon Elvas

for provisions for Hamilton's division, &c. However, I have called for a return of the stores there, and I will take care that they shall not get too low.

'Let me understand what you wish in respect to the disposition of the Portuguese cavalry; what part of it is to belong to the garrison of Elvas, and what brigade to be stationed near Elvas, with the particular object of supporting the cavalry of the garrison, of keeping up the communication between Elvas and Campo Mayor, and preventing the enemy's cavalry at and near Badajoz from annoying the garrison and its communications.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal*

'WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'P. S. I have spoken to Fletcher to send to Almeida a British engineer, to report on the damages; but you may as well send them a Portuguese. 'W.'

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'MY DEAR BERESFORD, 'Quinta de St. João, 8th July, 1811.

'I do not hesitate a moment in answering your letter of the 6th, which I have just received. In arranging the departments of the Portuguese army, I must take care not to engage to perform that which is impossible, and thus take upon me responsibility for what does not belong to me. I cannot engage to pay 600,000*l.* or 700,000*l.* a year in cash to the Portuguese Government, besides feeding their army: they shall have from time to time as much money as I can give them. I cannot allow Mr. Kennedy to undertake either to supply the forts of Abrantes and Elvas, or to feed any more Portuguese troops than he feeds at present, unless those Portuguese troops should be infantry, and actually serving in a British division.

'I shall be much concerned if my unwillingness to pledge myself, or the British departments, to perform that for which I can have not only no certainty, but upon which I can have no grounds of calculation, should delay your arrangements; but I will not involve myself in concerns in which I have nothing to do; and I know well, that if the Portuguese Ministers choose to work, and to make others work, the

arrangement can be made without calling upon me for such a pledge.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 8th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter, &c., which I have received from Mr. Stuart; and I request you to see the gentleman mentioned by him, and inquire who he is, whether he has any recommendation for me, or any other Officer, and what his business is in Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Return the enclosed.

‘ W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 8th July, 1811.

‘ The system proposed for arranging the Portuguese departments just goes to throw all the work, all the expense, and all the responsibility, upon the British commissariat and me; and to relieve the Portuguese Government from it entirely. To this I object, and I cannot concur in any part of the arrangement proposed.

‘ I shall feed the troops we now feed, but no more, unless it should be Portuguese infantry serving in British divisions. I will have nothing to say to Elvas and Abrantes, or to any concern jointly with the Portuguese Government; and I will not, because I cannot, pledge myself that any particular sum shall be paid in each month to the Portuguese chest. I can only say, that the sum shall be as large as I can make it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Charles Stuart.

To Major General Dunlop.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 9th July, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th. The affairs of the Peninsula have always been, and are still, in such a

state of uncertainty, that it is impossible for me to give any opinion, whether it would be convenient, or otherwise, for the General Officers of the army to go home; they must decide this matter for themselves; and if they wish to go, fix the period at which they will apply for leave. I must inform you, however, that not only the public, but the Commander in Chief, and Government, were highly displeased that so many General Officers were absent from the army during the last winter; and that it will be desirable to me, as well as to the General Officers who may wish for leave in future, that I should consult the Commander in Chief before I allow of the departure of any one in future, excepting on account of ill health.

‘I am very much obliged to you for your kindness to Lord March.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Dunlop.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Quinta de St. João,
9th July, 1811.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I enclose the state of the provisions in Elvas and La Lippe, the former on the 6th, and the latter on the 1st instant: you will see that they draw very handsomely on Elvas.

‘I cannot understand the difficulties said to exist in keeping the military chest supplied with the money said to be wanted for it in every month: for instance, the sum required for the expense of the whole army is 30,000,000 of crusades per annum, or 2,500,000 of crusades per mensem: the revenue, according to Mr. Stuart’s letter to me of the 10th June, is 730 contos in a month, 1,825,000 crusades. The supplies we already furnish your troops cost about 40,000*l.* per mensem, or 350,000 crusades; and I should suppose that the Portuguese Government could well receive supplies in kind at Lisbon every month to a similar amount, which would be monthly 700,000 crusades. There would remain to be provided for, monthly, 1,800,000 crusades, to which it appears that the revenue would be more than equal; but there are some other little items of accounts which would increase the payments by us; and of course

decrease the payments to the military chest; one of them is the whole expense of the pay and food of the 20th regiment at Cadiz.

‘After we should have thus given in provisions to the Portuguese troops, or in kind at Lisbon, to the value of 80,000*l.* per mensem, or, in round numbers, 1,000,000*l.* sterling per annum, there would remain 1,000,000*l.* sterling of the subsidy to be made good, of which sum Mr. Stuart thinks he can venture to promise to throw into the military chest every month between 50,000*l.* and 60,000*l.*, or 500,000 crusades. Upon adverting to Mr. Stuart’s statement of the expenditure of the Government, I find that it amounted to 113 contos, exclusive of arsenals; and to about 160 contos, or 400,000 crusades, in the month, including arsenals, besides military expense: if then, the Government will put the whole of these receipts every month into the military chest, and take from us 1,000,000*l.* in provisions and kind, and trust to what we can pay monthly of the subsidy for the expenses of the civil government, the military chest will be amply provided for; and in the course of the year, doubtless, the money payments of that part of the subsidy to be received in money will not be much in arrear, nor of course the charges of the civil government.

‘What I object to in the plan which came to me yesterday was, that, under pretence of forming a commissariat arrangement, it threw all the labor and all the responsibility upon the British army and British commissariat; while, at the same time, we were to supply, that which is the most difficult, the greatest part of the subsidy in money; and the Portuguese Government, who alone can get the money which is necessary to carry on their affairs, and who are most interested in carrying them on, were not to make every exertion in their power. I will make no exertion, and come into no arrangement which is not founded upon the positive stipulation that all the powers of the Government are to be really and duly exerted, and all their means fairly applied to carry on the war: when that is done, they will find me ready to labor in the cause, and to make every sacrifice, and everything else to forward it.

‘I see that some of the Officers have not been paid even gratuity since January, others not since February; some of

the troops have been paid only to the 31st May : if they had all this money, surely some might have been sent to pay the troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 11th July, 1811.

‘ I send with this my dispatch to Government, which I beg you to show to Generals Graham and Beresford.

‘ I enclose a statement showing the periods to which the Officers and soldiers of the Portuguese army have been paid pay and gratuity. I am concerned to observe that my representations upon this subject have had as little effect in procuring for these unfortunate gentlemen what is due to them as my representations to the Government have upon other subjects.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 11th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch (No. 39) relative to the grant of a medal to Colonel Sir Robert Wilson.

‘ I have already had the honor of reporting to the Secretary of State my sense of the services rendered by Sir Robert Wilson while under my command in the year 1809 ; and I see no reason why they should not be distinguished by the grant of the medal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 11th July, 1811.

‘ The enemy continued in the positions reported in my dispatch of the 4th instant, till the 7th, when they moved a large body of cavalry, and about two battalions of infantry,

from Montijo, towards the Gevora; and from thence upon Villar del Rey, La Roca, and Alburquerque.

‘The object of this movement was apparently to cut off our detachments employed in observing the enemy on that side, in which, however, they did not succeed; Major Cocks having retired with all his detachments upon San Vicente, still keeping communications open with Arronches and Portalegre.

‘The enemy’s troops retired from Alburquerque on the 8th, and Major Cocks again entered that town with his parties on the same day.

‘The army of Portugal are again in the same positions on the right of the Guadiana which they occupied when I addressed your Lordship on the 4th instant.

‘It appears by a letter of the 1st instant, from Marshal Marmont to the Prince of Neuchatel, that Soult has returned into Andalusia, leaving with Marshal Marmont the 5th corps and the greater part of his cavalry. Marmont appears to entertain the intention of posting his army on the Tagus at Almaraz, where he has a bridge, and maintain an intermediate post between his army and Badajoz, probably Truxillo, where I understand that the enemy are at work upon the ancient castle.

‘Excepting from this intercepted letter, I have had no reason to believe that the enemy had sent back so large a body of troops into Andalusia. But it is almost impracticable to procure intelligence of the enemy’s movements in this part of the country; notwithstanding, that I believe the inhabitants are as well disposed towards the Spanish Government as those of any other part of Spain.

‘If the battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to the regiments in the 5th corps, have made good the losses sustained by the latter in the battle of Albuera, I should conceive, from the returns I have, that the 5th corps consists of 12,000 effective infantry; which, added to the army of Portugal, would leave under the command of Marmont from 36,000 to 40,000 infantry, and between 5000 and 6000 cavalry, besides artillery. The allied army under my command consists of 42,000 effective infantry, and 4000 cavalry, of which 3000 are British cavalry, and this strength will in a short time be considerably increased.

‘ General Blake made an attempt to obtain possession of Niebla on the night of the 30th June ; in which place the enemy had a garrison of about 300 infantry. I am sorry to say, that this attempt failed ; and he remained before the place till the 2d instant, and then retired towards the Guadiana. On the 6th two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry of the 5th army, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, were crossing the Guadiana on a bridge constructed for them at San Lucar by Colonel Austin. The artillery was embarked at Ayamonte, and General Ballesteros, with the advanced guard, remained upon the river Piedra ; but I think it probable that General Ballesteros would have been obliged to retire, as a division of the enemy’s troops which had moved from Seville had arrived at Almendro on the 6th, and had turned off from thence upon Cartaya.

‘ It appeared to be General Blake’s intention to embark his troops for Cadiz ; but neither General Castaños nor I have heard from him since he marched from Jurumenha, on the 18th of June.

‘ In the north, General Bessières has returned again to Valladolid from Benavente ; and in the end of the month of June the enemy assembled at, and in the neighborhood of, Valladolid, a considerable body of troops. General Bonet, however, still remained in the neighborhood of Leon and Benavente with the troops under his command ; and I have received from General Silveira a report of the defeat of the French in an attack made upon a Spanish detachment from the army in Galicia, in front of Astorga, on the 25th June. The guerrillas likewise continue their operations, and besides the alarm given to Valladolid on the 15th, reported in my last dispatch, Don Julian gave a similar alarm to Salamanca on the 29th June ; but a considerable party of guerrillas belonging to different chiefs, which had taken a convoy at Peñaranda, were afterwards surprised there on the 30th of June, and dispersed ; about 200 having been killed, wounded, and made prisoners.

‘ I wish that I could report to your Lordship that some more beneficial advantage had resulted from the collection of the enemy’s troops in Estremadura to raise the siege of Badajoz, and better calculated to reconcile us to the disappointment upon that occasion. But I am apprehensive that,

till the Spanish Government shall reform their military system; till the Officers shall be instructed and the troops disciplined; till regular resources shall be found, and faithfully applied to the support of their armies on an expedition; and till the armies shall be equipped as they ought for the service required from them, the history of every attempt on our part to alter the nature of the war, on any general combined plan, will be the same as the last.

‘The enemy will collect to oppose us a larger body of troops than the allied British and Portuguese army can bring into the field, and will oblige us to take the defensive; and they will experience no danger, or even inconvenience, from their weakness in all other parts of the Peninsula, in consequence of their collecting their whole force to oppose us, because the Spanish armies are neither disciplined nor provided or equipped in such a manner as that they can perform any operation, even of the most trifling nature, if there should be any opposition on the part of the enemy.

‘The only chance, therefore, is to watch for opportunities of undertaking important operations of short duration, with the means at our own disposal, till the Spanish armies shall be in a better state.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Quinta de St. João, 11th July, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 22d June, in which your Lordship desires to have my opinion as to the restrictions which it may be expedient to put upon the grant of medals to British Officers, for distinguished merit displayed upon such occasions as the battles of Vimeiro, Coruña, Talavera, and Barrosa.

‘My opinion has always been, that the grant of a medal to an individual Officer ought to have been founded originally, partly on the importance of the occasion or action which it was intended to commemorate, and partly on the share which the individual Officer had had in the action to be commemorated; and that medals should have been granted for important actions only, and to those engaged

in them in a conspicuous manner, whatever might be their rank in the service.

‘ It was decided, however, that medals should be granted on the same principle only, but following strictly the example of the grant of medals to the navy, notwithstanding that an action on shore is very different from an action at sea; and the merit of the different classes of individuals are likewise entirely different. At the same time, this principle was departed from in some of the grants made.

‘ If the principle adopted in the grant of medals to the navy is adhered to in the grant of medals to Officers of the army, and that medals are to be granted to General Officers, and Lieutenant Colonels commanding regiments, on an occasion to be commemorated, because, on a similar occasion, they would be granted to Admirals and Captains of ships of the line, it is difficult to restrict the grant, or to make a selection of Officers to whom they should be granted, to commemorate the battles at Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro, if Government determine that these actions should be commemorated in that manner. If, however, that principle is departed from, it is not difficult to make out a list of the names of Officers already reported to your Lordship, who were at the head of corps or detachments upon these occasions, and who had a conspicuous share in the event which it is the intention of the Government to commemorate in this manner. It is not probable, however, that the adoption of this principle will decrease the number of those to whom the honor would be granted; but, as I have already represented to your Lordship, I do not think this important: that which is important in the establishment of the principle on which the grant of this honor should be made, is, that every Officer should feel that he shall receive the mark of distinction, if he should be in the place to distinguish himself, and should act in the manner to deserve to be distinguished, whatever may be his military rank. It may be contended by me, that the Officers of the British army do not require an honor of this description to stimulate their exertions, and that the grant of the medal is therefore useless; but, however, those who contend for this principle must admit that a selection of those who have had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves in an action is a less

objectionable mode of granting it than the grant of it by classes, whether the individuals composing those classes have distinguished themselves or not.

‘ I have now the honor to enclose lists of the names of the Officers who, on the principle of selection, ought, in my opinion, to receive medals for the battles of Busaco and Fuentes de Oñoro, if Government think proper to distinguish these battles by medals.

‘ In respect to the battle of Albuera, I was not there, and I am not able to give an opinion upon it. One brigade of the 4th division of infantry, however, was not in the action, nor Brig. General Madden’s brigade of cavalry. The brunt of the action was on the right; but some of the corps of infantry, I believe, and certainly General Otway’s brigade of cavalry, on the left, were not engaged. At all events, these troops were not engaged, as far as I understand, in a greater degree than the whole army were at Busaco, and every corps on the field at Fuentes de Oñoro.

‘ I mention these circumstances only to point out to your Lordship, that, in every action on shore, however severe, there must be some to whose lot it does not fall to have an opportunity to distinguish themselves; and that the principle of selection, without reference to ranks, ought to be adopted in every instance of the grant of medals to the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João,
12th July, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ You will have seen from Austin’s report of the 8th instant that it is probable Blake is off (for *we* know nothing of him), and that the Algarve is left very much to itself. I do not think it very probable that the enemy will make any serious attempt upon that province, but straggling parties might do a great deal of mischief; and I think you do well to send into Algarve the Setuval and Alcacer militia, to be under Austin’s orders, and to prevent anything small from insulting him: we can easily get them back by land, or by water, when we shall require them.

‘ I have at last got a statement of the regiments in the army of Portugal, but not their numbers: there are six divisions of infantry, and in each division four complete regiments, besides the Légion du Midi, Hanoverians, Prussians, and Irish. The regiments had, last campaign, four and five battalions each, including those brought in by the 9th corps, which have now joined them, and I should think this cannot now have less than from 1000 to 1200 men in each regiment: I am convinced, therefore, I am under the mark in supposing each division only 4000 infantry. They have one new regiment, the 130th, of which I have no account. They have eleven regiments of the cavalry which was in Portugal, which had forty four squadrons; and they have three regiments of four squadrons each, which passed the winter in Castille, and are in capital order: supposing the old cavalry, to be reduced one half, or to twenty two squadrons, they must have now thirty four squadrons. There is another fresh brigade of cavalry belonging to this army still in Castille, for which I have got the letter which Marmont has written.

‘ The devil is in the French for numbers!!! A deserter came in yesterday, and told me he heard Broissard say to another Officer, that the two armies had 60,000 infantry, and nearly 10,000 cavalry! I made them from 48,000 to 50,000 infantry, without the garrison of Badajoz, and 7000 cavalry.

‘ Our army continues very healthy, indeed more so since the nights have become warmer. I think you will do well to send us up your men as soon as they will be fit to join.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Marshal

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Austin.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 12th July, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 8th. I write to Marshal Beresford to request him to adopt measures to send you a force into Algarve at present. In the meantime, I request you to take measures to force the boats on the Guadiana to keep on the right of the river as much as possible. I do not think it probable that the enemy will venture to make any serious attempt upon Algarve, particularly if you

keep the boats out of their way; but it is as well that you should have some force.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Austin.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 10th to Lord Fitzroy Somerset; and I am very sorry that Captain —— has been guilty of a very great irregularity, in taking upon himself to do himself justice at Espinhal on the 11th May last, for which I must bring him to trial. I beg, therefore, that Captain —— may be put in arrest at large, and inform him that he will receive the copy of the charge on which he will be tried in due course.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811.

‘I have just received your letter of the 10th.

‘You will have seen from my letter to the Secretary of State, which I requested Mr. Stuart to communicate to you, that affairs are in such a state that there can be no reason why you should put yourself to any inconvenience to come to the army sooner than you would otherwise.

‘Nothing has occurred since I wrote to the Secretary of State, excepting that General Blake has embarked, leaving General Ballesteros, with his division, and the cavalry of the 5th army, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in the Condado de Niebla.

‘Believe me, &c.

Lieut. General Graham.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I have just received a letter of the 10th from Campo Mayor, from which I find that the Spaniards have not sailed yet, and some of Loy’s cavalry have not embarked, but the French have retired from Castillejos and Gibráleon.

‘W.’

MEMORANDUM

For Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811.

‘ The Captain General Castaños informed me yesterday, that General Ballesteros had remained with a division of infantry, and the cavalry under the Conde de Penne Ville-mur, in the Condado de Niebla; and that he (the Captain General) intended to recommend to General Ballesteros to retire across the Guadiana, into the kingdom of Algarve, in case he should be so pressed by the enemy as to render his retreat from the Condado de Niebla expedient. In consequence of this information, I recommend that General Ballesteros may be requested to communicate confidentially with Colonel Austin, who commands in Algarve, on all matters relating to his operations, in order that Colonel Austin may be prepared to assist General Ballesteros with the means of crossing the Guadiana with expedition, in case that measure should be expedient. It is also desirable, in order that Colonel Austin may be able to adopt measures to have the troops under General Ballesteros supplied with provisions during the time which it may be necessary that they should remain within the kingdom of Algarve. I propose to send Colonel Austin a copy of this memorandum, in order that he may be prepared to attend to General Ballesteros’ want of assistance to pass the Guadiana, and to his wants in provisions while he may be in Algarve.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 13th July,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 10th; and I am much concerned that I cannot take upon me to answer for your having the supplies of money wanted to make up the sum which you require to have in the chest every month. If you find that this failure, on the part of Great Britain, to be able positively to assure a certain sum every month, will prevent the accomplishment of the arrangement which you think necessary, you ought to report your opinions offi-

cially to the British Government; and I shall be very glad if they will make any arrangements by which I can be relieved from all concern in the money transactions of Great Britain with the Portuguese Government.

‘ I also think that if you are of opinion that the reserves of provisions cannot be supplied for the forts by the Portuguese Government, you should state officially that opinion, and then our Government will know upon what they are to reckon. I should think, however, that, Elvas being entirely supplied, you would be inclined to alter that opinion, unless indeed you should think that the Portuguese Government will not be able to supply the current consumption of the garrisons, and that they will immediately begin to consume the reserves.

‘ I acknowledge that the suspicion that this would be the case, and the discussions in which that question would involve the departments of this army, are the reasons why I positively refuse to have anything to say to the garrisons.

‘ If the Government act according to their own regulations, and will really put them in force, and really punish those who disobey them, there can be no difficulties about means of transport; but I do not see how these difficulties would be removed by our Commissaries supplying the reserves of the garrisons, and the Portuguese Commissaries the current consumption.

‘ I have done a great deal in the way of supplying the consumption of the Portuguese army, and probably have undertaken far more than I shall be able to accomplish in all situations; but this is very certain, that I cannot venture to undertake to do more.

‘ General Castaños has promised to garrison and refit Alburquerque, which is a great object in these times. He is going to send Don Carlos de España to Castille; and I am thinking of fitting up, as a little depôt of ammunition, &c., for him, in Monsanto, in which he will put 200 or 300 men, if the Portuguese Government will have no objection to his holding that place. I shall be much obliged to you if you will inquire. He is also desirous of having a similar depôt north of the Douro. I know of no place in Portugal which would answer his purpose; but, as well as I can

recollect, Monterey would. Do you recollect anything of Monterey?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P.S. General Picton tells me that the outwork at Campo Mayor is finished, and ready for the palisades.

‘ The artillery are much in want of mules, to which I hope you have adverted in your communication with Government; so much so, that I think it might be advisable to send away the 6 pounder brigade in Hamilton’s division, and to have only 9 pounders, and to employ all the mules in equipping them as they ought to be. Your brigades of infantry are likewise miserably deficient in provision mules.

‘ I saw the 2d and 4th, and Hamilton’s division, this morning. The 13th is a very fine regiment, in very tolerable order. I am sorry to say that Ashworth’s brigade have fallen off in their marching; all the rest capital. These Albuera divisions were very strong again.

‘ I have desired Mr. Kennedy to give the chest 50,000 dollars in coin.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

7 P. M.

‘ I have just received your two letters of the 11th.

‘ I have not yet seen the complaints of the Officers of our commissariat at Coimbra, but when I see them I shall write upon them. Our Commissaries are not allowed to give protection to individuals of any description, but they must have assistance from the country; and it will not answer the purpose of the Portuguese Government to prevent them from having it. All persons employed by us belonging to Spain are protected from the requisition. I suppose the Portuguese Government will not refuse to give the same countenance to the British army that is given by the Spaniards.

‘ I do not exactly understand the letter of the Government on the fortification of Elvas. In answer to the last paragraph, however, I must express a wish that Mr. Stuart should send it home.

‘ I do everything in my power to forward the cause ; and I wish that the Portuguese Government should try whether their affairs could not be improved by a change of hands. Nothing could be more satisfactory to me than such a change.

‘ I shall attend to your wishes in the distribution of the cavalry. You did not send me the report on Almeida.

‘ I sent Mr. Stuart a statement of the period to which the Officers of the army are paid. Mr. Kennedy can easily, and I shall desire him to-morrow to send an estimate of his disbursements for the Portuguese Government, which it is probable they will not much amend ; and he can send a monthly account, and a quarterly account ; because in the former he cannot include the disbursements at Cadiz. You can likewise send your demand upon England, which ought to have been sent by the Government as long ago as March ; but I cannot say that the balance will be paid in money, or at what periods it will be paid ; and upon that point I sincerely wish that you should come to an explanation with the British Government, and not with me.

‘ I have not now money to answer the demands of the British army ; and it is rather too much that the Portuguese should insist that I should fix the sums which they are to receive every month, out of the sums at my disposal, already not sufficient for the British army ; to which add, that occasional assistance is wanted for the Spaniards, and that there is no man, however anxious for the prosperity of Portuguese concerns, who will not admit that this assistance should be given. However, I have no desire that matters should continue as they are. Let Government provide only decently for the British army, and I shall be satisfied ; or let them take the whole concern out of my hands, and I shall be happy to resign it. Just to show you how we stand in respect to money, I mention that we have not even a shilling in the chest to pay the demands of the Officers of the 2d battalion of your regiment, upon the first being drafted by orders from England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Austin.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

' Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811.

‘I send you the copy of a memorandum which I have sent to General Castaños, which will explain itself. You will act as therein stated, if so required by General Ballesteros ; and I beg you to let me have an account of any expense you may incur on account of provisions or boats for General Ballesteros’ division of troops.

‘ You might as well have prepared a magazine, with 6000 or 8000 rations, for General Ballesteros, in case he should cross the Guadiana upon you suddenly ; but it may be as well not to let him know of it, otherwise you would not keep it long.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Austin.'

WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th, and its enclosures ; from the tenor of which last I suspect Mr. — to have been in the French service, and probably to be a spy. The phraseology of his letter to you is evidently that of a person who has been in the service of the French : and I beg you to communicate with Mr. Stuart in order to have him released from confinement in gaol, and send him to head quarters under charge of an assistant provost and a guard ; but let his reasonable convenience be provided for.

‘I beg you also to send me any letters or papers, or the memorandums of any interrogatories to him, which can throw light upon his conduct or intentions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Major General Peacocke.'

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

^c Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose certain papers which I have received on the subject of the misconduct of certain Officers at Espinhal, on the 11th May last, adverted to in a letter from you of the 10th of June; and I have to inform you that I have ordered Captain —— in arrest for his conduct, and I shall keep him in arrest during one month, in hopes that the Government

will, in the course of that time, adopt measures to enforce the attendance of the evidences against Captain —. If they should not do so I shall be under the necessity of relieving Captain — from his arrest.

‘I mention this, because I observe that, as usual, there is great readiness to complain of the injury done in this case, but no desire to prosecute; as it is obvious that the complainant not only knew the name of Captain —, and the regiment to which he belonged, but that he did not belong to the hussars. The consequence of his concealing the name of Captain — is that much time has elapsed, and I have been obliged to look through all the march routes given to troops in the month of May, before I could discover who was complained of.

‘I shall likewise observe on this case, that although Captain — will be brought to trial for having taken upon himself to do himself justice, I am not astonished when an Officer of the British army is guilty of this conduct.

‘They scarcely ever enter a village in which they or their men are not robbed, and they can get no redress on the spot; and, as for punishment for any crime committed, I repeat that, since I have been in Portugal, I have not known any man punished, excepting those suspected of being French partizans. But whatever may be the conduct of the Portuguese Government, I shall not allow the British army to commit irregularities with impunity, and Captain — shall certainly be tried, if, within a month, any evidence should be produced against him.

‘It is useless to inquire whether any steps have been taken against the criminal confined for the robbery.

‘I beg you to return the enclosed papers as soon as may be possible.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘His Excellency

Charles Stuart,

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY, Quinta de St. João, 13th July, 1811.

‘I enclose my last dispatch to the Secretary of State.

‘I have got a statement of the regiments in the army of Portugal, which amount to twenty four, and four or six bat-

ons of foreign troops and fourteen of cavalry. I have
 Officer who counted 25,000 infantry, coming through
 os, and there were some that passed through Lagunilla.
 y must be between 24,000 and 30,000 infantry, and the
 lry between 3000 and 4000 at least. They have one
 ment that was not in Portugal; and when one considers
 t that army was last year, and the reinforcements it re-
 ed, allowance is made for very handsome losses, in sup-
 ing them reduced to the numbers above stated. I think
 e numbers agree tolerably well with what I saw of the
 y at Fuentes, allowing for the detachment to Andalusia
 ineteen battalions of the 9th corps.

It is said in the French army that they have, between the
 armies lately brought into Estremadura, 60,000 infantry
 10,000 cavalry. I believe the latter exaggerated by
 ut 3000 men, although they had at Badajoz twenty seven
 iments of cavalry, but the former but very little, and not
 ll if the garrison of Badajoz is included.

We are increasing in strength. I have received at Lis-
 2000 or 3000 men from England. Our wounded, &c.,
 coming about, and we shall soon have not much less than
 000 effective men, Portuguese and English.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

e Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

Y DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 14th July, 1811.

I have just received your letter of the 12th. The horses
 hich you refer have been sent here by the Government at
 request, in order to supply the wants of the Officers of
 cavalry, who ought to have each an English horse; but
 y had not been able to purchase any in the country, and
 requested the Secretary of State to send them out.

I conceive that it is equally necessary that a General
 cer in your situation, coming from a place in which you
 ld not get the horses you require, should be provided by
 e public arrangement: and therefore I beg you to take
 a number of those horses as you may think proper. I do
 exactly recollect whether the price is 50%. or 60%. each,
 whether Sir Stapleton Cotton settled that they should

be paid for according to a valuation of each, the whole amount covering the expense of their purchase incurred by Government; and I shall not delay this answer to your letter till I shall have had time to inquire. Let me know the number you will take, in order that I may write to England to have them replaced for the service of the Officers of the cavalry.

‘There is nothing new this day, excepting a report from Caceres that Marmont has commenced his movement, which, however, has not yet been confirmed by anything from our outposts.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. I enclose an order to the Officer commanding the cavalry dépôt, to deliver to you as many of the horses purchased for the Officers of the cavalry as you may require.

‘W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Quinta de St. João, 14th July, 1811.

‘I received last night your letter of the 8th, after I had sent off the dispatch of yesterday.

‘I never entertained such an opinion as that attributed to me by Don E. de Bardaxi, viz., that, if the mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her colonies should fail, we ought to go hand in hand with the Spanish Government in carrying on hostilities against the colonies.

‘My opinion has invariably been, that, in all the concerns of Spain, Great Britain ought to take the liberal line of policy, and to lay aside, at least during the existing war, all considerations of mercantile profit; and it appeared to me that, in this question of the colonies particularly, this line would suit equally with the military policy and the mercantile interests of Great Britain, and add greatly to the general estimation of our character.

‘I am, and have always been, of opinion, that the notions of our merchants of the vast profits to be made by an immediate direct intercourse with the Spanish colonies were erroneous. That profit was to be made by this intercourse there is no doubt, and that eventually the extent and value

of the commercial intercourse with the colonies will be very great I am certain; but this value must be the effect of time, of the increase of riches, and of the growth of luxury in the colonies, and the period of its arrival at its highest state is likely to be checked by the extravagant speculations of our merchants.

‘ I think that, whatever may be the final relative situation between Spain and her colonies, Great Britain must be the gainer. The result must be the relaxation, if not annihilation of the colonial commercial system, and a direct allowed intercourse between the colonies and all other countries, in which Great Britain must be a partaker and the greatest gainer. In expectation of this ultimate gain, the policy of Great Britain ought to have been liberal throughout, as I hope it will turn out upon examination to have been. The wild speculations of the colonies ought to have been checked; the authority of the mother country ought to have been countenanced; and the endeavors of our traders and captains of ships to separate the colonies from Spain ought to have been suppressed.

‘ On these principles I approved highly of Lord Liverpool’s letter to the governor of Curaçoa, which circumstance may probably have given Don E. de Bardaxi a notion that I thought we ought to go all lengths with Spain in subduing the spirit of independence in the colonies; but I conceive these principles are by no means inconsistent with the conduct of the British Government since Lord Liverpool’s letter was written, at least as far as I have any knowledge of it; and what has occurred since does not appear to me to be inconsistent with that letter.

‘ When the colonies, at least some of them, had manifested an inclination to separate from the mother country, it was necessary for the British Government to consider, not only what Spain could do, but what Great Britain could assist Spain in effecting. Knowing what I do of the Spanish Government and its means and resources, and the employment for them, I am certain that they have not the power to reduce to obedience even one of the weakest of the colonies which is disposed to separate. I am equally certain that to make the attempt would be the grossest folly and misapplication of means; and I will go further, and declare, that I

believe that Great Britain could not, in justice to the greater object in the Peninsula, give Spain any assistance from which any good effect can be expected.

‘ I am afraid that it is but too true, that if distant colonies choose to separate from the mother country they will effect their object; and at all events it would have been the height of madness, in these times, for Spain to have endeavored, by force, to prevent such a separation, or for Great Britain to have encouraged and aided in such an attempt.

‘ The conduct which Great Britain ought to have followed was to endeavor, by influence and advice, to prevent matters from coming to extremities, if possible; and at all events not to direct her force to an object which was quite unattainable.

‘ Nothing can be so absurd as to suppose that Spain, with two frigates, could prevent the separation of the Caraccas, or that the reception in London of the deputies from that colony prevented that *great effort* from having its effect. If the deputies had not been received in London they would have gone by the first packet to France; and the truth, however disagreeable, which I have above stated, would have been discovered.

‘ At last Great Britain has offered her mediation in the dispute, which I wish had been asked for; and it remains to be considered on what terms the offer ought to be accepted. I have already pointed out that Great Britain is a fair mediator, as our interests, well understood, as I believe they are, are not inconsistent either with the well understood interests of Spain, or of the colonies, in their existing situation; and it would have been better if the mediation had been accepted in the spirit in which it was offered, and that the Spanish Government had come forward with a full but confidential declaration of their intentions respecting the colonies in future, both on the subject of constitution and of commerce. Great Britain would then have had something to mediate upon and to arrange between the two parties; but under present circumstances there is nothing for her to do, excepting to procure the submission of the Caraccas and Buenos Ayres; and, if Great Britain does not succeed in these impracticable objects, she is to aid Spain in forcing their submission! And I am supposed to approve of this

condition, and to think that Great Britain ought to join in this war between mother country and colonies ! One would really believe that Don E. de Bardaxi had never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, and to the objects which they have to acquire at home, or to the efforts making here by Great Britain, and that he thought I had considered of these subjects as little as he appears to have done !

‘ Great Britain cannot agree to this condition. In respect to constitution the Spanish Government has gone a great length ; but I doubt that they have gone so far as the colonies, some of them at least, will require. I think they will ask to have separate local representative bodies for the management of their interior concerns, of the same description with our colonial assemblies, leaving in the Cortes more or less authority in imperial and general questions, and having in the Cortes a representative or not, according to the nature of the authority remaining with the Cortes, and the mode in which it will be exerted. But this question, however important, does not appear to have been considered.

‘ In respect to commerce, the Spanish Government have said nothing. There is nothing more certain, however, than that the commercial intercourse between Spain and her colonies cannot continue to exist as it has hitherto. The consequence of what has already been done, and of what is offered in this proposed treaty of mediation, must be to place the colonies, in respect to trade, on the same footing with the mother country, and to allow the colonies to trade, as it may suit their interests, with all parts of the world, in the same manner as any province of Old Spain. If this consequence does not follow what has been done it is useless to talk to the colonies of equal rights, and interests equally well attended to. It will be obvious to the inhabitants of the colonies, and they will feel, that their interests are sacrificed for the supposed interests of the mother country, on the old system of colonial policy.

‘ I admit, however, that the mother country will lose immediately (though probably not eventually) very largely in revenue, and its inhabitants in commercial profits, by these commercial concessions to the colonies ; and although probably these losses are the unavoidable effects of the circum-

stances of the times, the mother country has a fair claim to participate in the advantages which the colonies will enjoy, particularly in the existing moment of her distress. This is an object to which the treaty of mediation should have adverted. The Spanish Government should have made known to Great Britain, confidentially, on what system it was proposed that the commerce of the colonies should be carried on hereafter; what duties should be levied on the imports of goods of foreign countries into the colonies; *and what proportion of those duties should be paid to the mother country for general imperial purposes*; and what to remain in the colony for local objects.

‘ With a system thus formed, Great Britain might have gone to work with some prospect of success in making an arrangement which would have permanently united the colonies to the mother country, by providing for their mutual interests on just and fair principles; and which at all events, by putting an end to the existing disputes, would have removed the uneasiness which they occasion, and would have increased the means and resources of Spain to carry on the war against the common and *only* enemy. And you will observe that in the establishment of this system Great Britain would have done, in every point, that which suits her own interest.

‘ But I am apprehensive that the Spanish Government have not taken an enlarged view, either of their own situation or that of the colonies, or of the two relatively with each other; and till they do so matters will only grow worse and worse daily, and it is useless for us to interfere in them; and after a long contest, which will only tend to the weakness of the mother country, and will deprive her of all the resources which she could otherwise derive from the colonies in her war with France, the business will end in the separation of the colonies from Spain.

‘ You are now in possession of my opinion upon this whole subject; and you may inform Don E. de Bardaxi that there is nothing so far from my thoughts as that it is possible for Spain to prevent the separation of any one colony that chooses to separate, and that nothing could be so absurd or so injurious to Spain herself, as for Great Britain to divert any of her military resources from the war in the Peninsula

to the impracticable object of reducing to obedience even the smallest and least powerful of the colonies of Spain disposed to separate.

‘ There is nothing new, excepting a report that Marmont is in motion to take up his proposed position on the Tagus.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 15th July, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you would look at the last paragraph of Dom M. Forjaz’ last letter, on the subject of the repairs of the forts, in which he refers to the payments of the subsidy.

‘ As I believe that the Portuguese Government have received, up to the present day, more than the old and new subsidy, and that we have been at all times in advance to them, those assertions respecting arrears of subsidy ought not in my opinion to go unanswered. At all events, as far as I have any knowledge, they have no right to make any official reference to the new subsidy, as they have not been officially apprised of it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João,
17th July, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have received your letters of the 12th and 13th. The breeze about the subsidy is a very curious circumstance: I really believe that, up to the present day, it has been overpaid to the amount of about 200,000*l.* sterling; and last year they received above a million in hard cash: within the last two months they have received above 200,000*l.* in money, allowing 25 per cent for discount upon paper.

‘ The losses at Albuera, and the substitution of 1st for 2d battalions, will render it difficult to place even one brigade in General Hamilton’s division. I intended to have placed there two brigades, and to have formed his division like the others, with only one Portuguese brigade, which we should

then have been able to provision; but we should not be able to provision two Portuguese brigades, with the means attached to one British brigade, in addition to the British brigade.

There is also another point to be adverted to in the consideration of this subject, and that is the growing deficiency of means of transport with all the Portuguese brigades in our divisions, particularly in the 5th division; they have not mules sufficient to carry their ammunition; in the 3d twenty eight mules were driven away by their drivers two days ago and in others there are deficiencies. I suspect that the Portuguese Commissaries do not take care to feed the people attached to the mules; for their life must latterly have been an easy one, and they have had but little to do, excepting to carry forage for their own beasts. Whatever may be the cause of desertion, however, the evil is a serious one, and must increase the difficulties of supplying the Portuguese troops by our commissariat, and in case of a march it will be quite impossible.

I see that there are some troops in motion in Castille towards Ciudad Rodrigo, which is I believe with a view to provision the place, which Don Julian had kept tolerably closely blockaded.

You may depend upon it that the return which I sent to Mr. Stuart of the state of the payments to the Portuguese troops was correct, as I received it from the regiments. Joaquim de Costa covers himself under the usual Portuguese subterfuge, that he has sent the money; but it has been applied to some other purpose, and the troops have not received it.

I have just received your letter of the 15th. As Ballesteros remains in Niebla, it is not so necessary to send militia into Algarve. I think we become more healthy every day.

I enclose you a daily state, which will show you how we stand now in cavalry and infantry. I have had a great deal of trouble in getting this state, particularly from Madden's brigade, in which I believe no return was kept; however, I believe it is at last right and regular. March is gone to Lisbon, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give him house and table room at Cintra, where he proposes to go.

‘As Marmont has moved, I move into cantonments also on to-morrow, having our right about Estremoz, and our left at Castello Branco. I shall go to Portalegre; I shall remain there for a short time, till all I expect join us, when I have two or three different designs in contemplation.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘P. S. I enclose a paper with but bad news.

‘W.’

To Major General Peacocke.

‘SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 17th July, 1811.

‘The horses of the 9th light dragoons are to be landed and given in charge to the men of the 2d hussars, King’s German Legion, and others who may be at the depôt at Belem, until they shall be hereafter distributed to regiments under orders from Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton.

‘The men and Officers of the 9th light dragoons, with their appointments, &c., are to be embarked in infantry transports, and to proceed to Sicily*; for which purpose I request you to make the necessary application to Admiral Berkeley for transports, as well as for a sufficient number of horse transports to carry to Sicily the horses belonging to the Officers of the 9th light dragoons.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major General Peacocke.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Quinta de St. João, 17th July, 1811.

‘In order to explain the orders which I have received from the Secretary of State, regarding the 9th light dragoons, in the readiest way, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the orders which I have given to General Peacocke; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order ships to convey this regiment to Sicily, and horse ships to convey the Officers’ horses. I have been likewise directed to request you to send

* A subsequent arrangement was made, and the 9th light dragoons served in the Peninsula until they returned to England in the spring of 1813.

back to Plymouth the horse transports which brought out the 9th light dragoons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Messrs. Brown and Reid.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 17th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant, and I have referred to the consideration of the Commissary General the offer which it contains, of the sale of certain oats, barley, and hay. I must inform you, however, that in every case of this description I consider myself obliged to act for the public as I would for an individual, that is to say, to purchase what the army require at the cheapest rate at which it can be procured, without any reference whatever to the loss of the seller.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Messrs. Brown and Reid.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 18th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have just received, which shows an alteration of plan about the 9th dragoons, and probably it may not be necessary for Sir William to go to Lisbon just at present; however, it is possible that the packet may bring the account of another change.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

18th July, 1811.

‘ Madden, who formerly complained of hard work, now that he has no work, complains of starvation: two days ago his horses had been six days without corn; and, having inquired on this subject from Mr. Thomas, I enclose his letter to Major Harvey.

‘ One of Madden’s brigades was to cross the Tagus in the new distribution of the army; but if they cannot be fed at

Campo Mayor, they cannot anywhere; and it would really be much better to draw all this cavalry to the rear, and feed them there, than keep them in front starving and plundering, and consuming that which our own horses will want yet, viz., straw.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P.S. Barbacena’s cavalry, and Nos. 6 and 9, are to go to Elvas. ‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 18th July, 1811.

‘ Since I had the honor of addressing your Lordship on the 11th instant, I have received a particular account of the regiments composing the army of Portugal. It consists of twenty four regiments of French infantry, of which one, the 130th of the line, was not in Portugal during the last campaign, and four regiments of foreign infantry, and fourteen regiments of cavalry, three of which were not in Portugal last campaign.

‘ All the troops which were in Portugal last campaign are now in this army, with the exception of seventeen battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to regiments serving in the corps composing the army of the south, and three or four battalions of the 8th corps, also of the same description.

‘ Allowing very largely for the losses of the French army in the late operations in Portugal, I cannot suppose the regiments of French infantry to be reduced below from 1000 to 1200 men each, or the foreign infantry below 500 men each; and on this ground I should suppose the army of Portugal now to consist of from 28,000 to 30,000 infantry. Sixteen of the regiments of cavalry which were in Portugal last campaign cannot now exceed from 200 to 250 men each; but the three which were not in Portugal arrived from France in the last autumn, passed the winter in Castille, and now consist of 400 or 450 men each. According to this estimate the cavalry would amount to from 3500 to 4000 men.

‘ These estimates of the numbers of the army of Portugal

agree with the reports I have received of them from a very intelligent Officer, Captain Grant, of the 11th regiment, who saw them march through the Puerto de Baños, and with what I saw of them at the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, after allowing for the deduction, from the force opposed to us on that occasion, of the battalions of the 8th and 9th corps, since detached to the army of the south, and for the cavalry of the imperial guard still remaining in Castille. The estimate of numbers also agrees with what the enemy have stated of their own force, and with the accounts which I have received of the numbers of particular divisions.

‘The army of Portugal, however, may be stronger than I suppose, as I have only a list of the regiments and battalions, and their distribution in divisions, but not a return of their strength. I know also that there are three more regiments of cavalry belonging to this army still in Castille, making the cavalry of the army of Portugal seventeen regiments of four squadrons each.

‘From the returns which I have of the army of the south, and supposing that the troops which joined Marshal Soult from Castille, with General Drouet, amounted to only 6000 men, I have estimated that the force of infantry which he brought into Estremadura amounted to 25,000 rank and file, and thirteen regiments of cavalry, making a total in the two armies of from 50,000 to 55,000 infantry, exclusive of the garrison of Badajoz, and twenty seven regiments of cavalry, or about 7000 cavalry, besides artillery.

‘This estimate of the numbers of the army of the south likewise agrees with the accounts which I have received of them from different quarters.

‘In my dispatches of the 11th instant I apprised your Lordship that the 5th corps d’armée, and the greatest part of the cavalry of the army of the south, had been left in Estremadura, in communication with the army of Portugal; and that from the returns I had reason to believe that the 5th corps consisted of 12,000 effective infantry. This would leave in Estremadura at present about 40,000 effective infantry, exclusive of the garrison of Badajoz, and between 5000 and 6000 cavalry, besides artillery.

‘In the situation which Marshal Marmont will take upon the Tagus he may assist or may receive assistance by his

right from Marshal Bessières in Castille, as well as assist or receive assistance from the 5th corps d'armée in Estremadura, and that is the motive for taking up this position. I should imagine that Marshal Bessières could bring together about 10,000 men, including Bonet's division, now in Leon, &c., and the imperial guard.

‘ I have now the honor to enclose to your Lordship the last weekly state of the British troops in Portugal, and the morning state of yesterday morning of the troops composing the allied army actually in the field, from which your Lordship will observe that there are 44,810 rank and file of infantry; and, taking the number of cavalry from the horses, 4299 cavalry, of which 3073 are British, besides artillery. In this state are not included the 68th, 77th, 32d, and 26th regiments, which have not yet joined the army; nor the 12th light dragoons; the whole of which, with recovered men from the hospitals, may be expected to add 5000 men to our numbers in the course of the next fortnight.

‘ With this force it becomes a question whether any and what operation shall be undertaken.

‘ With the fine and well-equipped army which we have, and with our cavalry in such good order as it is, and with the prospect of the renewal of hostilities in the north of Europe, I am most anxious not to allow this moment of the enemy's comparative weakness to pass by without making an effort to improve the situation of the allies in the Peninsula; and I proceed to inform your Lordship of what I think of the different courses of operation which we may pursue.

‘ In the present season of the year it is quite impossible to undertake the siege of Badajoz. The loss of men from the heat of the weather and the unwholesomeness of the climate in Estremadura, if the troops should be obliged to perform any labor during the ensuing six weeks or two months, would exceed what might be expected in a general action. Besides, if this operation were to be attempted, Soult could without difficulty increase the army in Estremadura from 10,000 to 15,000 men, and the enemy would again have the superiority of numbers in the field.

‘ I had intended to endeavor to fall upon the army of Portugal, if left to itself by Soult's movement to the southward in consequence of General Blake's operations: but

from what I have stated to your Lordship of the relative numbers of the two armies now existing in Estremadura, you will observe that ours are but little superior; that we are inferior in that principal arm in this open country, cavalry; and therefore that any success which we might derive in a general action, to which I might bring the army of Portugal and the 5th corps d'armée, would not be very decisive; and that, on the other hand, the loss which we should sustain, by the heat of the weather and by the length of the marches which we should be obliged to make, in order only to get water, would be very great.

‘The attempt to relieve Cadiz would certainly not succeed. The 5th corps d'armée and the army of Portugal would follow our movements to the south, if they did not attempt some offensive operation on the Portuguese frontier in our absence; and we should meet in Andalusia the whole force which lately obliged us to raise the siege of Badajoz, with the addition to it of the force which was left before Cadiz.

‘The next operation which presents itself is the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, for which I have so far prepared as to have our battering train on the Douro.

‘It would be necessary in this case to leave 10,000 or 12,000 men in Alentejo, to watch the movements of the 5th corps d'armée, which would reduce our force to about 45,000 men, to which Marmont and Bessières would be equal, and superior in cavalry; and if the 5th corps were to be moved to the north of the Tagus, to co-operate in the endeavor to oblige us to abandon our object, our troops in Alentejo would follow the movement. But still the enemy would be equal to us in numbers, and superior in cavalry.

‘This enterprise, however, upon the whole promises best. We can derive some assistance from our militia in the north in carrying it into execution, and the climate in which the operation is to be carried on is not unfavorable at this season. If it should not succeed, the attempt will remove the war to the strongest frontier of Portugal; and, if obliged to resume the defensive, the strength of our army will be centrically situated, while the enemy's armies of the north and of the south will be disunited.

‘Under all these circumstances I am tempted to try this

enterprise. But I beg your Lordship to observe that I may be obliged to abandon it. In a case in which the relative force of the two armies will be so nearly balanced as in this, and particularly in an operation in the Peninsula of Spain, it is impossible for me to foresee all the events which may lead to this result. But the arrival of reinforcements to the enemy, or farther information of the enemy's force, which should show them to be stronger than I now imagine them to be, or the falling off of the strength of our army owing to the sickness of the troops, which I do not now expect, would necessarily oblige me to abandon the enterprise.

‘My intention now is to canton the army on the two banks of the Tagus, until the reinforcements have joined. In the meantime the train will be moved up the Douro, and the preparations will be made for transporting it to Ciudad Rodrigo; and, when these are completed, I propose to put the army in motion to attempt the siege of that place, if I should find that circumstances afford a chance of success.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Quinta de St. João, 18th July, 1811.

‘The army of Portugal broke up from their position on the Guadiana on the 14th instant, and have moved towards Truxillo.

‘I have not yet heard that any troops had passed that town towards Almaraz, or that the cavalry which had been about Talavera and Lobon had retired farther than Merida. But their intention is certainly to take a position on the Tagus, which shall be central to the north as well as to the south, from which they could move with facility to either quarter to which our operations may be directed, and in which they can receive the assistance of the troops in Old Castille or in Estremadura, if they should require it.

‘They are fortifying the old castle of Medellin, as well as that at Truxillo, from which circumstance I judge that the communication between the army of Portugal and the 5th corps d’armée will be carried across the Guadiana, by the bridge of Medellin.

‘As the circumstances which induced me to occupy the position in which the army now is no longer exist, I propose to canton the troops for the present along the frontier, in those towns reported to be healthy, with the right at Estremoz, and the left across the Tagus, at Castello Branco; and the troops are already in movement with that object in view.

‘General Blake embarked his corps in the mouth of the Guadiana on the 6th, leaving General Ballesteros’ division of troops, and the cavalry of the 5th army, still in the Condado de Niebla. The troops sailed on the 13th; and General Ballesteros was near Ayamonte by the last accounts.

‘As soon as General Blake’s corps embarked the body of the enemy’s troops which had marched towards the Guadiana, and by the last account I sent your Lordship had turned towards Cartaya, retired from the frontier towards San Lucar, having heard probably that one of the objects which General Blake had in view when he embarked was to make an attack upon that place.

‘I understand that the troops belonging to the 4th corps, which Marshal Soult had brought into Estremadura, had marched towards Granada, so that there remain in Andalusia the 1st corps and the reserve; the 5th corps and the greatest part of the cavalry being in Estremadura.

‘I have heard nothing more of the action which it was reported had been fought near Astorga: and I have reason to believe that there was no foundation for the report upon that subject which General Silveira forwarded to me.

‘There is nothing new on the side of Valladolid, excepting that King Joseph had returned to Spain, and it is said arrived at Burgos with an escort of about 3000 men on the 5th instant. It is reported that he was to be followed by large reinforcements; but no troops had arrived at Bayonne when I last heard from thence.

‘A detachment of about 1000 men of the garrison of Salamanca had marched towards Bejar on the 10th, apparently to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, which place Don Julian had for some time held closely blockaded.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For Colonels Framingham and Fletcher, and Mr. Kennedy.

‘Quinta de St. João, 19th July, 1811.

‘1. The heavy ordnance and stores, and engineers’ stores, now embarked in the transports in the Douro, being required at Ciudad Rodrigo, measures must be adopted to remove them thither.

‘2. They must be removed into boats at Oporto, and carried by water to Lamego.

‘3. At Lamego they must be landed, and the ordnance removed at once by 384 pairs of bullocks to Trancoso. The stores, that is to say, 350 rounds for each 18 pounder and 24 pounder gun, and 160 rounds for each 10 inch mortar, to be removed to Trancoso, on 892 country carts.

‘4. The engineers’ stores to be removed to Trancoso upon 200 country carts.

‘5. The 892 carts, mentioned in No. 3, to be unloaded at Trancoso, and to return to Lamego, to bring up to Trancoso the remainder of the stores.

‘6. Upon the arrival of the second quantity of stores at Trancoso, the whole ordnance, and the stores for 350 rounds a gun and for 160 rounds each mortar, on 892 carts, and the engineers’ stores on 200 carts, to move to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘7. The ordnance stores to be unloaded at Ciudad Rodrigo, and the 892 carts to return to Trancoso for the second convoy.

‘8. Colonel Framingham to order from Lisbon to Oporto 1600 barrels of powder, to complete the quantity at that place to what will be sufficient for the shot and shells with the battering train.

‘9. Major Dickson is requested to proceed to Oporto, in order to superintend the removal of the ordnance and stores from thence, and Colonel Fletcher will send there an Officer of the engineer department.

‘10. These Officers will communicate with the gentlemen employed by the Commissary General, to collect the necessary boats and carts; and the matter should be arranged in such a manner as that the stores would be at Lamego at the time the carts would be ready to remove them.

‘11. The two companies of British artillery now at Lisbon to be ordered to Oporto by sea.

‘12. Probable time these operations will take :

12 days for Major Dickson’s journey to Oporto.

6 „ for the removal of the stores and ordnance to the boats.

6 „ from Oporto to Lamego.

8 „ from the boats to Lamego.

4 „ from Lamego to Trancoso.

4 „ carts to return and load.

4 „ two trips to Trancoso.

6 „ to Ciudad Rodrigo.

6 „ to return to Trancoso.

6 „ to bring the second quantity of stores.

—
62 days.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 19th July, 1811.

‘I request you to apply to Admiral Berkeley for transports to convey to Oporto two companies of the Royal British artillery, which you will direct to embark when the transports shall be ready; and, on the arrival of these companies at Oporto, they are to place themselves under the orders of Major Dickson.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Generals Picton, Campbell, and Slade.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘I have the honor to inform you that Don Carlos de España has been appointed to command and to superintend all Spanish affairs in Castille, and that part of Estremadura north of the Tagus, and to request you to communicate with him on the public service, and to give him countenance and support as far as may be consistent with the instructions which you will have received.

‘ I request you to forward to head quarters any letters that he may send to you for that purpose.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Generals*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Picton, Campbell, and Slade.’

To Rear Admiral the Hon. A. Legge.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th, announcing your arrival at Cadiz, to relieve Admiral Sir Richard Keats; and I assure you that I shall have great satisfaction in communicating and in co-operating with you, to forward the public service. Mr. Wellesley will make you acquainted with the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Rear Admiral
the Hon. A. Legge.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João,
20th July, 1811.

‘ In the existing situation of affairs I think it not impossible that I may be able to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, although the prospect that I should be able to effect that operation is become less favorable since the accounts have arrived of the fall of Tarragona. However, we shall have a very fine army of little less than 60,000 men, including artillery, in the course of about a fortnight; and I do not see what I can do with it, to improve the situation of the allies, during the period in which it is probable that, the enemy's attention being taken up with the affairs of the north of Europe, we shall be more nearly on a par of strength with him, excepting we undertake this operation. I have, therefore, at all events, ordered the battering train up the Douro, and the preparations to be made for moving it from Lamego; and Dickson goes to Oporto to-morrow to superintend these arrangements. There would be no difficulty in them if we had been able to save Almeida: however, it is useless to lament what cannot be easily remedied.

‘ It will be necessary that the militia of the *Tras os Montes*, at least of the northern provinces, should be under arms during this operation, and that we should have the assistance of all that, in *Beira*, whether for work or for other objects. These regiments should, therefore, be immediately embodied in their districts, and they can afterwards be assembled in large corps. I expect that in seven weeks I

shall have matters in preparation for this enterprise; but before that time it will be necessary to have troops on foot in Beira, to cover the movement of stores, &c.: this will give the army something more than a month in cantonments.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João,
20th July, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received last night your letter of the 16th. In respect to the protections from the recruiting laws of persons in the private service of individuals in the British army, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what is the law, and the practice under the law, in regard to the private servants of the Portuguese Officers, and the nobility and the gentry, and I shall desire to have the same exemptions in favor of persons in the private service of individuals in the British army.

‘ I think I may reasonably claim the same exemption for them, because, generally speaking, every man thus employed saves a man to the ranks. There may be abuses on our side; but I believe I can prove there is oppression on that of the Portuguese Government. The Officers of the Government in general have been very uncivil to our Officers lately, and there exists a very general disposition among them to quarrel and complain for very trifling causes, and that disposition is not a little encouraged by the Government. I should not like to see the convenience which an Officer derives from his servant depend upon any Portuguese authority; as, in their present disposition, I should be certain that the servant would be obliged to march, unjustly perhaps, whenever it should suit the Portuguese authority to manifest his dislike.

‘ I have received your letters of the 17th and 18th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

½ past 7 P. M.

‘ We have with our train at Oporto one half of the powder which is necessary for our enterprise, which I communicated to you this day; and I cannot discover exactly whether or not we have any more at Lisbon, or how much we have received from England of the different quantities for which I have written, or what we have done with any portion of it. We ought to have received 4000 barrels, besides what we had with our train. I believe we received 6000 barrels, and I know that General Howorth told me we had 7000 barrels when I ordered the last 2000 barrels for Elvas, and we ought to have therefore now 5000 barrels; but I can get no information upon anything here. I therefore request that upon the receipt of this letter you will make inquiry what quantity of powder either we have, or the Portuguese stores have, or the Admiral has to spare, and send off to Oporto without loss of time 1600 barrels: there must be a large quantity of powder in the works which could be brought down, and it is desirable that this quantity should be sent as soon as possible from any place to Oporto.

‘ On the 6th of June I wrote to England for 4000 barrels of powder, 2000 to be sent immediately, and 2000 hereafter; and, if you should not be able to send any powder from Lisbon, I beg you to explain the circumstance to the Admiral, and ask him to order a vessel to cruize off Oporto for the powder ships, and to take them in there.

‘ In case you should not be able from our stores, from your stores, or from the Admiral’s, to send any powder to Oporto, I beg you to get the Admiral to send the enclosed letter to England by an express vessel.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. It occurs to me that there is a very large quantity of powder in the British stores at Cadiz; and I beg you to inquire upon this point from General Graham, and, if there should be any, to send it immediately, and to order to Oporto what we want, if our wants cannot be supplied from Lisbon;

it can easily be replaced when ours shall arrive from England. I have written to my brother to have preparation made to send off the powder as soon as your requisition shall arrive, for any quantity not exceeding 1600 barrels.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 15th, and I now enclose my last dispatch and a confidential dispatch which I wrote to Lord Liverpool on the 18th. The fall of Tarra-gona will make some difference in the calculations on which my design is founded. But I have ordered the preparations for it, and I shall continue them till I find the plan to be impracticable.

‘ I am not sufficiently acquainted with the state of affairs in Murcia to decide whether it is right or necessary to increase the army in that quarter. You may depend upon it, however, that that army cannot be increased to such a degree as to enable it to make any effectual or useful progress even against the 4th corps, which Soult has reinforced, by sending back the division belonging to it which he had brought into Estremadura, much less such a progress against the whole army of the south. But it might be necessary to reinforce the army of Murcia, to enable it to hold its ground, which, however, from all that I have heard of the country, I am inclined to doubt. The reinforcement of the army of Murcia, therefore, is neither more nor less than a rank job, and a very dangerous one in these times.

‘ In my opinion the most interesting points at present in Spain are the Sierra de Ronda and the Condado de Niebla. The former, if the Spaniards should be obliged to act alone, is the fittest scene of their operations, and they would always have a retreat upon Gibraltar: the latter, if they are to combine their operations with ours, is the best, because the communication is shorter and more certain, and they would have a secure retreat into Portugal. In either case they could be supplied with facility from Cadiz, or they could be drawn thither if the enemy were to prepare for a serious attack upon that position.

‘ A corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, well equipped, in the

Sierra de Ronda, or the Condado de Niebla, would be a thorn in the enemy's side, to which he must pay attention; would be an effectual diversion for our operations; and, if in the latter, would be ready either to join us through Portugal, or to march upon Seville, if we should be able, in a later period of the season, to make another attack upon Badajoz. It may be depended upon that, if the allies can only get hold of Seville for a few hours, the enemy must raise the siege of Cadiz; and therefore it would appear most desirable for the Spaniards to turn their attention seriously to that object. But it must be *seriously*. It must be attempted with a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, well equipped with what is necessary to obtain success, and in some degree disciplined; and, if they once make such an establishment in one of those quarters, not only is their retreat secure, but the enemy must attend to them, or must give up Seville and the siege of Cadiz.

‘This is the object I had in view when I proposed to General Blake to go to the Condado de Niebla, when he declined to join himself to us, after the last siege of Badajoz. But he has since embarked, and he looks to other objects, which are quite impracticable, as he may depend upon it are all offensive operations with the Spanish troops in their existing state; and he will find that not only they are impracticable, but that he removes himself and his troops from the real scene of action, in which he might be of some use, if he would remain quiet.

‘I have not talked with Castaños or anybody upon this plan. The truth is, that it is impossible for any rational man to talk to any of them. They are visionaries and enthusiasts, who will not look at things as they really are; and, although they cannot be ignorant of the truth of all we say of the miserably inefficient state of their army, they talk and act as if it was an army, till some dreadful disaster happens, and they are highly offended if in any discussion the truth, which ought never to be concealed in such a discussion, is even hinted.

‘I make you acquainted, however, with my intentions, and my opinion of the mode in which the Spanish force under General Blake could assist me most effectually, and you

will judge from circumstances whether the subject can be brought forward usefully at all, and in what manner.

‘Austin, who has some sources of intelligence in Andalusia, tells me that the French intend to make a serious attempt upon Cadiz. The removal of the cannon from Badajoz looks like that plan, but it may be also with a view to the attack of Carthagena, which Soult had in contemplation. I understand that the Spanish Government, with their usual want of foresight, discontinued the works for the defence of the Isla and the communication with the Isla, as soon as they were able to send some of the troops away in the end of February last, and have not yet resumed them!

‘The thoughtlessness of this nation is too bad!!

‘What do you mean should be done about the 47th regiment?

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. Just to show you what kind of people even the best of these Spaniards are, I mention that Abadia, who took leave of me at Elvas about seven weeks ago, after having remained in that neighborhood nearly three weeks, is still at Lisbon. They say he is sick; but a journey would recover him. If he had gone when he ought, his army would now have been ready for action. As it is, the season for any operation on the coast will be over before he will reach Coruña, and then there is work for two months in organization, &c.

‘W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘I am rather apprehensive that I shall want from 1200 to 1600 barrels of gunpowder to complete the equipment necessary to enable me to carry on the operation which you will find, in my letter of the 18th, to the Secretary of State, I intended to carry on.

‘I have desired Beresford, who is at Lisbon, to apply for assistance to the British stores at Cadiz, if he should not find what we want in our or the Portuguese stores, or in the Admiral’s ships; and I request you to tell General Cooke

that I beg that any quantity of powder which may be in the British stores at Cadiz (not exceeding 1600 barrels), may be shipped and ready to be sent off at a moment's notice, when he shall receive a requisition for it from Sir William Beresford. I will replace what he will send.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote you on the 18th instant I have had reason to believe that we have not in Portugal the quantity of powder necessary to enable me to carry on the enterprise which I then informed your Lordship I intended to undertake.

‘ I therefore trust that your Lordship will have ordered out immediately 2000 of the 4000 barrels of powder which I requested to have on the 6th of June; and, if they should not have been sent before your Lordship will receive this letter, I beg that you will send them to Oporto without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir William Beresford, in which he has desired that the number of medical Officers attached to the Portuguese army may be increased from twelve to twenty, and that measures should be taken to replace those become non-effective on account of ill health.

‘ I would beg to recommend on this point the adoption of the rule which I have made in respect to Staff appointments attached to the British army, viz., that those who hold them shall receive no emolument on account of them, if absent from their duty on account of their health for a greater length of time than two months, unless their absence should have been occasioned by wounds. However, severe it may appear to deprive an Officer of his emoluments, whose absence may be occasioned by illness acquired in the perform-

ance of his duty in a bad climate, still, adverting to the abuse of sick certificates, and considering the right which the public have to expect that those paid for performing the duty of a Staff employment shall be efficient, I conceive that the justice of the rule will be found to preponderate over its severity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 20th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir William Beresford, in which he has enclosed one from Mr. Wellesley, conveying the offer of the Spanish Government to appoint Sir William Beresford a Captain General in the Spanish army, in testimony of their approbation of his conduct in the battle of Albuera, upon which I request your Lordship to state the pleasure of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st July, 1811.

‘ I have received your note about Colonel Barnard. Pakenham consented to the arrangement you proposed as soon as it was proposed to him; and I intended to send him to your division, but I waited till I should receive the report of the medical board on Beckwith's case. I am not certain, however, that the most convenient arrangement for the public service will not be that which you have proposed for the temporary command of the brigade, and Pakenham will do with pleasure whatever I wish him to do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Leite, Governor of Elvas.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st July, 1811.

‘ I send herewith a soldier who was concerned in the robbery of the house of Joana Euphemia Rita Silveira, in Elvas,

about which I wrote to you in the month of March last, and who can point out the persons who bought from him some flax stolen in the said house. I request you to send an Officer with him, to have the person pointed out who bought the flax, and that you will have this purchaser of property, which he must have known was stolen, dealt with according to law, and that the owner of the property, Joana Euphemia Rita Silveira, may have her property again.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Leite,*
Governor of Elvas.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Austin.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st July, 1811.

‘ Adverting to my letter to you of the 13th, requesting you to form a magazine upon the Guadiana, for the supply of the Spanish troops, in case they should be obliged to retire into Portugal, I have to inform you that I have desired Mr. Kennedy to send from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana a supply of flour and of forage corn for the magazine, as, under existing circumstances, it is much more easy for us to send these articles than to send money to purchase them. They will be entirely at your disposal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Austin.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st July, 1811.

‘ I have received your note of the 19th; and I conceive that the same circumstances which render it expedient that you should be supplied with horses by some public arrangement apply to your aides de camp, Captains Hope and Stanhope; and I beg you will take as many of the horses sent out for the Officers of the cavalry as you may think proper.

‘ You will have seen in my dispatch of the 18th that the enemy have moved; the cavalry left Merida on the 17th, when Cocks arrived there, and the army of Portugal are going into cantonments on the two banks of the Tagus. It is said that the 5th corps have moved likewise; but this I doubt. We are going into cantonments likewise; and, as we

are becoming very strong, I propose to endeavor to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo. Some time will elapse before the train, which is on the Douro, can be brought up; in the meantime the troops may as well be out of the sun.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st July, 1811.

‘ The letter from Dom Miguel Forjaz, to which I referred in mine of the 14th, is written to Marshal Beresford, and is dated the 1st July. It relates principally to the forts of Elvas, Campo Mayor, &c.: but the last paragraph, to which I refer, and of which I now enclose a copy, goes to assert that the subsidy has not been regularly paid. This I deny; and the assertion ought to be contradicted.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st July, 1811.

‘ I beg you to inform the Portuguese Government that it is my intention to repay to the Government the sums which have been advanced by General Silveira by my desire.

‘ The delay which has taken place in transmitting an answer has been occasioned only by the necessity of putting the transaction into an official shape, and of making those who have received the advances from General Silveira accountable through the several departments in which they are serving.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 21st July, 1811.

‘ It appears by accounts which I have received from Mr. Wellesley, dated the 15th instant, that Tarragona was taken by storm on the 28th of June; the 47th regiment, and the other troops which General Graham had lately sent to that

quarter from Cadiz, having arrived on the preceding day in the roads.

‘ I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to General Graham’s dispatch of the 14th June, and its enclosures, upon the subject of sending to Tarragona the 47th regiment, and the plan of recruiting, and other arrangements connected with that measure, upon which I request to have your Lordship’s orders.

‘ I likewise beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the future arrangements for the command at Cadiz, the troops at which place are now considered part of this army. The General Officer in command there has, however, always reported directly to the Secretary of State, and received his orders immediately from your Lordship; and I have not always been made acquainted with your Lordship’s instructions; nor have I known whether the measures adopted there have been founded upon them.

‘ As long as there was in command at Cadiz an Officer of the rank and character of General Graham I had no objection to this system. But I beg to inform your Lordship, that I cannot conceive myself responsible for the acts or conduct of any General Officer on whom the command at Cadiz may devolve, unless the correspondence with the Secretary of State is carried on through me, and I am made acquainted regularly with your Lordship’s wishes and intentions regarding that place.

‘ It appears to me that the best plan would be to consider the troops at Cadiz, as those at Gibraltar are, a distinct command.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Quinta de St. João, 22d July, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

8 A. M.

‘ Tell De Grey to send me the usual certificate of his health. I cannot allow any Officer to quit the army on any plea whatever, excepting that of ill health.

‘ In regard to — —, surely no man can contend that the want of a daily state for so many days was not a ground of complaint. Upon that ground I ordered the person

responsible to the Adjutant General (of whom in the first instance I complained) to be put in arrest; and, upon being informed that ———'s inferiors were in fault (for fault there was), I said, let them be put in arrest. I do not think there is anything unreasonable or harsh in all this, and with every good disposition towards ———, he must not expect that I shall recall anything I have ever authorized to be written respecting anybody, on any omission of duty in the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de St. João,
22d July, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Brito was with me last night, and told me that he was obliged to go to the sea coast for the sake of bathing, upon which subject he will probably apply to you. He leaves at Elvas a person who has always assisted him in giving intelligence, who he says is capable.

‘ Do you mean to promote Brito? It is certainly hard upon an Officer to employ him out of the line of his profession, and then not to promote him in his turn; at the same time it does not answer to promote those who have no knowledge of their duty. However, the practice of *aggregado* and *gradraçao* may enable you to overcome the difficulty which certainly exists in this case.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 22d July, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 20th instant, and, in consequence of the orders brought out by the *Merring* schooner, it is expedient to suspend the arrangement which I had proposed in my letter of the 17th, for sending to Sicily the Officers and men of the 9th light dragoons. I think it probable, however, that the arrangement, as originally proposed, will be resumed as soon as it shall be known in

England that I have brought from Cadiz to Lisbon the dismounted hussars of the 2d King's German Legion, to be mounted on the horses of the 9th light dragoons.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

' WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Quinta de St. João, 22d July, 1811.

' I return the letter to Marshal Beresford, in which I have marked the paragraph of which I complain. I sent you a copy of it yesterday.

' I observe that Dom Miguel Forjaz' last note contains the same unfounded statement, viz., that the subsidy has been in arrear, which I positively deny; and what I aver, viz., that it has always been in advance, can be clearly proved by a reference to the state of the payments at any one period since June, 1809.

' We cannot negotiate a loan here without the authority of Parliament, which is a very short answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz' proposal to raise money by loan. Besides, if we could raise money in that manner, the British army must have their share of it.

' The question of money becomes more serious every day; so much so, that Mr. Kennedy is going down to Lisbon to endeavor to effect an improvement. If this improvement cannot be effected, we must become bankrupt, as we have not a shilling.

' We have got but very little for the Algerines besides my subscription; but that little shall be sent to you.

' Believe me, &c.

' *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

' WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

' MY DEAR HENRY,

' Quinta de St. João, 22d July, 1811..

' I have received another account this day of the enemy's preparations at Seville, which it is reported are intended either to push with vigor an attack upon Cadiz, or to destroy Freire; the latter would lead to an attack upon Carthagera, which we know Soult has in view.

‘ It is very extraordinary that we should hear of these designs, and not the Spanish Government ; and particularly that they should have had no intelligence, and have taken no notice, of the collection of heavy ordnance at Seville from Badajoz. They may depend upon it that this equipment has not been brought to Seville for no object, and that, if it begins to move upon Cadiz, it is the enemy’s intention to make a serious attack upon the position there.

‘ You will of course send me the earliest intelligence you will receive of this design, and I will take care to reinforce Cadiz in time with some of our troops. But the Spaniards must look themselves a little to this subject, and must complete the works.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Juiz de Fora, at Borba.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de St. João, 23d July, 1811.

‘ I send herewith a soldier in the British army, who was lately concerned in committing a robbery at Elvas, in the house of Joana Euphemia Rita Silveira ; and he sold some of the articles stolen, viz., sheets, and a table cloth, for five dollars, to a woman at Borba, whom he will point out to you. I beg you to attend, and see this person, and that you will recover the sheets, and send them to Elvas to the woman. I likewise request you to carry into execution the law against the woman who purchased the sheets, &c., as she must have known them to be stolen.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Juiz de Fora, at Borba.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

‘ I am sorry to observe that the Government continue so unwilling to adopt the measures which you think necessary to supply what is required for their army, and at the same time to save as much as possible the expenditure of money ; but there is one very easy remedy, and that is, to order from England the articles which you think it necessary to have, and when they arrive their value shall be carried to account as so much subsidy.

‘ If the Government do not choose to adopt measures to feed their cavalry, and the brigades of infantry, on the Portuguese establishment, I wish they would say so, in order that we might send these troops to the rear, and that I might not be supposed to have 50,000 men, when in reality I have not 40,000 for action.

‘ It would also be but fair towards me, if the members of the Government would explain to the Prince Regent of Portugal that they cannot maintain their army upon the frontier, that His Royal Highness might lay aside some of the prejudices which he has imbibed against me.

‘ In respect to Madden and Colman, I confess I think the latter has the better claim to obtain his British rank of the two. I think it as well to leave both till an opportunity shall occur for the Portuguese Government to make the request from the British Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Marshal

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 23d. I do not think that the intelligence which I have received from Cadiz tends to prove that the enemy are about to carry into execution the plan which Soult had in contemplation for the attack of Carthagena.

‘ The execution of this plan must be connected with the march of heavy artillery and stores from Seville, which does not appear to have been sent yet; and I am therefore inclined to believe that Soult will use the force of which he has the command at present in making a serious attack upon Cadiz. It is difficult, however, to form a decided opinion upon this subject, without having better information than I possess.

‘ It is obvious that the removal of the heavy artillery from Badajoz was connected with a plan to attack either Carthagena or Cadiz; and, if the people who gave information from Seville would watch the progress of this heavy artillery, the Spanish Government must be acquainted with Soult’s design.

‘ One division of infantry, which belonged to the 4th corps, and came into Estremadura with Soult lately, has certainly returned to Granada; but it might have been desirable to reinforce the troops in that quarter, without reference to any plan of offensive operation, and Soult would still have a sufficient number of troops for the execution of his design against Cadiz. I request your Excellency to let me know whether you have received any intelligence which states that the division of the army of Portugal, which Colonel Grant informs me arrived at Plasencia on the 20th, had marched on for Ciudad Rodrigo. Colonel Grant mentions that part of it was intended to march in that direction by Coria, but not that these troops had marched.

‘ I sincerely wish that your Excellency had an army with which you could carry into execution the plan of operations of which your Excellency has given the sketch in your letter. I have always found that, when I have undertaken an operation which has removed me to a distance from the magazines of the army, the troops have starved. I have likewise found that when I have undertaken an offensive operation of great extent, and connected with the operations of the troops of Spain, the whole disposable force of the enemy has been turned against me with impunity.

‘ If I were to take the proposed position in the Sierra Morena, if my troops could survive the starvation which they would suffer, I should have Marmont, with the whole army of Portugal, to act on one side of me, and Soult, with the whole army of the south, on the other, leaving a division to maintain the blockade of Cadiz, and another at Granada to observe General Freire’s corps, in the same manner as during the late expedition into Estremadura for the relief of Badajoz. And this collection of troops would be made with impunity, as the late collection was. Instead of alarming King Joseph in his capital there, I should be too happy to be able to reach again the frontiers of this kingdom, in order to save my army.

‘ An army under the command of your Excellency might be more successful in all these respects: but your Excellency may depend upon the truth of what I have repeatedly had the honor of stating to you in conversation, and that is, that until the Spanish armies shall possess regular resources, by

which they can be supplied during any operation which they may undertake; until they are equipped in such a manner that casual or trifling difficulties will not impede their operations; and until the troops are disciplined, as all other troops are which are produced to meet an enemy in the field, it is useless to think of plans of co-operation between this army and those of Spain, which must be founded on the active offensive operations of all parts of the armies of all the nations. I should deceive myself, and you, and the Governments of both nations, if I were to encourage such a notion; and, if I were to undertake the execution of such a plan, I should incur the risk of the loss of my army for no object whatever.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain General*
Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. French, complaining of want of room at the depôt at Belem.

‘ This complaint has suggested to me an improvement in our arrangements of the depôts, which I have long had in contemplation, which is, to divide the depôt, having one part of it, consisting of men most nearly fit to join the army, at St. Julian or Cascaes, or any large healthy building in that part of the country; and the other part, consisting of men just dismissed from the hospital, in the barracks at Belem.

‘ Both parts of the depôt might be under the superintendence of the Commanding Officer of the depôt at Belem; but he might have a Commanding Officer under him, stationed at that part of it which would be in the neighborhood of St. Julian.

‘ I beg you to endeavor to arrange this plan; and you will fix with the medical Officers at Lisbon what part of the medical department shall attend that part of the depôt near St. Julian.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22d instant, enclosing a complaint of some Officer, whose name is not stated, for his conduct, and that of some soldiers, in enforcing a billet for Lieut. General Graham, granted by the competent authority, on the house of Senhor de Salles, at Lisbon.

‘ A billet is a legal order, from a competent authority to the person to whom it is addressed, to provide lodging for the bearer of it; and Senhor de Salles, to whom this order was addressed, refused to obey it; and the complaint is, that the British Officer, whose name is not stated, enforced the legal order of the Portuguese authority.

‘ I am at a loss to know what I am to do upon the statement of this case by the complainant himself, and by his friends, the Judge of the Police, the Magistrate of the Barrios, and the Secretary of State.

‘ It is impossible that the case can be made worse than it is by those who have already inquired into it; and there may, and probably will, be denials, justifications, and reasons given for much of the imputed misconduct; but I have no hesitation in declaring, that if I were to pronounce judgment, even upon the aggravated statements which I have read, all of them on one side of the question, I should honorably acquit this unknown Officer.

‘ I am ready to admit that it is very disagreeable to receive strangers into the house in which a family reside; but it must also be admitted that it is very disagreeable to become the prey of the conqueror, and to be “hewers of wood and drawers of water” to the common enemy of mankind.

‘ On the other hand, it is not very agreeable to come to a foreign country to seek the enemy in defence of that country, and to leave our houses and our properties in order to assist in saving the houses, the properties, and the honor of strangers.

‘ The law of Portugal has provided that Officers and soldiers shall be billeted upon private houses, and has inflicted this inconvenience upon individuals as one of the burdens resulting from the contest in which the country is

engaged to save all from the tyrant; and during the whole time that I have been in Portugal, in every town in which thousands have been billeted, I can recollect but one complaint on the subject of billeting, excepting at Lisbon.

‘ Having read, however, the inflammatory report of the Judge of Police, and of the Juiz dos Barrios, and of the Secretary of State, on the complaint of Senhor de Salles, I am not astonished that complaints on this subject should be frequent at Lisbon, where, if they did not receive encouragement from these high authorities, there ought, and would be none.

‘ This complaint, however, has at last brought the point to issue, which I discussed in my letters to you of the 31st December, 1810, and of the 3d January, 1811. There is law in Portugal, or there is not. If there is law, it must be enforced in respect to the inhabitants of the country, as well as in respect to the British army.

‘ The inhabitants of Portugal have duties to perform, and obligations have been imposed upon them by the law, in the critical situation in which their country is placed, of which one is to furnish lodging to the Officers and soldiers of the army upon the orders, called billets, of a magistrate. I beg to know from the Government whether the performance of these duties and obligations is to be enforced; or whether the people of Lisbon in particular are to be exempt from them, and are to be encouraged by the magistrates to resist the law and the performance of these obligations, where the convenience of a British General Officer is concerned.

‘ I have long seen the inutility of complaining to the Government on the conduct of any of the public servants. Indeed I have found it a useless waste of time to address them on any subject whatever; and therefore I shall not trouble you to make any complaint of the conduct of the Judge of the Police in this transaction, who, instead of endeavoring to conciliate in a case in which a General of the ally of the Prince was concerned, or, as was his duty, instead of enforcing the necessary law of the billets, has done everything in his power, in his report, to aggravate the supposed cause of complaint, and has become an advocate instead of a judge.

‘ The case, however, is so flagrant, and the conduct of the

magistrate has been so improper, and there has been manifested a spirit so hostile to the alliance, and so different from that which ought to exist, that, if I could entertain any hopes that the truth would reach the Prince Regent of Portugal, I would address his Royal Highness upon the subject.

‘I only hope that the time is not far distant when the British army, tired of such conduct, will impart to the British nation the disgust which it must occasion, as well as the desire to leave to its fate a country in which, by the Government and the higher orders, they have been so unworthily treated.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose a list of the names of the Officers of the King’s German Legion who have subscribed 279 Spanish dollars for the liberation of the Portuguese captives in Algiers.

‘I likewise subscribed the sum of 500 dollars; and I have directed the Commissary General to pay these sums to the Portuguese Government.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Portalegre, 24th July, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 18th. From the intelligence which you have enclosed I do not think that Soult’s design is quite clear. The Spaniards are as extraordinary in their mode of acquiring and detailing intelligence as they are in everything else. The whole world have seen the letters from Soult, in which he detailed his plan of operations in case he should be reinforced. He has been reinforced, and he has besides at his elbow the army of Portugal. But they forget this plan of Soult’s; and the people who are employed to procure intelligence, and those

who receive it, are as wild in their notions as if they had not the advantage of a knowledge of the enemy's design from himself. I acknowledge, however, that I have not yet received any intelligence which makes it quite clear whether Soult is about to push his attack upon Cadiz, or to make one upon Carthagena. But the march of the 5th corps, which has certainly quitted Estremadura, will show what his plan is.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from —, and my answer. This gentleman is as loose and as light as any Spaniard I know. He possesses all the defects of the Spanish character, with better temper and better manners than the Spaniards have in general. But in want of foresight he beats them all.

‘ In respect to money for the Spaniards, I beg you will recollect that you do not expend a shilling at Cadiz which does not take so much from the military chest of this army, from which disbursements to a considerable amount are likewise making constantly on account of the Spanish Government. We have never been in such distress as at present, and I can devise no means of relieving it. The Cortes and Spanish Government, if they could look at their real situation, ought before now to have adopted a plan for the relief of their finances, instead of which it is a subject of joke for Castaños. We have forced this measure upon the Portuguese Government, and in the course of a very short time their finances will be in a very flourishing state, if I can contrive to pay them any part of the subsidy in money with any degree of regularity. But this is impossible, and still more so to support our own army, if we are to give money to the Spaniards, either by way of loan or of gift. There would be no difficulty in either if the Spanish Government would arrange the American questions; but they will not do this; and in my opinion to give them specie is impossible.

‘ I am much afraid that it is too late to call in the Princess of Brazils to the Regency. But, as I before told you, I approve of that measure, having altered my opinion upon it. I do not think there is any reason to apprehend evils from her influence over the Portuguese Government. First, I do not think that she would have any influence; and next, if she had, I have brought matters almost to that state that it is

nearly indifferent what the Portuguese Government do ; and indeed I never give myself the trouble of writing to them, or of consulting their opinion on any subject whatever.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Houstoun.

‘ MY DEAR HOUSTOUN,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I am concerned to receive so bad an account of your health ; but you must go, if you cannot stay ; and I have only to lament that we are so unlucky as to lose you. Including yourself, we shall have nine General Officers gone, or going immediately, and five more want to go.

‘ As, however, the regulations of the army are applicable to all, I request you to send me the usual application for a medical board on your case, after whose report the whole transaction will be in a regular train.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Houstoun.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose the answers to two complaints from Coimbra, which you recently transmitted to me, against Captain —, of the —th, and Mr. —, of the commissariat, from which you will observe, that there was originally but little ground for complaint, and that, as usual, the Portuguese authority that complained never intended, and did not wish, to substantiate his complaint.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid observing, that the persons in authority at Lisbon have appeared to me lately to encourage these frivolous, and generally groundless, complaints from the officers of the Government, to which I am induced to attribute the number of them which I have lately received ; at the same time that those who make them manifest the usual disinclination to substantiate them. I have strong reason to believe that they are generally without foundation ; as I have for some time observed a visible improvement in the conduct of the soldiers towards the people of the country, and certainly,

those crimes, for which so many soldiers of this army have been executed, now occur but rarely. It cannot be credited that the soldiers who shared their provisions with the inhabitants of the country, to save them from starving, should afterwards ill treat the same inhabitants; and I am therefore very apprehensive that the frequency of groundless complaints lately is to be attributed to the excitement of the spirit of complaint by the Government.

‘However, I shall continue, as I have hitherto done, to inquire into every case brought forward which appears to afford ground for inquiry; and I hope that the Portuguese Government will discover, before it is too late, that the mode of saving their country is not to excite discontent against the British nation, by whose assistance alone they can be saved.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘*Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘In my opinion, it is necessary that Austin should continue to incur the expenses for intelligence.

‘I have called for fresh returns of payments to the army, and have informed Mr. Stuart that I shall never cease to represent upon this subject till the whole arrears are cleared off.

‘I am so confused with the numbers of the regiments of the Portuguese cavalry, that I do not know one from another, or what regiments are in brigades together. I understood that the 6th and 9th cavalry were at Estremoz, and were the cavalry allotted for the garrison of Elvas, to which place it was desirable they should go, as Estremoz is in the line of our cantonments. Barbacena’s brigade is in our 2d division of cavalry, and has been put into Elvas and Campo Mayor, as its cantonments, and to assist the cavalry of those garrisons in preserving their communications.

‘The militia of Lower Beira must continue assembled; but I have no objection to half a company at a time having leave, provided the other half company remains with the regiment complete.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken about our parade; we shall now be complete in everything.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ Cadogan has desired me to write to you about his brother, a Captain in the 71st regiment, whom he is very desirous of having sent out here, in order to do duty with the 71st regiment. He is very low down among the Captains, and, as Commanding Officer of the regiment, Cadogan cannot order him to join the battalion in Portugal. But, if he could be sent out in any manner, he would be very glad to have an opportunity of instructing him in his duty.

‘ I have got the army under cover from the sun for a little time, till the reinforcements shall come up and some of our numerous wounded shall recover, and while the preparations are making for an enterprise which I intend, if possible, to try; and, as usual, all the Officers of the army want to go home, some for their health, others on account of business, and others, I believe, for their pleasure.

‘ General Spencer is going, because General Graham has come from Cadiz; General Nightingall is gone; General William Stewart, General Lumley, General Howorth, and Colonel Mackinnon, likewise, on account of their health; Colonel Beckwith likewise going for the same cause: General De Grey has asked to go, because he has put his shoulder out; and I have this morning an application from ——— for leave to go, as his spleen is out of order. To this list add General Dunlop, General Hay, General Cole, and General Alexander Campbell, who have applied to go to settle their affairs; and you will see how we shall stand for want of General Officers. General Leith still absent. I have also innumerable applications for leave from Officers of all ranks. Till we can get the minds of the Officers of the army settled to their duty we shall not get on as we ought.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 22d instant, and I am much obliged to you for the information which they contain.

‘ I have directed that the train and stores may be disembarked from the ships in the Douro ; but it is desirable that the ships should remain for the present in that river. The ship of war which convoyed them thither might be employed on any other service you might think proper.

‘ I am obliged to you for sending the detachment of artillery to Oporto.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ The Prince of Orange is about to take advantage of the army being in cantonments for a short time, to visit Cadiz, and even, eventually, Gibraltar, if the winds should be favorable. He proposes to go to Cadiz by Ayamonte ; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to have a ship of war at Ayamonte to take him to Cadiz, and thence to Gibraltar, if it should be expedient for him to go there, and to bring him back to Ayamonte ; the same vessel to take our money at either, or both places, if there should be any at Gibraltar. The Prince of Orange will be at the mouth of the Guadiana about Thursday or Friday next, and I shall recommend him to the Commanding Officer in Algarve, Colonel Austin:

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Colborne of the 66th regiment (who also, by the bye, is going home for his health) has sent me word that he is very desirous of remaining with this army ; and

with this view, of effecting an exchange with Lieut. Colonel Ross, of the 52d, who it appears is going to Ceylon with General Brownrigg. I do not know anybody so fit to succeed Ross in the command of the 52d as Colborne, Arbuthnot being, I am afraid, in such a state of health as to render it hopeless that he will ever be able to take the command of the regiment in the field.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22d, enclosing a paper regarding arrears of pay to the Portuguese troops; and I have called for returns to show whether the statements in that paper are correct, and for returns to be made every three days of the state of the payments, till the whole of the arrears are paid off.

‘ As the British Government supply the pay for 30,000 Officers and men, and the gratuity for the Officers of the army, and the subsidy, is not, and has never been, in arrear, the pay of the 30,000 Officers and men, and the gratuity to the Officers of the army, ought never to have been in arrear, whatever may have been the financial distresses of the Government, if the subsidy had not been misapplied.

‘ I shall continue to give you information on this subject till I shall find that the arrear is entirely paid off.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 23d; and I entirely concur with you, that, till the Junta de Viveres are abolished *in toto*, the new subsidy cannot be given to the Portuguese Government. You may proceed on the principle of all the letters which I have written to you on this subject, with a certainty that I shall concur with you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I wrote to you on the 20th to request that you would urge the Commanding Officer at Cadiz to have 1600 barrels of gunpowder embarked, and in preparation to be sent to us, if Sir William Beresford should require them. I find that we shall not want this powder; and I shall be obliged to you if you will tell the Commanding Officer at Cadiz that the preparation may be discontinued, and that the powder may be relanded.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lord Eldon, Lord High Chancellor.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy and translation of a letter which I have received from General Blake, in answer to one which I wrote to him, to transmit the resolutions of the Houses of Lords and Commons of Great Britain and Ireland of the 7th June, on the subject of the battle of Albuera.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Lord High Chancellor.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

[A letter in similar terms to the Right Hon. the Speaker of the House of Commons.]

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose the last weekly state, likewise the morning state of the troops in the field of the 23d instant.

‘ The 12th light dragoons, the 26th, 28th, 32d, 77th, 3d batt., and 95th regiments, are not included in the latter, not having yet joined the army.

‘ I have given leave to Licut. General Sir Brent Spencer to go to England, at his own desire, in consequence of Licut. General Graham having arrived at Lisbon to join the army in the field.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ The enemy’s cavalry left Merida on the morning of the 17th, and Major Cocks’ piquets were in that town shortly afterwards.

‘ The enemy have since continued their march upon Almaraz; and, on the 20th, one division of infantry had arrived at Plasencia, which town, I imagine, will be the farthest advanced of their cantonments on the right of the Tagus. On the same day Marshal Marmont was at Almaraz, and other divisions had marched from Truxillo, in the same direction. One division of infantry and some cavalry still remained at Truxillo, according to the last accounts. The 5th corps had broken up in Estremadura, and marched towards Andalusia.

‘ The allied army under my command have taken up the cantonments towards which I informed your Lordship in my last dispatch they were marching.

‘ I have reason to believe that the French troops did meet with a check in an attack which they made on a detachment from the army of Galicia at Puente de Orvigo, on the 24th of last month.

‘ There is nothing new in the north. King Joseph was at Valladolid on the 10th, and proceeded on the 12th on his journey towards Madrid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th July, 1811.

‘ I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the letter which I addressed to your Lordship on the 6th of June, in regard to the want of powder in this country. It is very desirable that the 4000 barrels therein required should be sent out at an early period, and that arrangements should be made to send out hereafter 2000 barrels in addition to that quantity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major Dickson, R. A.**

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

‘ I write just to let you know that the powder, deficient of the quantity necessary for our object, will be sent from Lisbon to Oporto without loss of time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R.A.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. C. Colville.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 24th. The placing the 77th in your brigade is only a temporary arrangement, to make it of due strength till the 1st batt. 5th regiment shall arrive, when that battalion will be sent to you, and the 77th removed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
the Hon. C. Colville.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose two letters, which I beg you to send by an Officer to the Juiz de Fora at Sabugal, and desire the Juiz de Fora to send a trusty person with one to Almeida, and another person, on whom he can depend, with that for Don Julian Sanchez to Fuente Guinaldo, where will be found a detachment of his troops.

‘ Believe me, &c

‘ *Major General
A. Campbell.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. G. L. Cole.

‘ MY DEAR COLE,

‘ Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

‘ The scene shifts in this extraordinary war so frequently, and so many unexpected circumstances occur affecting our situation, that it is difficult to say at what period it is possible to allow an Officer to quit the army.

* Major General Sir Alexander Dickson, K.C.B., then Captain Dickson, R.A., and Major in the Portuguese service. The details and superintendence of the sieges were principally confided to him.

‘I have now an enterprise in progress, which, in the course of a short time, will bring us all out of our cantonments, and, if it should be successful, will give a new turn to affairs.

‘You ought not to go now, therefore. Whether you can go in winter will depend upon circumstances and events, for which I cannot answer, and upon which you had better delay to determine till you shall see how affairs stand.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General
the Hon. G. L. Cole.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

‘I concur entirely with you about Dickson’s merits, and I will endeavor to get for him the rank of Major. The manner in which he was employed at the two sieges of Badajoz, and that in which he is now employed, will make a distinction in his case, of which I will avail myself in my recommendation of him to head quarters.

‘I shall leave two divisions in Alentejo, unless the 5th corps should cross the Tagus to co-operate with the army of Portugal in impeding our enterprise.

‘We are a good deal embarrassed in our cantonments by your sick horses. Would it not be desirable to move away everything of this kind as far to the rear as Evora, where they would be well supplied, and quite out of our way?

‘I hope to send up the account of your commissariat expenses for feeding the Portuguese troops to the 24th June, from the 25th April. This will give the best estimate of the expense for future months.

‘In the meantime Mr. Kennedy has furnished me with an estimate of the expense of feeding 2000 men and 2000 horses for thirty days, which amounts to 41 contos of reis, 11,050*l.* sterling. If we feed 16,000 men and 1600 horses, the expense will be 88,000*l.* per mensem, which is something more than double the amount of the charge for April, in which was not included transport to the expense of magazine. However, the actual charge will probably not amount to this sum.

‘First, we do not feed 1600 animals.

‘ Secondly, some of the articles estimated are not always paid for, such as wood ; and others, such as wine, and sometimes forage, are not always issued : but I should think that the actual charge would not amount to much less than 70,000*l.* per mensem.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Portalegre, 26th July, 1811.

‘ I enclose my last dispatch. Since writing it I have received accounts that Bessières had brought 10,000 or 12,000 men to Benavente, in consequence of which Santocildes had retired one march behind Astorga.

‘ The Prince of Orange is going to Cadiz, and I shall give him a letter of introduction to you.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Portalegre, 27th June, 1811.

‘ I am very much annoyed by — — —’s conduct. By this unfortunate obstinacy he will be in a bad scrape, and he deserves that an effort should be made to save him ; but no man can be allowed to insult his Commanding Officer.

‘ I did not recollect that I had told you that Captain Byrne should go home. I am convinced there is no reason why he should go ; but if I told you he should, he shall go ; and I must write to the Secretary at War by next post, to say that I had allowed him to go. He must have leave, however, for only two months.

‘ I am concerned to hear of the bad condition of the 13th dragoons.

‘ I must make a movement to our left, and place the greatest part of the army, and at least your division of cavalry, on the other side of the Tagus ; but, if the 13th dragoons are in such bad condition, they must be left behind, and we must take the 14th instead.

‘ I must take some decided steps about the 13th dragoons.

It is too bad that they in particular should be so unfit for service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Austin.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st. General Castaños certainly informed me of the intention of the cavalry of the 5th army to return through Portugal into Estremadura; but I concluded that of course they would wait for a military route before they would march, and that, till that was called for, I did not think it necessary, or rather it did not occur to me to apprise you of this march.

‘ I now enclose you the route, and beg you to fill up the days, and apprise the British Commissary at Beja, &c., when they will pass each place, that they may be prepared.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Austin.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 27th July, 1811.

‘ I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 24th last night; and I write to let you know that there is no reason why you should hurry yourself from Lisbon.

‘ Upon a comparison of the strength which we can bring upon one point with that which the enemy can collect in Castille, I think I have a chance of succeeding in taking Ciudad Rodrigo, and the preparations are in progress for that enterprise.

‘ I can certainly undertake nothing else at present which would at all improve the situation of the allies in the Peninsula; and, adverting to the facility with which the French march corps from one side of the Peninsula to the other, and to the little detriment to their interests which results from the abandonment of a province or kingdom to collect a large force against us, I must consider it not improbable that I shall be obliged to abandon the enterprise. The preparation for it, however, will take up a considerable time,

and you will see that there is no occasion for your hurrying yourself.

‘ We have reports, as usual, that Ciudad Rodrigo is but ill supplied with provisions, for which I believe there is no more foundation than for these reports in general.

‘ It may be advisable, therefore, that we should approach the place a little earlier than I at first intended ; and with this view, and because the whole of Marmont’s army have crossed the Tagus, I am sending more troops across, and I have it in contemplation to make a general movement to our left.

‘ Soult certainly intends to avail himself of the large force he now has in the south to make an effort against the position of the allies at Cadiz, or to obtain possession of Carthagera. I do not think it quite clear which plan he will follow. He has certainly sent to Granada the division of the 4th corps which was lately in Estremadura, and, it is said, some troops under La Tour Maubourg ; but I believe these last are cavalry only, which would not be of much use in an attack upon the Isla de Leon. These reinforcements may have been sent to enable Laval (who I believe now commands the 4th corps) to keep Freire in check, as this last General had lately made some progress, and had got as far as Guadix.

‘ I am inclined to believe he will attack Cadiz, as I have not heard that any of the heavy ordnance moved out of Badajoz has been sent from Seville towards Granada, and I suspect that it is going down the Guadalquivir unobserved by those who are employed to procure intelligence for the Spanish Government.

‘ I have written to my brother about the state of the works on the Isla de Leon ; but, from all I see and hear, I am very apprehensive that the affairs of Spain are nearly irretrievable. There is no money, and there are no means of getting any, and there are no disciplined troops. Even if we should strike a fortunate blow I fear that we should do them no good.

‘ Till Soult’s design upon Carthagera is manifest nothing can be more absurd than to send Blake’s corps into Murcia, where they have already 20,000 men opposed to 5000 French, which may have been increased to 12,000 by the

first reinforcement from Estremadura, and probably to 14,000 by the last. My opinion is, that Blake's corps should be employed either in the Sierra de Ronda or in the Condado de Niebla, as this may be depended upon (although the Spaniards will not admit it), that they may increase the corps in Murcia to any extent they please; but they will not be able to drive the French out of Granada.

‘The strength of their corps in Murcia, therefore, ought to be fixed with a view to a defensive war in a very strong country, and should be increased in proportion as the enemy, by the increase of his force, and his other measures in that quarter, should manifest a design to attack Carthagena.

‘A force stationed in Niebla, or the Sierra de Ronda, would always have a secure retreat. From either situation they would threaten Seville, which is the foundation of the enemy's existence in the south of Spain. In Niebla they would be in direct communication with us, and they might be equipped in such a manner as to render it quite impossible for Soult to move all his troops, with impunity, upon us; and from Niebla or La Ronda the troops might be brought to Cadiz, with facility, if wanted. But this plan will not be adopted, because it does not afford ground for anybody to boast for a few days that the enemy will be overthrown, and that the southern provinces of Spain will be relieved.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘Portalegre, 28th July, 1811.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

11 A.M.

‘The orders were sent from hence, I believe, two days ago, for you to march, not exactly with a view to a mere change of cantonments, but to a service which I think it probable you will be able to perform, which I will explain more fully when I shall see you, which will probably be in a day or two. The fact is, that I am about to move the whole army farther to the left, and I want to get your division in your old place at the head of our cantonments.

‘Murray will send the orders by your aide de camp; and

I wish that, if you can with convenience, you would go to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL, ‘ Portalegre, 28th July, 1811.

‘ Upon referring to your letter of the 28th to Murray, I observe that you complain that the soldiers receive their *balances* at the depôt at Belem. I rather think that you must be mistaken with regard to this fact. They may receive money, necessaries, &c., at Belem; but I conceive that they cannot, under existing orders, receive the *balance* due on their accounts. Let me know how this fact stands.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
A. Campbell.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Portalegre, 29th July, 1811.

‘ Lord Blantyre has written to me to propose to transfer to the navy a boy by the name of John Fraser, who is so prone to desertion that they cannot keep him with the 42d regiment. I have sent him to the Provost at Lisbon; and, if you have no objection to taking him, I request you to desire General Peacocke to send him on board any ship you please, and I will discharge him from the 42d. He will not be at Lisbon for some days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

‘ I am very much distressed by the contents of Lieut. Bell’s letter of the 28th to General Murray; and I beg that in future the General Orders of the army may be attended to in the Light division, which require that, when a soldier is so unwell as to be unable to march, he should be sent to the general hospital.

‘ I am perfectly aware of the inconvenience and loss of numbers attending this order; but I am also aware of the impossibility of finding conveyance for the removal of an accumulation of sick with the several divisions of the army, at the moment it may be necessary to order them to march; and I am convinced that the loss of numbers would eventually be greater than it can be under the system which has been ordered.

‘ I would also beg to draw your attention to the order which was issued only on the 23d instant, in regard to the immediate issue of clothing, &c., brought up for the troops. Obligated, as we are, to bring from Lisbon every article of food, and of equipment of all descriptions for the troops, it is impossible to find conveyance to draw after the regiments the clothing, &c., which they may require. What the troops want should be issued to them as soon as it reaches the regiments, and the means of conveyance should be delivered to the commissariat, to be applied to other purposes.

‘ Obedience to this order may sometimes be attended by inconveniences, but they are trifling in comparison with the inconveniences which all would suffer from a disobedience of it. If the troops in the Light division are to disobey these orders, others will do the same; and we shall end by being obliged to employ the means of conveyance which we can get in removing sick, when the General Officers commanding divisions should choose that they should be sent away; and in carrying clothing, which the Commanding Officers of regiments may find it convenient to bring with their regiments; and the movements of the army must be cramped.

‘ It is very desirable that the General Officers commanding divisions should understand that the divisions under their command respectively are only parts of an army, which must be governed by system and rule; and that every departure from the system ordered, and the rule laid down, however convenient to the particular division, must be inconvenient to the army at large, and therefore detrimental to the service.

‘ I have ordered that the men of the Light division left at Castello de Vide may be removed to the hospital at Abrantes, and that the clothing belonging to the 43d may

be sent after the regiment; and I beg that it may be issued to the soldiers the day it reaches the regiment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

‘ I have received another letter from General Picton respecting the state of Arentschildt’s mules. You will be good enough to equip the 9 pounder brigade; as the others are nearly useless, and there are not enough for the 6 pounder brigade, it would be better to send these away.

‘ It is very desirable that we should send to a distance from the army all useless animals incapable of work. Cries of want of forage are coming from all parts; animals with sore backs, or useless from want of condition, eat as much hay and straw as others; and there are numbers of the Portuguese army of this description mixed up with the troops. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order all the disabled horses of the Portuguese cavalry, and the disabled mules of the artillery, to Evora, which will be out of everybody’s way, and they will get forage there, and recover.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

‘ Although anonymous letters in general deserve no attention, and I feel but little inclination to attend to the complaints of the people of Lisbon about billets, still, when a fact is stated against any Officer, it is fit that it should be inquired into.

‘ I therefore enclose you the extract of an anonymous letter which I have received regarding the conduct of the Paymaster of the ——— regiment, in a house in which he was lately billeted at Lisbon; and I request you to find out what house it was, and to go or send to the owner, and find out whether there was any, and what, cause to complain. If

there was any ground for [complaint I beg you to have the story of the complaint taken down in writing, and to send it to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 30th July, 1811.

‘ I did not explain myself sufficiently in my letter to you on the subject of the division of the depôt at Belem. I am desirous that it should be divided if possible; and that the soldiers who are nearest to being fit to join the army should be sent to a distance from Belem, as proposed in my former letter.

‘ I request, therefore, that you will endeavor to arrange a plan for the division of the depôt, notwithstanding that you have procured a building in the neighborhood of the barracks at Belem which will hold 800 men.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st August*, 1811.

‘ As Mr. Kennedy had written to the Commissary in Chief regarding our want of money, I did not think it necessary to trouble your Lordship upon that subject; nor should I do so now, if I did not feel the utmost anxiety upon it, particularly as these wants will materially affect any prospect we may have of carrying on the war offensively.

‘ The army subsist at present almost entirely upon supplies brought from the sea coast, and either imported from England, or purchased at Lisbon with bills drawn upon England, not to be negotiated in the Peninsula.

‘ Your Lordship may conceive the detail and labor, and expense of transporting all that such an army consumes, excepting meat and straw, so great a distance, by land and water conveyance, and will judge how these must be increased by the increase of distance, particularly of land car-

* Lord Wellington was promoted to the rank of General in Spain and Portugal on the 31st July, 1811.

riage. The land carriage is also materially increased in this season, in consequence of the rivers ceasing to be navigable for a great part of the course for which they are usually navigable till July.

‘Notwithstanding the saving of the demand for money, which has resulted from the mode in which we have subsisted the army hitherto, I am sorry to say that we have not had enough to pay the army to the 24th June, whereas they ought to be paid, according to His Majesty’s regulations, to the 24th August. The bāt and forage allowances due to the Officers of the army in March last have not been yet paid, and the winter bāt and forage allowances will be due in September; and the Spanish muleteers, by whose aid alone we can exist at all under the system which we have been obliged to adopt, have generally not been paid for six months.

‘It may be depended upon that no supplies can be procured in Spain without ready money to pay for them; but your Lordship will see that we have no means of purchasing supplies in Castille, or any fertile district near which we may be able to carry on our operations; and that we must still rely solely upon the long, complicated, and laborious communication with our magazines upon the coast, which will become more difficult and precarious in proportion as the distance will be increased.

‘Under these circumstances, notwithstanding that I am convinced that His Majesty’s Government have done everything in their power, I venture again to draw their attention to the subject. If so small a sum as 100,000 dollars in specie could occasionally be sent to this country, I am convinced it would have the best effects, if only in enabling the Commissary General to keep down the rate of exchange, and increasing the confidence of monied men in the resources of Great Britain.

‘I have heard that 2,000,000 of dollars for the merchants of Cadiz have lately arrived from Mexico; a part of which sum, I have no doubt, will be secured for the use of the army: but the whole of this sum would scarcely defray the demands upon the military chest which I have above detailed to your Lordship, which must be paid in specie, besides the others of a contingent nature, depending upon

the possibility of assuming the offensive ; and at all events the supplies of specie to be procured for bills would be increased, and would be procured at a cheaper rate, if it was known that any sum whatever in specie (the amount of which need not be stated) was periodically received from England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Castello Branco, 1st August, 1811.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 25th of July I have received intelligence which has induced me to believe that the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo was very ill supplied with provisions ; and that Don Julian Sanchez had been more successful in preventing the introduction of supplies from the country than I had imagined the limited force under his command would have enabled him to be. I have therefore moved the whole army to their left, with the intention, if I should find the intelligence which I have received to be well founded, to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo immediately. If, however, I should find it otherwise, or if, as I imagine, the the enemy have within these last two days introduced a supply of provisions into the place, I propose that the army shall take up its cantonments in Lower Beira instead of Alentejo, till all the preparations will be completed for the further operation which I intend to carry on against Ciudad Rodrigo, if circumstances should permit it.

‘ I propose to leave General Hill, with the 2d and General Hamilton’s divisions of infantry, and part of Sir William Erskine’s division of cavalry, in the Alentejo, to observe the enemy’s movements on that side.

‘ I had been misinformed respecting the movements of the 5th corps when I addressed your Lordship on the 25th July. They had not then quitted Estremadura ; but I understand they are now in march towards Andalusia.

‘ The army of Portugal remain in the positions which I informed your Lordship that they occupied in my dispatch of the 25th July, excepting that the division at Plasencia has extended through the mountains to Bejar and Baños.

‘ By a letter from General Silveira of the 21st July, which

I received on the 26th, I learned that General Santocildes had retired with the army of Galicia from the neighborhood of Astorga to Manzanal on the 17th, in consequence of Marshal Bessières having collected at Benavente a force, consisting of 11,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry. General Santocildes intended to endeavor to maintain himself at Manzanal; and, although I have not heard from that quarter since the receipt of General Silveira's letter of the 21st, I imagine that the enemy have been satisfied with obliging Santocildes to retire to the mountains, as I learn from Don Julian, from Ledesma, on the 26th, that a detachment of Bessières' troops, consisting of 6000 men, had arrived on that day at Salamanca; and I have since heard from other quarters that these same troops had moved with a convoy towards Ciudad Rodrigo. These two last reports, however, have not been confirmed from any other quarter, or by any accounts from Don Julian since the 26th.

'It is reported that Marshal Soult is gone to Granada; but this report has not been confirmed.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

'MY DEAR CAMPBELL, 'Castello Branco, 2d August, 1811.

'It is very evident to me that you have not before you a true statement of the case regarding the payment of soldiers in the dépôt at Belem; and I beg you therefore to delay to give any orders, or, if you have given orders upon the subject, to recall them, till I shall have inquired how this matter really stands. It cannot be as you suppose it is.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Major General
A. Campbell.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'MY DEAR BERESFORD, 'Castello Branco, 2d August, 1811.

'I have received your letter of the 29th. In all the discussions which we have with the Portuguese, as well as the Spanish, Government, on the subject of the resources for the war, one would imagine they had no interest, or a minor interest, in carrying it on; and that we were the principals,

and that they were conferring an obligation upon us in doing what is necessary, not only to preserve their independence as nations, but their lives and fortunes as individuals. I protest against such notions; and I declare again, that if I find the Portuguese Government do not allot every shilling of the revenue which can be so allotted to carry on the military operations, do not improve their resources to the utmost, and do not carry into execution the laws to bring forward the resources of the country for the army, I will not consent to give the increase of subsidy, and I shall recommend to the British Government to give no more than the subsidy of 1810.

‘I have long been convinced that there is no chance of success in this war, unless the Governments and people of the Peninsula should exert themselves really for their own salvation; and I shall be satisfied with no half measure. I shall be obliged to you if you will hint these sentiments to Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘The mules which we have bought have cost us lately 150 dollars each.

‘I do not understand the answer of the Portuguese Government to my proposition respecting Monsanto. Don Carlos de España was desirous of having a place in which he could lodge ammunition, &c., to be delivered to the guerrillas, and which would afford him a secure retreat for the depôts of corps, and the recruits raised in Castille and Estremadura, in case the enemy should advance; for which purpose I proposed that Monsanto might be given over to him. This place has long been abandoned by the Portuguese Government: they will not, and have it not in their power, to garrison it, and the enemy consequently had possession of it last summer; and yet they say that Don Carlos de España shall have the place, provided a Portuguese governor and the Portuguese civil authorities shall remain in it. There is neither Portuguese governor nor garrison, and I suspect only a Juiz Ordinario.

‘The question is, whether the Government will give the place over to the charge of Don Carlos de España and a Spanish garrison, or whether they will not; upon which I should be glad to have an answer in the affirmative or the negative, as soon as may be practicable. Of course Don

Carlos will have nothing to do with the place, and I shall lodge no ammunition in it, under the circumstances proposed by the Portuguese Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Castello Branco, 2d August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th July, and I now enclose the copy of my dispatch to Government of yesterday.

‘ The opinion which you say prevails at Cadiz is very little promising; but I do not see in what manner you can combat it, or, if you could, that it is any concern of yours.

‘ Great Britain did not bring Spain into the contest. On the contrary, the war, in its commencement, and throughout its progress, has been carried on by the Spaniards without reference to our opinions, and generally in direct contradiction to our recommendation; and then we are to be blamed and abused, because, contrary to our own judgments and the plain dictates of military expediency, we do not choose to enter upon wild and visionary schemes which we have not the means of accomplishing.

‘ The Spaniards forget that, by the folly and treachery of their own Officers, they have been brought to the state in which they now find themselves; and we do not remind them sufficiently often of these circumstances; and that the cause for which we are contending is theirs essentially, whatever may be the degree of interest which we feel in it.

‘ Who lost the battle of Ocaña, contrary to our advice and intreaties, and consequently Andalusia? Who gave up Badajoz treacherously, when we were moving to their assistance? Are we to blame if the Spanish armies are not in such a state as that they can be opposed to the enemy? or if the Cortes have neglected their duty, have usurped the powers of the executive government, and have misspent their time in fruitless debates? Are we in fault because, by the mismanagement of the American colonies, the world has been deprived of its usual supply of specie, and Great Britain in particular cannot find money to carry on her own operations, or aid the allies?

‘ Let any one Spanish transaction be examined, and the inexperience and folly of the principal people in Spain will be manifest. I apprised —— of my intention and plan for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and him alone; the success of which depends principally upon the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from the enemy. Some Spanish women at Portalegre were apprised of the plan by him, and it must reach the enemy!!! Yet —— is one of the best of them.

‘ Look at Abadia’s conduct in respect to Galicia. Examine any transaction in which they have been concerned, and it will be found characterized by delay, weakness, folly, or treachery! And then we are to be told that our political object is to ruin Spain!

‘ It is rather a curious circumstance that I have received, in the report of a conversation between two French Generals at Salamanca, the account that the French attributed to us the same motives.

‘ I have already apprised you of my opinion of the practicability of assisting Spain with money; and I now enclose you the copy of a dispatch which I wrote to Lord Liverpool yesterday, upon our own wants.

‘ How we are to get through an operation upon the frontier I do not know; and if the muleteers should leave us, which they ought, there is an end to the war, as far as we are concerned in it, as it will be quite impossible to carry it on at a distance from the points at which the rivers cease to be navigable.

‘ I do not think it quite clear that Soult has left Seville, though Austin, who has the best intelligence, says he has.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Pedrogão, 4th August, 1811.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 1st, and the enclosure from Lieut. Mackworth; and I now enclose the letter for Marmont, which he desires to have, and which I request you to forward to Truxillo if you can, if not, to Badajoz.

‘ Desire the Officer who goes with the letter to be very cautious in his communications with the French Officer respecting the movements of the army. He may say, if asked, that the cantonments have been altered, and that my head quarters are in a quinta near Portalegre. He must say that he belongs to my Staff; and, upon the whole, both because it would be difficult to get to Truxillo, and because it might be discovered at that place that we had marched, I consider it best that he should go only to Badajoz.

‘ I write this letter to Marmont only because you desire it; but I am positively certain that it will answer no purpose whatever.

‘ I have been moving pretty quickly, and have not yet had time to write you instructions applicable to the different cases which may occur while we may be separated, but I will do so this day or to-morrow if I can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

‘ Au Quartier Général,
ce 4 Août, 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘ Ayant reçu hier une lettre de la part de Monsieur le Lieut. Mackworth, qui est prisonnier de guerre à Truxillo, par laquelle il m'apprend que votre Excellence était disposé à le renvoyer à l'armée Anglaise si j'en faisais la demande, en échange pour un Officer du même rang, prisonnier de guerre en Angleterre, qui serait renvoyé de suite en France, j'ose vous prier de faire cet arrangement, et de me nommer l'Officier prisonnier en Angleterre que vous désirez soit renvoyé en France, et je m'engage qu'il sera renvoyé de suite.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Marmont,
Duc de Raguse.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Pedrogão, 4th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st July. It is quite impossible to allow General Hervey to go to England at present.

‘The officers of the corps of guides must of course not be promoted over the heads of the seniors. I only wish that when their seniors shall be made Lieutenants, they may be made Lieutenants *agregados*.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Pedrogão, 4th August, 1811.

‘Major General Lumley’s state of health requiring his immediate return to England, I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that he may be accommodated with a passage in the first man of war which may sail for that country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Pedrogão, 4th August, 1811.

‘I have this day received your letter of the 30th July. I consider it desirable that the battalion of Royal Marines, under the command of Major Williams, should still be detained at Lisbon, but that all the marines belonging to the ships of the squadron under the command of your Excellency should be sent to their ships.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Major General Needham.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Pedrogão, 4th August, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 8th July. I concur in the recommendation of Lieut. Colonel Sutton to be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the service of His Majesty, because Lieut. Colonel Sutton had distinguished himself in the Portuguese service, and he deserved that promotion.

‘Major Offley, who has retired from the Portuguese service, is likewise a very good Officer, and may distinguish himself likewise when he shall have an opportunity; but he

has not yet had the opportunity, therefore I cannot recommend him for promotion.

‘ I am sorry that Major Offley should feel hurt at the promotion of Lieut. Colonel Sutton; and particularly so, that I cannot with justice to others attend to your request that I should recommend Major Offley for promotion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Needham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Pedrogaõ, 4th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d July, regarding Lieut. — of the — dragoons.

‘ I beg to observe, that in an army so large as that under my command, and so dispersed as it is in general, and the communications between one part of the country and the other being so difficult as they are in Portugal, it is not at all times possible to collect the members of a Court Martial, and the witnesses who it is necessary should attend it; and, when a General Court Martial is assembled, its proceedings must necessarily be suspended when the army, or that division of the army to which the members belong, are in operation against the enemy.

‘ Lieut. — was brought to trial in the month of September last at Niebla, upon charges preferred against him by Colonel Sir Granby Calcraft, before a General Court Martial, of which Major General Slade was President. Before the Court could conclude its proceedings the movements of the enemy obliged it to adjourn, and the members to return to their duty; and, shortly afterwards, Captain Percy, one of the members, was taken prisoner, and two others, Major Butler and Captain de la Motte, were obliged to quit the country on account of their health; and the number of members was reduced to a President and eleven.

‘ It then became a question, upon which doubts were entertained, in what manner it was legal, just, and proper, to proceed to the trial of Lieut. —, upon which I forwarded the enclosed memorandum to the Judge Advocate General.

‘ When his answer arrived the army was again engaged

in operations against the enemy. The regiments to which some of the members of the Court Martial, the prosecutor, the prisoner, and some of the witnesses belonged, were detached to the frontiers of Andalusia, while others were on the frontiers of Old Castille; and it would have been impossible to assemble all the parties till the army collected in the end of June on the frontier of Estremadura.

‘ In the meantime Lieut. Fox, the principal witness for the prisoner, was killed; and I then received the letter from Colonel Lord Edward Somerset, and its enclosure from Lieut. —, which I now transmit.

‘ Upon receiving that letter I deemed it proper to pardon Lieut. —, and to order that he might be released from his arrest, in a letter, of which I enclose a copy, from the Adjutant General; notwithstanding that, His Royal Highness will observe, by the perusal of the copy of the proceedings of the Court, as far as they had gone, that Lieut. — was not entirely free from blame.

‘ I am much concerned if any Officer suffers from delay in bringing him to trial, or in bringing his trial to a conclusion. It can be no object to me to delay a trial; on the contrary: but I must take care that the trial, when it does take place, is one in earnest, and that all the witnesses who can throw light on the charges are present to give their testimony, and that the law and the Articles of War are attended to; and also that the members of a General Court Martial are with their regiments and brigades at the time the troops are engaged in operation against the enemy.

‘ If the mode of trial by Court Martial is inconvenient on active service, the fault is in the law, and, I hope, not in the mode in which it is carried into execution.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Pedrogão, 4th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th, with the enclosure from Colonel Hamilton.

‘ Our cavalry were in very bad order, because they were very hard worked, in very bad weather, in a country in which

there was very little forage. All the arrangements of carts could not have remedied this inconvenience.

‘ Mr. Kennedy, as Commissary General, is at the head of the transport department, and is perfectly capable of conducting it, and does conduct it as well as any man can. I should not wish to have anybody sent out from England to perform the duties now performed so well by Mr. Kennedy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Pedrogão, 4th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 17th July, in which you have enclosed the copy of a memorandum of the 13th July, which you had received from His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, in regard to the enlistment of Portuguese recruits for the British regiments.

‘ The people of Portugal agree remarkably well with the British soldiers. I have never known an instance of the most trifling disagreement among the soldiers or Officers of the two nations. The Portuguese soldiers eat the same food, and, as military men, adopt the same habits as our soldiers, including, in some instances, their disposition to intoxication; and therefore I should think it a preferable mode of introducing them into the British service, to place them indiscriminately in the same companies with recruits raised in His Majesty’s dominions. Each individual would then be more likely to conduct himself on every occasion, and in all circumstances, as a British soldier. However, there is no reason to believe that the Portuguese soldiers, if collected in separate companies, would behave otherwise than well in any situation: and, if that mode of incorporating them be preferred, I see no objection to it.

‘ I am apprehensive, however, that your Lordship is much mistaken if you imagine that you could increase your numbers to any great extent by the adoption of this measure. It could not be attempted without the consent of the Portuguese Government; and I do not think that they could be prevailed upon to give their consent to our enlisting a single man.

‘Your Lordship is probably not aware that the whole military force of Portugal is raised by a conscription, not very different from that which prevails in France; and that, according to the ancient constitution of Portugal, every individual is obliged to serve in the regular army, in the militia, or in the ordenanza, as an Officer or a soldier. Those who might enlist to serve in the British army therefore, would, in proportion to their numbers, decrease the number of those liable to be called upon to serve in one of the Portuguese military establishments; and this plausible reason would afford the Portuguese Government ground for a refusal to grant permission to enlist recruits in Portugal, to which they would adhere.

‘But if the Portuguese Government should, contrary to my expectation, grant permission to enlist recruits, I believe that we should get but very few, notwithstanding the known attachment of the people to us.

‘The people of Portugal, in general, are agriculturists, and, like those of the same description in all other countries, are very little disposed to military service. As I have before stated, they are obliged by the ancient law of their country to serve, otherwise I believe that very few of them would be found in the ranks; and they are very much addicted to desertion (not to the enemy) in their own country, as well as in Spain.

‘In Lisbon and Oporto some recruits might be got; but, to show your Lordship how few, I may mention that an attempt was made, under the patronage of the present Patriarch, to raise the Lusitanian Legion by enlistment, instead of by conscription, and two battalions were never completed; and their losses by desertion were so great, and their gains by recruiting by the mode of enlistment so small, that in a very few months after they were raised it was necessary to give up the mode of recruiting by enlistment, and to allot the Lusitanian Legion to one of the provinces, to be completed with recruits raised within the same by conscription.

‘The recruits for the Lusitanian Legion, however, were raised principally at Oporto, and some might be raised at Lisbon; but to show your Lordship how few, and how difficult it would be to detain in the service those enlisted

there, and how unlikely the Government would be to consent to our enlisting recruits there, I may mention that, even with the assistance of the conscription, they have never been able to keep the Lisbon regiments complete, notwithstanding that, with their usual partiality to that city, they have not allotted the number of regiments which it ought to keep complete, according to any fair comparative estimate of its population; and the recruits sent to those regiments desert as soon as they reach them.

‘ From this statement your Lordship will be able to judge of the expediency of pressing this subject on the Portuguese Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Penamacor, 5th August, 1811.

‘ As I never reported to your Lordship that I entertained any intention to repair the fort of Almeida, I did not think it necessary to apprise your Lordship that that intention had been frustrated; nor should I now advert to the subject, only that I observe that the measures adopted at Almeida, under the directions of Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, in the commencement of June, have attracted the attention of the public of England.

‘ The mines which the French General Brenier had prepared, when he was about to evacuate Almeida, entered the rampart on a level with the *terre-plein* of the fort, and were carried along the exterior *revêtement*.

‘ Many of these mines did not explode, and those which did explode did no more mischief than to throw into the ditch of the place the exterior *revêtement* of the rampart of that part, as low down only as the *terre-plein* of the fort. The effects of the mines were so ill calculated, that the ramparts and parapets remained entire, and, with but few exceptions, the guns in their places in the embrasures in the latter, and the destruction could not be perceived in the inside of the fort.

‘ The stone and rubbish, however, which were lodged in the ditches by the fall of the exterior *revêtement* of the rampart afforded practicable passages into the place, nearly

at all the points at which the mines had exploded; but, with this exception, and the destruction of one outwork in the same manner, the works of the place were in as good order as when I had seen them in the year 1810.

‘ Under these circumstances, I proposed to the Portuguese Government a plan of putting the place immediately in a state to be tenable against a *coup de main*, in order to afford time for consideration whether the expense should be incurred thereupon for re-establishing it entirely. Although I was aware of the utility and importance of having Almeida as a secure post for the operations which I had in view for the campaign, yet I thought it not improbable that I should be obliged to remove the whole army from that part of the country; and, for that reason, and because I knew from experience that the Portuguese Government would adopt none of the measures necessary to put the place in a state to be held against a *coup de main*, if they entertained any hopes that I should do the work, I thought it proper to intimate to them that the work must be done by the means which they should collect themselves, and that I must have their determination, and that they must collect the people immediately.

‘ I enclose the copy of the letter which I wrote to Mr. Stuart upon this occasion, on the 13th of May, in answer to which I was informed that the Portuguese Government would readily undertake the proposed work.

‘ On the 16th of May I quitted Villa Ferosa to join the troops in Estremadura, having previously detached two divisions from the army in Castille; and I left with Sir Brent Spencer the enclosed memorandum, written on the night of the 15th*. It provided for his operations, in case the enemy should make an irruption into Portugal upon hearing of my departure with the two divisions of the army, and for the necessity of his retreat; and particularly specified that Almeida should be destroyed when abandoned by General Pack, but that it should not be abandoned “till it should be necessary.”

‘ On the 29th of May† I made Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer still further acquainted with my views respecting

* See vol. vii., p. 567.

† Ibid. p. 617.

Almeida, in a letter which I wrote to him in answer to one in which he had informed me that he had set General Pack's brigade to perform the work which I had thought necessary to render the place tenable against a *coup de main*.

‘ On the 1st of June I wrote another letter* to Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, directing the movements which he should make in the event of the enemy moving to the southward; in which letter I particularly specified that General Pack must remain at Almeida, till relieved by the expected militia garrison.

‘ It will thus appear that I ordered, on the 15th of May last, that Almeida should be effectually destroyed, if it should be necessary to abandon it, when I contemplated the possibility of the enemy's endeavor to return into Portugal, and of the necessity for the retreat of the troops from the frontiers of Castille; and that on the 1st of June I ordered the movement of the troops on the frontiers of Castille to the southward, when I thought it probable that Marmont would make the movement to the southward, with the exception of General Pack's brigade, which I desired might remain at Almeida till relieved by the militia, and of the 5th division, in the cantonments on the Upper Coa.

‘ It did not occur to me that, in the event of the enemy's movement to the southward, it would be necessary to withdraw from the frontier, or to abandon Almeida, and therefore I did not advert to this possibility in my letter of the 1st of June.

‘ It appears that Marmont made the movements in the beginning of June contemplated in my letter of the 1st of that month, and Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer made those directed for the troops under his command; but, on the 7th of June (the day on which Marmont marched to Moras Verdes, after having thrown provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo), General Pack withdrew from Almeida by order of Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, and completed its destruction, leaving still one battalion in the neighborhood of that place; from which it would appear that the abandonment of that place was not necessary: and I have the honor to enclose the official report which I have received

* See vol. vii., p. 627.

from Sir Brent Spencer, of the 14th of June, on that subject, in answer to a letter which I wrote to him on the 11th of June*.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Penamacor, 6th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d August. I do not recollect the proposal made against Lemos; but I suppose it was some trick by the Government.

‘ It appears to me that we are going backwards in the way of influence with these gentlemen. Let me know it officially if they refuse to adopt the measure you propose in respect to the military chest, &c.

‘ I enclose the state of the ammunition with the several brigades of Portuguese artillery on this side of the Tagus, from which you will see how things stand.

‘ I think I shall soon have a sufficient quantity of artillery to attach a British brigade to each division, excepting Hamilton’s, so that you may then keep the whole of this artillery in reserve.

‘ I rather think that I shall immediately close up Ciudad Rodrigo. It will depend upon what I shall hear this day.

‘ I beg you to let me know what orders you have given about the militia of Beira and Tras os Montes, and to what places I shall send orders for each of the regiments.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Penamacor, 6th August, 1811, 9 A. M.

‘ I have received your note of the 5th. I do not know whether you received a long letter-which I wrote to you from Portalegre nearly a fortnight ago, in which I explained the object of our movement to this side of the Tagus.

‘ I have not yet received the intelligence which I expect at every moment, which will enable me to determine whether

* See page 1.

I shall move on upon Ciudad Rodrigo immediately or not. From the tenor of that which I have received, however, I think I ought to move on, and I therefore recommend to you to come here to-morrow. If I should leave this place I shall send a note to Pedrogão in the morning early, where you will do well in that case to halt, and you will be able to overtake me at Sabugal the next day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel O’Lalor.

‘ Penamacor, 6th August, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

8 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of 5 P.M. yesterday. I do not exactly understand the paper which you have sent me.

‘ The enemy have certainly not got provisions for two months in the place, if they have no more than you state; but I suppose what is stated has been introduced lately, and, with what was there before, makes an amount sufficient for two months; but this notion does not agree with my other accounts. I wish, therefore, that you would make farther inquiries what quantities they really received, what quantities they had before, and for what time they have now; and the strength of the garrison, of what force of each description of troops.

‘ I shall be to-morrow at Sabugal, and next day, probably, in front of that town.

‘ It is very desirable that some arrangement should be made for securing for us all the provisions of that part of the country, as, if we are to blockade that place, we must not starve.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel O’Lalor.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To ————.

‘ MY DEAR ————,

Penamacor, 6th August, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 20th July, in which you apprise me of the impression so unfavorable to me in a certain quarter, from my having omitted to make

my acknowledgments of the support I had received, and particularly for having been allowed to recommend a certain number of Officers for promotion.

‘ You were quite correct in stating that I had expressed my acknowledgments to the office from whence the communication had proceeded; and, if reference is made to the office of the Commander in Chief, it will be found that on the 14th of May I did express what I felt upon the particular subject of the promotion of the Officers, not in cold terms.

‘ It may be wrong to consider public arrangements not as matters of favor to any individual, and therefore not fit subjects for the acknowledgments of that individual; and, at all events, I do not see in what manner, or in what terms an individual like me is to address the head of the nation upon such an occasion.

‘ Even if I had received a mark of personal favor, I should doubt the propriety of my addressing my acknowledgments direct to so high an authority; and, if it be true that the support of the war in the Peninsula is a public arrangement, I should be apt to consider an address of acknowledgment from me as misplaced, if not something very near impertinence.

‘ It appears to me to be now too late to write anything more on the subject of the recommendations for promotion; but you may depend upon it, if another occasion should offer, I shall not fail to do what you have informed me would be well received.

‘ I hope that His Royal Highness will believe that he has not in his service a more zealous or a more faithful servant than myself. I shall serve him to the best of my ability as long as he may think I can promote his service; and His Royal Highness will find that I shall not ask for his favor at all for myself, and, I hope, not unreasonably for those under my command, who have a right to expect that I should make known their pretensions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ ——— ———.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Sabugal, 7th August, 1811.

‘ From what I have heard of the state of the provisions, and of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, I propose to shut it up as soon as I can, unless, before I can do so, I should receive positive intelligence that the information which I have already received is erroneous.

‘ It must be expected that the enemy will adopt all the means in their power to oblige us to desist from our object and we must be prepared to adopt measures to resist them wherever they shall attack us.

‘ One of their plans will be to collect the whole of their force; that is, Bessières’ army of the north, the army of Portugal, and the 5th corps, and fight a general action, to oblige us to relinquish our object. If they do this, I shall bring Hill’s corps to this army.

‘ Another plan will be, to manœuvre with the 5th corps on the south of the Tagus, whilst, with the army of the south and the army of Portugal, they attack us. This we shall oppose with Hill’s corps on the south of the Tagus.

‘ Another plan will be, to manœuvre with the army of Portugal on the north of the Tagus, and through Lower Beira, and, with the 5th corps on the south of that river, thus, if possible, to oblige us to raise the siege or blockade, and the army of the north would then relieve the place.

‘ Against the execution of this plan I propose to make the following disposition :—

‘ First, I propose that all above 10,000 men of Hill’s corps shall form a reserve, to be stationed at Castello Branco ; and, secondly, in the disposition for the blockade or siege, I propose that the 4th division shall be between Penamacor and Sabugal. This division, with what Hill can spare, will give nearly 10,000 men for the position of the Ocreza, besides Le Cor’s militia. On the other hand, the 4th division will be at hand to join the army, in case the army of Portugal should join the army of the north to attack us. I propose to make Le Cor occupy Monsanto, which will confine the enemy in some degree, and, I believe, Penagarcia, and also Sortelha.

‘ It will be very desirable that the garrison should be in

readiness to be thrown into Abrantes, as well as that the militia of the north, and of Beira, should be ready to play such part as may be allotted to them in these operations.

‘It will also be necessary that the Government should be prepared to feed the militia, and that money should be sent to the Commissaries of Madden’s and Otway’s brigades of cavalry, and of Pack’s brigade of infantry, and of the brigade No. 5 caçadores and 13th infantry, in order that something may be purchased for them in Spain, otherwise they will starve; or I must relinquish the operation.

‘I have just received your letter of the 4th. I wait to give any answer about the servants till Government shall have decided upon your reference. You have forgotten to send me the enclosures mentioned in your letter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Major General Peacocke.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Sabugal, 7th August, 1811.

‘I request you to give directions that every man, and every thing, coming from Lisbon for the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and Light divisions of infantry, may be sent by sea to the mouth of the Mondego, and thence by Coimbra to the army.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General Peacocke.’*

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

MY DEAR HILL,

‘Sabugal, 8th August, 1811.

‘My intention is to blockade, and even to attack, Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should be in my power; and I am now about to inform you of the mode in which I should wish you to co-operate in what I shall do.

‘You are aware that what is called the army of Portugal is stationed upon the Tagus, with its right at Plasencia and its left at Truxillo; and the 5th corps, under Drouet, is at Zafra, having, I believe, one division in the Condado de Niebla. This corps consists of two divisions of infantry of about 10,000 men, and, I should think, not less than 2000 cavalry.

‘My wish is, that you should observe the movement of the 5th corps. If the 5th corps should move to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, you will then move to cross the Tagus at Villa Velha, and proceed on by Castello Branco to join the army.

‘I propose that your corps in Alentejo should be joined by the 9th dragoons. Barbacena’s brigade of cavalry already belongs to it; and it will further be joined by the 28th regiment, and detachments arrived for the 57th and other regiments, and others that are expected every moment, including cavalry and infantry.

‘I should not wish you to keep more men in Alentejo than 10,000, and that the remainder should be eventually detached to Castello Branco, in order to form the foundation of a corps to be formed there to keep up the communication with the army.

‘In a view to this detachment, I would wish you now to send one brigade of British infantry from the 2d division, and one regiment of Portuguese infantry from General Hamilton’s division, to Portalegre. This brigade of British infantry should be supplied by its commissariat, and Major General Hamilton will take care that the Portuguese regiment is well supplied with provisions by the Portuguese commissariat. Hereafter, when the proper time shall come, I will order these troops to cross the Tagus to Castello Branco.

‘If the 5th corps should, instead of crossing the Tagus, manœuvre upon you in Alentejo, I request you first to move upon Portalegre, and there either stand their attack or not, as you may think proper, according to your notion of their force compared with your own. If you should not stand their attack, you will retire by Gavião towards Abrantes, and thence across the Zezere, taking the line of the Tagus, with Santarem upon your right. When you shall pass Niza, you will pick up the bridge of Villa Velha, and either send the boats down to Abrantes or destroy them.

‘It is possible that the army of Portugal, instead of moving to attack us at Ciudad Rodrigo, may manœuvre on the right of the Tagus, by Zarza la Mayor and Castello Branco.

‘I shall in that case join the 4th division of infantry with the detachment from the 2d, and General Hamilton’s division, which will be at Castello Branco, and with Le Cor’s

militia, and shall endeavor to stop them in the position of the Ocreza. In this case it would be desirable that you should maintain yourself at Portalegre as long as possible, and that you should not retire from Gavião in a hurry; and that you should maintain yourself upon the Tagus, with your left upon the Zezere, till these troops should have joined you.

‘ This is the general outline of what I intend; and I shall be glad to hear from you whether I have made myself clearly understood by you.

‘ I have desired Murray to establish a daily communication with you by means of mounted guides; and I beg that you will have the dispatch sent from your quarters daily at the regular hour.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I send a letter for Marmont, which I beg you to forward to Badajoz.

‘ W.’

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 8th August, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what regulation you have made for the payment of the soldiers at the depôt at Belem, as the Officers commanding companies in many regiments of the army complain that the soldiers being paid their balances at Belem, for a period to which the estimates of the regiments of the army have not been discharged, come up to their regiments in debt.

‘ I do not recollect that the regulations of the service, or the General Orders of the army, would allow of more money being drawn for a soldier in the depôt at Belem than would be absolutely necessary to sustain him, or than would be required to supply him with necessaries. But I should be glad to know what the order and practice is at Belem, before I give any further order upon the subject.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will have the men reported to be fit for duty at Belem examined from time to time, to see whether any of them have become fit for service in the field.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Sabugal, 8th August, 1811.

‘ I wish to draw your attention to the situation of the Prince of Orange with this army. I have appointed him, with his own consent, to be one of my aides de camp, and it is impossible for anybody to conduct himself with more propriety than he does in every respect.

‘ I think, however, that if His Highness was promoted in the course of a short time to be a Colonel in the army, I could attach him to a brigade, in a situation in which he would have a better opportunity of seeing how the detail of the army was conducted, and how the duty was done, at the same time that it would be more suitable to his rank and situation in life.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will consider of this subject.

‘ The Prince is now gone to Cadiz, and I expect him in about a fortnight.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Sabugal, 8th August, 1811.

‘ I enclose the morning state of the 5th instant of the troops in the field. The 32d and 77th regiments are not included, not having yet joined the divisions to which they belong.

‘ I am sorry to say that the young troops have not stood their march very well, although the marches were purposely made very short, and they were never exposed to the sun at a later hour than 8 o'clock. The diseases, however, are very slight, and, with the exception of some few of the Walcheren soldiers, the old soldiers are remarkably healthy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Sabugal, 8th August, 1811.

‘ I have continued to move the troops to their left since I addressed you on the 1st instant, as I did not, till last night,

receive any accounts upon which I could depend of the state of the supplies in Ciudad Rodrigo. I have now reason to believe that a sufficient supply to last the garrison for two months was introduced into the place about the 28th of July, and the troops which escorted the convoy returned again to the north about the 2d instant.

‘ General Silveira writes on the 28th of July, that Bessières’ troops, and those under General Santocildes, still maintained the positions which he had reported on the 21st that they occupied respectively; and he says that Bessières has under his command, including the garrisons of Zamora and Toro, not less than 20,000 men. This force is larger than I imagined he could collect, and renders it improbable that I shall be able to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I observe, also, that the French are collecting large magazines at Vitoria; from which circumstance I should imagine that the reports which they have circulated of the early arrival in Spain of reinforcements have some foundation.

‘ These circumstances, combined with a knowledge which I have obtained, that the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo had received information of our march in that direction, have induced me to continue it, and to take up our cantonments in that neighborhood.

‘ At present I think it more doubtful than it was that I shall be in a situation to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but the movement which I am making may lead to some operation by the enemy which may afford an opportunity of striking an advantageous blow; or, if reinforcements are not expected from France, the enemy may be induced to draw some troops from the eastern coast of the Peninsula, or from the southward, to impede our progress, and thus a seasonable diversion will have been afforded to those of the allies who are at present the most pressed.

‘ In all my considerations upon this subject I do not at all reckon upon the operations of the corps under Santocildes, because I am quite convinced that if the enemy should think it expedient to collect their forces, to fall upon the allied British and Portuguese army, not only they will not be prevented from doing so by any apprehension of the

operations of the corps under General Santocildes, but that the operations of that corps are not likely to be of the description to give them any reasonable grounds for uneasiness.

‘All the movements of General Santocildes, from the moment he would leave the hills of Galicia, would be cramped by his apprehensions of the enemy’s cavalry opposed to his undisciplined infantry, and he would probably not be able to get possession even of Salamanca.

‘I learn that a part of the 5th corps still remained at Zafra on the 2d of this month, and one division only had gone towards the Condado de Niebla.

‘All accounts agree in stating that Marshal Soult has gone towards Granada.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I have received a report from Valladolid, stating that Marshal Bessières has returned to France, and that General Dorsenne now commands the troops in the north.

‘W.’

To Marshal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

‘Au Quartier Général,
ce 9 Août, 1811.

‘MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘J’ai l’honneur de vous envoyer une lettre que je viens de recevoir de l’Angleterre, par laquelle votre Excellence verra que Monsieur Ville sur Ancy, au sort duquel votre Excellence s’intéressait, a été envoyé en France.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘*Le Maréchal Marmont,
Duc de Raguse.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To J. Duff, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Casillas de Flores, 9th August, 1811.

‘I was in hopes that I should have heard from you after the arrival of the *Minho*, to inform me of your success in procuring for the army some of the money which has arrived in that vessel. I assure you that we were never in such want of money as we are at the present moment; and I hope

that you will spare no effort to send us, as soon as possible, the largest supply that can be procured.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Duff, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Casillas de Flores, 9th August, 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Secretary of State. I am very apprehensive that there are some symptoms of Buonaparte’s coming to Spain, of course with a large reinforcement, notwithstanding that I hear from Salamanca that the report there of a war with Russia was more prevalent than ever.

‘ I write to Duff by this opportunity, to request him to spare no means whatever to increase our supplies of specie; you may depend upon it that every shilling you get for bills upon England, and advance to the Spanish Government, is so much out of our military chest. I conceive that we now get every sum which any individual is willing to advance for a bill upon England, excepting those sums which you get, and that we should get these sums likewise, if you did not take them. I do not mean to say, however, it is not as necessary to supply the Spaniards with money at times as it is to supply our own troops, and I have more than once supplied them from our military chest; but still the supply of specie by you at Cadiz diminishes the supply of the military chest of this army.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain Kipping, Commandant at Coimbra.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 12th August, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter and its enclosures, which I have received from Mr. Stuart.

‘ I beg that you will go to the house occupied by Staff Surgeon —, and that you will ascertain whether it is true or not that Mr. — had the door of a room broken open at the —’s, at Coimbra.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Kipping.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 12th August, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 6th; and I am concerned to find that the Government persist in an erroneous system of taxation, notwithstanding all that we can represent to them upon the subject. However, the Government of the Brazils being determined to annihilate the influence of the servants of the British Government in the concerns of Portugal, it is almost useless to remonstrate; and, in my opinion, you should confine yourself to the limit of telling them individually and privately, that unless they introduce the reforms in all the branches of the administration which have been recommended to them, they must not expect the increased assistance of Great Britain. This intimidation will have, at all events, the effect of strengthening the hands of our friends.

‘ You are quite in the right to adhere strictly to the orders you have received respecting the settlement of the accounts of the subsidy.

‘ I believe there was some mismanagement on the part of the gentlemen who ordered the preparations for the feast at Mafra: but I was intolerably cheated, as will appear when I state that I found the meat, fowls, wine, &c., and the Commissary General carried the things to Mafra for me, and yet the feast, in addition to these, cost me 1200*l*. I referred the bills to the police. I do not know what their decision was; but, as they were certainly exorbitant beyond measure, I determined to defer the payment till it should be perfectly convenient to me. I do not know whether it is yet so, not having had time to look into my accounts; but I should imagine not, as the situation which I fill is not only not a sinecure, but not remarkably well paid. I cannot, however, think it any hardship to oblige people to wait for their money who have asked three times at least more than they ought; and, at all events, I cannot allow you to incur an inconvenience which I cannot at present incur myself. I can certainly pay some of the money, and I shall make Sodré begin the settlement immediately.

‘ I desired Mackenzie to remove my wine from Bandeira’s because Bandeira, after having invited me and all my family

to consider his house as our own, and to go there when we pleased without billet, had a breeze with Campbell the other day, because he went to live there without a billet, and was nearly coming to blows in the street. I was very glad to have so good an opportunity of divorcing myself from Bandeira. I desired that a house might be taken for me, in order in some degree to mortify the Government and the principal people of Lisbon, and if possible to make them feel a little respecting their conduct about billets. I am slaving like a negro for them: I have saved the people in Lisbon, particularly, from the enemy, and I take nothing from them, while they continually torment me with their frivolous complaints on subjects on which they ought to have no feeling.

‘ I shall not make use of the palace of Bemposta, or of anything else belonging to the prince; nor will I lie under any obligation to any Portuguese for my private convenience. I shall pay rent for the house, which I want only to hold my wine, and to receive the Officers of my family when they go to Lisbon. I shall not be sorry if the Government and principal people of Lisbon know the reason why I take this house; viz., that I will not lay myself under an obligation to any of them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th August, 1811.

‘ In consequence of the reports which I received, that the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo were in want of provisions, which reports were not contradicted in time, I have brought the army to this quarter sooner than I intended; which circumstance may, I think, injure our enterprise.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th, but not that of the 1st: everything appears to me to be going on well, and I should hope that we shall not be materially wrong in our time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R.A.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General H. Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th, in respect to Captain Boyce’s leave. I beg you to show to Captain Boyce the enclosed letter which I have received from the Horse Guards, upon the numerous applications from the Officers of the army for leave of absence, and also to point out to him the inconvenience to his own regiment which must result from his absence at present. I have felt this inconvenience so strongly that I have sent my own aide de camp, Captain Canning, to do duty with the regiment.

‘ Under these circumstances, I am under the necessity of declining to give leave of absence to Captain Boyce; and, even if he should send in his resignation, I cannot allow him to quit his regiment till his successor shall be appointed. I am very sorry to be obliged to refuse Captain Boyce; and I hope that his good sense will point out to him the injury which will result to himself from the step which he states he intends to take. I can only say, that, if any Officer is sent from England to relieve Captain Boyce, he shall have immediately the leave which he solicits.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
H. Campbell.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th. The acquittal of the Conde de Sabugal is very extraordinary, his honorable acquittal still more so; as, if I recollect rightly, I sent to the Government undoubted proof of his belonging to the “Légion d’Honneur,” and of his being an Officer in the service of France. Indeed, I have his name in the *Emplacement* of the army as a Lieutenant Colonel.

‘ I should think Beresford will not allow him to join any regiment as an Officer.

‘ I do not know whether I have the power to depute any person to administer an oath, which I am required by the auditors to administer, or in what form I ought to make out

the deputation. But you will do well to make inquiry from the auditors on both points.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 13th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th, regarding the sending to France the disabled prisoners of war.

‘ I can have no objection to their being sent ; but, as the French Government will in all probability pay no respect to the Portuguese flag of truce, I should recommend that these prisoners should be sent to England, and that you should address the Transport Board to have them sent to France by an English flag of truce.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 14th August, 1811.

‘ I enclose a complaint, and the translation of it, which His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon has transmitted to me, of the damage done to the barracks at Evora, by the British troops lately stationed there under — —, of the Buffs.

‘ It distresses me much to find that, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken for such a length of time, the troops cannot be detached from under the immediate view of their General Officers, without doing some damage to the buildings in which they may be quartered, or mischief to some individual. I cannot but attribute the cause which is thus given for these constant complaints to the inattention of the Officers of the regiments. I beg that — — may be called upon to report upon this complaint, and particularly to state whether the General Orders of the 29th May, 1809, were obeyed when the detachment under his command was at Evora ; because it appears to me that if they had these causes for complaint could not have been given.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th August, 1811.

‘I have this day received your letters of the 9th, but not yet that of the 1st, which, however, appears to be very interesting, as you had communicated in it some opinions and wishes respecting roads. I beg you to send me a duplicate of it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Dickson, R.A.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th August, 1811,

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

Half-past 5 P.M.

‘I have not sent you instructions regarding your situation at Martiago, because I have not yet been able to acquire all the information which I want regarding the country on the right of the Agueda. It appears to me that you have nothing to apprehend in your front. Don Julian has detachments in Tenebron, Santi-espiritus, and I believe Moras Verdes; and I have this evening desired Murray to request that you would place a detachment of infantry at Las Agallas, and one of cavalry at Monsagro, to observe the roads leading through the Sierra on that side, and to communicate with Captain Grant, who was at Aldea Nueva de la Sierra yesterday evening; you will do well to communicate with him, and open all letters to me coming from him or others on that side.

‘I would likewise recommend to you to place a party of cavalry at Zamarra, and let them communicate with Don Julian’s people, Tenebron, &c., and know all that is going on.

‘You have nothing to apprehend from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, where there is no cavalry, and only 1500 infantry; you must only observe well the enemy’s movements below the mountains, and give me the earliest intelligence of them. I propose, if possible, to keep the troops in their cantonments, and to prevent anything from getting into Ciudad Rodrigo; and after I shall have completed my reconnoissance on the right of the Agueda, the day after to-morrow, I shall be able to tell whether I shall succeed.

It would be impossible to throw the troops permanently across the Agueda.

‘The 5th division observe Gata, Perales, &c., on your right, and behind you; but you must observe those on your side of Gata. I have ordered Slade’s brigade to be relieved by the 1st hussars and the 11th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General
R. Craufurd.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. Have you ordered from Gallegos the commissariat stores belonging to your division, which I told you were there.

‘W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY, ‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th August, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 31st July, and I recommend to you to make Government acquainted (in a private form) with the circumstances which have come to your knowledge. It appears to me that something is wrong, though what I cannot say, as I cannot conceive in what manner those most likely to be discontented with the continuance of the war, viz., the landed proprietors, emigrants to Cadiz, can have, or can suppose they have, the power to deliver the place to the enemy by any negotiation of theirs. It is obvious, however, from the intelligence sent from the Puertos, that the French believe they have a chance of obtaining possession of the place; and this intelligence tends to confirm the truth of that which you received of the meetings of the American deputies. These deputies met because they found that there existed an inclination somewhere to submit to the French, which fact is confirmed by the intelligence from the Puertos; and the turn which the deliberation took is natural, and can be accounted for only by the belief that they considered the submission of Cadiz to be probable.

‘My own opinion is, that several will be inclined to submit to the French as soon as they shall find them in possession of Valencia. Almost all the grandees have estates in Valencia, upon the rents of which they have subsisted since they have been deprived of the estates in the other provinces by the operations of the war, and they will of course feel

sorely the loss of these their last means of subsistence ; but their influence at Cadiz is not great, much less paramount ; and I should think that the merchants and people of that town would not submit on any account. However, you should inform Government of what you have heard, and either propose to them some plan of proceeding, in case matters should come to the worst, or desire that they should leave the decision upon the occurrences which may arise to the authorities upon the spot.

‘ I do not understand your meaning in one part of your letter, in which you say that our Government will have to decide whether “to take up the cause of the people, and abandon the Government altogether, or continue to support a system which must in the end prove fatal to the cause.” I have always thought that we supported the existing Government in Spain because it was the choice of the people : if that is not the case we are acting on a very mistaken principle.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of this day.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 14th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d July, regarding Private ———, of the —th regiment. This soldier was tried by a General Court Martial, for desertion, on the 14th June, 1810, and was sentenced to be transported, as a felon, for seven years, and at the end of that period to be at the disposal of His Majesty.

‘ I enclose an extract of the General Order of this army of the 22d June, 1810, by which it appears that this sentence was confirmed ; and, having been published in General Orders, it cannot be believed that the sentence of the General Court Martial was not made known to the prisoner.

‘ The Deputy Judge Advocate’s papers of the year 1810 being at Lisbon, I cannot at present show that the proceedings of this General Court Martial were transmitted to the office of the Judge Advocate General ; but Captain Goodman declares that he believes they were, in the same manner as

the proceedings in all other trials are; and, although I cannot find the copies of the letters written to the Adjutant General and to the Commandant of the depôt at the Isle of Wight, I enclose the copy of a letter written on the 19th September, 1810, by Major General Stewart to Colonel Darroch, respecting — —, —th regiment, from which it appears that the sentence of the General Court Martial on — — had been communicated to the Adjutant General, and to the Commandant of the depôt.

‘As it is necessary that His Majesty’s pleasure should be taken upon sentences of transportation, in order that they may be carried into execution, I have latterly considered it proper to transmit to the Judge Advocate General, to be laid before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, for His Royal Highness’ commands, all proceedings of Courts Martial on the trial of soldiers, on whom that sentence may have been passed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Adjutant General
of the Forces.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th August, 1811.

‘The enemy have made no alteration in the position of their several corps since I addressed you on the 8th instant. The army of Portugal were in the same positions in the valley of the Tagus, and about Plasencia, on the 12th instant; and the army of the north and the 5th corps on the 8th instant.

‘It appears that Soult has certainly proceeded to Granada with a large body of troops.

‘I have cantoned the allied army in the country on the sources of the Coa and the Agueda, and between those rivers, in situations from which I can collect them at any point at which it may be desirable. In the meantime the train is moving up the Douro, although but slowly, owing to the difficulties which attend all operations of that description in the Peninsula.

‘I have received a report that a reinforcement, consisting of about 10,000 men, of which 800 cavalry, were assembled

at Bayonne in the last week in July; but I have not yet received any intelligence of their farther progress.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th August, 1811.

‘I enclose the last weekly state, and the morning state of the troops in the field of the 11th instant. The 32d and 77th regiments, and the detachment of the 3d batt. 95th regiment, are not yet included in the latter.

‘I am sorry to observe, however, that there is a diminution of the effective strength of the troops which have marched, to the amount of about 1000 men, in the last three weeks, notwithstanding the care which was taken to move them by short marches. The sickness has fallen principally on the troops lately arrived; but I understand that it is not of much importance.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Dunlop.

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811,

‘MY DEAR SIR,

8 A.M.

‘General Craufurd has sent me a report which he has received from Robledillo, stating that a division of the enemy were yesterday marching between Santivañez and Villa de Torre, as they said, on their road towards Gata. It is also reported that there were cavalry marching towards Cilleros. If this intelligence be true, I conceive it can be only a reconnaitring party; but I shall be glad to know whether you have heard anything of them.

‘I ordered that hussars might be placed in observation in Gata, Perales, Cilleros, Acebo, San Martin, Villa Miel, and Valverde del Fresno, so that nothing ought to move in that part of the country without your being informed. You should fix upon a bivouac upon the top of each of the passes of Gata, Perales, San Martin, and Valverde, to assemble your troops from their cantonments, in case the enemy should move that way.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General Dunlop.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Dunlop.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811,
7 P. M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I have just received your report of this day, which is very satisfactory. I agree with you that Payo is a most important point; and I would recommend to you to keep as many troops there as you can cover, and probably one battalion in bivouac, which might be relieved occasionally. Of course the troops must not be moved to the heads of the passes till the enemy’s designs shall be manifest: probably Payo would be the best alarm post for them all, and the troops to be moved there in the first instance in case of alarm.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Dunlop.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of this day. I have General Dunlop’s report of the enemy having been at Gata last night with about 1200 men. They left it this morning, and had parties in all the villages at the bottom of the passes of Perales, Acebo, and San Martin, and they were out of all early in the day, excepting San Martin, from whence Dunlop had not heard when he wrote.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel the Hon. E. Capel.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘ General Graham gave me your letter of the 28th June some days ago, and I mislaid it by accident, or should have answered it at an earlier period. When Colonel Macdonald went home an application was made to me by Lord Aylmer, who had been an Assistant Adjutant General with this army, to be appointed Deputy Adjutant General at Cadiz, and I recommended him to General Graham. In the meantime, however, General Graham had appointed Ponsonby,

who was already attached as an assistant to the staff at Cadiz, and Lord Aylmer's appointment did not take place.

‘ Lord Aylmer is now in England for the recovery of his health, and it is possible that he may not return to the Peninsula, or that, if he should return, he may not now wish to go to Cadiz: in either case, as far as I am concerned, nothing would be more satisfactory to me than that you should be appointed Deputy Adjutant General at Cadiz; but you must see from what I have stated to you respecting the part which I had taken to procure the appointment for Lord Aylmer, long before you had come out, that it would be impossible for me to interfere in your favor, till it should be decided that Lord Aylmer either could not, or declined to, receive the appointment. I understand that you are now Assistant Adjutant General, doing the duty of the office at Cadiz; and I recommend you to remain in that situation till we shall see what Lord Aylmer will do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel*
the Hon. E. Capel.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above I have seen General Graham, from whom I learn that you are not on the staff at Cadiz; and I beg you to let me know whether it would be agreeable to you to be appointed an Assistant Adjutant General there, under the circumstances stated in this letter.

‘ W.’

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 8th instant, for which I am much obliged to you. I shall attend to the enemy's operations towards Cadiz, when he shall direct them to that quarter.

‘ I do not understand that the battalion of German recruits at Cadiz is one to which an Officer could get his original commission in His Majesty's service, although being in His Majesty's service he might be appointed to act with it. I shall, therefore, recommend Mr. Fox for a commission in one of the regiments of the line, and it will then be possible to appoint him to do duty with the battalion of German recruits at Cadiz.

‘ Captain ——— cannot be appointed a Captain in the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘ Mr. Kennedy having arrived, I have applied to him for the vouchers and receipts for the provisions delivered to the Portuguese troops, and they shall be sent to you.

‘ I have ordered that 100,000*l.* in paper may be paid into the chest; likewise 100,000 dollars in specie, of a sum which ought to arrive at Lisbon about this time from Cadiz.

‘ You will have observed from my dispatch to Government, that I had heard of the reinforcement expected in Spain. I heard of it from my friends in Salamanca; but, as I have invariably found that they diminish the numbers of the enemy in their accounts, I am inclined to believe that the reinforcement consists of the numbers stated to you from Coruña.

‘ I hope to be able to send you, in a day or two, further accounts of the supplies to the Portuguese troops to the 24th of June.

‘ Mr. Kennedy tells me that the Portuguese Government refuse to take from us wheat, barley, or oats, or any of the articles which they are daily purchasing with money in the market of Lisbon. This is a rank job of the Junta de Viveres.

‘ I am not in general very suspicious, but I begin to suspect the Government of treachery. Nothing can be so fatal to the cause as to distress us for money, and yet all the measures of the Government appear to have that sole object in view.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Charles Stuart.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘ I enclose a petition which I have received from the keeper of a coffee house at Lisbon, on the subject of a regulation supposed to have been recommended by me, that

the coffee houses at Lisbon should be closed at a certain hour every evening.

‘ If this regulation was adopted, and still exists, in consequence of my recommendation, I beg you to represent to the Government that I recommended the regulation at a period when the enemy were advancing into the country, and when disturbances were expected in that city. But unless there is a reason to suspect an inclination to disturb the peace of the city, in the disaffected class of the inhabitants under existing circumstances, I see no reason why the regulations should be continued.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letters of the 3d and 8th. All accounts appear to agree in stating the fact that there exists a very bad spirit at Cadiz. General Graham has shown me two very impudent publications, one of which, the *noticias*, in the *Seminario* of the 1st August, is, I understand, published by an agent of the Government.

‘ It is a curious circumstance that I, and not General Castaños, should be blamed for the plunder of Alburquerque, as if it was my business, and not his, to occupy that fort: what makes this abuse still better is, that I urged him repeatedly to occupy this place, in which he had his hospitals. As for the French expedition to Alburquerque, you will see the account of it in my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 11th July. They were at Alburquerque one evening; and, unless I had extended my posts to that town, I could not have prevented what happened, and this extension did not suit my plan at the time. Besides this answer to the abuse, I have another to give, which is, that when I enter Spain, I quit my magazines, and my troops and their horses starve. Will the Government or General Castaños set this to rights? Even Cocks’ parties of observation, which saw the French enter Alburquerque, found it difficult to subsist so far from the magazines. What would the army itself have found?

‘ I agree with the Spanish Government, that it would be very desirable to them that we should be bound by certain stipulations to perform certain operations for them, which they cannot, or will not, perform for themselves; but, in general, there are two sides to a bargain or contract of this description; and it would be very desirable that the Spanish Government, who will be one side in this contract, should state which part they will perform in any one operation which can be undertaken. When they come forward with a statement of this description, which will satisfy my mind, and in which I can have confidence, the Government will not find me backward in engaging myself in any operation.

‘ I am obliged to you for the pains you have taken about our money. I approve highly of Green’s proposition to have supplies of arms, ammunition, provisions, and corn, in the ships of war on the coast of Catalonia, for the use of the Spanish armies there. Green appears an intelligent fellow; and I shall begin now to read with some interest the accounts of the war in that quarter. I return his and Doyle’s letter.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Just to show you the kind of people the Spaniards are to deal with, I mention that I cannot station even a corporal’s party, or send a patrol, into the Sierra de Gata, or the Sierra de Francia, without giving the corporal money to pay for rations for the horses and men of his party, while the French take everything in the same districts for nothing. The inconvenience does not consist in paying for these articles, for which I am willing to pay, but in being obliged to make every corporal who goes with a patrol a purchasing Commissary.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘ I have received an application from Captain Lewis Ruman, of the 97th regiment, who has been for some time employed within the Spanish territory with Lieut. Colonel Fraga, in obtaining intelligence of the enemy’s movements for the Marques de la Romana, Castaños, and myself, that I should request the Spanish Government to appoint him a

Lieutenant Colonel in the Spanish army. I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay this request before the Spanish Government; and I assure you that they cannot promote a more deserving Officer, or one who has rendered more important services to the cause than he has.

‘In general, I have objected to the grant of rank in the Spanish army to British Officers; but in this instance it is really a duty to promote the wish of Captain Ruman to receive this mark of distinction from the Spanish Government’

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 15th August, 1811.

‘I enclose some letters on the claim of the acting Adjutant Harvey, of the 66th regiment, to receive the pay of that appointment during the period that he has been doing the duty for the Adjutant, who has been absent since the year 1809, on account of his health.

‘I conceive that it is not intended that the Officers of the general Staff of the army, or those attached to regiments, shall have leave of absence, excepting on account of their health; and it remains a question how long they shall be entitled to their pay, when their bad health requires that they should be absent from their duty. I have established a rule in this army, that any Officer of the general Staff, absent from this country for more than two months for the recovery of his health, shall forfeit his Staff pay, unless his bad health shall have been occasioned by wounds received in the service; but I do not conceive that I have authority to extend the operation of this rule to the regimental staff.

‘It would be desirable, however, that some general rule should be made upon this subject, and that it should be clearly understood, how long an Officer on the staff of a regiment may be absent, and continue to receive his staff pay.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th August, 1811.

‘ I have at last received your letter of the 1st August; and I have desired General Murray to have the road repaired which leads down to, and up from, the ford of the Coa, immediately above the bridge of Almeida. I have no objection to your avoiding Trancoso entirely, and proceeding by any other route that you may prefer. You will in this case fix upon the place for the first depôt on that road, letting me know which it is, and giving information to the Commissary General’s Officers, in order that they may collect there the necessary provision of forage, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th August,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received last night your letter of the 12th. I think the 24th regiment should be in the brigade with the 13th and the 5th caçadores. I propose to move these last towards the lower parts of the Coa, in order to be nearer the Portuguese magazines on the Douro. I do not think it would answer to relieve the 20th regiment by anything but a good and well disciplined one. I do not know what can be done respecting the 22d regiment, excepting that the Government should render the law more efficient in respect to the discovery and punishment of desertion.

‘ I am concerned to find that the Government still go on so slowly.

‘ Our train is moving up gradually, though I much fear that I shall not be able to accomplish my object; particularly if it be true that 17,000 men have entered Spain lately. It is as well, however, to be in some degree prepared to undertake it, if circumstances should favor its accomplishment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I believe we shall want the assistance of some Por-

tuguese artillery, besides the artillery with the several brigades, for the siege, and it would be desirable that you should send 200 or 300 to the army. I propose to attach a 9 pounder brigade to the 6th division, so that the 6 pounder short brigade with them may be put down.

‘W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 17th August, 1811.

‘Having lately made an arrangement for the better conducting of our military posts, my attention has been drawn in a very particular manner to the enormous expense which we are incurring on this head every month for the Portuguese Government.

‘The post office is a branch of the civil Government, from which, in every well regulated country, the Government derive a revenue, of course after defraying all the charges attending upon it; and the Portuguese Government, as well as others, enjoy this revenue. One of the charges against this profit was, I believe, peculiar to this country. The Government not only engaged to pay the usual price for the use of the post mules to transport their posts and messengers, but likewise half a dollar a day for each mule, to the number of six kept at each post stage. It is true, that they never performed the engagement above referred to; and the only profit the keepers of post horses derived was from the hire of their horses or mules to carry the messengers or the mails.

‘Before the last French invasion we paid, for any extraordinary post which the service of the armies required, only the expense of the hire of the post mules which carried it; and I understand that the keepers of post mules were perfectly satisfied with this payment, as well on account of its regularity as because the constant daily employment of the mules afforded means to subsist them, and sufficient profit to replace any that might have been worn out in the service.

‘Since the French invasion, however, circumstances have altered; and, although the British Government derive no profit from the post, we have incurred enormous expenses on this account. First, while the head quarters were at Car-taxo the Commissary General of the British army was

obliged to supply with rations all the mules and postilions posted on the road from Lisbon to that place, besides paying the hire of the mules for the carriage of our messengers and posts.

‘ Secondly, since the French have retired from Portugal, the Commissary General of the British army has supplied with rations all the mules and postilions on all the roads leading to the army, on which that mode of communication has been established, besides paying the expense of their hire for our messengers and posts.

‘ The expense of these rations is enormous, and, at all events, ought not to fall upon the British Government; and, in my opinion, we do a great deal when we pay the expense of any particular line, or of more frequent communication which the military operations for the defence of Portugal may render necessary.

‘ When the British Government sent an army to this country to aid in its defence, and gave Portugal a subsidy, it did not contemplate the possibility that it was not to have the use of the ordinary establishments of the country, or that the expense of the maintenance of those establishments was to be paid out of the military chest, while all the profits resulting from them were to go to the Portuguese Government: my opinion, therefore, is, that the expense of these rations is properly a charge against the Portuguese Government.

‘ When first the French retired, it may have been necessary to give rations to the mules and postilions established at the several post stages, and the same necessity may still exist in some parts of the country; but it is still desirable to revert to the old system as soon as possible. Accordingly, I have this day directed, that wherever it may be possible, half a dollar a day for each mule kept at each post stage in all the military communications may be given instead of rations, which will of course be charged against the Portuguese Government; and besides that we shall pay, for our couriers and extra posts, the usual hire of the mules.

‘ I beg you to inquire from the Portuguese Government, whether this arrangement is satisfactory to them. If it should not be so, I beg them to take care that the post mules are established and kept up as usual on the roads;

1811.

FUENTE GUINALDO.



and I will use them as before the late French invasion, paying the usual hire for those which I use.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 18th August, 1811.

‘ I heard of the misfortune which occurred to one of your brigades of mules; but I hope it is not so extensive as you imagine. The Commissary General will remedy it. I do not know how they came to pass by San Martin, and it is still more difficult to account for the surprise of our piquet there; but I understand that the whole party, German, English, Spaniards, and muleteers, were looking at a procession when the French entered the town. It is very unfortunate that the cavalry, whom I had ordered to Gata, were not sent to that place; if they had been, this misfortune would not have occurred, and I should have known of the enemy’s being at Gata sufficiently early to attempt something upon them.

‘ I heard last night (but not from good authority) of a party being collected at Granadilla, probably for another reconnoissance.

‘ I am going over to Cesmiro this morning, in order to look at the country on the other side of Ciudad Rodrigo, and I shall not be back till to-morrow: but, if anything comes near enough to you to enable you to strike a blow without incurring much risk, I wish you would do it.

‘ You see, by Grant’s account of the 16th, how the last reconnoissance got off: I think the next would be directed more towards Escarigo. It is not impossible but that they might wish to open a communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; in which case, I mean to assemble the army about Pedro de Toro, and you might collect your division at once at Zamarra, and be in readiness to fall upon anything not too large for you, which should attempt to cross the plain. I consider Monsagro to be a point at which you ought to have an intelligent Officer, who would be able to give you information of all that passes in the Sierra on that side.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I had a report from Sir Stapleton Cotton yesterday, that there was a squadron of hussars at Ciudad Rodrigo. I rather believe that he must have mistaken Don Julian’s people for Frenchmen: Don Julian’s people are about the place in all directions; and I heard from the town yesterday, that there was no cavalry there.

‘ W.’

To ——— ———, —th Regiment.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cesmiro, 18th August, 1811.

‘ Major General Campbell has informed me that he had placed you in arrest, on charges, copies of which will be transmitted to you in the usual course by the Adjutant General, and he has communicated to me a correspondence which has passed, upon which he has founded those charges. I am very desirous, if possible, to prevent these charges coming under the consideration of a General Court Martial; and as it appears to me that you have not considered the subject in its true light, I trouble you with this letter, and I send it direct to yourself, because your Commanding Officer is the other party in the question, and I am desirous to avoid influencing the final decision by a Court Martial, by any opinion of mine, in case I should not succeed in convincing you that you have taken a mistaken view of your case.

‘ It appears that you imagine that you have reason to complain of an order issued by your Commanding Officer, Major General Campbell, and you have remonstrated upon this order. I put out of the question, for the present, the consideration of the justice and the injustice of this order; or whether you had ground, or otherwise, to remonstrate, as bearing in no manner upon the case. It is obvious that if you address your superior Officer upon any subject, you must make use of respectful terms, and must avoid the use of those which are offensive. This necessity exists in the common intercourse of life, in which nothing offensive is tolerated, either by the rules of society or by the law; much less is anything offensive allowed in the intercourse among military men, particularly in the communications of an Officer, of whatever rank, to his Commanding Officer. I observe that in your letter of the 9th August, addressed to the Assistant Adjutant General, you state that from the

papers you transmitted, "it must appear that the orders of that day, as applicable to the regiment and yourself, are *totally destitute of foundation*;" that it is "proved *that it is the reverse of what has been stated*;" and that, if allowed to remain on record, it will be a *gross injustice to yourself* and the regiment. You sent the letter containing these expressions, notwithstanding that the Assistant Adjutant General and Major General Burne had refused to forward it to the Major General, because it contained offensive expressions.

'I believe it will be admitted that the use of such expressions would not be tolerated in private life; nay, the law would protect any individual from them, whatever might be the ground afforded for the use of them; much less can the use of them be allowed from an Officer to his superior, upon an order issued by such superior. I would also observe, that the use of these expressions was entirely unnecessary for the purpose of your remonstrance: your legitimate object in that remonstrance was to show Major General Campbell that he was mistaken, and that his order ought not to have referred to the —th regiment; you were to effect this object by the papers which you enclosed; and to add your comments upon these papers was not necessary for your purpose: but when those comments were conveyed in offensive terms, it would appear that they were added only for the purpose of offending. On this ground I am most anxious that you should not appear before a General Court Martial on such a subject. The discussion of it cannot lead to any good effect, whatever may be the result; and if the General Court Martial should view it in the light which I do, in concurrence with the opinion of Major General Burne, and of the Assistant Adjutant General, you will be in a situation in which I shall be concerned to see any Officer of your rank. I request you, therefore, to reconsider the subject, on the ground on which I have placed it; and I assure you that nothing will give me more satisfaction than to have succeeded in prevailing upon you to recall expressions, which nothing should have provoked you to use to your Commanding Officer.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' ————,

—th Regiment.

' WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above Major General Stewart has brought me the papers which you had sent to him, which, as I have above informed you, I had already seen.

‘ W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cesmiro, 18th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 13th. The delays of the Portuguese Government are most provoking. I must again draw the attention of our Government to their conduct. It appears to me that we have lost all influence over them.

‘ The clothing for 30,000 men, and arms, sent to Portugal, are in addition to the subsidy, and must not be charged against it.

‘ I concur entirely with you regarding the persons chosen to compose the committee at Lisbon. I do not know Dr. Bonifacio, but I dare say he is a proper person. The others certainly are so.

‘ I do not know how you are to get money for the purposes proposed. However, that is never thought of in England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Dunlop.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 19th August, 1811.

‘ I understand that there was, on the 16th, a French Officer of the 47th regiment prisoner in Acebo, whom the magistrates were inclined to set at liberty. I beg that, as soon as possible after you shall receive this, you will send a patrolle into Acebo, and demand this French Officer, and send him and the magistrates of the town to me. If he should be gone, send the magistrates of the town.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Dunlop.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose a letter from General Alava to the magistrates.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. Colonel Framingham, commanding Royal Artillery.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 20th August, 1811.

‘I request you to order Lieut. Colonel Fisher to deliver to the Spanish Ambassador at Lisbon 2000 stands of arms, for Colonel Downie’s Estremadura legion, which are to be forwarded to the orders of General Castaños; likewise 1200 stands of arms for the regiment La Princesa; and 2000 stands of arms for the use of new levies in Castille. These two last mentioned 1200 and 2000 stands are to be delivered to the orders of Major General Don Carlos de España.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Framingham.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 20th August,
1811.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I enclose a copy of a report which I received from Fletcher, respecting the present state of Almeida. It would be really worth while to have the men collected, and that done which he recommends.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Marshal

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To General Abadia.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 20th August, 1811.

‘This letter will be delivered to you by Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, who has been appointed by the British Government to reside in Galicia, and to communicate such matters, for the information of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, as it may be interesting for His Royal Highness to know; and to deliver to your Excellency such supplies of arms, &c., as the British Government may have it in their power to forward to you.

‘I beg leave to recommend Sir Howard Douglas to your attention.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General Abadia.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Calvert, Adjutant General to the Forces.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 20th August,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I have received your letter of the , and I am very much obliged to His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent for the trouble which he has taken to remove from my mind the uneasiness which I felt, under the notion that His Royal Highness believed that I could do otherwise than forward his views, in respect to his regiment, by every means in my power.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of stating to His Royal Highness how sensible I am of his graciousness.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Calvert,*
Adjutant General to the Forces.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Officer commanding the Artillery at Lamego.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811.

‘ I have received a letter from Mr. Pipon, informing me of the illness of Major Dickson, of the artillery; and I have now to request that you will have the ordnance and stores brought up to Lamego, and that you will remain there till Brigade Major May shall arrive with my further orders.

‘ I beg to hear from you what progress has been made in the operation of the removal of the ordnance and stores from the boats to Lamego.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Officer commanding*
the Artillery at Lamego.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Dunlop.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811,
3 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I request you to send to Acebo a patrolle; and to send here, to wait upon General Alava, Don José Almazara, *Commandante del Rey* of Plasencia, who is established there. You had better send a few infantry with the party, lest this gentleman should think of resistance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Dunlop.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811.

‘ I have directed that ——— may be sent back to Lisbon; and I beg that after his arrival there he may be sent to England by the first opportunity that may offer.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of a letter to the Secretary of State regarding this person, and I beg that you will give it to the Captain of the ship in which ——— shall sail, and request him to send it to the Secretary of State, from the port at which he will land, informing the Secretary of State at the same time that he is landed.

‘ I beg you to have ——— comfortably accommodated on his passage, and that you will give the Captain of the ship ten pounds, to be given to ——— when he shall be put on shore in England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811.

‘ I have written a long letter to the Portuguese Government, to endeavor to prevail upon them to adopt the arrangements for the conduct of the civil departments of the army recommended to them.

‘ I shall send you in a day or two the accounts of our demands to the 24th June. They will amount to above 80,000*l.*; and besides this there is a demand for above 400,000 dollars, for provisions for the 20th regiment. To this add 100,000*l.* in paper, and 100,000 dollars in specie, which I ordered to be paid to the chest the other day, and it will turn out that the subsidy is pretty well in advance according to my account.

‘ You will have heard that ——— is arrived at Lisbon, and by all accounts he appears to be “a liar of the first magnitude.”

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th July. Since I wrote to you in June Sydenham has been at head quarters, where, with his usual ability, he acquired a great deal of information upon many points, which will be very useful to the Government in England. While he was with me I arranged all the details of a system for all the departments of the Portuguese army, and he and Beresford went to Lisbon in the end of June, to endeavor to prevail upon the Government to carry them into execution. Beresford has been there ever since, and nothing is yet done.

‘ In the meantime the Portuguese revenue has increased so much, as that in the month of July they realized more than 300,000*l.* sterling, so that there is no longer the excuse of want of money; and yet commissariat matters go on so ill that I have been obliged to send 4000 troops to the rear, because they can get no food in a forward position; and these are the only troops they have to feed with this part of the army. I have written a remonstrance to the Portuguese Government upon the subject, of which I will send a copy to England.

‘ I think that you have done well to send Mr. Bissett out to see what the nature of the duties of the Commissary General are, before he undertakes to perform them; but I anxiously hope that Mr. Kennedy will not leave us. In promoting Mr. Bissett, you have put him over the head of Mr. —, who is with this army. I have tried Mr. —, and he certainly was not, and, I should think, is not, fit to be Commissary General to such an army as this; but he is a very meritorious public servant, and has performed his duty very much to the satisfaction of Mr. Kennedy, and I have no doubt would be equal to the management, as Commissary General, of a concern on a smaller scale, which should be attended with less difficulty than is experienced in this. I am apprehensive that he will be a little annoyed that Mr. Bissett is put over his head; and probably you might be induced to promote him likewise, as he really deserves it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Gordon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811.

‘ Sir Howard Douglas arrived here two days ago; and, having had a conversation with him, he has set out for Galicia, through the northern provinces of Portugal.

‘ At his desire I have permitted Captain Douglas, of the 51st regiment, to accompany him; and I enclose to your Lordship a letter which I have received from Sir Howard Douglas, in which he requests to give a staff allowance to Captain Douglas, upon which I request to have your Lordship’s commands.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811.

‘ I beg to recommend that 15,000 sets of accoutrements may be sent to Lisbon, in order to enable me to supply the Spanish levies with accoutrements from time to time. I have in the stores at Lisbon about 15,000 stands of arms, but no accoutrements now remaining.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811.

‘ I received information from Major General Peacocke some time ago, that a British subject, by the name of ———, was confined at Lisbon, by order of the Portuguese Government, on suspicion of being a spy; and, upon a perusal of the report of his examination and of the letters he had written, having been of opinion that there was some foundation for the suspicion, I requested the Portuguese Government to deliver this person over to me, in order that I might examine him. They readily complied with this request, and ——— was brought to head quarters in charge of the Provost Marshal; and, having had two conversations with him, he appears to me to be able to give but a very unsatisfactory account of the motives for which he came to this country, where he knows nobody; and his ac-

count of his former life in England is by no means consistent. I have therefore deemed it best to send — — back to Lisbon, and to direct Major General Peacocke to send him to England by the first opportunity that will offer after he shall reach Lisbon.

‘ Since the works between the Tagus and the sea were commenced I have directed that they should not be inspected by anybody, from a desire to prevent not only a description, but a plan of them from being given to the public and to the enemy. — — was found near the works at Alhandra, and had questioned the peasants in the neighborhood respecting the number and calibre of the guns in them, the number of men, &c. &c.; and he was arrested by the guards of the ordenanza stationed in the works.

‘ In his examination before the magistrates of Lisbon and by me he stated that he had come to Portugal with a view of serving in the German hussars; and it appeared that the ship in which he said he had come had returned to England, by and he knew nobody at Lisbon.

‘ From the terms in which he addressed Major General Peacocke I was inclined to believe that he had been in the French service, and that he intended to enlist into the hussars, in the belief that he would be able to desert from that corps with the intelligence which he should have procured more easily than from a British regiment; but, on examining him, I did not find any cause to confirm the suspicion that — — had been a soldier. But as he had no business in Portugal, and could not give a satisfactory account of himself, I thought it best to send him to England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 21st August, 1811.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 14th instant I have received from different quarters reports of the movement of reinforcements into Spain, the numbers of which have been stated to be from 14,000 to 24,000 men. The accounts which appear most deserving attention state that a *corps de reserve*, amounting to 24,000 men, is to be formed in the

northern part of Castille, consisting principally of battalions belonging to regiments already in Spain, filled with recruits of the late conscription.

‘ But, besides these battalions, I have reason to believe that some of the old troops are coming into Spain. The 5th light infantry in particular, which were at Cherbourg, are, I know, upon their march into the Peninsula; and this circumstance will serve to show that the collection of troops in the camp of Boulogne has the same object in view as the formation of an army of reserve in the north of Castille, viz., to form the newly raised conscripts. If the collection at Boulogne had any other object in view, the 5th light infantry would not have been brought from Cherbourg into Spain.

‘ I have not heard how far the reinforcements have advanced into Spain; but they had not reached Valladolid on the 15th instant.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of any importance since I addressed your Lordship on the 14th. On that evening a detachment, consisting of about 1200 infantry and cavalry, arrived at Gata, which is on the south side of the mountains which separate Castille from Estremadura, and on the following morning they surprised a small piquet in San Martin de Trebejo, under Lieut. Wood, of the 11th light dragoons, whom they made prisoner, with ten men, and went off that evening to Moraleja, and on the next morning to Monte Hermoso.

‘ The army of Portugal have nearly exhausted that part of Estremadura in which they are now stationed, and it is extraordinary that, notwithstanding the miseries which they have inflicted upon the people of the country, there is no resource or service which they require from the inhabitants that is not instantly afforded. Such is the effect of the terror which they have inspired, that they draw resources even from some of the villages in which the guerrillas are stationed. I have, however, no doubt of the attachment of these people to the cause of their country.

‘ There is no doubt of the enemy being much distressed for want of money. I have reports from all quarters that the troops have not been paid for several months, and their departments are much distressed. They endeavor to relieve this distress by levying contributions on the country in every

manner that can be devised. But the relief to be obtained in this manner is trifling; and the Spaniards will at last learn, from the repeated oppressions of the enemy, that their only chance is determined resistance or flight.

‘ I have not heard of any movements by the troops in the north, or in the south, since I last addressed your Lordship.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Grey, 5th Foot.*

‘ MY DEAR GREY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d August, 1811.

‘ There are two modes in which Officers have been permitted to serve in the Portuguese army: twenty four Officers obtained one step of promotion in the British army, in which they are considered as unattached Officers, not having a regimental commission, and these are doing duty in the Portuguese regiments, with one step of Portuguese rank senior to that which they hold in the British service.

‘ Officers belonging to British regiments, principally with this army, we allow to enter the Portuguese service, still holding their commissions in their regiments in the British service; these obtain no step of British rank on entering the Portuguese service, but they obtain one step of Portuguese rank; that is, a British Major is made a Lieut. Colonel of a Portuguese regiment, still continuing Major of his regiment in the British army; but as long as he holds his Portuguese commission he will command all Lieutenant Colonels appointed after he shall have been appointed.

‘ Since March, 1809, when the twenty four Officers first referred to were appointed to serve with the Portuguese army, and promoted, the Officers selected to fill vacancies among those twenty four, and to receive one step of British rank, have been taken from among those serving with the Portuguese army, of the other description who had not received British rank upon entering the Portuguese service.

‘ From this statement you will see that Marshal Beresford cannot recommend that you should be made a British Lieutenant Colonel upon entering the Portuguese service. You will be a Portuguese Lieutenant Colonel, and if there should

* Now Colonel Grey. He had served in the 33d regiment, when Lord Wellington commanded it.

be a vacancy in the twenty four, you will have the same claim with others of being promoted, more particularly if fortune should favor you by giving you an opportunity of distinguishing yourself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Grey.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d August, 1811,

9 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I am much obliged to you for the information contained in your letter of yesterday. There are certainly not more than from ten to twenty cavalry in Ciudad Rodrigo. I have written in Bell’s * favor, and I will repeat my recommendation of him. We have accounts of reinforcements having arrived in Spain, the head of them at Valladolid.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

‘ Au Quartier Général,

ce 22 Août, 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’envoyer à votre Excellence le reçu de Mons. Ville sur Ancy pour l’argent que vous lui avez envoyé.

‘ J’ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m’a fait l’honneur de m’écrire le 13 Août, et je vous suis bien obligé d’avoir renvoyé M. le Lieut. Mackworth. J’ai écrit en Angleterre pour faire renvoyer en France sur parole M. le Capitaine d’Artillerie, Gravelle; et je suis bien-aise de pouvoir faire quelque chose qui vous soit agréable.

‘ Je vous propose de faire l’échange de cet Officier pour le Capitaine Lutyens de 11^{me} regiment du dragons; et je vous prie de nommer un Officier du grade de Lieutenant que je pourrais renvoyer en échange pour M. le Lieut. Mackworth.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Marmont,
Duc de Raguse.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

* Colonel Bell, Secretary to Government at the Cape of Good Hope. He was then a Lieutenant in the 52d. His great talent in sketching country had recommended him to Lord Wellington’s notice.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d August, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter for Marmont, which I beg you to forward to Badajoz as soon as you can. I likewise enclose Marmont’s letter to me, from which you will observe that Mr. Mackworth is not exchanged, but only allowed to come in upon his parole; but if Marmont does not name an Officer to be exchanged for him, in answer to my letter, I shall send one in, and will give Lieut. Mackworth his cartel.

‘ I have lately made an alteration in the system of our ordnance; and I propose to have with each division of infantry one heavy brigade of 6 pounders, or one brigade of 9 pounders, and to have no artillery in reserve, excepting with the infantry and the Portuguese artillery. You have with the 2d division two brigades, one of heavy 6 pounders, and one of 9 pounders; and I wish you would keep which you choose, and send the other across the Tagus to join the 5th division. Murray will send the route for it.

‘ There is in General Howard’s brigade a company of the 3d batt. 95th regiment, which Sir Brent Spencer detained last year, as the regiment was his: I wish this company to join its battalion, and that one of the companies of the 60th, in the brigade with the Buffs, &c., should be in General Howard’s brigade; this brigade, having the 71st in it, requires light infantry less than any of the others.

‘ The company of the 95th may move with the guns.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d August,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received last night your letter of the 17th. I agree with you, that you ought to recommend an Officer in the room of M’Mahon; but I am afraid it ought to be —, instead of ****. — is the senior of the two in the same brigade, and although **** is undoubtedly the best and the most deserving, — has by accident been the most distinguished; and it will increase the bitterness of the pill which has already been administered to him in too great a degree

if **** should be preferred to him, the claims of both being grounded on services performed while both were in the same brigade. There is time for you to consider this suggestion before the post goes next week, and I therefore make it to you; but if you should still prefer ****, I will of course recommend him.

‘ In my opinion there are no Officers who deserve promotion better than Carroll, Whittingham, and Roche. It was a job originally to place them among the twenty four destined to discipline the Portuguese army; but I believe they could not get them promoted to the rank of Major in any other manner: but, having been placed in that situation, there are no Officers who have led such a life as they have, particularly Carroll. However, I think that Hill, or Doyle, Le Mesurier, and Campbell, have claims likewise; and I have no objection to bring them forward: but I think it better not to say anything against the promotion of the other three. I have taken the opportunity of Pack’s wants to write to the Government about the delay of the arrangements, a letter which I hope will have some effect.

‘ Mr. Stuart informed me that Redondo and Forjaz are inclined to refer their dispute to me; if they do, I shall decide upon it by return of post.

‘ I sent you Fletcher’s opinion about Almeida. If the masons and people are assembled for the work proposed by Fletcher, I shall send him an English engineer over to have it executed: it is an inconvenience of the first magnitude not having that place in order.

‘ You will hear that the French are getting in reinforcements, and they appear to threaten Galicia. My position here, however, must keep them in check; at the same time that they must prevent the execution of the design which brought me here: that I cannot help, and I shall not be dissatisfied, if I can save Galicia. In the meantime, although I scarcely hope that I shall be able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, I allow the train to come on as far as the neighborhood of Trancoso, in case the French should enter Galicia, that I may be in a situation to proceed at once, and vigorously, with the siege. As for Marmont, I think I am more than a match for him singly; but not if he has 20,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry upon the Duero to join him, of

which number the northern army now consists. From this statement you will see what a convenience it would be to have Almeida in a state of security.

‘ If I find that the troops move forward from Rio Seco, I shall order Silveira to collect his forces.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d August, 1811.

‘ I quite agree in opinion with you regarding the military chest. It should be entirely under the control of the General, or of the Minister in the war department. I rather believe of the latter; at the same time, that the heads of departments who receive funds from the military chest, should be accountable in the usual manner to the department of finance. But when the parties shall refer their dispute to me, I shall draw a memorandum upon the subject, which will settle the mode in which the business shall be conducted.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Charles Stuart.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th. We have in the British stores at Lisbon no planks for gun and mortar platforms, nor any of the articles which you require, which are not wanted for the service of the army; and I believe that they cannot be procured at Lisbon at a cheaper rate than you can procure them at Cadiz: but I recommend you to send to England a regular requisition for every article of store that you require.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d August, 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. Since I wrote it I have heard that about 5000 or 6000 infantry, and 1500

cavalry, have arrived at Valladolid; these are said to be the garrison of Pamplona, &c., who have been replaced by the lately arrived reinforcements. The French appear to threaten Galicia; but it is said that, hearing of our position here, they are about to detach to Salamanca. It will be impossible for me to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, while this large army shall remain on the Duero, and another on the other flank at Plasencia: but I shall not be dissatisfied, if by our position we shall save Galicia; and I do not propose to give up all thoughts of attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should be possible.

‘It is again said that Soult is not gone from Seville, and I should be glad to hear from you on that subject. I believe he is gone.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 23d August, 1811.

‘I do not want to renew the discussion of the other day; but I enclose the account of the cause of the issues to the Royal dragoons since the 1st August, at the head quarters only, without counting what they had picked up at the out quarters. This quantity is very insufficient, and I hope such deficiencies will not occur again; but there is some difference between this account and that of fifteen pounds in fifteen days given by Slade.

‘When supplies are deficient, there is a loose way of talking of them, which may be very excusable; but it should not be taken for an official report.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 23d August, 1811.

‘Just after you went away, Mr. Kennedy brought the enclosed returns, which revived me a little; from which it appears that, since the date of your returns, the 16th has been supplied, and have in hand to the 25th.

‘ However, the 100 mules which left Loza the 22d cannot be back till the 27th or 28th at soonest ; and I am afraid that, unless they manage their stock now in hand, they will be again without for a day or two.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart. ’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Don Carlos de España.

‘ à Fuente Guinaldo,

ce 23 Août, 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 22. Je ne pourrais pas, sans grand inconvénient, étendre mes postes à Ledesma, malgré que ce point soit important. Je vous conseille de ne rien risquer pour le maintenir ; à moins que les Français se renforcent considérablement sur le Tormes, je ne crois pas qu’ils s’établissent à Ledesma ; mais il y a grande différence entre s’établir dans un poste et d’y laisser s’établir la force ennemie. Ainsi malgré qu’ils n’y resteront pas à moins que les renforts ne viennent sur le Tormes, ils pourront bien tâcher d’en chasser les troupes de Don Julian, et si vous trouvez qu’ils en ont le dessein je vous conseille de les en retirer.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *General*

Don Carlos de España. ’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 23d August, 1811.

‘ I have received Dom Miguel Forjaz’ letter and the enclosures respecting the military chest, to which the answer is written, and will go this night, if M. Sodré can translate the papers in time.

‘ I observed that one of the proposals in the Conde de Redondo’s plan is that we should begin a new account of the subsidy from the 1st October ; and that all arrears or debts previous to that time shall be settled thereafter—how, is not stated. I have taken no notice of this article in my observations, excepting that the regulation thereof has nothing to do with the formation of the military chest ; but I recommend to you to take notice of it, and not to increase the Portuguese debt, at least till the 1st October.

‘ I have desired Mr. Kennedy to pay to the chest 100,000 dollars in specie of a sum lately arrived from Cadiz, which is 200,000 dollars in specie, and 100,000*l.* in paper, which I have ordered to be paid to the chest within these last eight days; and I intend to give another 100,000 dollars in specie of a sum which I expect from Cadiz in the end of the month.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose the accounts of issues to the Portuguese troops to the 24th June, and the accounts of issues to the regiment at Cadiz, amounting to 163,800*l.*

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 24th August,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Picton, regarding Champlemond, to which I beg to draw your attention. It states generally the purport of a conversation which I had with him the day before yesterday on the same subject, with this addition, that I told him I believed I was the cause of Champlemond’s disgrace, by having reported to you the manner in which the sick of his brigade were sent from Nave d’Aver in the commencement of the month of May. In answer, he told me that Champlemond had brought to punishment the Officer and Surgeon who had gone in charge of these sick; and he then mentioned that he had ordered Champlemond off the field on the 3d May, in consequence of his being entirely unfit for duty from sickness. All this being the case, you will probably think him worthy of being promoted to be a Brigadier General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 24th August, 1811.

‘ M. Sodré has finished the translation of my papers on the military chest; but, as I cannot tell whether the translation accurately explains my meaning, I send you the original

drafts, which I beg you will return to me as soon as you shall have done with them: if there should be any doubt, you can explain my meaning from these papers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 24th August, 1811.

‘ I forward a letter and its enclosure which I have received from the Officer who commands at the hospital station at Coimbra.

‘ I am inclined to believe that — must have made a mistake, and that she intended to make the complaint of * * * * which she has made of † † † †. * * * * is in the Portuguese army. If, however, she should be of opinion that she has any reason to complain of † † † † conduct, I shall have him put in arrest, and shall bring him to trial before a General Court Martial, if she will order the witnesses to attend it.

‘ I have likewise the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. General Hill, with a report from Lieut. Colonel Stewart, who commanded the troops lately occupying the barracks at Evora, on the damages stated to have been done to those barracks.

‘ It is very desirable that some means should be adopted of verifying these complaints. It is obvious that this complaint is much exaggerated, if not entirely destitute of foundation; and, at all events, Lieut. Colonel Stewart having manifested an inclination to attend to any complaints made of the conduct of the troops, it appears that it would have been more friendly if the magistrates or Barrack Master at Evora had complained in the first instance to that Officer, instead of to the Secretary of State.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 24th August, 1811.

‘ Having received the directions of the Secretary of State to pay to — —, late of the Lusitanian Legion, certain

allowances from the 29th June, 1808, to the 23d February, 1809, I beg that you will ascertain for me whether any allowances had been issued by the Portuguese Government to the Lusitanian Legion during that period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 25th August,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I wish that you would speak to Dom Miguel Forjaz about the practice which prevails of publishing, in the Lisbon newspapers, the intelligence received from Salamanca by General Silveira, and forwarded by him to the Portuguese Government, from which papers it is copied in the English newspapers. Our correspondents there will certainly be discovered if this practice is continued. Indeed they will be lucky if their own indiscretion does not bring some of them to the gallows.

‘ What do you think of one of them going to Ledesma the other day and dining with Don Carlos de España and Don Julian, which was known publicly, and talked of at Salamanca; and, having escaped hanging upon that occasion, they wanted to have a meeting with Alava and O’Lalor!!! However, they are so very useful to us, that we should take care that they are not discovered by our means. You may depend upon it that if this intelligence from Salamanca, as published in our newspapers, is observed in Paris, and it becomes an object to discover who gives it, our friends will be discovered and hanged.

‘ I think that Marmont is about to move; and if he approaches us alone, or not sufficiently supported, I should not be surprised if we were to come to blows in a few days. However, it is not to be expected that he will approach us, excepting in great strength, as they are very strong upon the Duero.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

'SIR,

'Fuente Guinaldo, 25th August, 1811.

'I have the honor to enclose to you an extract of a letter of the 14th August, which has been transmitted to me by Marshal Sir William Beresford; from one paragraph of which it appears that the Portuguese Government has decided a question respecting recruiting persons in the employment of the departments of the British army, upon which I intended to address you as soon as I should have ascertained exactly how the law stood upon this subject.

'It is impossible for any army to keep the field without having some assistance from the country; and assistance of this description is particularly necessary to the British army in this country. It might have appeared desirable to the Portuguese Government to know how far we could do without this assistance, particularly as the greatest part of the Portuguese army are fed by the British departments.

'I beg likewise to mention that the Spanish Government, to whose troops we do not at all times give this assistance, have exempted from the laws of the conscription all the persons in the employment of the British army.

'I am far from wishing to interfere with the laws for recruiting the army; but I beg you to inform the Portuguese Government that, if they do not recall the words marked in pencil in the enclosed letter, I beg that they will take measures to feed their own troops, as the British departments can feed them no longer.

'The inconvenience which the army will feel from the want of the services of these people would be so great, and the conduct of the Government in depriving us of their services in this sudden manner, without previous notice, is so unfriendly, compared with the conduct of the Spanish Government on the same subject, that I must submit it to the consideration of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Great Britain.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 26th August, 1811.

‘ Having been out all the morning, I have only now received your two notes of this day.

‘ I did not know that Don Julian’s party had been withdrawn from Zamarra; and I suppose they have also withdrawn from the neighborhood of the place, as they sent no report either of the party that went to Zamarra or of that which went likewise to Pastores.

‘ In consequence of Major Greuben complaining that his party had too much to do, I have ordered another squadron to be sent to you; but I think it would be advisable to place some of your infantry in Zamarra. I think you had better not send them any farther forward at present.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM.

For Lieut. Colonel Framingham, commanding the Royal Artillery.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th August, 1811.

‘ 1. Captain Macdonald’s troop of horse artillery to be ordered to be prepared to march as soon as possible, and, when ready, they are to march to join this army.

‘ 2. One of the two companies of artillery, now with the battering train, to be ordered to Castello Branco, to take charge there of the brigade of 6 pounders lately belonging to the German artillery. The drivers at Coimbra, and all other spare drivers with the army, likewise to be ordered to Castello Branco.

‘ 3. When the heavy 6 pounders shall arrive from Lisbon at Castello Branco, the company of artillery, ordered by No. 2 from the heavy train, are to be attached to them, and the brigade of heavy 6 pounders there to be equipped from the horses, &c., of Captain Thompson’s brigade, and are to join the army.

‘ 4. Captain Thompson and his company are to go to Lisbon with the German light 6 pounders, either drawn by bullocks or worn-out horses, according as may be provided hereafter.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 27th August,
1811.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I enclose a letter from the Engineer at Almeida; from which it appears that he has neither money nor people to proceed with his work, for which he desires to have my instructions. It is useless to instruct him under such circumstances.

‘I have ordered Lieut. Craufurd, of the 91st regiment, to place himself under your orders.

‘I have no particular anxiety respecting the German serjeant you mention in your letter of the 23d.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 27th August, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 21st August. My opinion is, that there will be no inconvenience in equipping at Oeyras the soldiers who are fit to join the army; and, when equipped, they might be embarked at Paço d’Arcos or elsewhere, and sent up with the tide as high as Sacavem, from whence they might proceed.

‘It will not do to send them to Oeyras, and to bring them back to Belem to be equipped, and keep them there in confinement. It is much better, though a little more troublesome, to equip them at Oeyras.

‘However, the great difficulty will probably consist in the Commissary’s sending out to Oeyras the articles of equipment which they will require; but I dare say that he will not find it impossible to overcome this difficulty.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General Peacocke.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 27th August, 1811.

‘I have desired the Commissary General to pay to the chest of the “Aids” 150,000 dollars of a sum of money recently arrived from England.

‘ The conduct of the Portuguese Government in refusing to receive from the commissariat articles which were tendered to them, and afterwards purchasing those articles in the market at Lisbon, and covering this transaction by a falsehood, viz., that they did not know that the commissariat would supply the articles wanted, is of a nature so injurious to the alliance, and to the very existence of the contest, and is so mean and dirty in itself, that I earnestly request of you to represent it to Lord Wellesley, and to inform the Portuguese Government that I have made this request.

‘ The Portuguese Government are, or ought to be, aware of the difficulties in which Great Britain is involved, in order to procure not money’s worth, but money,—specie,—to maintain the contest, of which the probable want alone renders the result doubtful. In order to avoid this want they are making the most gigantic efforts, at an enormous expense, to send to this country every article that an army can require, in hopes to save the demand for, and expenditure of, specie in the purchase of these articles in the country; and the Portuguese Government, instead of seconding their laudable efforts, set themselves against them, and, for the sake of a dirty job in Lisbon, purchase there the articles with which the commissariat have been supplied from England, and which were tendered to them.

‘ Either the Portuguese Government are entirely ignorant of what is going on in the world, or they are the friends and partizans of the enemy to the utmost of their power. I defy them, in their situation, to aid the enemy so much as by increasing the demands of specie upon the British Government. I declare that I have no patience with such conduct.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st, enclosing a note of the 17th from Dom Miguel Forjaz, on the subject of a complaint from the Postmaster at Estremoz.

‘ This complaint does not mention the name of the person complained of, or the regiment to which he belongs, or even

the date of the occurrence which is its subject, or any one circumstance by which it could be traced and investigated. It is impossible to give redress when the complaints are so vague.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th August, 1811.

‘ By reference to the states which I send you by this post your Lordship will see how we stand in respect to British cavalry. As for the Portuguese cavalry, I am afraid that, owing to starvation, they are worse than useless, and we must not reckon upon more than the British. I am very confident that, even with the numbers which I have now with me, no accident can happen to us ; but we have not enough to take the field on a decidedly offensive plan.

‘ In my letter of the 18th July I reckoned the French cavalry actually with the army of Portugal about 3500 men. Recent reports state that the army of the north have 2500 cavalry. These are already double the numbers which we can produce, on this frontier, of British cavalry. But I believe there is also, in Castille, a brigade of light cavalry belonging to Marmont’s army ; at least he mentions it in a letter which we have intercepted.

‘ When, in my letter of the 18th July, I mentioned 3500 as the number of cavalry with the army of the south, I meant the cavalry which had come into Estremadura, and had joined with that of the army of Portugal. According to the returns which I have of Soult’s army of the south, he has 7774 cavalry, of which he brought only the number above mentioned, as I believe, into Estremadura.

‘ From this statement, your Lordship will see how unlikely it is that you can make us equal to the French in cavalry for a decidedly offensive operation.

‘ It has never been possible for us to assemble our whole army on this frontier, more particularly since the fall of Badajoz and the destruction of the Spanish army of Estremadura. We are nearly twice as far from Lisbon at this spot as Badajoz is. The Tagus is fordable nearly everywhere

from Abrantes to below Santarem; and if I were to leave the Alentejo without a respectable body of troops, the enemy might and would move the 5th corps through that province, and they would be at Lisbon as soon as I should hear that they had passed the Guadiana. It is as necessary to leave cavalry with that corps in Alentejo as it is to leave infantry; and accordingly your Lordship will see that some of the British cavalry remain there. These, however, are not the most efficient regiments.

‘ There is another point also to be considered in the assembling of these large bodies of cavalry, and that is, their food. It is impossible to describe the difficulty with which food is procured for them. The cavalry collected with this army are now fifty or sixty miles distant, in order to get food, and I trust to be able to assemble them when I shall want them. If I should bring them together too soon, or keep them together too long, the horses would starve.

‘ At the same time I am of opinion that we cannot have too much British cavalry. We can certainly do nothing without them in a general action out of our mountains; and, from all that I can learn, the expense of feeding the horses is not greater than it is in England, as the hay or grass they eat is seldom paid for, and the straw, when they get it, is not nearly so expensive as the hay is in England. An augmentation of cavalry, therefore, should the season be favorable, and the country which is the scene of our operations should produce forage, will give us great advantages; and even if we should be obliged to keep part of our cavalry in the rear, from the want of forage, it will enable us to relieve those in front occasionally, and thus always to have a body of cavalry in good condition. I am therefore very glad that you have sent Le Marchant’s brigade.

‘ I am almost certain that I shall not be able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, and I think it is doubtful whether I shall be able to maintain the blockade of that place. However, I shall not give up my intention until I am certain that the enemy are too strong for me in an action in the field. The place, although weak in itself, and though the ground on which it stands is badly occupied (the French have improved it in some degree), is in the best chosen position of

any frontier fortress that I have ever seen. It is impossible to do anything against it, either in the way of siege or blockade, excepting by crossing the Agueda, and of all the ravines that I have ever seen this is the most difficult to cross, excepting close to the fort; and in winter it cannot be crossed at all, excepting at the bridges, of which the only practicable one for carriages is under the guns of the fort. We must fight the battle therefore, to maintain this blockade, with our backs to this river, over which we should have to retire in case of check: and this would be an awkward position, in which I ought not to involve the army, unless the numbers are so nearly equal as to render success probable. You will observe that these circumstances all favored the French when they attacked the place from Spain.

‘ However, there is one thing very clear, that if we cannot maintain this blockade, the enemy must bring 50,000 men to oblige us to raise it; and they can undertake nothing else this year, for they must still continue to watch this place, and we shall so far save the cause. In the meantime, if they offer me a favorable opportunity of bringing any of them to action, I shall do it.

‘ I hear reports of peace from all parts of Spain, and it is a subject of common conversation and general joy among the French Officers. I know that some of them have received accounts from Paris, stating that peace was likely to take place. We have certainly altered the nature of the war in Spain; it has become, to a certain degree, offensive on our part. The enemy are obliged to concentrate large corps to defend their own acquisitions; they are obliged to collect magazines to support their armies (Marmont says he can do nothing without magazines, which is quite a new era in the modern French military system); and I think it probable, from all that I hear, that they are either already reduced, or they must soon come, to the resources of France for the payment of those expenses which must be defrayed in money. As soon as this shall be the case, and as soon as the war will not produce resources to carry itself on, your Lordship may be certain that Buonaparte will be disposed to put an end to it, and will submit to anything rather than draw from France the resources which must be supplied in

order to keep together his armies. I think it not unlikely, therefore, that peace is speculated upon in France.

‘ We have a great many Officers and men sick, but none or very few seriously so. It is astonishing how easily the Officers and soldiers of our army are affected by sickness, and the little care they take of themselves. In some situations also the effects of the climate are terrible. Very recently the Officer commanding a brigade of artillery encamped them in one of the most unwholesome situations, and every man of them is sick. However, the weather will soon become cool in this part of the country, and I hope there will be an end of the sickness.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose the morning state of the 25th, with a note on the back, showing the state of the army in cavalry and infantry in Castille and in Alentejo.

‘ W.’

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter, and its enclosure, from Mr. Stuart, and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me have your opinion upon the latter. It appears to me to afford another instance of the desire of some of the members of the Portuguese Government to interfere in everything; it regulates those matters which have been regulated already fifty times; it interferes, by way of civil regulation, in that which can be the result only of military order, &c. &c.; however let me have your opinion upon it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.,*

Commissary General.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. However desirable it may be that the Portuguese Government should take from us articles in kind, instead of money, Mr. Dunmore must not be allowed to give anything whatever without reference to you.

‘ W.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your note of this day; the reports which you have received agree with those which I have. I rather imagine that the whole of the cavalry had gone forward towards Salamanca, but I suppose now that only part is gone to open the communication with the army of the north. A reinforcement has arrived at Valladolid, and the army of the north is very strong, and is apparently about Leon, Benavente, Rio Seco, and Valladolid. The army of Portugal are apparently collected in the different passes of the Sierra, Baños, Tornavacas, and El Pico, and thereabouts; and they will pass the mountains probably when the army of the north approach the Tormes, unless they have in view some plan of greater extent, founded upon the arrival of larger reinforcements than I have yet heard of.

‘ It appears from intercepted letters that great preparations were ordered at Valladolid, Burgos, &c., in the end of June, for the arrival of reinforcements which were to be at Bayonne early in August; and these were of such an extent, and the orders so detailed, that I think that the Emperor then intended to be of the party. The recall of Bessières, in July, would prove an alteration of plan; but whether he comes or not, or whatever may be the extent of the reinforcement now come, or coming, it is certain that there is now a very large army north of the Duero.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I enclose you the draft of a letter which I have written this day to Bacellar, and I rather think that the intelligence which I have received since I wrote this letter ought to induce me to go further, and to collect his troops immediately.

‘ You will see the dispatches to Government, but I have no doubt that unless the design has been altered since the

end of June and beginning of July, we shall have the Emperor in Spain and *hell to pay* before much time elapses.

‘I have my train well in hand, and can have it on board again in a very few days.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Lieut. General Bacellar.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August, 1811.

‘You will have received from General Silveira accounts of the enemy’s progress, and of their positions on the frontiers of Galicia and Tras os Montes. I have no doubt that their design, whatever it was, has been suspended, in consequence of the position of the allied army under my command on the frontiers of Castille; but as it is difficult to foresee what movements the enemy will make, and as at present the provinces of Tras os Montes and the Minho are in a very defenceless state, I wish you to give orders that all the Officers and soldiers of the militia in those provinces should join their corps; and you will direct General Silveira, General Trant, and Colonel Wilson, to be in readiness to perform those operations which were directed by Marshal Sir William Beresford last year, in the event of the enemy’s invasion of the northern provinces by the different northern passes.

‘The enemy’s position at present at Benavente, Leon, &c., would indicate a movement by the northern passes; and it might be expedient that General Silveira should assemble his cavalry, and two or three of the nearest battalions, at Braganza, from whence he would observe the movements of the enemy, and could adopt such further measures, according to the instructions of Marshal Sir William Beresford, as the movements of the enemy might render necessary. My opinion is that the enemy will immediately move their whole force towards the Agueda; but as I may be mistaken, and as a large force is certainly collected about Benavente and Leon, I think it proper to direct you to adopt these measures of precaution.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Bacellar.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

⁶ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th instant. I will appoint Colonel Skerrett to be a Colonel on the Staff, from the 4th May, till the pleasure of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent shall be known.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General Cooke.'

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

¹ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August, 1811.

· I have this day received your letter of the 21st, and I now enclose copies of two dispatches to Government of this date. Nothing can be more interesting than the intercepted letter and the return you sent me; and I shall be much obliged to you for everything of that kind that you can send.

‘ I always reckoned the Imperial Guard at 6000 infantry and 900 cavalry!! But there is nothing like the Spaniards for exaggerating their own force, and diminishing that of the enemy. I am convinced from these papers that Buonaparte intended to come to Spain himself: the departure of Bessières for France may be a sign that that intention has been relinquished. He certainly will not come unless he has a most commanding force.

Ever yours most affectionately,

'The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.'

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

⁶ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August, 1811.

‘ A considerable body of troops arrived at Valladolid, by forced marches, on the 16th and 17th of this month, and turned off towards Rio Seco, from whence I have not yet heard of their moving. These troops, in number about 7000 or 8000, are stated to have been drawn from the garrisons in the north of Spain, having been relieved by the reinforcements which have lately arrived from France. I have likewise learnt that about 1500 dragoons, belonging to the regiments with Marmont’s army, who had been sent

to France in the spring, dismounted, have returned to Valladolid with their horses.

‘ I have not yet heard that the enemy had made any movement in the north. General Santocildes wrote on the 15th from Astorga, that the enemy were in considerable strength in his front, and he proposed to retire into the mountains of Galicia. But as they must have heard about that time that the allied army were upon the frontiers of Castille, it is probable that the execution of their plan was suspended, more particularly as the march of the reinforcements, which had been forced as far as Valladolid, was stopped about the same time at Rio Seco.

‘ Marmont has likewise broken up his cantonments in the valley of the Tagus, and his army are in the mountains which separate Castille from Estremadura ; but excepting a small body of cavalry, apparently destined to open a communication with the army of the north, none have yet passed into Castille.

‘ I conclude that he will not pass the mountains till the army of the north shall have approached the Tormes, and that then the operations of both will be directed against the allied army under my command.

‘ The division of the army of Portugal which was cantoned at Jaraicejo and Truxillo, in breaking up has, I hear, had some success against a small Spanish corps under General Morillo, and the Estremadura legion, under Colonel Downie, which had removed on as far as Montanches.

‘ I have not yet heard that this French division has passed the Tagus.

‘ I have received no late intelligence from the south of Spain. General Ballesteros was still in the Condado de Niebla by the last accounts, there being no vessels to remove his troops to Algezir.

‘ The enemy are exerting themselves in an extraordinary manner to raise contributions in Spain. They have demanded one-fourth of the crops from the cultivators of the land ; and, in order to procure money, they sell the grain, even by retail, which is thus forced from the people by way of contribution.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Dumouriez.

‘ à Fuente Guinaldo,
ce 28 Août, 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Je vous suis bien obligé de votre lettre du 5 Août que je viens de recevoir. Vous avez vu la manière dont nos tentatives sur Badajoz ont fini, et vous allez voir comment celles que j’avais l’intention de faire sur Ciudad Rodrigo vont finir.

‘ J’étais bien content de faire passer mes troupes à la droite du Tage pendant les chaleurs d’Août et Septembre, et je menaçais Ciudad Rodrigo pour faire une diversion pour les Espagnols, et j’avais l’intention d’en faire le siège, si j’eusse eu en tête une force contre laquelle je pouvais me tenir. Tout de suite, voilà tout le monde que se rassemble sur moi. Marmont passe en Castille; l’armée du nord, renforcée par des troupes dernièrement arrivées, arrête sa marche sur Santocildes, et j’attends à chaque moment les nouvelles de son arrivée sur le Tormes.

‘ Vous verrez que Santocildes, ou plutôt Abadia, qui commande en Galicie à présent, ne pourra rien faire, faute de ressources et n’ayant point de cavalerie, malgré qu’il soit entièrement dégagé par nous.

‘ Vous verrez aussi que l’armée de Blake qui est allée en Murcie ne fera rien. Peut-être même que Blake sera battu par Soult, qui a avec lui le 4^e corps d’armée et la réserve, et quelques bataillon du 1^r corps, ayant laissé le 5^e corps en Estremadure, et le restant du 1^r corps devant Cadiz. Mais si Blake n’est pas battu, soyez sûr que faute de ressources et de discipline et d’arrangement jamais il ne fera la marche que vous avez indiquée. Pour Silveira, il ne commande que la milice, qui fait très bien pour une défense pour le Portugal, mais ne peut pas entrer en opération en Espagne.

‘ Ainsi vous voyez que votre perspective d’une guerre offensive n’est pas encourageante; mais je ne perds pas courage. Tant que nous ne serons pas battus, les Français ne peuvent rien faire de ce côté-ci; et à la fin les Espagnols verront qu’il est nécessaire d’organiser et discipliner leurs armées et de leur fournir de ressources; et alors les affaires iront mieux.

‘ Je serais bien-aise d’avoir le plaisir de vous voir, si vous passiez dans ce pays-ci; mais je ne vous le conseille pas.

Vous verriez bien des choses qui vous dégouteraient de ces guerres révolutionnaires, malgré que les malheurs de notre temps les rendent peut-être nécessaires.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Le Général Dumouriez.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th August, 1811.

‘ Since I closed my dispatch of this day to your Lordship, I have received some very interesting papers which have been intercepted from the enemy.

‘ It appears by a return of the 10th July, that the division of guards alone, which are in Castille, amount to above 15,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry; and as far as I can judge from the accounts which I have of the enemy’s strength, they had besides, in the army of the north, at least 16,000 infantry and some cavalry, before the late reinforcements arrived.

‘ These papers contain very particular and detailed orders for equipping the army of Portugal with a very large proportion of cannon, and with horses to draw it, and for the junction of all detachments. There are also detailed orders direct from the Emperor for the collections at Burgos and Valladolid, of the contents of particular magazines; and a communication is made to the Duc de Raguse on the 19th July, that the Emperor had on that day reviewed a very fine body of troops, destined to reinforce the armies in Spain; which country and Portugal it had been determined to subdue.

‘ From all these circumstances, I should be inclined to believe that the Emperor was coming to Spain in person.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th August, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

3 P.M.

‘ I have just received your second letter of this day, and at the same time one of the 28th from Don Carlos de España, which does not mention the enemy’s arrival at

Ledesma; neither do I believe Colonel Barnard's account of the arrival of the convoy.

'I have an intercepted letter this day in cypher, which shows that the army of the north, and of Portugal, will join to attack us, as I supposed.

'If the Spanish peasantry will not trust us for a short time, they must keep their wheat for the French, and we must eat our biscuit. I cannot get up money in sufficient sums to pay ready money for all our provisions, and the pay of the troops likewise.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major General
R. Craufurd.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'Fuente Guinaldo, 29th August,
1811.

'MY DEAR BERESFORD,

'I find that the militia in Beira are not supplied with arms, and it is desirable that you should immediately turn your attention to that object.

'I find that the Government has supplied the Superintendent of Transports, who is to buy mules for the artillery, with paper money only. He will not get one mule in Spain for the whole sum in paper that he has in his hands.

'I am in hopes soon to have with each of the 5th and 6th divisions a 9 pounder, or a heavy 6 pounder brigade; and I propose then to send away your 6 pounder artillery for these divisions, and you might apply the mules to render Arentschildt's and Dickson's artillery quite complete: or if they can be completed otherwise, it would be very convenient to have these two brigades in reserve with the army, in case it should be desirable to move any division by mountain or narrow roads, for either one or the other purpose; they will both be disposable in the course of a short time, I hope.

'Believe me, &c.

'Marshal
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'WELLINGTON.

To His Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick.

'SIR, 'Fuente Guinaldo, 29th August, 1811.

'I have delayed to reply to your Highness' letter of the 27th July, regarding Lieut. —, till I should receive an

answer to a reference upon the subject which I made to Colonel de Bernewitz for information, and I have now the honor to enclose to your Highness a letter which I have received from Colonel de Bernewitz. I recollect to have refused leave of absence to Lieut. — after the siege of Badajoz, or to accept his resignation without your Highness' consent, because I was not aware of the circumstances which occasioned the request for leave, or the offer of the resignation, and I wish to adhere to the rules which I had made to allow no Officer in your Highness' regiment to resign his commission and return to Germany, without your Highness' special permission; but if I had been made acquainted with the circumstances which had occurred, I should have thought it desirable that Lieut. — should quit the service, and should in the meantime have leave of absence.

‘ My reason for entertaining this opinion is, that the instances of want of spirit among the Officers of the army are very rare, and the example of punishment for this crime is not required. This being the case, I should wish to avoid giving the soldiers, and the world, a notion that an Officer, particularly one belonging to a foreign nation, can behave otherwise than well in the presence of the enemy; and if there should be an unfortunate person who fails in this respect, I would prefer to allow him to retire to a private station, rather than expose his weakness.

‘ On these grounds, I would still recommend to your Highness to accept the resignation of his commission, which Lieut. — has offered. Your Highness will observe that he has absented himself from his regiment without leave, for which crime I propose forthwith to order him in arrest; but I beg to recommend to your Highness to accept his resignation, and to allow him to return to Germany, as being in every respect an Officer unfit to serve His Majesty in your Highness' regiment, at the same time that it is not expedient to expose his weakness by bringing him to trial before a General Court Martial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Serene Highness
the Duke of Brunswick.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th August, in which you have enclosed one of the 23d from Dom Miguel Forjaz, desiring to have my opinion of a proposed regulation on the subject of means of transport, and of supplies of provisions for the troops.

‘ As the Commander in Chief of the British army, I have nothing to say to any Portuguese regulation, excepting to obey it, as far as may be in my power, and as far as it may not be inconsistent with the orders and regulations of His Majesty.

‘ I am sorry that there are parts of the proposed regulation which are inconsistent with those regulations, viz., all the arrangements included in the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th articles. I cannot allow any person to give receipts for provisions excepting those who receive them; nor can I allow the Commissary General to pay for provisions delivered to the British troops on the production of any document, excepting the receipt of the person who received the provisions.

‘ If I am desired, as the Marshal General of the Portuguese army, to give my opinion of the proposed regulation, I answer that the regulation appears to me to be entirely useless in many parts, and in others injurious to the public service.

‘ There is already a Superintendent of Transport in each province, whose duty appears to be of the same description with that prescribed for the Inspector General of Transport and of Provisions in the 1st, 2d, and 3d articles of the proposed regulation. I do not see the use of two Officers to perform the same duty.

‘ The lists of means of transport to be made, under the 4th article of the regulation, were actually made and completed in all the provinces of the Kingdom, in consequence of a proposition made by me as long ago as November, 1809, and I have now copies of them. It might be very proper to order that new lists might be made in parts of Beira and parts of Estremadura, in consequence of the invasion of those provinces last year; but the lists of the means of transport, &c., in the other provinces ought still to be complete.

‘ All that is required to render the existing system perfect is to enforce the law.

‘ First, to oblige all magistrates, upon whom requisitions should be made for means of transport, to issue their orders to the owners of means of transport to produce them at a certain place, at a certain time.

‘ Secondly, to oblige the magistrates to levy a penalty on those who should omit to obey this order ; and,

‘ Thirdly, to punish all magistrates who should omit to levy the penalty if the means of transport should not be produced as ordered.

‘ I beg to observe that this is the law of England, and the practice ; and it is notorious that more attention is paid in England to the rights of private property than in any other country. But, on the other hand, every person is obliged, under a penalty, to assist the public cause ; and the magistrates are obliged to do their duty, or they are punished according to law.

‘ If this system be carried into execution, it will be necessary that the Portuguese Government should pay regularly the hire of the means of transport which are required for the service, and then the odious and oppressive system of *embargo* may be put an end to throughout the country. But I wish the Government to understand that, unless the owners of means of transport are forced to produce at the place and hour ordered the means which are required ; unless the magistrates are forced to do their duty ; and unless the Portuguese Government shall pay regularly for the means of transport required for the Portuguese army, either the odious system of *embargo* must continue in all its rigor, or the Governors of the Kingdom must make up their minds to lose the country.

‘ I see that the 5th article goes to suspend the powers of the Special Commission and of the magistrates, in regard to the proprietors of lands, which, in my opinion, is not advisable. The proprietors of lands are those most able to supply means of transport. They are the persons most interested in the defence of the country ; and yet the effect of the regulation would be to protect these very people from punishment, for neglecting to supply the means of transport

which are necessary for its defence, and which they alone have in their possession.

‘ The 6th article is as objectionable as the others. The question is, whether means of transport are required for the army or not. If they are required, they must be made to go the distance ordered, unless relieved. They cannot be relieved unless a fresh set of magistrates and fresh inhabitants should do their duty, and produce fresh means of transport required from them. Upon this subject a new regulation is not required.

‘ I have always objected to the plan of the Government crowding different objects into the same regulation. I have already stated the objections to the remaining articles of the proposed regulation as referable to the British army; and understanding that there is now under consideration a plan for regulating a commissariat for the Portuguese army, the consideration of this part of the subject should be deferred till the commissariat should be established, to which it essentially belongs. I am convinced that the proposed regulation in the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th articles must be altered when the commissariat shall be established, or it will be very inconvenient to that establishment.

‘ I request you to lay this letter before the Portuguese Government, as containing my opinion on this regulation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 29th August, 1811.

‘ I was obliged to send off the dispatch to you at an early hour this morning, in order to catch the post at Elvas, and I did not reply to a very interesting part of your letter of the 21st instant.

‘ I am quite convinced that the majority of the Officers of the Spanish army would prefer submitting to the French to allowing us to have anything to say to their troops. In truth, they are by no means convinced, or at all events will not allow, that our Officers know any more of their profession than they do themselves; and we may depend upon it

that we should always have them acting against us, and that all of their class in this country would follow their example.

‘ I think it probable, but I am not quite certain, that we should get some of the lower orders of the people of Spain to serve in regiments officered by British Officers; but I am convinced that if the authorities of the country should set their faces against the measure, we should get but few. Then the discipline through which a soldier must pass, that in which he must be kept, and the privations to which every soldier is exposed, do not render his life a very happy one; and this circumstance, added to the reproach which every soldier under the command of our Officers would have to endure from the Spanish Officers and people of that class, would occasion desertion to a degree scarcely credible. We have already experienced it in the Chasseurs Britanniques, in which regiment there were some Spaniards, but they have all deserted.

‘ If we trace the history of the establishment of British Officers in the Portuguese army, it will be found that two circumstances occasioned it.

‘ First, the absence of a great number of the efficient Officers of the army with those corps which were, and are still, in France, and the suspicions which attached to those which were returned to Portugal.

‘ Secondly, the murder of the Commander in Chief, Bernardin Freire, in a mutiny of the soldiers, and refusal of all the Portuguese Officers to take the command of the troops.

‘ To this add, that it had not been unusual to call foreign Officers to the command of the Portuguese armies; and circumstances which had recently occurred had tended very much to raise the reputation of our Officers at that time in Portugal, while the conduct of the foreign Officers in the service had tended to sink theirs.

‘ None of these circumstances exists in Spain; and it must not be expected that we should find the Spanish soldiery inclined in the same degree to submit to our discipline.

‘ You will then say, what is Great Britain to do? I answer, persevere in the contest, and do the best she can, while she endeavors to prevail upon the Spaniards to improve their military system.

‘ The contest is expensive, and affords but little or no

hopes of success, excepting by tiring the French out. After all, military success probably could not reasonably be expected in a contest between the powers of the Peninsula and Great Britain on one side, and the French on the other, which had begun by the French seizing the armies, the fortified places, the arms, and the resources of the Peninsula. These are circumstances to which the people do not advert in general, but they bear upon every event of the contest; and the folly and treachery of the Spaniards in the loss of battles and strong places have increased our difficulties, but still I am not without hopes. We have already, in some degree, altered the nature of the war and of the French military system. They are now in a great measure on the defensive, and are carrying on a war of magazines. They will soon, if they have not already, come upon the resources of France; and, as soon as that is the case, you may depend upon it the war will not last long.

‘We may spend ten millions a year in this country; but it is a very erroneous notion to suppose that all that expense is incurred by the war in the Peninsula. Our establishments which we have here would cost very near half that sum if they were kept at home, and the surplus only should be charged as the expense of this war. I do not mean to say that that expense is not great, but it must be borne as long as the Spaniards and Portuguese can hold out, or we must take our leave of our character as a great country.

‘I enclose an intercepted letter which was in cypher, which shows that I have not mistaken the enemy’s plan of operations.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart., President of a
General Court Martial.*

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 30th August, 1811.

‘I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of Private ———, of the 52d regiment, whom the Court have recommended *in the body of their sentence*, in which recommendation I entirely concur; but as that mode of recommendation adopted by the General Court Martial is not

regular, and has been forbidden by His Majesty's orders, I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial on this trial, and request that that part which recommends Private — may be struck out from the sentence, and may be the subject of a separate letter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th August,

1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have some mode arranged of feeding your detachments on the roads to the army. They come through our cantonments invariably starving, and they are fed by our Commissaries, which, in addition to our own detachments, is an increase of consumption not provided for ; and it prevents the accumulation of supplies which is necessary, in order to enable the army to do anything.

‘ In the march routes to the detachments from this army, it is particularly specified at what places, and from whom, they are to receive provisions ; and very few, and very small, magazines are sufficient for the purpose.

‘ It would be very desirable if an arrangement of the same description were made for the march of the detachments of the Portuguese army.

‘ I have complaints from our cantonments on the high road from Castello Branco of the consumption of the supplies for these detachments, and it comes to be a serious object.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Don Carlos de España.

‘ à Fuente Guinaldo,

ce 30 Août, 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ J’ai donné ordre qu’on donne à l’Ambassadeur d’Espagne à Lisbonne 2000 fusils et autres équipemens pour être à vos ordres ; et 1200 fusils et autres équipemens pour le Régiment la Princesa, pour être pareillement à vos ordres.

‘ Vous me demandez à present 1000 fusils, et je voudrais savoir si vous en voulez 1000 outre les 3200. Je vous prévien que je n’ai pas d’équipemens, les ayant envoyé tous à Cadiz. Vous me demandez aussi de les envoyer à Oporto. C’est dommage que vous n’avez pas pensé à Oporto plutôt, si vous voulez y avoir les 3200, parceque les fusils auront été donnés il y a quelques jours à l’Ambassadeur d’Espagne, et les départemens Anglais ne peuvent plus s’en charger après qu’ils ont été donnés à l’Ambassadeur. Mais je ne doute pas que si vous écrivez à Monsieur l’Ambassadeur il vous les enverra à Oporto.

‘ Il parait que l’ennemi va se rassembler en assez grande force sur le Tormes. Quand je saurai leur force, je verrai ce que nous pourrons faire.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ General

‘ WELLINGTON.

Don Carlos de España.

To General Abadia.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th August, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th of August. I had already requested Colonel Sir Howard Douglas to apprise your Excellency of the state of affairs in this quarter, and I have now to inform you that we remain still in the same positions as when he left this.

‘ The enemy heard on the 14th instant of our arrival here, and it appears that from that time they altered their design in the country north of the Duero, whatever it was.

‘ I understand that the troops which arrived at Valladolid about the middle of the month, by forced marches, halted at Rio Seco; and I learn that there was another detachment of about 7,000 very fine troops still at Valladolid on the 22d.

‘ Marmont at about the same time commenced collecting his troops in the Puertos, and on the 28th and 29th his advanced guard passed through the Puerto de Baños, and arrived on the 29th at Tamames.

‘ I understand from an intercepted letter that it is his object to effect a junction with the army under the command of General Dorsenne, which is that beyond the Duero, and the two to move to attack this army. This junction, which I cannot prevent, will necessarily frustrate my object, more

particularly as I see by your account of the state of your army, that you cannot move from Galicia; and I propose to act according to circumstances and to the strength of the enemy. It is very obvious, however, that unless the enemy should be very largely reinforced, they cannot undertake any thing serious against you, so long as I can keep my army collected and entire, unless they should give up Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Abadia.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th August, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 25th and 26th. I see that, even by their own accounts, the Portuguese Government are debtors to us, after bringing in the charge for the 20th regiment, and for the supplies to the latest period; and they will be debtors for a much larger amount when the accounts shall be settled, as they ought to be, on the principle fixed by us.

‘ You did quite right to send your note, marked A, in your letter of the 26th.

‘ I do not understand what offence the Spaniards can have taken with my brother's letter to Bardaxi.

‘ I am afraid that Beresford has been rather in a hurry in his application to the Portuguese Government about Colman and Madden. I applied some time ago to the Horse Guards to have these Officers restored to their rank in the British service, and received an answer stating that hereafter it might be granted upon an application from the Portuguese Government. The time for the application was not stated; but it appears to me that the proper time for such an application would have been the moment at which the allied army should have gained any success, if they should again gain such. It would then certainly have been successful: success is now doubtful, and a second refusal of the application may affect its final success.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 30th August, 1811.

‘ A Portuguese of the name of ——— passed through here some days ago, on his way to Lisbon from Madrid, respecting whom, since he has gone through, I have entertained some suspicions. It appears by his papers that he was appointed to be an Officer of the Secretariat by Senhor Araujo, and was employed in the embassy at Madrid, where he has remained ever since the revolution. He told us some few *lies* here, but that is nothing. What strikes me as extraordinary is, that he should have been able to find his way from Madrid, through the French armies and the guerrillas, bringing with him some valuable baggage, and a kind of suite, consisting of his sons, servants, &c. If I have a correct notion of the state of things at Madrid, he could not have passed with this train from that city to the guerrillas without the connivance of the Government, and, if that is the case, he has come for some sinister purpose.

‘ He talked to me of his intimacy with Dom Miguel Forjaz. I rather think that the guerrilla who first took charge of him, Avril, has not a good opinion of him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General R. Craufurd.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 31st August, 1811,

11 A. M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I have received the reports of Lieut. Bedell and Major Gruben; and the letters which I received last night gave me reason to believe that the enemy had not come to Tamames.

‘ There is no convoy coming to Ciudad Rodrigo. The convoy which left Salamanca on the 27th, or was about to leave it, was one of artillery for the army of Portugal, and its route is between the Tormes and the Duero.

‘ I have constant intelligence from Salamanca, the last letter dated the 27th; and there was no convoy for Ciudad Rodrigo then thought of.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Major Generals Slade, Anson, and Alten, and Colonel
Sir Granby Calcraft.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 31st August, 1811.

‘ Arrangements have lately been made, which I hope will be carried into execution, to attach to each of the regiments of cavalry under your command such a number of mules as will secure for them a constant supply of corn ; but I am desirous to carry this arrangement still further, and, if possible, that each of the regiments should at all times have in its cantonments a supply of corn to last the horses for six days.

‘ A large supply of corn is shortly expected from the magazines in the rear ; but it is obvious that this quantity can be gained upon the daily consumption only by reducing the allowance, if the horses should be in good condition, and while they do not work, and if they should be well provided with other forage.

‘ It is impossible for me, or for anybody who does not see the horses, to judge of these points ; but I request you to reduce the quantity of corn to be issued to the horses of the regiments in the troops under your command, to eight, or even seven, pounds a day for each horse, if you should be of opinion, from the circumstances above referred to, that you can do so without injury to their condition, in order, with what shall arrive from the magazines, to gain upon the consumption a store of corn, to remain in the cantonments of the regiments, which will last the horses at the full allowance six days. When this store shall have been accumulated, I should then wish that, at all events, the issue of the full allowance should be recommenced.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Generals Slade,
Anson, and Alten, and
Colonel Sir G. Calcraft.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 31st August, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will talk to Dom M. Forjaz about the state of the bridges on the Alva, on the Ceira, and on the Mondego, which were destroyed in the last campaign, some by the French and some by General Bacellar.

‘ Among other excellent establishments in Portugal still existing there is a fund for the construction and repairs of roads and bridges, which, like all others, is, I believe, entirely misapplied; and then, as usual, when it becomes necessary to do the work the expense falls upon us.

‘ It becomes necessary to repair these bridges forthwith. In the course of the month of October the rains will commence, and the safety of the army may depend upon the passage of these bridges being secured. I have already sent an Officer to look at them, and, whether the Government will repair them or not, I must have them repaired; but I am determined that the expense shall be charged against the subsidy.

‘ It is too bad, that with funds existing in the country for all these purposes, and with persons capable of executing them, I can get nothing done excepting by my own Officers; and then we are involved in the greatest difficulties to get the people necessary to work, and the materials to enable us to perform the works which we are obliged to undertake.

‘ I beg you to tell Dom Miguel Forjaz that I desire to know, by return of post, whether the Portuguese Government will or will not undertake to repair the bridges on the Alva, the Ceira, and the Mondego, in such a manner as that they will be passable in October; and that, if they will not, I request them to write orders to the governor of Coimbra, and the magistrates of Arganil, Goes, Louzão, Ponte da Murcella, Foz d’Arouce, &c., to give every assistance that Captain Macleod may call for, either in workmen or materials, to enable him to repair them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. General Bacellar, who destroyed the bridges on the Mondego, should be ordered to repair them.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 1st Sept., 1811.

‘ I received only yesterday your letter of the 20th July. In case the unfortunate event, which you mentioned, should

occur, I am at a loss to know how I shall employ Herbert Taylor with this army, excepting in the situation of Deputy Adjutant General, now held by General Pakenham, but which he would resign, I know, if I could make any other convenient arrangement for the performance of its duties.

‘Employment with the Spaniards would not suit him at all. Sir Howard Douglas is in the only situation of that description in which he would feel any interest; and he is too low down among the Colonels of this army to give him the command of a brigade.

‘If you should think that the situation of Deputy Adjutant General would suit him I shall be obliged to you if you will offer it to him. Major General C. Stewart generally goes home every winter, when the business of his department would fall upon him; and, in the event which would leave him at liberty to accept the situation, it is probable that it would be necessary to Stewart to be absent for a great length of time, in order to ensure his election to Parliament.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 2d Sept., 1811.

‘I have received your letters of the 29th August, regarding the conduct of two marines on duty at Fort St. Julian, and I am very sensible of the kindness of the motives which have induced you to refer this case for my consideration. I have directed the Judge Advocate to draw charges against these men founded on Major Dickenson’s report.

‘I am much obliged to you for sending the newly arrived detachments to Figueira.

‘I agree entirely with you about the sea sand on the platforms at St. Julian. It will undoubtedly render the water brackish collected in the tanks from these platforms, and fresh sand bags can be placed at any moment.

‘Have you heard anything of Lord March?

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel —, —th Regiment.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3d Sept., 1811, 9 P.M.

‘ I return your letter of this day’s date, as it contains a request to which I can give no reply, unless the letter should be transmitted in the channel prescribed by His Majesty’s Regulations.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Bacellar.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3d Sept., 1811.

‘ I write to inform you that the Spanish army has been obliged to retreat from its positions at La Bañeza and Puente de Orvigo, and has fallen back at least as far as Villa Franca.

‘ I am not exactly informed of the circumstances which occurred previous to the retreat of the Spanish army of Galicia, but I believe they must have sustained some check.

‘ A considerable proportion of the enemy’s troops, which were in their front, have arrived at Salamanca, with a view to operations in this quarter, in concert with the army of Marmont; and it is stated that 25,000 men, belonging to the army of the north, will be assembled there in the course of a few days: at all events, it is obvious that the enemy have at present no design to extend their operations in that quarter; and therefore, it appears to me desirable that General Silveira should place his corps of observation for the present at Freixo de Espadacinta, or Torre de Moncorro, rather than at Braganza.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Bacellar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 3d Sept., 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from the Conde de Aguiar, and its enclosures, from which I learn that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer upon me the title of Conde de Vimeiro, and the Grand Cross of the Order of the Tower and Sword, and a pension of 20,000 cruzados per annum.

‘ I beg that your Lordship will lay these letters before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and request that His Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to permit me to accept of the favors which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal has been pleased to confer upon me.

‘ Having considered it my duty to urge the local Portuguese Government, almost with importunity, to increase the disposable revenue of the state to the utmost, by every measure in their power, as well of increased taxation as of reform of abuses in the collection and management of the revenue, and of economy in the grant of salaries and in every branch of the expenditure, as the only measures by which the expenses of the war could be provided for by the necessary sums of specie, I have thought it proper not to accept of any allowance from the Portuguese Government for the office of Marshal General of the army, which I fill.

‘ In case His Royal Highness the Prince Regent should think proper to allow me to accept the favors conferred upon me by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, I propose in like manner to decline the acceptance of the pension offered to me during the continuance of the existing war for the independence of the country

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept., 1811.

‘ I received your letter yesterday evening. You are quite right to go on the staff to the East Indies, if you think it will suit your views; and I can only say that I shall be very sorry to lose your assistance here.

‘ I hope that you will soon get well of the ague: you had better move up to this high ground for a day or two.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
A. Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept., 1811.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 31st, I state that I conceive you will act correctly in not making over to the Portu-

guese Government all the money which the Commissary General gives to you. I order him to give to you money whenever he can spare it, specie particularly. You must be the best judge whether the money ought to be given to the Portuguese Government. Their debt to us is now so large, and daily increasing so fast, that I conceive that you ought not to advance any more money, unless it is obvious that the money cannot be got from any other quarter, and that the service suffers from the want of it. You will observe that there will be a very heavy demand for the provision stores lately required, and a demand for the provisions issued to the troops from the 25th July to the 24th September.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I return the list of persons who receive newspapers. I know nothing of any of them, excepting of those who are Officers of the army, and of course can form no judgment whether any of them send the newspapers to the French army.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept., 1811.

‘ I enclose the copy of a dispatch from General Foy, who commands the division of the army of Portugal at Truxillo, to General Girard, who commands a division of the 5th corps at Zafra, which was intercepted and deciphered, and shows that the plan of the enemy is exactly what I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 28th August, that I believed it was.

‘ That this is the plan is further confirmed by an intercepted letter of the 1st instant from General Wathier, at Salamanca, to the General commanding at Ciudad Rodrigo, of which I enclose an extract, announcing the intention of the General commanding the army of the north to collect 25,000 guards at Salamanca in the course of six days, and to move to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo in concert with the Duc de Raguse.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that General Wathier states

that the army of the north had had some considerable success against the Spanish army of Galicia. I have received no accounts of these operations, excepting that the troops which had been halted at Rio Seco, towards the middle of the month, had afterwards moved forward upon Benavente about the 23d or 24th. No attack had been made as late as the 26th; and General Dumoustier's division of guards arrived at Salamanca on their return from the expedition on the 1st instant; so that it is not probable that the check received by the troops in Galicia was of the important description stated by General Wathier.

‘ I enclose a letter, however, of the 15th instant, received from General Abadia, who commands the army in Galicia; from which your Lordship will observe that they are in want of everything, and that I did not form an erroneous calculation when I stated, in my dispatch of the 8th August, that I could not believe that this army could make any movement to assist us. I do not believe that they have been defeated, as stated; but I shall consider it very fortunate if General Abadia should be able hereafter to sustain himself in Galicia.

‘ Some detachments of convalescents, amounting to about 2000 men, belonging to the army of Portugal, which had been left in Castille, have lately been sent to join their regiments; and this army has likewise been reinforced by the dragoons lately returned from France with their horses. I likewise believe that some of the reinforcements (of the number I am not accurately informed) which have lately entered Spain have been sent on from Valladolid to join this same army. Your Lordship will see from General Wathier's letter the strength in guards expected from the army of the north, which must either be exaggerated, or the guards have been reinforced since the return of the 10th of July, adverted to in my dispatch of the 28th of August.

‘ The army of Portugal however, reinforced, and the guards, even according to their state on the 10th of July, united, would be too strong for me to think of maintaining the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo on the other side of the Agueda, under all the disadvantages attending the communication across that river. I therefore propose to take a position on the left of the Agueda, if I should find the enemy

to be really in such strength as that it is not advisable that I should attack them, and leave it to them to attack us if they should think proper.

‘ In consequence of the statement in General Foy’s letter, that a body of troops from the army of the centre were to take the ground of the army of Portugal at Plasencia and Almaraz, I have desired General Hill to detach a body of troops, which had before been prepared for that purpose, to Castello Branco, to keep up the communication between him and the army, and to station himself with the 2d division of infantry at Portalegre.

‘ I have received reports that a division of the 5th corps had moved upon General Ballesteros near Ayamonte. The General retired to the Isla de la Canela, in the mouth of the Guadiana; and the enemy were in Ayamonte, but in small force, on the 24th August. As the ships had arrived to carry off General Ballesteros to Algeziras, I imagine that the enemy will have retired again from Ayamonte.

‘ According to accounts from the south east coast, which I have received from Mr. Wellesley, it appears that the Spanish army of Murcia had retired early in August to its position at Lorca, one of the divisions having received a check on its retreat. General Roche reports, on the 14th August, that the French had in front of this army only 14,000 men; and if this report be true, it is probable that Soult has returned to Cordova with a part of his force, which is generally reported throughout the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Since closing this dispatch I have received a letter from General Silveira of the 1st instant; from which I learn that General Abadia had retired in the best order from La Bañeza and Puente de Orvigo, and that he was preparing to resume his position in front of Astorga, in consequence of the retreat of the enemy.

‘ I enclose the morning state of the 1st instant.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 4th Sept., 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of this day. Since writing it I have received a letter from Silveira, of the 1st, which affords ground for belief that Abadia managed his matters remarkably well; and that, instead of having retired to Coruña, he was about to advance again to occupy his ground at Astorga. I do not give any credit to the account of Mina’s affair. I must have heard of it if there had been any foundation for the report.

‘ I believe I can send you 3000 or 4000 stands of arms, but no accoutrements.

‘ ——— having determined to quit the French service without any engagement being entered into with him, there does not appear any occasion for making such an engagement at present.

‘ I will apply to the Secretary of State regarding him after I shall have inquired from some of our Officers whether he really did behave well to them when they were taken at Talavera, as I am sorry to say, that I have heard from some of them, that the Irish Officers in the French service behaved particularly ill to them.

‘ I have not often seen so absurd a paper as ———’s. It would do very well for the Encyclopædia; but there is not one word in the whole paper applicable to the present situation of Valencia.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigade Major May, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 5th Sept., 1811.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 2d, which I have just received. Everything appears to me to be in a very satisfactory state; and I only wish that matters were also so satisfactory in other quarters as to give me hopes that I should be able to derive all the advantage from your arrangements which they are calculated to afford.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brigade Major May.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I had thoughts of attaching to each troop of horse

artillery one of the iron 5½ inch howitzers, instead of the small brass howitzer they have now. Let me have your opinion whether the carriages, &c., of these iron howitzers are so complete as that this arrangement would answer. We could contrive to give them another ammunition car to carry spherical case for this howitzer. 'W.'

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

SIR,

Fuente Guinaldo, 6th Sept., 1811.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st August, and I am much concerned to find there is any difficulty upon a subject on which, of all others, it appears to me that there ought to be none.

'The establishment of post mules on the roads for the conveyance of letters is one of the ordinary establishments of the country, of which the Government have at all times borne the expense, and the question is, whether the Government or the military chest are to defray this expense in future.

'It is very possible that I may be mistaken in my notion that profit is derived from the establishment of the posts in Portugal, and that, owing to the usual mismanagement, what is profit elsewhere becomes loss in this country; but that is no reason why the military chest of the British army should defray the expense of the Portuguese posts; neither can any ground be found for such an extraordinary conclusion in Senhor Sodr 's correspondence with the Secretary of the Post Office.

'When the army pursued the enemy to the frontiers of Castille, there were no means on the roads of communicating by letter with Lisbon, and Senhor Sodr ' wrote to Sr J. B. Gomez, to urge that measures might be taken to have post horses placed at the stations at which they had formerly been; for which horses Senhor Sodr ' was authorized to say that the Commissary General of the British army would provide forage, and also rations for the postillions, as the only mode by which either could be provided with subsistence in those days.

'An advance was made by the Portuguese Government to the post masters of six contos of reis, to enable them to purchase and place mules upon the roads, in order to

provide the means of communication. I believe it will be admitted that it was the interest and the duty of the Portuguese Government to provide these means without loss of time; and they accordingly made this advance, which the post masters were to repay out of the sums due to them, of 400 reis each mule per diem, for keeping the mules.

‘ It now appears that not only the Government refuse to pay the expense of the rations given to the men and animals placed on the roads, by which alone they were kept alive, but that a claim is stated against the military chest for the advance of six contos of reis for purchasing them, in order to keep up the communication, for which it is the peculiar duty of the civil Government, in every civilized country, to provide. And this claim is made at the same time that it had been settled that the post masters were to repay these very advances !

‘ I am willing to pay from the military chest the usual price of 200 reis a league for every post horse or mule used for the service of the British army on the ordinary lines of communication of the country; and, besides, to pay half a dollar a day for each horse or mule kept at the post stages on the lines of communication established purposely for the service of the army; but the Government must pay the expense of all the rations which have been delivered to the postillions and post mules, or of the 400 reis per diem which have been given for each mule kept on all the ordinary lines of communication of the country, of which I shall send you the account.

‘ I beg to have an answer to this proposition by return of post, and that you will inform the Government if they do not acquiesce in this proposition, I request they will provide posts for the Portuguese army, and for the civil correspondence in all parts of the country, as well on the direct as on the cross lines of communication; for if any proposition so unreasonable should be insisted upon, as that the military chest of the British army is to defray the expense of all the Portuguese posts between the Tagus and the Douro, I give notice that I will not allow any Portuguese correspondence of any description, whether civil or military, to be carried on by those posts of which I shall defray the expense.

‘ I beg that you will lay this letter before the Portuguese Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept., 1811.

‘ This letter will be delivered to you by General Carrera, of the Spanish service, who is anxious to proceed immediately to Cadiz ; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will forward his wishes, by providing him with a passage in a man of war, whenever an opportunity may offer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel —, —th Regiment.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant, in which you have desired that I should give you leave of absence for two months to go to England, “ where business deeply involving your future prospects requires your presence.”

‘ As I have been under the necessity of declining to comply with all the requests of this description which have been made to me lately, I cannot comply with yours ; and I observe that you must have been prepared for this answer, by the answer which I learn from Major General Campbell that he had sent to the letter which you had written to him upon the same subject.

‘ As you have stated to me in a former letter the nature of your business in England, and as it appears not only that it can, but that if you were in England you would be under the necessity of transacting it in writing, and therefore that it can be transacted with equal advantage from this country, I feel the less concern at being obliged to refuse to comply with your request for leave of absence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept., 1811.

‘ So much time elapses before soldiers who have been in hospital in this country recover sufficiently to be able to undertake a march to join their regiments; and being under the necessity of making them invariably march under the command of an Officer, in order to keep them in order, whereby the march of even those who are sufficiently recovered is necessarily frequently delayed till the party becomes so large as that an Officer can be afforded to take charge of it: this has occasioned very large depôts of convalescent and recovered men and Officers at all our hospital stations, but particularly at Lisbon.

‘ It is impossible to allow the command and charge of these depôts to fall into the hands of any Captain of the army who may happen to be the senior of the convalescent Officers, or the senior of those who may have been sent to the hospital station in charge of sick; as the charge, at all times one of importance, is sometimes of great magnitude, as, for instance, there are now at Lisbon not less than 8000 sick and convalescent soldiers.

‘ Under these circumstances, not being able to spare Field Officers for the duty, I have been obliged to select a Captain to place at the head of each of these depôts, who is generally the best in his regiment, and necessarily one of long standing. Of course this is an inconvenience to the regiments, and a detriment to the service; and it occurs to me that there might be found in England Field Officers who would be glad to undertake this charge, who would have sufficient intelligence to conduct it well, but who are unequal to the more active and arduous duties of the field.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention the subject to His Royal Highness; and if he should consent to the plan proposed, if you will endeavor to find four intelligent Field Officers, to be sent out here, to be at the head of our principal depôts of convalescents.

‘ I allow the Captains when employed on this duty nine shillings and sixpence a day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 7th Sept., 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Marshal Sir William Beresford, containing the copy of one which he had received from the Conde d’Aguiar, acquainting him that the Prince Regent of Portugal had been pleased to confer upon him the title of Count of Trancoso, and the grand cross of the order of the Tower and Sword.

‘ I beg your Lordship to lay these letters before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and to request the permission of His Royal Highness for Sir William Beresford to accept the honors conferred upon him by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 10th Sept., 1811.

‘ I enclose a sealed paper, which contains a letter of the 8th instant, which I received last night, from Lieut. Colonel —, of the —th regiment.

‘ I beg that you will return this paper to Lieut. Colonel —, and inform him, that although the Regulations allowed of his applying to me direct for leave of absence, on an occasion on which his immediate superior had declined to forward his application, it is inconsistent with the spirit, as well as a breach of the letter of the Regulations, that he should forward complaints of his immediate superior, on various subjects, under pretence of continuing a correspondence on the subject of his request for leave of absence.

‘ I hope that the feelings which Lieut. Colonel — expresses upon the censure which he has received will induce him to avoid that conduct in future which may expose him to it. The object of His Majesty’s Regulations, on the mode to be observed by Officers in forwarding their applications, and stating their complaints, is not less to support the discipline and preserve the subordination of the army than it is to bring to the knowledge of the Commander in Chief

the truth, by which knowledge alone he can do justice to all parties.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General
A. Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th, and I now enclose my dispatch of this day. I have no news which that dispatch does not contain, excepting a report that Suchet is collecting his troops at Zaragoza.

‘ Is it true that Monserrat is taken?

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letter, enclosing one from Lord Wellesley of the 24th of August, relative to the omission of Dom Miguel Forjaz to make known to the Prince Regent of Portugal the names of the Officers who had distinguished themselves in the service in this country ; to which I have to reply, that Dom Miguel Forjaz receives from me every week a dispatch, containing an account of the operations of the army during the preceding eight days, in which dispatch the names of those Officers of both services who have distinguished themselves are mentioned. These dispatches are intended for the information of the Governors of the Kingdom ; and I conclude that they communicate their contents, or possibly transmit the originals, or copies, to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent in the Brazils.

‘ Dom Miguel Forjaz has no authority from me to recommend any Officer, nor any means of acquiring information regarding the services of any Officer, excepting from these weekly dispatches.

‘ As the contents of these dispatches, particularly those parts of them relating to the services and merits of different Officers, are published in the *Lisbon Gazette*, I should think that it might have been discovered that the names of the Officers, British and Portuguese, who had distinguished

themselves throughout the war, were already known to His Royal Highness, and that, without any great effort, Dom Miguel Forjaz might have been screened from the imputation of neglect and disobedience upon this occasion. But I am concerned to have again occasion to remark that, in addition to all the other difficulties which prey upon me in this country, the support of the British Government is not given to that Officer of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's Government in Portugal, who was selected by His Royal Highness, and upon experience has been found to be the most fit of all His Highness' servants to carry on the arduous concerns with which he is charged.

‘ I say “ found upon experience,” because I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I entertained against Dom Miguel Forjaz prejudices of the same description as appear to be entertained against him in the Brazils; but I altered my opinion of him upon experience of his abilities, his zeal, and his integrity; and I think I have reason to complain that this Officer, who is thus preferred by me, after a prejudice against him, and upon trial has not received the support of His Majesty's Government in the Brazils, and that he is consequently at this moment on the point of being driven from his office in disgrace, and all the details of the military department to be placed in the hands of a person certainly less capable, but probably entirely incapable, of conducting them, and this in the middle of a campaign.

‘ I had recommended to Dom Miguel Forjaz to resign his office, and had determined to make no effort to induce the Prince Regent to retain him in his service; because His Royal Highness, in his letter to me of the 7th of February last, expressed his displeasure with him in such strong terms, that it appeared to me to be useless, and likely only to be injurious to Dom Miguel Forjaz, to endeavor to protect him against the powerful party in the Brazils, who appeared determined to remove him from his office, and, if possible, to destroy him.

‘ The accusations against him also are so inconsistent with each other, and so contemptible, that it is obvious they are only the effect of malice and of the spirit of party, which could have been contended against successfully on the spot alone.

‘ Dom Miguel Forjaz is at one time accused of being a partizan of the French. He is then accused of disobeying the Prince’s orders, of opposing himself to his Prince, and of founding his opposition on the support he received from His Majesty’s servant in this country, and of boasting of this support, forgetting that Dom Miguel Forjaz, who is the Secretary of the Local Government in Portugal, will neither obey nor disobey any orders but those of the Local Government. He is then accused of an intrigue with *me*, forgetting that I have something else to do and to think of besides the petty intrigues of Lisbon; that, excepting the Patriarch, I never spoke to any member of the Portuguese Government; that I do not know even by sight the majority of them; and that it is quite impossible that I can feel any interest in their proceedings, excepting as they affect the operations of the war: and lastly, to crown all, Dom Miguel Forjaz is accused of disobeying the Prince’s repeated orders, in omitting to bring under His Royal Highness’ view, in order to receive marks of His Royal Highness’ favor, the names of his friends, the English Officers, of those friends on whose support he relies to keep him in office against the wishes of his Prince.

‘ But this last crime is, I conclude, committed in his quality of French partizan.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 24th August.

‘ General Campbell had already consented to stay some time longer.

‘ When I wrote to you in February last in regard to Clinton, things were in a very different state from what they are now, and the opinions of people very different.

‘ I object to the mode which our Officers have of adopting an opinion upon a subject before they can entirely understand it; and each then acting as if it were necessary that he should produce by his conduct an alteration of measures

in an army, as he would in the House of Commons. Every man has a right to form his own opinion, and to retain it if he thinks fit; but I expect, what I do not always find, viz., that when he comes to the army he shall act according to my opinion, I being alone responsible for everything. However, matters are so altered, and it is so little likely that there can be any difference of opinion about what is going on, or what may go on, that not only I have no objection, but I shall be glad to have the assistance of General Henry Clinton.

‘As for former subjects of difference of opinion, they are gone by, and are not worth considering; neither would I ever think of them under existing circumstances.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘I have received your letters of the 21st and 23d August, regarding specie for this country.

‘Since I wrote to you on the 1st August we have received more money than usual from Cadiz, and we have got some at Oporto, which, with the sum which arrived very opportunely from England, relieved our distresses. You may depend upon it that there is no scheme for raising a shilling which can be suggested which is not considered; and, when it comes to be closely examined, it generally turns out that it would not answer any purpose, except to interrupt for a time the success of the existing mode of raising money.

‘The only thing that has ever occurred to me that it might be practicable to try, and which might produce the effect of bringing some money into the chest, which would not come into it otherwise, is to lodge in the hands of the Commissary General a certain sum, 100,000*l.* for instance, in exchequer bills, and to enable him to issue them when he should think proper, with the consent of the Commander in Chief, and to pay and charge the interest of them in his accounts when issued.

‘We might possibly, at some periods, get some money in this manner, and we might save the issue of some specie in

the payment of our debts, by paying them in exchequer bills.

‘ In the discussions for the formation of a military chest for the Portuguese army, to which Sydenham was a party, it was pretended that some difficulty was experienced in the arrangement, because I would not engage to pay a specified sum every month from the military chest to the King’s Minister, to enable him to pay the subsidy ; but this was nonsense. I proved that the payment of the subsidy was in advance ; and, in point of fact, when all accounts shall be settled, I have no doubt that it will be found that we are in advance, on account of the subsidy, not less than 400,000*l*.

‘ The difficulty on the subject of specie, as well as that felt on every other subject, originates with the Government ; and, till a new Government is formed, and acts upon better principles, the increase of subsidy, even accompanied as it has been by an increase of revenue, will produce no effect.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘ Referring to the assembly of troops on different points on our frontier, and to the accounts which I receive from the Admiral of general naval preparations, I should wish that, till the equinoctial rains have filled the Tagus, we should be tolerably strong in fleet, either at Cadiz or Lisbon.

‘ I think we have nothing to apprehend on shore, and nothing on shore and afloat, if the Tagus should be in a state to afford us a barrier ; but, being fordable everywhere just now, and there being a chance of an attack by land and by sea at the same time, I think it proper to mention that we ought to have some maritime strength, particularly if the Government give any credit to the reports of the great maritime preparations by the enemy which are in circulation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received lately from the Duke of York several orders to send regiments home, &c. &c.; upon which I should wish to be informed what is the practice of the service.

‘ If His Royal Highness directs me to draft two battalions into one, there is no material diminution of force here, and I understand that the arrangement is to be carried into execution; but he has lately desired me to send home the 85th regiment, which I intended to do as soon as it should be relieved, or immediately, if there had been no prospect of an early operation; and by the last post the 29th and 97th regiments, the whole of which would make a diminution of about 600 rank and file of infantry, which becomes a little important.

‘ I do not know whether I am right or wrong, but I consider your Lordship responsible for the force I have here; and although I should be sorry to be the cause of any unpleasant explanation on a subject of this kind, I think it right to inform you that I have received these orders, and that I consider that I must obey them; but if it should be possible, it is desirable that you should come to an understanding with His Royal Highness regarding the recall of troops from this country.

‘ I have written to him this day, to tell him that I had detained the 85th, and should detain the 29th and 97th till relieved, in consequence of the sickly state of some of the regiments, and the prospect of an early operation, unless I should receive his orders to send them home immediately at all events.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘ The plan of operations of the enemy’s armies, or the period of its execution, appears to have been altered since the 1st instant, as the guards have not been collected at Salamanca, at least as far as I have heard; and Marsha

Marmont has undoubtedly removed his head quarters back again to Plasencia, and Foy's division of infantry of the army of Portugal, which he announced in his letter in cipher to Girard, of the 20th August, was to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, still remains in Lower Estremadura. The enemy, however, are actively employed in raising contributions in Castille and Estremadura ; and a detachment of the guards and of the Lanciers de Berg, which arrived at Salamanca on the 1st instant, drove Don Julian's troops from Ledesma on the 4th, and have since obliged them to retire across the Yeltes. They have, however, themselves again retired towards the Tormes.

‘ Either these operations or increased vigilance of the police at Salamanca have prevented my receiving any intelligence from my correspondents in that town since the 3d instant, and I am therefore not fully informed of all that has passed lately, and is passing, on the Tormes and the Duero. I am very apprehensive that their silence may be attributed to the latter cause, and even that some of them may have suffered for their attachment to us, as the intelligence which they sent to General Silveira having been constantly published in the Portuguese, and afterwards copied into the English newspapers, must have attracted the notice of the enemy ; and it is more than probable that if any great operation is in contemplation, particular orders have been sent to increase the vigilance of the police, and to put an end to all intercourse which I may have had with the interior of Spain.

‘ The enemy appear not only to have altered the plan of operations which they had formed for the army of the north, and for the army of Portugal, for the first days of this month, but also the general plan for the campaign of the year.

‘ Soult certainly marched to attack the Spanish army of Murcia, and his intention was to endeavor to obtain possession of Carthagená. He left in the blockade of Cadiz two divisions of the 1st corps, and in Seville and about Zafra, in Estremadura, the 5th corps. He had some success, as reported in my last dispatch, against one division of the army of Murcia, on the 9th of August, and the army of Murcia took a position near Lorca. It is generally reported

that there had been another action on the 14th of August, in which the French suffered considerable loss; but Mr. Wellesley has transmitted to me a letter from General Roche, from Alicante, of the 18th, in which he does not mention that event, and I therefore give no credit to this report.

‘ But it appears that Soult, instead of following his success against the army of Murcia, has returned to the westward: and I have a report that a detachment had arrived on the 2d instant at Llerena, in Estremadura, and that he was about to assemble a force there. It is so difficult to obtain intelligence in the south of Spain, that I cannot be certain of the truth of this report. Mr. Wellesley has transmitted me another, received from General Campbell, of the 26th August, which the latter had received from General Beguines, that the enemy had moved upon Malaga.

‘ These two reports are not entirely inconsistent with each other. It was probable that the intelligence of our movements upon Ciudad Rodrigo would induce the enemy to turn all their attention to this side of the Peninsula; and that the desire that Girard should occupy the position of Truxillo, which it is very necessary for the enemy to secure, would occasion the march of additional troops to occupy the country about Zafra; and this would impede the execution of all the great plans in the south east part of the Peninsula, at the same time that Soult would still be sufficiently strong to carry on his operations in the Campo de Gibraltar.

‘ If the alteration of the plan, or of the period of execution by the armies immediately in my front, is connected with a plan for a general movement of all the armies towards the frontiers of Portugal, the movement stated would be made upon Llerena; but probably as large a force would be assembled at that place as could be drawn from the southern provinces of Spain; in which case the movement upon Malaga could not be made.

‘ This is the plan, the execution of which would probably be attempted, if the Emperor were to come to the Peninsula; but since the receipt of the intercepted letters, adverted to in my dispatch of the 28th August, and which were dated in the end of June, I have had no reason to believe he was coming; and as Bessières and other Officers have been

called to France suddenly in the end of July, and from intelligence lately received from Bordeaux, I am inclined to believe he is not coming; and I do not think the execution of this plan would be intrusted to any of his Officers now in Spain.

‘The French retired from Ayamonte on the night of the 24th, and a detachment proceeded to make an attack upon the castle of Paymogo, in which a small Spanish garrison had been left by General Ballesteros. The enemy were repulsed.

‘The detachment of Spanish troops in Estremadura, under General Morillo, joined with Colonel Downie’s legion, and the cavalry of the 5th army, the whole under the Conde de Penne Villemur, have had some success in an attack which they made upon a detachment of Foy’s division, at Caceres. They drove the enemy in a very creditable manner from that town, and took some prisoners.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. Since I wrote this dispatch, I have received a letter of the 7th from Salamanca, which has relieved me from the anxiety which I felt respecting my correspondents in that place. It appears that the enemy have not collected on the Tormes the troops which they had intended to collect early in the month.

‘W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 21st August, regarding the intention to request the Prince Regent of Portugal to return to this country, and I can only assure your Lordship that the Government shall be made acquainted with the opinion which I have been able to form upon that subject, as His Royal Highness’ return will affect the situation of affairs here and in the Brazils.

‘It is my opinion that a change of Government in Portugal is become absolutely necessary. The Prince Regent’s servants have in fact no influence over the proceedings of the Local Government; and it appears to me that approbation is claimed from the Brazils, in proportion as all the

measures proposed by the Prince Regent's servants are opposed. None of the reforms proposed in the civil departments of the army are yet carried into execution; the Local Government have positively refused to adopt some of them, and they have done everything in their power to defeat the effect of others, by the mode in which they have proposed to carry them into execution, and they would not have discussed even one of the plans proposed, if I had not positively refused to allow a shilling of the additional subsidy to be paid till they were adopted.

‘It is a matter of astonishment that such a spirit should exist among people who absolutely depend for their existence upon the continuance of His Royal Highness’ protection of their country, but so it is. The truth is, that they have been ashamed of the degree of influence and power which they had been induced to give to British Officers in their army. The contrast of the conduct of the Spaniards is perpetually occurring to them; the Spaniards reproach them that they have no country, and that there are no Portuguese; and the object of the Local Government appears to be to diminish the reputation and the influence of the British Officers as much as they can, after they have given them the command of their armies, and to raise that of Silveira, and of others of this description; and with this view they oppose every measure proposed by us, and I suspect have gone even farther, and have employed more than the due proportion of the resources of the Government to support the little desultory operations of these Officers, in preference to those of the army. I believe there was never a more flagrant instance of the perversity of the human mind!! I believe that if —— had cordially supported the measures of the King’s servants here, that the Government would have been changed long ago; as matters are, however, there is no chance of a change of Government, or of an alteration of its conduct for the better.

‘Without more knowledge than I have of the character of the Prince Regent of Portugal, it is difficult for me to determine what effect would be produced by his coming to assume the Government. The endeavors to raise the national character would probably be redoubled, to which, however, I have no objection whatever, if the measures for

improving, and for the better application of the resources of the country recommended by me, are carried into execution ; and as I believe fear is the predominant feature in the character of the Prince of Brazils, I think that a sense of the danger which would result from a neglect of the measures proposed would secure his support of them ; but it would be necessary to have about him a British Minister, who, at the same time that he should conciliate His Royal Highness' confidence, would act cordially with the Officers in command of the army.

‘ It might be necessary to insist with His Royal Highness that all the engagements entered into with Beresford when he took the command of the army, regarding the promotions of the army, punishments, &c. &c., should be strictly performed, otherwise the Fidalgos would soon annihilate all discipline, and ruin the army.

‘ The presence of His Royal Highness in Portugal would have many good effects in respect to the contest, if it should produce no very bad effect in respect to the authority which we now have over the operations of the army.

‘ First, it would give fresh spirit to the exertions of all the Portuguese, many of whom look very anxiously to the future state of their country, even if it should get through the existing crisis. Secondly, it would have some effect of the same description throughout the Peninsula, as well on the Spaniards as the French. It would show both that Great Britain was not only determined to persevere, but considered success to be certain, if the Portuguese should continue their exertions in union with us.

‘ I am not so certain of the effect that will be produced by this change in the Brazils, and indeed I do not understand the subject so well ; but it is my opinion, that the British Government ought to consider even this branch of the subject, as it will affect the interests of Great Britain through Portugal, and not as one affecting the mercantile interests of His Majesty's subjects.

‘ The Brazils will be reduced from the situation of an independent country to that of a colony, which the inhabitants of the Brazils may not much like ; and, considering all that is going on around them, some of them (unless they are well managed, as we may be certain they will not be)

may be induced to oppose; but even in this extreme case of the loss of the Brazils, I should think it the interest of Portugal, and of course of Great Britain, that the Sovereign should reside in Portugal.

‘ I am not entirely convinced that Portugal can do without the Brazils; but it is not impossible, in my opinion, to conciliate the interests of the Brazils, and of Portugal, the Sovereign residing in the latter Kingdom. It cannot be done, in my opinion, by bringing back the Brazils to the state of restraint of a colony in point of trade; and if the trade is left as it is, the mercantile interests of the Brazils, and of His Majesty’s subjects, will not be injured by the removal of the Government to Portugal; but in this case it would probably be necessary to arrange that a proportion of the duties on imports and exports paid in the Brazils, should be transferred to the treasury of Portugal.

‘ If this object should be effected, the political and financial interests of Portugal will be conciliated with the mercantile interests of the colony and of the British merchants. It is impossible for me to say whether it can be effected or not; I only state what is desirable, and what must be effected at some time or other, if the result of the contest should be successful, and we should be able to maintain the independence of Portugal against the enemy; neither is it possible for me to judge whether the inhabitants of the Brazils would be content to return to the situation of a colony, their trade being left independent, paying to the mother country a part of the duties levied upon it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 11th Sept., 1811.

‘ I enclose the weekly state of the 1st, and the morning report of the 8th instant.

‘ I am sorry to say that our young soldiers are sickly; but the disorders are not very violent; and I hope that at the end of this month they will be less prevalent. It is melancholy, however, to see the effect which the Walcheren fever has had upon the constitutions of both Officers and soldiers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Bacellar.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 12th Sept., 1811.

‘Major General Don Carlos de España has informed me, that, upon the recent movements of the enemy between the Tormes and the Yeltes, he had been under the necessity of sending across the Duero the battalions of Spanish recruits which he was forming on the left of that river, and that one battalion, consisting of 1300 men, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Don Manuel Bendito, had gone over from Fermoselle to Bemposta, and that another battalion, consisting of 600 men, under the command of Don Felipe Baxona, had gone over from Saucelle to Freixo de Espadacinta. I request that these troops may be received with hospitality within the Portuguese frontier.

‘Don Carlos de España has informed me, that he had sent over, from Saucelle and Fermoselle, magazines of corn for the support of these troops; but, as they may be under the necessity of remaining in Portugal longer than those magazines will provide for their subsistence, I beg that you will give directions that the Superintendent de Viveres in the province of Tras os Montes may take measures to supply them with provisions, for which I will pay from the military chest of the British army, until a British Commissary can be sent to supply them.

‘I beg that you will inform the Superintendent de Viveres of the province of Tras os Montes, that I hold him responsible for a due obedience to this order, and that there shall be no ground for complaints on the part of the Spanish Officers and troops.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General Bacellar.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 12th Sept., 1811.

‘I enclose a list of the Portuguese subjects in the service of the medical department, and a list of those also in the commissariat of the British army, whom I wish to be exempted from the operation of the recruiting laws.

‘In the list of persons employed by the commissariat the names of several laborers are included. These I should have directed to be struck out, if I had observed any system

British troops in defence of the Kingdom of Portugal; and the confidential Minister of the Prince of Brazils, upon reading these complaints, instead of urging the Local Government to adopt energetic measures to prevent the existence of ground for these complaints, recommends "greater energy in their replies to them," and that the King's servants here (that is to say, I) should be made responsible for the failure of the Portuguese departments.

' After obtaining a knowledge of the sentiments of Conde de Linhares, I cannot recommend that the Prince of Brazils should be invited back to Portugal. Bad as things are now, they would certainly be worse if he were in the country; and unless the British Government take up the subject, and bring these gentlemen to a proper understanding of the nature of their situation and of their duties, we must only jog on as we can, exposed to all the inconveniences and risks, and incurring all the expenses, of this contest.

' If Government would follow my advice, however, they would make the Prince of Brazils understand, that great as is the interest of the British Government in maintaining the contest for the preservation of his dominions, his own interest is greater; and that if he and his Ministers, and his servants in this country, did not exert themselves, the assistance of the British, both in money and troops, should be withdrawn.

' I have already fought one battle on this frontier with defective equipments of all kinds, owing to the neglect of the Portuguese Government, and I am on the eve of another; but this will not do: there is not another Officer in the service who would go through what I daily endure to keep the machine together, and it cannot last.

' Your Lordship may depend upon it, that with all our efforts and good will we cannot save this country, if the sentiment of the Conde de Linhares and of the Government should become the prevalent sentiment of the country, and it should be imagined for a moment that the interest in the contest is ours, and that the Prince of Brazils and the Portuguese nation have but a minor interest in it, and need make no exertion. This is exactly what I have been contending against since I first landed in Portugal, and that

one sentence which I enclose is sufficient to undo all the good that we have done to this moment.

‘Whatever measure Government may adopt upon this subject, I trust that they will not make it known that the intelligence of the existence of this dispatch from the Conde de Linhares was received from ———.’

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept., 1811.

‘I received last night your letter of the 13th, enclosing one of the 12th from Lieut. Colonel ——— to Major General Burne, and I beg that Lieut. Colonel ——— may be informed that I cannot give him leave of absence.

‘I have not received, through the channel prescribed by His Majesty’s Regulations, any statement of the injuries of which Lieut. Colonel ——— complains. Till the Lieutenant Colonel will adopt that mode of transmitting his statement it will be impossible for you to know of what he complains, or for me to form a fair opinion on his complaints.

‘As I returned the letter which Lieut. Colonel ——— wrote to me on the 8th instant, in a cover, sealed up and directed to Lieut. Colonel ———, I conclude that it reached him in the state in which it left me, and therefore that you could not have seen it.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major General
A. Campbell.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept., 1811.

‘We have no chance with Colonel ———, excepting we proceed regularly, and you may depend upon it that at last he will be brought to act as he ought. He will give me a great deal of trouble, but that is my misfortune, and I should have much more trouble by departing from the regular mode pointed out by the Regulations. When he sends his statement of injuries to you, you will of course write your observations, your answer, and the defence of yourself, on

each injury stated, and forward it to me; when that paper shall reach me I shall determine what I will do.

‘ I have sent you a cask of Lamego.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
A. Campbell.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 14th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of General Orders* which I have issued this day on the subject of billeting the Officers and troops, which I beg you to lay before the Portuguese Government, and urge them to give orders that the arrangement proposed in the third paragraph may be carried into execution, as far as may be possible, in all the large towns in the Kingdom.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 15th Sept., 1811.

‘ I received your letter of the 6th in time to write to Lord Liverpool by the last post, to apprise him of my opinion that we ought, under existing circumstances, to have a larger fleet in the Tagus than we have; and indeed I think that we ought at all times to be at least safe on that side.

‘ I also wrote to Sir William Beresford, to apprise him of my opinion that the sea batteries ought again to be armed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept., 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 12th.

‘ Our horses are bought in England for twenty five guineas each, and I calculate that it costs ten pounds to bring every horse to this country, making his price here thirty five guineas, or thereabouts.

* See volume of General Orders, under the heads of LISBON, 14th March, 1809, and QUARTERS, Fuente Guinaldo, 14th September, 1811.

‘ I could not with propriety make a contract with an American to supply horses for the army without the consent of Government, and it would scarcely be worth while to make one for such a saving as five guineas for each horse.

‘ In all probability, the expenses of the Officers there to approve of the horses would cost as much as the difference of expense of the horses. There is also another objection to this plan, which is, that although horses might be very fit for the service in Passamaquoddy Bay upon their embarkation, the voyage would probably make such an alteration in their condition, particularly under American care, as might make them very unfit for service on their arrival here, more particularly as this American care would be bestowed upon the horses with a certainty that, after the inspection previous to embarkation, they must be taken, whatever may be the state of their condition on landing.

‘ We do not use horses for bât, but mules ; and these, dear as they are, are cheaper than the American horses would be under the proposed contract, and answer the purpose equally well, if not better.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept., 1811, 1 P. M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 15th, and that from General Cooke. The orders of this army specify that when a Lieutenant Colonel is named in orders to command a brigade, he is to receive a staff allowance equal in amount to his pay ; but those who hold the command in a temporary manner, without being named in orders, as many do at this moment, do not receive the allowance.

‘ I think the best way would be to consider the regulations of this army applicable to the troops at Cadiz, and to give to those Officers named by you to command brigades, and in Cadiz, the allowance during the time they shall exercise their command respectively. Upon the same ground Lord Proby ought to have the allowance likewise.

‘ When I settled this arrangement the same objections were made by several of the seniors here as are now made

at Cadiz; but, in my opinion, it is very injurious to the service to remove an Officer from a situation of which he performs the duty well, viz., the command of his regiment, for any temporary purpose, such as the command of a brigade, till a General Officer should be sent from England to command it. I resisted these pretensions on these grounds, and I must do to Officers the justice to say that they ceased to bring them forward. Lately I have not appointed in orders Lieutenant Colonels to command brigades, and I believe there are none in this army who receive the allowance.

‘I shall write to England respecting the battalion of foreign detachments. I have a great objection to foreigners in this army, as they desert terribly; and they not only give the enemy intelligence which he would find it difficult to get in any other manner, but by their accounts and stories of the mode in which deserters from the French army are treated by us, some of them well founded, they have almost put an end to desertion. I would therefore prefer not to have any of them here. I have sent orders to the 39th to join this army, and the Chasseurs de Watteville to go to Ireland, according to the orders of the Secretary of State.

‘Of course Captain Hamilton cannot be more than a Deputy Assistant till he shall be promoted to be a Field Officer.

‘I send you a letter of the 10th from my brother, from which you will see the intelligence he had up to that period.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I enclose some interesting papers just now received. I rather judge that Montbrun, in his “*Patente Jaune*,” states that the convoy will commence its march on the 20th or 21st. It is obvious, from the letter from Salamanca, that it will not on the 15th.

‘W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept., 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, regarding the establishment of the posts.

‘I have no authority, and never had the intention, to pay

from the military chest for any Portuguese civil or military establishment. I have taken upon myself at times to assist the Portuguese Government by making advances from the military chest for the support of their establishments, for the benefit of the service; but I never conceived it possible that any hesitation would be made about repaying these advances, whether made by way of ration or in money; and I can only say, that if there is any hesitation about complying with a proposition so reasonable as that the Portuguese Government should repay the advances made in ration and money for the support of the post horses and mules on the ordinary lines of communication of the Kingdom, I must throw myself on the mercy of my own Government for forgiveness for having been so improvident as to make these advances under a confidence in the honor of the Portuguese Government that they should be repaid.

‘ I can make no arrangement to pay half or any proportion of the expense of maintaining post horses and mules on the ordinary lines of communication in Portugal.

‘ If the Portuguese Government choose not to support the post horses and mules on the ordinary lines of communication, I must take measures to establish and support a communication with Lisbon for the use of the British army, till I can receive the orders of my Government upon such an extraordinary determination by the Portuguese Government, as that the military chest of a foreign army is to defray the expense of one of their ordinary, domestic, civil establishments. But I repeat, that I will not allow one Portuguese letter to be carried by the communications which I shall support.

‘ I beg to have a decided answer upon this subject by return of the post, in order that I may lose no time in apprising my Government of the fault I have committed in trusting to the honor of the Portuguese Government, in making advances for the support of one of their civil establishments, and in requesting the forgiveness of the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland for this improvidence.

‘ I beg that this letter may be laid before the Portuguese Government.

‘ The Government shall have the account of the rations

issued to the post horses and mules, and postillions, as soon as it can be made up.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept., 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, conveying complaints from Dom Miguel Forjaz, on the subject of means of transport, which you state that you would not have forwarded to me if Mr. Dalrymple had sent you an answer upon them. It is my duty to attend to all subjects of this description; and you may depend upon it that I shall give every attention in my power to the subject now brought under my consideration.

‘I am sorry, however, to have to observe that these complaints on the part of the Portuguese Commissaries are generally the pretences for some neglect of duty, and I cannot recollect one of them which has contained a plain statement of facts.

‘It generally turns out, upon inquiry, that some fact, material to the consideration of the case, has been grossly misrepresented, and that no ground of complaint does in reality exist.

‘It will not excite surprise, therefore, that I should have called for explanations from Mr. Berard, Mr. Pratt, and Mr. Drake, before I should decide upon the complaints which have been made against these gentlemen respectively.

‘When the allied army are acting together, it is necessary that some rule should be established for the distribution of the means of transport, &c., which the country affords, and which are generally required for the service. Under the 2d and 3d articles of the arrangement of the 10th June, 1809, it has been settled that the Commissary General of the British army shall make that distribution; and accordingly, during the campaign of 1810, the distribution of the means of transport, both by land and water, was made under my directions, according to the number of troops of both nations then in the field.

‘ It was found, however, that great inconvenience resulted from this distribution, because the British commissariat paid, and the Portuguese commissariat did not pay, for the means of transport which each used; and in the campaign of 1811, the boatmen, in particular on the Mondego, insisted, as a condition on which alone they would put their boats in a state to perform any service, that they should not be handed over to the Portuguese commissariat.

‘ The distribution of the means of transport, therefore, has not gone on so regularly this year, and it appeared to be a matter of but little importance, as so large a proportion of the Portuguese army was fed by the British Commissaries.

‘ My attention, however, has lately been drawn to this subject by Mr. Kennedy, in consequence of a large requisition for carts for the movement of the heavy train having been made at Lamego. The Portuguese Commissaries immediately discovered that they could not carry on the service unless they had some carts on the road from the army to Lamego; and, upon reference from Mr. Kennedy, I decided that upon every fifteen carts received from the Superintendent of Transport at Lamego and on the Mondego, the Portuguese Commissaries should have one.

‘ I made this distribution by referring only to the number of rations for men and horses which the Commissary of each nation had to issue, and putting entirely out of the question the movement of the battering train from Lamego, or the field stores from Coimbra, which falls exclusively upon the means of transport allotted to the British Commissary General.

‘ In considering this subject, I only request the Secretary of State to consider that the British commissariat feed the largest proportion of the Portuguese troops, and that the transport of the equipments for all the operations of the war fall upon the means of transport allotted to him.

‘ Lately, indeed, he has been feeding not only the regular troops, but the militia who are escorting the battering train, because nobody else will perform that duty.

‘ I have frequently repeated that, of which I am firmly persuaded, if the call for means of transport for both armies were twice as large as it is, the country possesses the means

of supplying it without inconvenience, if the Government choose to enforce their own laws and regulations.

‘ I have lately had an opportunity of seeing how the French conduct these concerns in Castille, in which kingdom neither the Spanish nor the British army could ever procure adequate means of transport, any more than the British or the Portuguese army can now in Portugal. The Prefect issues his orders to the several heads of districts, directing that a certain number of carts, drawn in a certain manner, and a certain number of mules, belonging to the district, each cart and each mule attended by its owner or his servant, shall be at a certain place, at a certain hour, on a named day. The head of the district either sends a similar order to the heads of villages, or makes the detailed distribution by name throughout the district.

‘ This is the mode of proceeding pointed out by the law of Portugal, but the difference in the mode of executing the law is the cause of the difference of effect. Notwithstanding the dislike to the French, and the reluctance with which the people of the country serve them, and that they are never paid, not a cart or mule required is missing at the named hour, not an owner of a cart or mule is absent. But in Portugal, where the Government will not carry into execution their own laws, means of transport are always deficient, the service is always cramped, and so it will continue until some dreadful misfortune happens, and the French enabled to establish themselves in Portugal, to carry into execution the law, as they do in Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 16th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, regarding the assistance to be given to the poor inhabitants of Portugal who are sick, from the fund arising from the bounty of the British Parliament, or the charity of individuals in England.

‘ The knowledge which I have of this country induces me

to request that you will suggest to the gentlemen appointed to manage and distribute these funds, the expediency of attending to the districts on the banks of the Coa, from its source at least as far as Pinhel.

‘ These districts were the seat of war during the months of July, August, and September, 1810, when the harvest of that year was reaped, the whole of which was consumed by the enemy ; and again, in the beginning of April of this year, when the little they had sown began to appear above ground, and was consumed.

‘ The inhabitants of these villages are reduced to subsist upon a small quantity of millet which they have contrived to save ; but the food is not of a description, nor is the quantity sufficient, to subsist them through the winter. Money distributed in these villages would enable them to procure some food from Spain ; and if the British army should canton for any time in these districts, the inhabitants will gain something by the services they will render the army.

‘ However, the distressed state of these people deserves the attention of the managers of these charities.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 17th Sept., 1811,
12 at noon.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ I recommend the arrangement you propose for the command of the 16th by to-morrow’s post.

‘ I had thoughts of reducing the establishment of all the regiments in this country to three squadrons, being certain that we shall thereby lose no effective numbers, and that it will be a great convenience to the regiments ; but I have delayed the measure till I should see you, and till the horses should arrive.

‘ The latter are arrived, I understand ; and you might as well prepare your returns and statements of men and horses in each regiment, and after the expected *bustle* I will settle the business.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th, and I enclose the copy of my dispatch of this day to the Secretary of State.

‘ I do not believe that Suchet came to Burgos, although Castaños swore that he was there; and I am quite at a loss to know what Soult is doing.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept., 1811.

‘ Neither the army of Portugal, nor that of the north, have made any movement of importance since I addressed you on the 11th instant. Both, however, have been concentrated in a greater degree than they were; the army of Portugal being between Bejar and Plasencia, with their advanced posts on this side, at Val de Fuentes; and the army of the north on the Lower Tormes, and between that river and the Duero.

‘ Both armies are employed in collecting supplies of provisions; and I enclose the deciphered copy of a letter in cipher, from General Montbrun to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, from which it appears that it is the enemy’s intention to endeavor to introduce large supplies of provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo from the side of Plasencia, as well as from that of Salamanca. The dates being all in cipher, and not having been able to discover that part of the key, we do not know exactly on what day the operation is to commence, but I should imagine about the 20th or 21st.

‘ From what I have stated to your Lordship in former dispatches regarding the enemy’s strength, and the difficulties and risks attending any operation on the right of the Agueda, you will not have expected that I should be able to prevent the introduction of this convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Since I last addressed your Lordship, I have heard that the army of Portugal had received a reinforcement of 4000 men from Valladolid, recently arrived from France, besides one of between 2000 and 3000 convalescents, which had

before joined from Salamanca ; and many horses, as well for dragoons as artillery.

• All accounts, however, concur in stating that there are a vast number of sick in this army ; and I may be mistaken in my estimate, as well of their numbers as of those of the army of the north, although founded on the best information in regard to the army of Portugal, and upon actual returns of the army of the north.

• I propose, therefore, to keep the allied army in such a situation as long as I can, as that I may see the enemy, and form an opinion of their strength from a view of them when collected.

• If I should not be able to prevent the introduction of the convoy, I shall at least have had the satisfaction of obliging the enemy to collect all their troops for the purpose of escorting it, and thus of contributing to save the army and the kingdom of Galicia.

• I have not yet received from General Abadia an account of his operations ; but I enclose the copy of a letter which he wrote to Don Carlos de España on the 8th instant, and the extract of a letter from General Walker of the 4th, and the copy of a letter from General Abadia to the Junta of Coruña of the 31st of August, the whole of which, with the account of General Wathier to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo of the 1st September, transmitted in my dispatch of the 4th, will give your Lordship a notion of what occurred, and of the existing state of affairs in Galicia. I do not transmit a letter of the 5th instant which I have received from Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, as he has your Lordship's directions to send home copies of all his communications to me.

• In my opinion, General Abadia made his retreat in good order, notwithstanding that it was made under circumstances of disadvantage, in consequence of its having been commenced too late. On this account he lost the great communication with Coruña ; and if the enemy had been able to persevere, they would have gained possession of that town and of Ferrol.

• Your Lordship will have seen the account of events in Murcia subsequent to the 9th of August, from which it appears that the army of Murcia also lost the great com-

munication with Lorca and Murcia by a similar error; and that the several divisions were separated, and sustained severe loss.

‘ I have not yet received accounts, upon which I can rely, of the direction of Soult’s operations, since his success against the army of Murcia, as it is so difficult to procure intelligence in the south of Spain which can be relied upon; but it is certain that none of his troops had arrived at Llerena, as reported to me; and I believe equally so that they had not been directed to establish the authority of the French Government in the Campo de Gibraltar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept., 1811.

‘ Major General Cooke has written to request that some arrangement may be made for the disposal of the battalion of foreign detachments doing duty at Cadiz. This battalion consists of some men belonging to the Chasseurs Britanniques, and of some recruits enlisted for general service, either at Gibraltar or on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, and not yet allotted to any regiment, and therefore but ill provided with clothing and appointments. Major General Cooke states that he has understood that these men are dissatisfied with the uncertainty of their situation, and he expresses an anxiety that they should be disposed of in regiments.

‘ I am not at all anxious to have any of them with this army. The number of foreigners with this army is a serious inconvenience, as they not only convey intelligence to the enemy, which they could acquire in no other manner, but they have nearly put a stop to desertion from the enemy’s ranks by their accounts, unfounded or exaggerated, of the manner in which deserters are treated and disposed of in the British service.

‘ Those men who do desert now, therefore prefer to take their chance with the Spanish levies to coming to us; and they earnestly intreat that they may not be sent to us, as they have been informed by the deserters from our army

that the deserters from the enemy are sent to the West India Islands, and have no chance of ever returning to Europe.

‘ I would beg to recommend, therefore, that those men of the battalion of foreign detachments at Cadiz, not belonging to the Chasseurs Britanniques, should be formed into a battalion of the German Legion, or of the 60th regiment, and that Officers should be sent to take charge of them, and that they should be clothed in the usual manner.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept., 1811.

‘ I enclose the last weekly state of the British army, and the morning report of the army in the field of the 15th September.

‘ I am concerned to say that the sickness of the newly arrived troops, and of those which were in Walcheren, still continues. Some of the regiments lately arrived have not now in the ranks fit for duty half of the number of men they landed in this country ; and the daily diminution of numbers from these, and the regiments that were in Walcheren, is such, that the numbers of the army for duty are scarcely kept up by the daily arrival of reinforcements. The Officers also are as sickly as the soldiers.

‘ The army is situated in good cantonments, in the most healthy part of the country. The troops have undergone no fatigue, and have been remarkably well fed.

‘ The disorder is generally of the intermittent description, and not very severe, and the deaths not numerous. I am in hopes also, that as there has been a favorable change in the weather within these last few days, the troops will soon regain their health and strength.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 20th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th.

‘ I think you had better send to England the papers which

have passed between you and the Government regarding Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘I wrote by the last post to Lord Liverpool on the conduct of the Government of Brazils, and I hope that the subject will be taken up and handled with some vigor.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Sept., 1811.

‘I have received your letter of this date, enclosing one of the 8th instant from Lieut. Colonel —, of the —th regiment, containing a narrative or statement of complaints against yourself. I am much concerned that Lieut. Colonel — should have thought it necessary to bring forward these complaints at this period; but as he has done so, it is my duty to take them into consideration, and to decide upon them.

‘Before I advert to the complaints made by Lieut. Colonel — of the language which he asserts you used to him and the —th regiment, on the morning of the 11th May, I shall consider of the others contained in the statement enclosed in his letter.

‘Your report of the transactions of the 11th May does not appear to me to afford any ground of complaint to Lieut. Colonel —.

‘First, Lieut. Colonel — does not know what that report contains.

‘Secondly, it contains nothing regarding the conduct of Lieut. Colonel —, excepting that he crossed the bridge of Barba de Puerco in pursuit of the enemy, contrary to your intentions, which is acknowledged by himself in the papers which he transmitted to me enclosed in a letter to the Adjutant General, of the 24th of May.

‘But this report occasioned what Lieut. Colonel — calls a most severe censure on his conduct from me; upon which I have only to observe, that the censure was directed to that part of Lieut. Colonel —’s conduct which is acknowledged by himself; a conduct, of which there had lately been other repeated instances in the army, from

which the public interests had suffered, and I thought it proper to record every flagrant recent instance of it in the notice which I took of it addressed to you, but intended to be circulated to the Officers of the army at large.

‘ It is not necessary that I should explain to Lieut. Colonel — the reasons for which this paper was not circulated to the army, as I had intended ; but they were not founded on any conviction produced on my mind by Lieut. Colonel —’s letter of the 24th, that the conduct of Lieut. Colonel — had been misrepresented to me ; because, on the contrary, Lieut. Colonel — avowed in the papers which he enclosed, that he did cross the bridge of Barba de Puero, and attempted to justify that measure ; but without producing any conviction on my mind of its propriety.

‘ Neither do I think that your division order of the 9th August, adverting to the number of men of Major General Burne’s brigade who were not in the ranks on the march, and to the mode of messing in those regiments, affords any ground of complaint to Lieut. Colonel —.

‘ First, I observe that there is nothing harsh in the mode of expression used in this order ; and that it prescribes nothing that can be too often repeated to the regiments composing this army.

‘ But secondly, I observe that it was called for, and rendered necessary ; first, by your own observation, and the report by the Brigade Major, of the number of both regiments of the brigade who were moving with the baggage, instead of in the ranks of their regiments, which report I have in my possession ; and secondly, by what you had seen of the mode of messing of both regiments, and by the conversations which you had had on that subject with Major General Burne.

‘ I would also add, that from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry of the 14th August, held by Lieut. Colonel —, it does appear that the soldiers of the —th regiment were not at all times messed in the manner pointed out by your order : a question was asked, “ Have the men of your companies been messed according to this rule ? ” to which the answer was “ Invariably, in stationary quarters, and at all other times that *circumstances allowed it to be practicable.* ”

‘ I am not aware of any circumstances in which the —th have ever been placed, in which it was not practicable to mess the soldiers as directed in your orders, and the standing regulation of the service; and if that mode was departed from in any one instance, it was not only right, but you would have neglected your duty, if you had omitted to notice it; and it would have been more becoming in Lieut. Colonel — to have explained the cause of the deviation from your order in so important a matter, in order to avoid censure, than to have complained in the terms he did of a division order, of which the object was to correct this irregularity.

‘ I postponed the consideration of the complaints first stated in Lieut. Colonel ——’s narrative, because it appears to me, that till he conceived he had other grounds of complaint, he must have considered the language which he states you used to him and his regiment on the morning of the 11th of May of very little importance, or else deserved; and that he has complained of it now only to aggravate the other complaints which he has made.

‘ Harsh and ungentlemanlike language by a superior does afford ground of complaint to an inferior Officer. But the complaint of it ought to be made at the moment at which the feelings of the inferior have been injured.

‘ It would undoubtedly be better if language of this description were never used, and if Officers placed in the situation in which you were on the morning of the 11th of May, could correct neglects and errors likely to be attended by consequences fatal to the public interests, in language which should not hurt the feelings of the person to whom it is addressed; and with a manner divested of vehemence.

‘ But, unfortunately, there are some of us who cannot avoid to feel warmly for the success of the operation of which we have the charge; and to express ourselves with vehemence, and in language not perfectly correct, on the mistakes and neglects which are likely to impede it; and although I consider every Officer responsible for language of this description, the complaint of the person to whom it is addressed ought to be made immediately, in order that all the circumstances under which it was used may come fairly

before those whose duty it may be to inquire into the subject; and that it may be seen whether there was any and what provocation in error or neglect for the language used.

‘Conceiving, therefore, that Lieut. Colonel ——’s feelings could not have been hurt by the language now complained of, or that he could not have allowed four months to elapse without making his complaint; and that it is now made only to aggravate his complaints on other subjects, which afford him no ground at all for complaint, I do not think it proper to make his complaint on this head the subject of farther inquiry.

‘I beg that you will communicate this letter to Lieut. Colonel ——, and that you will inform him that I cannot give him leave of absence.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General
A. Campbell.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigade Major May, R. A.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 21st Sept., 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 15th, and I am very much obliged to you for having staid with the train when Major Dickson was again unfortunately taken ill.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Brigade Major May.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Sept., 1811.

‘You will have seen Mozinho’s report of the 16th September, 10 o’clock at night, containing an account which he had received from a friend at Badajoz, of the enemy’s intention to augment that garrison considerably, with a view certainly to annoy our frontier.

‘I have long been astonished that they had not done something of this kind, more particularly as they must know that Campo Mayor and Ouguela are very indifferently garrisoned, and that those points are very important to us, in case we should take any position on the frontier.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will send an Officer over to Campo Mayor and Ouguela, and see how those places are supplied with provisions, &c., and gar-

risoned. Let me know whether the new outwork at Campo Mayor is yet palisaded, and what is the state of the works at Ouguela. The Commanding Officers of those places should likewise be on their guard against surprise.

‘ I do not recollect exactly how General Hamilton’s division are cantoned; but it might be desirable to move them to Sta Olaya, St. Vicente, &c., in order to give protection and countenance to these places, in case any dash should be made at them.

‘ The French have moved: and I think that by to-morrow we shall have a very large army in our front.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 22d Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th. I imagine that Marshal Beresford’s objection to salt fish, equally with salt meat, is principally that those articles are more expensive than fresh meat, and require large means of transport to move them to the troops, and because he could leave no discretion with the Junta de Viveres, who purchase salt fish as a job, and issue it constantly at any inconvenience; and he prohibited the issue of it entirely.

‘ Salt fish, however, and salt meat are very necessary for the garrisons. They would also be very necessary if the troops should again be obliged to retire to the neighborhood of Lisbon; and I recommend that you should converse with Beresford upon the subject, and let what he may think necessary for the garrisons, &c., be retained in store, not to be issued without his orders, and the remainder be disposed of as you propose.

‘ The French army has moved upon Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept., 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 19th.

‘ I have not got by me at present the memorandum which

I sent for the formation of the military chest; but it appears to me that the Portaria will answer tolerably well.

‘ I do not understand the plan of giving up the new decima in order to obtain means of transport. Is it intended that the produce of the decima should be allotted to the payment for means of transport? If it is, the produce of the decima ought to go into the military chest. Or is it intended to remit the decima to the inhabitants as a bonus, in consideration of their supplying means of transport? If that is the plan, the abuses will be greater than ever, and the Portuguese Government will get neither decima nor means of transport. The rich, who will gain all by the remission of the decima, will, as usual, throw the burden of supplying the means of transport upon the poor, who will gain nothing: and the odious system of embargo will in a manner be legalized, as the Officers of Government will have a kind of right to the use of the means of transport of every man, which they will exercise upon the poor in that manner.

‘ Is it intended to remit the decima, and to pay the present price for means of transport likewise? If it is, the price of an article, or rather for a service, which is paid for by no other army excepting ours and the Portuguese, will be enormously increased. We already pay more for the common transport by the country carts than we should for the carriage of the same weight in England; and I believe that the transport even by mules is not only more convenient, but little more expensive. You may depend upon it that the price paid is full compensation for the service, and it is, in fact, all clear gain.

‘ The French have not yet appeared, but I think they will before evening.

‘ I shall have my hands very full of business for the next three or four days, and shall not be able to dispatch the mail on Wednesday, and I therefore request you to detain the packet till I shall write to you to dispatch it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 23d Sept., 1811, 7 A.M.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received the enclosed copy of a letter in cipher, from Marmont to Girard, which has been intercepted. Marmont is mistaken; and I do not think that Girard has a force to annoy you.

‘ I reckon that you have about 11,000 men: and he cannot have 6000, of which 1100 or 1200 are cavalry.

‘ If he moves forward, I beg you will fall upon him, if you think you can do so with any prospect of success.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Quadraseis, 29th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 24th, 26th, and 27th.

‘ Do not be too early in putting troops in Arronches. It is, in summer, the most unhealthy place in Alentejo; that is, before the Caya runs plentifully.

‘ I promised General Castaños a month’s provisions for the garrison of Alburquerque; and I beg you will give them to him.

‘ I could not prevent Marmont from relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, and we have retired to this neighborhood: but we had two little affairs with him, in which the troops behaved remarkably well, particularly the 2d batt. 5th regiment, 77th, and 21st Portuguese regiment, and General Alten’s brigade of cavalry, near El Bodon, on the 25th.

‘ The French have gone back.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Quadraseis, 29th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th.

‘ I recommended the measure of arming the forts, not on any suspicion of the enemy’s intentions founded on intelligence, but from the suggestions of my own mind, reflecting upon what it was probable the enemy might attempt. I am certain, that if Buonaparte does not remove us from the

Peninsula, he must lower his tone with the world : and I am equally certain that he will make every effort to avoid this necessity. He has a fleet, and does not want for armies ; and he is just the man to sacrifice his fleet, and to make a great effort with his armies to effect this object. I fear the results of neither the one nor the other if we are prepared. But as we are not prepared with a fleet at Lisbon, which, in my opinion, we ought always to be, I thought it proper to desire that the sea forts might be armed, as the only measure in my power at the time it was supposed probable that he was coming himself to take command of his armies.

‘ The mail was robbed by some of my vagabond soldiers.

‘ The packet may sail when you please. I shall send off another dispatch on Wednesday, to sail by the packet of Sunday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quadraseis, 29th Sept, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th.

‘ It is very reasonable and proper that the Portuguese Officers should manage the Portuguese concerns, and I hope the Portuguese Government do me the justice to feel that I interfere in no concern of theirs, excepting by their desire, and to give them assistance. I sincerely wish that it was never necessary to interfere even in this manner.

‘ In respect to the Post Office, I do not desire to have any concern with it, provided they will really manage it. I shall run my own *parte*, and pay 200 reis a league, and manage that by my own Officers on the ordinary lines of communication ; and I will pay all the expenses, and manage by my own Officers all the concerns on the extraordinary lines.

‘ I hope, however, that the Government, which are so tenacious about their right to manage this concern, will really conduct it as it ought to be conducted, and not allow it to be neglected as everything else is.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quadragesima, 29th Sept., 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st, and I am much concerned to observe that my letters upon the subject of the posts are not yet understood by the Portuguese Government.

‘ I wish them to pay for nothing but the ordinary establishment of posts, and I will pay from the military chest for all the extraordinary lines of communication rendered necessary by the course of the operations of the war.

‘ I shall state what I conceive to be the ordinary lines of communication, and how many mules at each stage, and what the extraordinary lines, by the next post.

‘ Although it is not my business as Commander of the British army to observe upon the intention of charging the expense of the posts of the Kingdom to the Portuguese military chest, I beg leave to draw your attention to it.

‘ If I understand the reason for forming the military chest, it is to have at command, and distinct, the funds for defraying the expenses of the army. But not only will those funds not be distinct, but they will be very insufficient for their purpose, if the ordinary expenses of the civil establishment of the Government are to be defrayed from it.

‘ The Portuguese Government might as well defray the expenses of the salaries of the Juiz de Fora from the military chest as the expenses of the Post Office.

‘ I shall make a representation to the Government on this subject, as Marshal General of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quadragesima, 29th Sept., 1811.

‘ I enclose the last weekly state, and the last morning report of this army.

‘ We are really almost an army of convalescents. There is no serious sickness among the troops, and but very few die, but I never saw the army capable of bearing so little; nearly one half of all those recently arrived from England

have gone into the hospitals. You will see that we were hard pressed on the 25th, but I never saw the troops behave so well, or so steady.

‘ The French produced an immense army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I shall write to you on Wednesday respecting my plans in future. I propose to try something of the same kind as what I have done lately, that is to draw everybody upon myself, and relieve other parts of Spain; but I shall first allow these armies to separate, and in the meantime the equinoctial rain will fall, and I hope that our troops will become more healthy.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quadraseis, 29th Sept., 1811.

‘ The enemy commenced their movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo with the convoys of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar, and from Salamanca on the 21st instant, and on the following day I collected the British army in positions, from which I could either advance or retire without difficulty, and which would enable me to see all that was going on, and the strength of the enemy’s army.

‘ The 3d division, and that part of Major General Alten’s brigade of cavalry which was not detached, occupied the range of heights which are on the left of the Agueda: having their advanced guard, under Lieut. Colonel Williams, of the 60th, on the heights of Pastores, within three miles of Ciudad Rodrigo; the 4th division was at Fuente Guinaldo, where I had strengthened a position with some works; the Light division on the right of the Agueda, having their right resting upon the mountains which separate Castille and Estremadura. Lieut. General Graham commanded the troops on the left of the army, which were posted on the Lower Azava; the 6th division, and Major General Anson’s brigade of cavalry, being at Espeja, and occupying Carpio, Marialva, &c.

‘ Don Carlos de España observed the Lower Agueda with Don Julian Sanchez’s cavalry and infantry.

‘ Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, with Major General Slade’s, and Major General De Grey’s brigades of cavalry,

were on the Upper Azava, in the centre, between the right and left of the army, with General Pack's brigade at Campillo; and the 5th division was in observation of the Pass of Perales, in the rear of the right, the French General Foy having remained and collected a body of troops in Upper Estremadura, consisting of part of his own division of the army of Portugal, and a division of the army of the centre; and the 7th division was in reserve at Alamedilla.

‘The enemy first appeared in the plain near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 23d; and retired again in a short time; but on the 24th, in the morning, they advanced again in considerable force, and entered the plain by the roads of Santi-espíritus and Tenebron; and before evening they had collected there all their cavalry, to the amount of about 6000 men, and four divisions of infantry, of which one division was of the Imperial Guard; and the remainder of the armies were encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘On the morning of the 25th the enemy sent a reconaissance of cavalry towards the Lower Azava, consisting of about fourteen squadrons of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. They drove in our posts on the right of the Azava, but having passed that river, the Lanciers de Berg were charged by two squadrons of the 16th, and one of the 14th light dragoons, and driven back; they attempted to rally and to return, but were fired upon by the light infantry of the 61st regiment, which had been posted in the wood on their flank, by Lieut. General Graham; and Major General Anson pursued them across the Azava; and afterwards resumed his posts on the right of that river. Lieut. General Graham was highly pleased with the conduct of Major General Anson's brigade; and Major General Anson particular mentions Lieut. Colonel Hervey, and Captain Brotherton, of the 14th, and Captain Hay and Major Cocks, of the 16th.

‘But the enemy's attention was principally directed during this day to the position of the 3d division, in the hills between Fuente Guinaldo and Pastores. About 8 in the morning, they moved a column, consisting of between thirty and forty squadrons of cavalry, and fourteen battalions of infantry, and twelve pieces of cannon, from Ciudad Rodrigo,

in such a direction, that it was doubtful whether they ~~would~~^{could} attempt to ascend the hills by La Encina, or by the direct road of El Bodon, towards Fuente Guinaldo; and I was not certain by which road they would make their attack, till they actually commenced it upon the last.

‘As soon as I saw the direction of their march, I had reinforced the 2d batt. 5th regiment, which occupied the post on the hill over which the road passes to Guinaldo, by the 77th regiment, and the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and Major General Alten’s brigade, of which only three squadrons remained which had not been detached, drawn from El Bodon; and I ordered there a brigade of the 4th division from Fuente Guinaldo, and afterwards from El Bodon, the remainder of the troops of the 3d division, with the exception of those at Pastores, which were too distant.

‘In the meantime, however, the small body of troops in this post sustained the attack of the enemy’s cavalry and artillery. One regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking two pieces of cannon which had been posted on a rising ground on the right of our troops; but they were charged by the 2d batt. 5th regiment, under the command of Major Ridge, and the guns were immediately retaken.

‘While this operation was going on on the flank, an attack was made on the front by another regiment, which was repulsed in a similar manner by the 77th regiment; and the three squadrons of Major General Alten’s brigade charged repeatedly different bodies of the enemy which ascended the hill on the left of the two regiments of British infantry, the Portuguese regiment being posted in the rear of their right.

‘At length, the division of the enemy’s infantry which had marched with the cavalry from Ciudad Rodrigo, were brought up to the attack on the road of Fuente Guinaldo, and seeing that they would arrive and be engaged before the troops could arrive either from Guinaldo or El Bodon, I determined to withdraw our post, and to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 2d batt. 5th regiment, and the 77th regiment, were formed into one square, and the 21st Portuguese regiment into another, supported by

Major General Alten's small body of cavalry and the Portuguese artillery.

'The enemy's cavalry immediately rushed forward, and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese regiment; and the 5th and 77th regiments were charged on three faces of the square by the French cavalry, but they halted and repulsed the attack with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. We then continued the retreat, and joined the remainder of the 3d division, also formed in squares, on their march to Fuente Guinaldo, and the whole retired together in the utmost order, and the enemy never made another attempt to charge any of them; but were satisfied with firing upon them with their artillery, and with following them.

'Lieut. Colonel Williams with his light infantry, and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. Trench with the 74th regiment, retired from Pastores across the Agueda; and thence marched by Robleda, where they took some prisoners, and recrossed the Agueda, and joined at Guinaldo in the evening.

'I placed the 3d and 4th divisions, and General Pack's brigade of infantry, and Major General Alten's, Major General De Grey's, and Major General Slade's brigades of cavalry in the position at Fuente Guinaldo on the evening of the 25th, and ordered Major General R. Craufurd to retire with the Light division across the Agueda, the 7th division to form at Albergueria, and Lieut. General Graham to collect the troops under his command at Nave d'Aver, keeping only posts of observation on the Azava; and the troops were thus formed in an echelon, of which the centre was in the position at Guinaldo; and the right upon the pass of Perales; and the left at Nave d'Aver; Don Carlos de España was placed on the left of the Coa; and Don Julian Sanchez was detached with the cavalry to the enemy's rear.

'The enemy brought up a second division of infantry from Ciudad Rodrigo in the afternoon of the 25th; and in the course of that night, and of the 26th, they collected their whole army in front of our position at Guinaldo; and not deeming it expedient to stand their attack in that position, I retired about three leagues, and on the 27th formed the army as follows: viz., the 5th division on the right, at Aldea

Velha; the 4th, and light dragoons, and Major General Alten's cavalry, at the Convent of Sacaparte, in front of Alfayates; the 3d and 7th divisions in second line, behind Alfayates; and Lieut. General Graham's corps on the left at Bismula, having their advanced guard beyond the Villar Mayor river; and Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry near Alfayates, on the left of the 4th division, and having General Pack's and General M'Mahon's brigades at Rebolosa, on their left. The piquets of the cavalry were in front of Aldea da Ponte, beyond the Villar Mayor river; and those of General Alten's brigade beyond the same river, towards Forcalhos.

‘ It had been the enemy's intention to turn the left of the position of Guinaldo by moving a column into the valley of the Upper Azava, and thence ascending the heights in the rear of the position by Castillejos; and from this column they detached a division of infantry and fourteen squadrons of cavalry to follow our retreat by Albergueria, and another body of the same strength followed us by Forcalhos. The former attacked the piquets of the cavalry at Aldea da Ponte, and drove them in; and they pushed on nearly as far as Alfayates. I then made General Pakenham attack them with his brigade of the 4th division, supported by Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole, and the 4th division, and by Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry; and the enemy were driven through Aldea da Ponte, back upon Albergueria, and the piquets of the cavalry resumed their station.

‘ But the enemy having been reinforced by the troops which marched from Forcalhos, again advanced about sunset and drove in the piquets of the cavalry from Aldea da Ponte, and took possession of the village.

‘ Lieut. General Cole again attacked them with a part of General Pakenham's brigade, and drove them through the village; but night having come on, and as General Pakenham was not certain what was passing on his flanks, or of the numbers of the enemy, and he knew that the army were to fall back still further, he evacuated the village, which the enemy occupied, and held during the night.

‘ On the 28th, I formed the army on the heights behind Soito; having the Serra de Meras on their right, and the left at Rendo, on the Coa; about a league in rear of the

position which they had occupied on the 27th. The enemy also retired from Aldea da Ponte, and had their advanced posts at Albergueria; and as it appears that they are about to retire from this part of the country, and as we have already had some bad weather, and may expect more at the period of the equinoctial gales, I propose to canton the troops in the nearest villages to the position which they occupied yesterday.

‘ I cannot conclude this report of the occurrences of the last week, without expressing to your Lordship my admiration of the conduct of the troops engaged in the affairs of the 25th instant. The conduct of the 2d batt. 5th regiment, commanded by Major Ridge, in particular, affords a memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline of the troops, and their confidence in their Officers, can effect in the most difficult and trying situations. The conduct of the 77th regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Bromhead, was equally good, and I have never seen a more determined attack than was made by the whole of the enemy’s cavalry, with every advantage of the assistance of a superior artillery, and repulsed by these two weak battalions. I must not omit also to report the good conduct on the same occasion, of the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Colonel Bacellar, and of Major Arentschildt’s artillery. The Portuguese infantry were not actually charged, but were repeatedly threatened, and they showed the utmost steadiness and discipline, both in the mode in which they prepared to receive the enemy, and in all the movements of a retreat made over six miles of plain in front of a superior cavalry and artillery.

‘ The Portuguese artillerymen attached to the guns, which were for a moment in the enemy’s possession, were cut down at their guns.

‘ The infantry upon this occasion were under the command of Major General the Hon. C. Colville; Lieut. General Picton having remained with the troops at El Bodon; and the conduct of Major General Colville was beyond all praise.

‘ Your Lordship will have observed by the details of the action which I have given you, how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of the 1st hussars and 11th light dragoons of Major General Alten’s brigade. There were

not more than three squadrons of the two regiments on the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished the cavalry for the outposts of the army, and they charged the enemy's cavalry repeatedly; and notwithstanding the superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained if I had not preferred to abandon it to risking the loss of these brave men by continuing the unequal contest under additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate entry of fourteen battalions of infantry into the action, before the support which I had ordered up could arrive. Major General Alten, and Lieut. Colonels Cumming and Arentschildt, and the Officers of these regiments, particularly distinguished themselves upon this occasion.

‘I have also to mention that the Adjutant General, Major General the Hon. C. Stewart, being upon the field, gave his assistance as an Officer of cavalry with his usual gallantry.

‘In the affair of the 27th, at Aldea da Ponte, Brig. General Pakenham and the troops of the 4th division, under the orders of Lieut. General the Hon. G. L. Cole, likewise conducted themselves remarkably well.

‘His Serene Highness, the Hereditary Prince of Orange, accompanied me during the operations which I have detailed to your Lordship, and was for the first time in fire; and he conducted himself with a spirit and intelligence which afford a hope that he will become an ornament to his profession.

‘The enemy having collected for the object of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo the army of the north, which were withdrawn from the attack they had commenced on General Abadia in Galicia, in which are included twenty two battalions of the Imperial Guards, and General Souham's division of infantry, composed of troops recently arrived in Spain from the army of Naples, and now drawn from the frontier of Navarre, where they had been employed in operations against Mina, together with five divisions and all the cavalry of the army called off Portugal, composing altogether an army of not less than 60,000 men, of which 6000 cavalry and 125 pieces of artillery, I could not pretend to maintain the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, nor could any effort which I could make prevent or materially impede the collection of the supplies or the march of the convoy for the

relief of that place. I did all that I could expect to effect without incurring the risk of great loss for no object; and as the reports as usual were so various in regard to the enemy's real strength, it was necessary that I should see their army in order that the people of this country might be convinced that to raise the blockade was a measure of necessity, and that the momentary relief of Galicia, and of Mina, were the only objects which it was in my power immediately to effect.

'I have had no reports from the north since I addressed your Lordship last, nor from the south of Spain.

'General Girard had collected at Merida a small body of troops, I believe with the intention of making an incursion into Portugal, under the notion that I had withdrawn Lieut. General Hill's corps from the Alentejo for the purpose of maintaining the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. But I imagine that he will break up this collection again, as soon as he shall hear that General Hill is at Portalegre.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*

'WELLINGTON.

'P. S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the 25th and 27th instant.

'W.'

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., in an affair with the Enemy on the Heights of El Bodon, on the 25th, and near Aldea da Ponte, on the 27th September, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	1	1	40	40	42
Wounded . . .	16	13	156	63	185
Missing . . .	—	1	33	9	34

To Major Dickson, Royal Artillery.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Richoso, 1st October, 1811.

‘I received your letter of the 20th, and I am happy to find that you are so well.

‘The Portuguese commissariat must feed the militia wherever they can. If they cannot feed them our Commissaries will, but the Portuguese Government shall pay the expense.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Dickson, R. A.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘SIR,

‘Richoso, 1st October, 1811.

‘I have received your letter, No. 4, of the 19th September. I request you to send me either the originals, or accurate copies, of all the letters and papers which may be intercepted from the enemy.

‘I concur with you in the expediency of supplying the chiefs of guerrilla corps with mountain artillery. I supplied Don Julian Sanchez with the only guns of this description that I had, which he unfortunately lost. But they were very useful to him.

‘I concur entirely in your opinion regarding the inexpediency of raising corps of deserters from the French army. They will be worse than useless to General Abadia. They will desert and convey intelligence to the enemy, probably at critical moments, when the enemy could not otherwise obtain any; and they will augment the evils resulting from the disorganized state of the military force.

‘I beg you will inform General Abadia that I had it not in my power to prevent the enemy from throwing a supply of provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo. I delayed them, however, as long as I could; and they were induced to cross the Agueda with their whole army, in hopes that I should wait to be attacked in a bad position at Fuente Guinaldo. They withdrew from this part of the country only yesterday; the army of the north taking the road to Salamanca, and that of Portugal the road of Baños and Plasencia. It is said that the former are going to Valladolid, which I should think not unlikely, with a view to collect supplies.

‘ We had two partial actions with them, one on the 25th, and one on the 27th September; on both which occasions our troops behaved remarkably well, and manifestly showed their superiority.

‘ Although the army of the north may now go to Valladolid, it is certain that their intention is to endeavor to obtain possession of Galicia. As soon as I shall learn that these two armies are separated decidedly, I shall commence some operation which will, if possible, bring them upon me again; and I shall in this manner do everything in my power to create a diversion in favor of General Abadia, and give him time to form his army.

‘ I have enclosed your observations on Valença to Marshal Sir William Beresford.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Lieut. Colonel

Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Richoso, 1st October, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th September, and I shall consider of Dom Miguel Forjaz’ plan for transport. From the first appearance of it, however, I am decidedly against it.

‘ I forward a note and its enclosure which I have received from Colonel Grant, who is prisoner at Plasencia, regarding the Marquez de Ponte de Lima and the Marquez de Valença. Let me know what the Government wish that I should do respecting these noblemen.

‘ Gordon says that Pamplona’s aide de camp told him that he wished to come in, and he thought he said General Pamplona likewise. Gordon says that he answered him that he knew nothing about the mode in which he would be received; and that all the information he could give him was, that Mascarenhas had been hanged, and the Conde de Sabugal acquitted.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. The French retired yesterday from Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Richoso, 1st October, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch (No. 49), regarding a plan proposed by Brig. General Carroll for raising 7500 men in the Spanish service, to be called the Irish brigade.

‘ I beg to refer your Lordship to my dispatch of the 15th December, 1810, regarding the means which the regiments of this army possess of affording Officers to assist Brig. General Carroll. Since that dispatch was written, the Officers of the British army have been so sickly, that there are with the regiments not sufficient numbers to do the duty, particularly of those regiments recently arrived in this country.

‘ I have in store at Lisbon some arms, but no accoutrements or clothing, or necessaries. Excepting in arms, therefore, it is impossible for me to give to Brig. General Carroll the assistance which he requires.

‘ In referring to my dispatch of the 15th December, I beg your Lordship to advert to the opinions it contains regarding the policy of giving assistance of the description required by General Carroll to raise corps in Spain.

‘ Colonel Downie, and particularly General Carroll, are more fit to command corps than many, or perhaps than any, of the Officers to be found in the Spanish service; and I conceive that the British Government cannot apply their resources allotted for the support of the cause in Spain better than by supplying arms, clothing, accoutrements, and necessaries for the troops to be raised and commanded by those Officers. I have no doubt that they will make as good use of this assistance as it is possible to make, and that the result will be as beneficial to the cause as it has been under any other mode of distributing this description of assistance.

‘ But I beg to observe to your Lordship, that when a number of soldiers have been raised, armed, and accoutred, and even disciplined, but half the business to be done, in order to derive any effectual service from them, is effected.

‘ Means must be found of paying and supporting them, at least of supporting them while engaged in operations against the enemy in the field; and, till these means are found, the

other expense incurred cannot produce much of the benefit expected from it.

‘The employment of British Officers would make no difference in this respect. The corps of troops to which they should be attached would be better disciplined possibly; but it would be equally useless as a military body in large operations; and indeed it is doubtful whether these Officers could attempt to discipline, or even to command soldiers neither paid nor fed, even if they were willing to serve without pay themselves.

‘In whatever way British Officers are employed with the Spanish troops, the measure will be viewed with jealousy, and will occasion some disgust among the national Officers. If it should not be completely successful, as it appears to me impossible that it should be, unless means of paying and feeding the troops are provided, it is certain that the want of success will not be concealed, and that it will be attributed to the want of skill in the British Officers, or to any rather than the real cause.

‘Under these circumstances I recommend it to your Lordship not to allow British Officers to serve with the Spanish troops, till adequate means of paying and providing for those troops, at least when engaged in operations with the enemy, shall be found.

‘But there is another view of this subject to which I wish to draw your Lordship’s attention. When the British Officers would enter the Spanish service, they would have prejudices and opposition of all descriptions to contend with, as well on the part of the soldiers as of the Officers of the national service. They could perform their duty only by receiving the steady support of their own commander, whose character must be of that description to command the respect of the Spanish authorities. If their commander should omit, or should not be able to support them in their exertions and their authority, they must fail.

‘I must also observe that British Officers require to be kept in order, as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in a foreign service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service, has shown me that there must be an authority, and that a strong one, to keep them within due bounds, otherwise they would

only disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed, the Officers whom they should be destined to assist, and the country in whose service they should be employed.

‘Neither Brig. General Carroll nor Colonel Downie are persons of that character in the military profession to be able to protect and support the British Officers in the performance of their duty in the Spanish service, or to preserve due subordination among them, in relation to the Spanish Officers and authorities.

‘I therefore earnestly recommend to your Lordship not to allow any Officers of the British army to serve with General Carroll’s corps, under existing circumstances.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Richoso, 1st October, 1811.

‘Adverting to your Lordship’s dispatch of the 3d September, regarding the grant of medals to the Officers of the army, it occurs to me that an improvement might still be made in the system: for instance, many Officers in the course of service become entitled to two, or three, or more medals. In my opinion they should receive but one; but for every additional action deemed worthy of the medal, in which any Officer having a medal should be present, he should be warranted to have the name of that action engraved on his medal, and that in that case the fresh medal for that action should be given to the Officer next in command in the regiment, who was present, and distinguished in the action.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 2d October, 1811.

‘I enclose the last morning state.

‘Your Lordship will be concerned to observe the number of sick it contains; but I am happy to say that there is no serious disorder, and that that which prevails is principally a return of the Walcheren fever, or a disorder of the same description produced among the newly-arrived troops by

previous derangement of their bowels, in consequence of their eating unripe fruit, and drinking to excess, on their arrival in this country.

‘ I yesterday saw the 4th dragoon guards. Of 470 men, they could produce only 230 mounted; and these looked more like men come out of the hospitals than troops just arrived from England.

‘ These men have to take care of the horses of the whole regiment, and allowing that one man can take care of three horses, they could not produce in the field for any service at this moment above 110 men.

‘ All the newly arrived regiments of cavalry are in nearly the same state.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 2d October, 1811.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 29th September, I have learned that the enemy retired from Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, the army of the north towards Salamanca, and it is said Valladolid, and the army of Portugal towards Baños and Plasencia.

‘ Girard’s division of the 5th corps, which I informed your Lordship had been collected at Merida, has retired from thence, and has again been cantoned in the neighborhood of Zafra.

‘ I likewise learn that General Foy, who had advanced as far as Zarza la Mayor, in the valley of the Alagon, with his own division, and one of the army of the centre, has retired towards Plasencia.

‘ The allied army are cantoned on both sides of the Coa, having their advanced posts on towards Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter of the 19th September, which I have received from General Abadia, which will show your Lordship the state of affairs in that province.

‘ The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are of the 14th, from which it appears that Marshal Soult was on his return to the westward.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

SIR,

Freneda, 3d October, 1811.

‘ Having learned from the enclosed letter from Major General Alexander Campbell, that Lieut. Colonel —, of the —th regiment, intends to lay before the Commander in Chief the circumstances of a complaint of his Commanding Officer, Major General Alexander Campbell, which he has lately brought under my consideration; and thinking it probable, from the length of time which has elapsed since he announced his intention of making this complaint, that he has either forwarded it, or proposes to forward it direct to His Royal Highness, and that it might be convenient to His Royal Highness to be made acquainted with all that has passed here relative to this complaint, I trouble you upon this subject.

‘ When the garrison of Almeida escaped on the morning of the 11th of May last, I received a report from Major General Campbell, of which I enclose the extract regarding the conduct of Lieut. Colonel —, stating the losses which had been incurred, in consequence of the imprudence of Lieut. Colonel — in passing the bridge of Barba de Puerco. Upon receiving this report, I wrote a letter to Major General Campbell, in which I pointed out the evil consequences which had resulted from Lieut. Colonel —’s conduct, and adverted to instances which had recently occurred of similar conduct, which had been attended with similar unfortunate results.

‘ I had intended to circulate copies of this letter to all the divisions of the army; but on the night of the day on which I wrote it, I received the intelligence of Soult’s movement into Estremadura; and I commenced my journey, in the morning, to that province, which was continued at such a rate, as that my papers could not keep pace with me. When they arrived in Estremadura, I was employed in other concerns; in re-organizing the divisions which had fought the battle of Albuera, in preparing for the siege of Badajoz, &c., &c.; and the circumstances adverted to in the letter to Major General Campbell of the 15th May, had no longer that degree of attention from the Officers of the army, to render its circulation so beneficial as it might have been.

‘About a fortnight or three weeks after this letter was written, I received the enclosed, of the 24th May, from Lieut. Colonel —, which only tended to prove that his conduct at Barba de Puerco had been as represented by Major General Campbell, and I therefore returned him no answer.

‘I conceive that my letter of the 15th May contains no censure upon the conduct of Lieut. Colonel — which was not justified and even rendered necessary by the circumstances which had occurred.

‘It appears to be quite a novel notion in the military profession, that an Officer is to commit an imprudence, by which some loss is incurred, and more is risked; and that I, who am responsible for the faults and neglects and imprudences of all, shall not be allowed even to notice such misconduct.

‘I heard no more of this complaint of Lieut. Colonel —’s, till the month of August, when Major General Campbell issued a division order, of which I enclose a copy, on the 9th of August, in which he noticed the mode in which the regiments in Major General Burne’s brigade made their marches, and that in which they messed.

‘This order drew from Lieut. Colonel — letters to his Commanding Officer, Major General Campbell, for writing which he was placed in arrest, and brought to trial, and convicted of writing improper letters to his Commanding Officer. The proceedings on the trial of Lieut. Colonel — are at the office of the Judge Advocate General; and I enclose a copy of the General Order of the 1st of September, which contains the reprimand which he received.

‘Before I ordered that Lieut. Colonel — might be brought to trial, I made an effort to bring him to a sense of the impropriety of his conduct in a private letter which I addressed to him on the 18th of August, of which I enclose a copy. His Royal Highness will see in the proceedings of the General Court Martial the use which Lieut. Colonel — makes of this letter.

‘After the trial was over, I had the correspondence of which I enclose copies, with Major General Campbell, on Lieut. Colonel —’s wish to go to England, as he said, to complain to His Royal Highness of Major General

Campbell, and to take legal advice in respect to his conduct; and having at length, on the 20th of September, received his complaints of Major General Campbell in the prescribed channel, and Major General Campbell's reply to his complaints, of which I enclose a copy, I wrote to Major General Campbell the letter upon them, of which I enclose a copy, on the 21st of September.

‘I have only to add to this letter the report which Major General Campbell gave me, which he had received from the Brigade Major of General Burne's brigade, of the number of men found straggling from their companies on the march on the 9th of August; on which report his order of the 9th of August was founded. When it is considered that the —th regiment had not 400 men under arms, it did not appear to me to be unreasonable in Major General Campbell to require that they should not have as many as sixty, besides Major General Burne's orderlies and guard, marching with the baggage.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Adjutant General
of the Forces.*’

‘WELLINGTON

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Freneda, 3d October, 1811.

‘I enclose copies of my last dispatches; and have no news to give you in addition to that they contain.

‘The equinoctial rains have begun here. They are probably general; and if so, Abadia is, I hope, safe for this winter. But I shall try something for him as soon as the weather shall settle.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 3d October, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th September, in which you enclosed one from Don Miguel Forjaz, and a copy of a proposed Portaria, regarding means of transport.

‘It is not in my power, as Commander of the British army, to make an advance of 150,000*l.* upon a speculation which has in view to procure means of transport for the

army, even though I should be convinced that it would be successful.

‘I am convinced, however, not only that the proposed scheme will not produce any good effect, but that it will aggravate all the existing evils.

‘It is not necessary that I should trouble you with my reasons for entertaining this opinion, as what I have stated above is a sufficient answer to the proposition made to me as Commander in Chief of the British army; but if the Portuguese Government should think proper to call for my opinion on this proposed Portaria, they shall have it.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 3d October, 1811.

‘I enclose a letter of the 28th September, from Mr. Barnard, containing a complaint of the conduct of the Capitão Mor of Abrantes, in seizing certain persons while employed by him in transporting corn for the cavalry.

‘When the exception to the laws of the conscription was under discussion, I stated to Sir William Beresford the probable result of leaving persons in the employment of the British army at the discretion of the magistrates of the country.

‘It was quite certain that, as soon as these magistrates should find any persons liable to the laws of the conscription actually in the employment of the British army, they would immediately seize them, to show their activity, and in hopes that by our subsequent interference these people might be released.

‘The recent occurrence at Abrantes is a practical example of this conduct. The Capitão Mor had it in his power to seize those persons, as recruits for the army, before they quitted Abrantes in the service of the British army, but that would not suit his purpose. The men must have served, and his activity would not have attracted notice. But by delaying the measure he puts the British army, and of course the service of the country, to the greatest inconvenience.

‘It is absolutely necessary that while persons are in the

actual service of the British army, they should not be seized in this manner.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 4th October, 1811.

‘ I write to let you know that I have received accounts through my brother at Cadiz, stating that Soult returned to Seville about the 18th of last month, bringing with him some of the troops which he had taken to the eastward, if not all of them: he was making requisitions for carriages, and it was generally supposed was about returning into Estremadura.

‘ Inform General Castaños of these circumstances, and if you should have reason to think them confirmed, let me know it, and send orders to the brigade of the 2d division, and the regiment of General Hamilton’s division (which are gone to Castello Branco), and the 2d hussars, to cross the Tagus, and join you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Could not you get some man to go to Zafra, and discover for you whether the enemy have there any, and what quantity, of heavy artillery ?

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 4th October, 1811.

‘ I enclose the proceedings and sentence of a General Court Martial, which I have confirmed, on the trial of Privates — and —, of the Royal Marines, doing duty on shore at Fort St. Julian.

‘ I beg you to peruse these proceedings; and as it appears that the property which was taken from the woman was restored, and as it was the first and only complaint which has been made of these troops, I propose, if you see no objection, to pardon these two soldiers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 4th October, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 30th September, in which you have enclosed one of the 28th from Dom Miguel Forjaz, in regard to the attendance of witnesses upon British Courts Martial.

‘ I beg that you will inform Dom Miguel Forjaz, that when a British soldier is accused of an offence against the laws of Portugal, I have no means of punishing him, excepting by giving him over to the Portuguese tribunals for trial, or by bringing him to trial before a Court Martial.

‘ If the Portuguese Government desire it, offenders of this description shall be given over to the Portuguese tribunals; but from what I have seen of the proceedings of these tribunals, I am afraid that they will not be punished, excepting by confinement in a miserable prison, without trial, and that you will be obliged to interfere in their favor, as His Majesty’s subjects, in order to soften the rigor, alleviate the miseries, or abridge the duration of their confinement.

‘ If offenders of this description are to be tried by Court Martial, the Court must by law have the best evidence of the case which circumstances will admit. The law of England prefers *vivâ voce* testimony to all other; and if that can be got, and is not produced, the Court will acquit the prisoner. On this account I am always obliged to require the attendance of witnesses on the Courts Martial.

‘ It would be impossible to assemble a Court Martial at Leyria, for instance, or in every place in which a British soldier should be accused of an offence. All that can be done is to assemble a General Court Martial at head quarters, and to summon the witnesses of a fact which is the subject of complaint, to attend and give their testimony *vivâ voce*; and if they will not or cannot attend, I am sorry to say that it is not in my power to punish.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Freneda, 5th October, 1811.

‘Let me know what orders you have given respecting the disposal of the remount horses recently arrived at Lisbon.

‘I wish to have the 2d hussars mounted as soon as possible, and that the 3d squadron of the 9th light dragoons should join their corps.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘P. S. General Le Marchant having arrived at the army, the 4th dragoon guards had better be left under his command.

‘W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 5th October, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose a list of the stages at which mules ought to be kept, for the purposes of the ordinary communication between the frontier and Lisbon, and a statement of the number of mules to be kept at each stage.

‘The same number of mules have been at all times kept at the same stages, by the Portuguese post office.

‘I likewise enclose a list of stages, and a statement of the number of mules to be kept at each stage, which are necessary for the communications of the army, and where mules have not been usually kept; and as they will be placed there for the convenience of the army, I propose to pay their expense from the military chest.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*

‘WELLINGTON.

Charles Stuart.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘Freneda, 6th October, 1811.

‘I am very sorry to hear that you are unwell, particularly as I had put you on a Court Martial to try Major Oflley for an act of insanity. If you are not well enough to sit on the Court Martial, let me know it, and I will order Hulse for the duty.

‘I have been very well during the late *bustle*. Pray let me hear how you are, and

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General
A. Campbell.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I have written to the Adjutant General a detail of ———’s concerns, which I should wish you to see before it goes. I’ll send it to you, if you can’t come here before Wednesday.

‘W.’

To General Bacellar.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 6th October, 1811.

‘It is absolutely necessary that there should be a sufficient number of workmen and artificers at Almeida to complete the works at that place, and that there should be a guard of militia with the heavy train. You will make such dispositions as you may think proper for these purposes, but it is really time that a work, which was ordered above two months ago, should at length be seriously commenced upon.

‘The enemy have retired from this neighborhood, and it is necessary that the Conde d’Amarante should observe their movements to the northward. If he should find that they are about to attack General Abadia in Galicia, he will put his corps of observation at Braganza, or at Chaves, and he will endeavor, without risking his infantry beyond the frontier, to divert their attention from General Abadia by light movements of his cavalry, and by threatening their communications.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General Bacellar.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 6th October, 1811.

‘I have received your letter. I have not leisure to read Senhor ———’s works, nor have I inclination to contend with him, whether he or my Officers have the merit of the plans by which Lisbon and the country were saved from the enemy.

‘I think that I have reason to complain of Senhor ———’s plans and memoirs as having misled me, and occa-

sioned inconveniences and expenses which would not have been incurred, if I had not had them in my hands. I am not desirous of making any complaint of Senhor ———, and I give him credit for being a good draftsman, and for having taken some pains to acquire information in the country, which was the object of our researches; but it would be just as possible to discover the longitude in his papers and plans, as that degree of accuracy and information on which alone any good system could be founded.

‘ If Senhor ——— wants a reward for his plan and memoir, I have no objection to his getting it, and I shall be silent, or even recommend it. But if he pretends to have anything to say to what has been done by our Officers, I must expose his ignorance, and the negligence with which he made his survey and report, and the consequences which would have resulted by attending to either, whatever trouble such exposition may cost me.

‘ I can only tell you that I reconnaitred the ground in October, and depended for some facts upon his report, and formed my plans accordingly. Afterwards Fletcher and our engineers found that these facts were represented erroneously; and I was obliged to travel again to Lisbon in February, 1810, and to alter the whole plan, and to undo all that had been done, in consequence of the erroneous information in ———’s memoir. You know that I was at Lisbon in February, 1810, as you followed me to Thomar; and that was the reason of the journey. From this statement, which refers only to one point, you will judge of ———’s merits.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Senhor José Clementi Pereira.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 7th October, 1811.

‘ I received by the bearer your two letters of the 4th, from Cañaveral. I beg that you will acquaint the two gentlemen, to whom one of your letters relates, that in consequence of a communication of their wishes to me through another channel, I have applied to the Portuguese Government in

their favor. I expect the answer at every moment, and as soon as it shall arrive, I will send it to them through you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Senhor José Clementi Pereira.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose letters for those two gentlemen, but they shall hear from me again as soon as I receive a letter respecting them from the Government.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Freneda, 7th October, 1811.

‘ I understand that the greatest number of the dismounted men of the 2d hussars are at Lisbon, with their appointments; and if they are to receive the horses of the 12th and 9th, they should be ordered to some station with their appointments, to which station the horses of the 12th and 9th should be ordered likewise.

‘ In regard to the transfer of horses from one regiment to another, we must go by some general rule; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make an official report of all your proceedings on this subject, as I must report on them to the Horse Guards.

‘ The general rule which I would lay down is, that every regiment shall have one tenth of the number of its rank and file dismounted. Afterwards, if you find a regiment very sickly, you may dismount more if you think proper, and transfer the horses to other regiments whose men are more healthy; but I wish you to begin with the adoption of that general principle.

‘ The horses which the Officers of the cavalry will not take at the price stated, must be sold by public auction for the price bid for them.

‘ I do not like to weaken the light cavalry in the Alentejo just now, as Soult is at Seville, and preparing for some movement.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ P. S. Clinton is sick at Lisbon. I should prefer that the desire to join his regiment should come from himself, rather

than the order from me, and I wish you would write to him about it. The 16th, however, will not be badly off when they get Lord Charles Manners, which is likely before Clinton can join. 'W.'

To Major General Peacocke.

' MY DEAR GENERAL,

' Freneda, 8th October, 1811.

I have had some conversation with the Quarter Master General regarding the mode in which the barracks occupied by the 5th dragoon guards were recently given over to the Portuguese barrack department, and your orders to Captain Mackenzie, to which I wish to draw your attention.

' There is no doubt that it is absolutely necessary that a Staff Officer should attend upon every occasion in which a regimental Officer is to hold official intercourse with any of the departments of the Portuguese army, particularly if the regiment should recently have arrived in this country. I am sorry to say that our Officers are too much disposed to treat with contempt all foreigners; and I have seldom met with a Portuguese from whose story the truth can be discovered, if he should have reason to complain. It is very proper, therefore, that an Officer of the Quarter Master General's department should superintend the delivery of barracks to the regimental Officer who receives them, and their restoration to the Portuguese department, of which restoration he should give notice to the Portuguese department, as he is the person who conveys to the regiment their orders to march, and to quit the barracks which they have occupied. So far is necessary.

' But your order, by letter of the 31st of October, goes to a weekly inspection of the barracks in Lisbon and Belem, under the inspection of the Officer of the Quarter Master General's department. It is quite impossible that he should really execute this duty, and the others required from him; and if the weekly inspection is necessary, it is necessary that it should be made without his superintendence, and exposed to all the evils of an intercourse between a Portuguese department and a regimental Officer, without such superintendence.

' I conceive, therefore, that it will be better that this weekly inspection should not be made, and that the matter

should be left as it now is; viz., that the Officer of the Quarter Master General's department should superintend the delivery and the restoration of the barracks alone.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Peacocke.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Freneda, 9th October, 1811.

‘I also thought, at one time, that horses were come out for the 2d hussars; but if you have no official report of it, it cannot be true.

‘I agree with you that the 12th ought not to lose any more horses; and I leave it to you to give such orders as you may think proper about turning some of their horses to grass.

‘I do not think the 9th dragoons ought to have more than forty dismounted men altogether. It appears by your return that they have already twenty men dismounted, and they might give twenty more horses to the 2d hussars.

‘I shall accordingly desire Murray to order twenty men with their appointments of the 2d hussars to come up to Abrantes, and I think it would be well to order as many more without their appointments, as would mount the effective horses of the regiment. When the sick shall recover, they might either go to the depôt at Belem, to wait for horses from England, or they might return to their horses, and the men to be now ordered from the depôt might return to Lisbon. Let me know how many men would be required from Belem according to this scheme, and Murray shall send the route.

‘How do the 13th stand in respect to men and horses? Could they give any to the 2d hussars? The 2d hussars have left Pedrogão, and have returned to the Alentejo. It is necessary to keep Major General Long's division in strength just at present.

‘I was yesterday at Celorico, where, among other irregularities, I saw that the soldiers of the cavalry carry to the hospital their corn sacks, which are filled with baggage on their return. I had one of these sacks, belonging to a man of the 16th dragoons, examined, and found that it contained his bags, three blankets, a jacket, &c., havresack, accoutrements, pots, pans, &c. &c.

‘ It is very reasonable that the soldiers of the cavalry should have means given them of carrying to their regiment from hospital their bags, and probably their cloak. But their accoutrements and clothes they might carry themselves on the march, as well as one blanket; and at all events the corn sack, one should think, ought to remain with the horse. Will you check this practice? The consequence of it is increased difficulty in procuring conveyance to carry those articles which ought to be carried, viz., the men’s bags and cloaks.

‘ I beg you to write to Sir William Erskine about drafting the horses from the 9th, when the men of the 2d hussars shall arrive at Abrantes, respecting which Murray will apprise you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 9th October, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 1st, and I now enclose my dispatch of this day. I have no other news for you excepting a general report among the French, that Buonaparte left Paris to take the command of his army in Germany, on the 12th September. This report receives some confirmation from a letter which I received by the last mail, from the Duke of Brunswick, dated the 10th September; in which he tells me that that event was expected, and he wished that his regiment might be sent to England, in order to go to Germany.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 9th October, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant and its enclosures, containing a correspondence which you have had with Major General Peacocke and with the Secretary of the Portuguese Government, regarding the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Borel, the cashier of the Paymaster General at Lisbon.

‘ From this correspondence it appears, that Mr. Borel has been arrested and imprisoned without cause assigned, without notice to any British authority, contrary to the stipulations of treaty, and to the principles of the alliance, and even to the common forms of civility, in consequence of orders from the Prince Regent in the Brazils, that certain persons of that name should be arrested. I request that you will inform the Portuguese Government that if they do not either give some better reason or more satisfactory explanation than that already given for the arrest and imprisonment of this person, I shall consider it my duty to order all persons attached to the British army to place themselves in security till the orders of the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland can be received.

‘ I am perfectly aware of the consequence of the measure which I shall adopt upon this occasion; of the want of confidence and terror which it will create at Lisbon, throughout Portugal, and even throughout the Peninsula. But if those under whose immediate directions this violation of all the decent forms of civility has been committed do not think it necessary to advert to these consequences, there is no reason why I should; and I shall certainly endeavor to prevent these sudden and arbitrary arrests of persons confidentially employed by the departments of the British army without cause assigned; and shall take measures to make known to the public my reasons for the adoption of these measures of precaution and security.

‘ I beg to be understood as not giving any opinion on the cause of the arrest of Mr. Borel. This gentleman, equally with others in the British service who have been arrested and imprisoned, either by the Portuguese Government with notice to me, or by me, in consequence of the desire of the Portuguese Government, may have been guilty of crimes which deserve punishment. But I complain of the insult, of the mode in which this measure has been carried into execution, to which, as the Commanding Officer of His Majesty’s troops, I will not submit.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 9th October, 1811.

‘The army of the north have cantoned along the Duero, having some troops at Benavente, and some at Valladolid: they have likewise one division, that of General Souham, at Alba de Tormes, and a stronger garrison than usual at Salamanca.

‘The division at Alba is probably destined to preserve the communication with the army of Portugal, which have taken up their cantonments again about Plasencia.

‘Soult arrived at Seville about the 18th of last month, and some preparations were making there, apparently for a movement into Estremadura, by the troops which he brought back with him from Granada. I conclude that his return to Seville and these preparations were occasioned by the notion which was generally entertained by the French Officers, that I had drawn Lieut. General Hill's corps out of Alentejo for the purpose of aiding in our design upon Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘It is probable, therefore, that the movement will not be made, unless it should be necessary, with a view to protect the march of a convoy for Badajoz, as soon as it shall be found that Lieut. General Hill was still in Alentejo, and that the convoy had been introduced into Ciudad Rodrigo. I have also heard this day that General Ballesteros had defeated on the 25th September, near San Roque, a French division of 3000 men which had been sent against him, which renders it more probable that there will be no reinforcements to the troops in Estremadura.

‘The position of our troops for the last two months has undoubtedly deranged all the enemy's plans for the campaign, and they have been able to effect nothing, excepting to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, notwithstanding that they have received very large reinforcements. I do not think it probable that at present they will undertake anything of importance, excepting to endeavor to force Ballesteros to embark, which he can always effect, having a secure retreat upon Gibraltar.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 9th October, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Brig. General Trant, containing the copy of one which he has received from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, stating that His Royal Highness has been pleased to confer upon him the order of the Tower and Sword, in the degree of Commander.

‘ I beg that your Lordship will lay these letters before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and that you will request the permission of His Royal Highness for Brig. General Trant to accept the honor conferred upon him by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 10th October, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th.

‘ It is difficult to give credit to the accounts which we receive from General Castaños of the operations of the enemy’s southern armies, as I believe he has very little, if any, intelligence on which he can rely; and I know that the desire to involve us in operations in Estremadura, with a view to cover a certain extent of country, in order to draw provisions from it, gains credit for intelligence very little deserving of any, which is afterwards communicated to us as true.

‘ It is not easy to believe that Soult is coming with any force into Estremadura, now that the object which would have brought him there is gone by, and that one of his detachments has met with a serious check by Ballesteros, near San Roque, on the 25th of last month. It may be true, however, as we know that Buonaparte has ordered that a garrison of 6000 men should be placed in Badajoz, and it is probable that Soult may find the presence of a large body of troops to be necessary, in order to throw into the place the supplies which it will require for that number of troops.

‘ There is likewise another and a larger view of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, in which Soult’s presence, and that of a large force in Estremadura, would be expedient. The enemy’s plan for the campaign has certainly been inter-

rupted, and possibly prevented by our recent operations, and it is not unlikely that they may be desirous of resuming part of it, viz., that part which had for its object the conquest of Galicia.

‘ In my opinion the army of the north could not venture to invade Galicia, leaving Castille and the army of Portugal at our mercy, as there is no doubt that this army is much stronger than either the army of the north or that of Portugal, and the consequences of such a measure might be fatal to the whole French system. The only mode in which the invasion of Galicia can be resumed with safety, is for Soult to bring a large army into Estremadura, and either alarm us for the safety of the frontier of Alentejo, or to be in a situation to join the army of Portugal, in case we should attack them. The former is the plan which the enemy would most probably adopt. Or the enemy may have another plan; they may intend to employ the army of Portugal in the execution of that part of their plan for the campaign which had the attack of Valencia in view; in which case also they would assemble a large corps in Estremadura, and Soult would come there himself. I have taken this view of the enemy’s intentions, in order to render my intention more clear to you; and I shall add to it the certainty I feel that there exists at present no serious intention of making an attack upon any of the Portuguese possessions, excepting probably the post at Ouguela, or that at Campo Mayor.

‘ If your corps and this army could both be so strong in cavalry as that both could venture into the plains, there would be no difficulty in our concerns. Unfortunately neither of us is so strong as we ought to be, and I can therefore venture upon the little offensive which I can undertake only in one quarter. If you had cavalry, you certainly have infantry in sufficient numbers to beat the 5th corps out of Estremadura; but your cavalry is not sufficiently strong. I think, however, that you are strong enough to prevent the 5th corps from doing anything, even though Soult should add to it another division.

‘ In attempting this, however, you must proceed with great caution, and endeavor to have the best intelligence of the force Soult brings with him. I recommend to you to canton your troops as soon as you find that the enemy are serious in their advance upon Badajoz, nearly on the ground

which we occupied with the army in the end of June and beginning of July, having one Portuguese and one British brigade, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, and some Portuguese cavalry, cantoned in Campo Mayor, but ready to take post on the heights behind at a short notice, and the others at S^{ta} Olaya, Quinta del Obispo, &c. &c.

‘ If you should find that Soult collects in too great force for you, you will retire upon Portalegre, and thence, if you should find it necessary, upon Gavião and Abrantes, sending down our bridge from Villa Velha.

‘ It appears to me, however, to be scarcely possible for Soult to bring such a force as to be able to attack you at Campo Mayor, or to cut off your communication at the same time, both with Elvas and Portalegre, and unless he can do that, you have always a secure retreat, and he must give up his plan, or fall between your corps and the army.

‘ If Soult should bring a large army into Estremadura, with a view to enable the army of Portugal to co-operate in the invasion of Valencia, I shall reinforce your corps with some infantry, and nearly all the cavalry, and I think we shall soon have back again the army of Portugal. If he should come only to throw provisions into Badajoz, I am afraid that we cannot prevent it, under existing circumstances.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 10th October, 1811.

‘ Having transmitted to Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole your letter of the 9th ultimo, containing the complaint of an outrage committed at Leyria, by two soldiers of the — regiment, with directions to bring these culprits to trial when they should join their corps, I have the honor to forward to you, to be laid before the Portuguese Government, the accompanying letter and its enclosure, which I have received from the Lieutenant General, by which it appears that the two soldiers have been convicted and punished for the crime they have committed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 10th October, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 6th.

‘I think you had better entirely confine your efforts to the measures recommended in my letters of the 26th March, and of the 8th April. The commissariat and military chest being now in hand, should be carried through; and then we can take up the arsenal and medical establishment.

‘I have written to you officially regarding M. Borel, and I have written to the Government to desire to see the Prince’s orders on this subject.

‘Whenever we get a sum of money from Cadiz or from England, I always desire that a proportion of it may be given to you; and I have besides ordered at times that paper money should be given to you. You are the best judge at what period to pay these sums to the Portuguese Government, but I would advise you not to pay any more till the military chest be established; and not to pay into the military chest in any one month, more than 100,000%, whatever may be the sum in your hands.

‘I have omitted telling you that I have recommended to the Portuguese Government to pay the interest on their paper money from the 1st of July last, and to call in that now in circulation; and to issue paper of the same numbers and for the same sums as those now in circulation, of a better description and not so likely to be forged. These two measures together will raise the value of the Portuguese paper so high, as nearly to overcome all our financial difficulties in this country. It will not cost above 100,000% every six months to pay the interest, and the rise in the value of the paper, and the consequent saving in the price of every article purchased for the army, will more than cover the expense. But I much fear that the Government will not adopt the measure.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th October, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Mr. Kennedy, containing various papers from Mr. Pratt, Mr. Drake, and Mr. Berard, in answer to complaints of these gentlemen by the Portuguese Government and commissariat forwarded to me by you on the 12th September.

‘ The perusal of these papers will shew you the degree of confusion which prevails in the transport department of the army, and the uncertainty in all our operations which must result from it, and the corruption of the Portuguese commissariat; and the tyranny and oppression under which the people labor.

‘ Unless I determine at once to move the army down to Lisbon, and thus put a stop to our demands for means of transport, it is impossible that any orders I can give can apply a remedy to these evils. It must be very evident to any person who reads these papers with attention, that the British Commissaries are not in fault; indeed, Mr. Pratt has no troops at his command to carry on the war against his adversary the Portuguese Commissary at Escaroupin; and the alleged seizure of boats by that gentleman was nothing more than the employment of a certain number of boats, already in the service of the British Government, to perform a particular service, viz., to remove sick and wounded men to Lisbon.

‘ Nothing but the desire to complain could have occasioned any complaint against Mr. Drake or Mr. Berard.

‘ I have already repeatedly pointed out the only remedy to all these evils. It is for the Government to enforce their own regulations, by adequate punishment of the magistrate who refuses or neglects to issue his warrant or order to the owner of a boat or cart, at a particular time and place for the service of the army; and by adequate punishment of the owner of a boat or cart, who shall refuse to attend and to continue to attend so long as his services shall be required.

‘ This is the law and practice in Great Britain and in all parts of the world; it is the practice in those parts of Spain occupied by the enemy, and the consequence is that although they do not pay, they never want means of trans-

port of all kinds; and until the Portuguese Government shall abandon their view of false popularity, and shall protect the people over whom they are placed from the horrible tyranny and oppression under which they are laboring, by enforcing their own regulations by adequate punishments, the system of embargo, with all its evil consequences, including these corruptions, disputes, &c., &c., must be continued, or the army must go down to Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th October, 1811.

‘ Having caused inquiries to be made regarding the state of the people on the Coa, with a view to the distribution of the money which you informed me in your letter of the 27th September last that the committee intended to intrust to me to be distributed, some measures have occurred to me which it would be expedient that the Portuguese Government should adopt with a view to the relief of these unfortunate people.

‘ First, it is very desirable that the utmost encouragement should be given to the transit of provisions as well from Spain into Portugal as from one part of Portugal into another; and that duties on all kinds of goods passing in or unto Upper or Lower Beira should be excused. The Government will lose but little revenue by this measure, as the army being exactly on the frontier, it is impossible that it can be collected; but the existence of the revenue regulations gives an excuse for a system of oppression on the part of the Portuguese revenue officers which must prevent Spanish dealers from bringing provisions to the Portuguese markets.

‘ Secondly, it is desirable that all duties should be excused on the sale of goods in the fairs and markets of Upper and Lower Beira.

‘ Thirdly, it is desirable that the prices of provisions, and indeed of all other goods, in all the towns and villages of those provinces should be left free, and find their own level.

‘ By these measures we may hope that the people will

have something that they can buy with the money that will be given to them.

‘ From what I hear, I am much afraid that the distribution of money to the Bishops has not been and will not be of much service. The Bishops and great convents in Portugal and Spain have always been in the habit of distributing provisions daily to the poor; and the consequence of this system is the establishment in the neighborhood of their palaces and convents of a number of idle people of both sexes, who perform no labor, and live upon what they thus receive and can procure by begging from strangers.

‘ I understand the Bishops have added the sums sent to them respectively by the committee to what they already expended in this manner, by which proceeding the relief it affords is but partial.

‘ That which would be desirable is, if possible, to aid laborious exertions to procure a subsistence, by small advances of money, and I propose to keep this principle in view in the distribution of the money intrusted to me, by which not only it will subsist those to whom it will be given for a longer period, but it may be hoped that the people will resume their habits of industry, and that they will soon again be able to provide for their own subsistence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 13th October, 1811.

‘ I hope you do me the justice to believe that if I had the slightest notion of the circumstances under which the sick of the 2d division had been detained with their regiments, or that you had had anything to say to that measure, I should not have noticed it in the manner I did in the orders of the 5th instant.

‘ The ignorance of their duty of the Officers of the army who are every day arriving in this country, and the general inattention and disobedience to orders by many of those who have been long here, increase the details of the duty to such an extent as to render it almost impracticable to carry it on; and owing to this disobedience and neglect,

I can depend upon nothing, however well regulated and ordered.

‘ I have lately, therefore, endeavored to correct this inattention by pointing out to Officers in General Orders its consequences ; and you will observe that the General Order of the 5th, to which you refer, does no more than advert to these consequences. I adopt this measure very much because I am convinced that the disobedience of which I complain is not wilful, but is the consequence of inattention, and the bad military habits which our Officers acquire when they enter the service.

‘ In this part of the army, even under my own eye, the same thing is occurring daily, and is attended by the most disastrous consequences. Although we had recently been in expectation for a fortnight of the necessity for moving the troops, the sick were left with the regiments, contrary to repeated orders ; and they were at last sent to the general hospital at Celorico, at the same moment, to the amount of about 2000 : the consequence was that the people at the hospital were not prepared to receive so many at a time ; and it happened to be bad weather, and above fifty died in one week, and the others were in a very uncomfortable state : to this add, that by keeping the fever cases, as they do, till the fever approaches to, or is in, or has passed the crisis, the danger of death is increased by removal ; whereas by removal in an early stage of the disorder, the patient is generally improved. However, all this never occurs to these gentlemen, who think of nothing but their regimental convenience ; and yet if they witness any of the inconveniences which uniformly result from their own or the disobedience of their brother Officers, they are not the last to cry out ; as for instance, my friend —— of the ——th dragoons, in the case of Captain ——.

‘ However, you may depend upon it that I had not any the most remote intention to advert to you, and if it will be any satisfaction to you, or you wish it on any account, that this should be explained in General Orders, I have no objection to doing so.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 13th October, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th instant, and I think it would be desirable to make use of the *Agincourt* to carry to England the 29th, 85th, and 97th regiments, with the addition of such transport tonnage unemployed as may be necessary for the accommodation of these regiments.

‘I purpose to write to the Secretary of State by the next mail, to suggest the expediency of sending back the troop ships to the Tagus.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 13th October, 1811.

‘In answer to your letter of the 9th, I can only assure you that I wrote to the Government upon the wants of General Pack’s brigade, in consequence of his complaints to the Quarter Master General, and being determined to bring officially under their view every deficiency of this description which occurs.

‘I am inclined to think that the continuance in circulation of the Portuguese paper, if it should rise in value, will be a convenience; and I could not now advise that the debt should be funded, but rather that the interest promised should be paid upon the circulating paper, and that the quantity in circulation should not be increased.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*

‘WELLINGTON.

Charles Stuart.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 13th October, 1811.

‘I am afraid that you did not understand my letter respecting the Marquez de Ponte de Lima, and the Marquez de Valença, as I intended you should. I intended that you should apply for an answer to the application of these two noblemen to be allowed to return to Portugal; and I mentioned at the same time the application of Pamplona’s aide

de camp to Gordon, which I did not intend should be forwarded to the Government, but as a matter of information to yourself.

‘As the Government, however, have answered the applications of the Marquez de Valença and of the Marquez de Ponte de Lima, with that of Pamplona’s aide de camp, it might happen that the latter might be hanged by the French if I were to send the copy of the note, which I should wish to be able to do to the former. If Valença and Ponte de Lima should not like the answer, which it is probable they would not, they might possibly inform against Pamplona’s aide de camp, and there is no reason why they should be made acquainted with his secret.

‘There appears to me to be a clear distinction between the case of Ponte de Lima and Valença, and that of Pamplona’s aide de camp.

‘First, those noblemen were forced to go to France; whereas the aide de camp went voluntarily, I believe, since the restoration.

‘Secondly, those noblemen have never served in any military capacity, and I believe were never in the service. The aide de camp has served in Portugal, and against his country.

‘I wish, therefore, that the answer of the Government should be confined to the cases of the Marquez de Valença and the Marquez de Ponte de Lima. In regard to the aide de camp, I propose, if possible, to make a spy of him, under a promise that, if he gives good intelligence, I will, at some time or other, endeavor to obtain for him a pardon.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘His Excellency
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘Freneda, 14th October, 1811,
Half past 10 P.M.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘I have just received your letter of the 13th. I think, upon the whole, that you had better not move Colonel Byng’s brigade from Niza, unless you should have a reason for doing so, which you did not know when you wrote to me on the 13th.

‘ My opinion is, that Marmont has only gone in search of provisions, and not to attack Valencia. However, we shall see in a few days, and I shall determine how to annoy and derange their projects again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 15th October, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th.

‘ I am astonished that, since the British engineers have been employed between the Tagus and the sea, the Government should have employed any Officer to make a plan without reference to me; and I wish that neither plan nor memoir had been sent home to Lord Wellesley.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inform Dom Miguel Forjaz of these my sentiments, and that I object to the recommendation of Senhor ——— to the Prince Regent, for a work in which he had no share whatever.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Freneda, 15th October, 1811, 9 A.M.

‘ I have been turning over in my mind what you stated in a late letter about the horses for the Officers of the cavalry; and I am very much afraid that if we do not take measures to insure to Government the price that they have paid for the horses which they have sent, the Officers of the cavalry will not have the advantage of getting horses in this manner in future.

‘ The horses cost Government 50*l.* each; and I have put the price of 60*l.* upon each, in order to defray the expense of loss by deaths, &c. It is reasonable to suppose that some of the horses are worth more than 60*l.*, and others may be worth less, but they would all run the chance of getting the good; and even the bad, probably (as they are bought by the best judge in England), would not be worth less than 50*l.*

‘ If they were all taken at 60*l.* each, I think the Govern-

ment would have no reason to complain; but if some are taken, and others are to remain upon my hands, I think it but fair that the Government should have the advantage of a larger price for the better horses, as it will incur the risk of receiving a smaller, in a sale by auction, for those not so good.

‘ If, therefore, the Officers of the cavalry will not take the horses, after all the pains which it has cost me to get them for them, I shall request you to get Lieut. Colonel Elley, and two other good judges, to fix a price upon the several horses which will come up; and the Officers who choose to take them may take them at the price fixed. Those they do not choose to take shall be sold by public auction; and, in the meantime, till the period of the auction shall be fixed, I shall be obliged to you if you will have the horses taken care of.

‘ I shall request General Graham to show his horses to Lieut. Colonel Elley, and the Officers you will appoint to fix the price of these horses, and they shall likewise fix the price which he is to pay for those which he received.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ Freneda, 16th October, 1811,
Half-past 5 p.m.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ I am glad that the plan which I proposed for the horses will answer. In fact, General Graham chose only out of the first lot of horses, and not out of the whole; but it is fair, that having had the choice, he should pay; and the price shall be fixed by Colonel Elley, &c., who will, of course, do justice between the public and individuals. The payment for the horses shall be made easy to them.

‘ I was convinced that there was a mistake in Mr. Macleod’s return of your forage. You should not allow your aide de camp to draw for the commissariat mules attached to the cavalry staff; or if you do, they should be separately mentioned, and not called yours. The orderlies appear to be separately accounted for.

‘ I enclose you the Commissary General’s note respecting

the 4th dragoon guards. I hope they have not ten days' supply of rye bread, or forty days' of bad meat.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General*

' WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

' P. S. I see Tweeddale's hounds are just arrived. I hope you will come over and take a hunt some day or other, or we will draw your way when you like it. ' W.'

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

' MY DEAR COTTON,

' Freneda, 16th October, 1811, noon.

' I am concerned to hear that the 4th dragoon guards do not get better, and particularly that their continued sickness should be attributed to that extraordinary circumstance in this army, "bad food." However, that is very easily remedied; and I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy both about that and their want of corn, and of salt, this morning. Colonel Sherlock applied to keep the Commissary they have.

' The Commanding Officer should apply for money if he wants it.

' The regiments which have long been with the army are much in arrear, and those which arrive are generally in advance; but I never refuse to advance to the latter whatever sums they may require on the estimates, for months to which the rest of the army have not been paid. This is a case that has occurred frequently.

' I have no objection to the quarters of the 4th dragoon guards being changed; but I think they are in as healthy a situation as any in the country.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. General*

' WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Lieut. General Hill.

' MY DEAR HILL,

' Freneda, 16th October, 1811, 2 P.M.

' I received this morning your letter of the 14th, and I have since seen the papers transmitted by Colonel Offency. I have no doubt but that the object of the French is to throw a convoy into Badajoz, which we cannot prevent under present circumstances.

' Girard commands only one division of the 5th corps;

and we may depend upon it that if there were more than one division on this side of the Guadiana, besides cavalry, Drouet, who commands the corps, would have been with it.

‘ You have done right to order up the troops from Niza.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Lieut. General Hill.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

SIR,

‘ Freneda, 16th October, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th.

‘ I am very desirous that the sick should not be removed from Coimbra, excepting those belonging to the 29th, 85th, and 97th regiments, and such men as it may be necessary from time to time to send to England, as I find that it is almost impracticable to get up to the army from Lisbon a soldier who has recovered from sickness.

‘ I write this day to request the Secretary of State will order the troop ships of war to the Tagus, and will send out twelve coppered transports, drawing nine or ten feet water.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

Vice Admiral

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 16th October, 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of this date. I have no other news for you, excepting that Dr. Curtis, the rector of the Irish College of Salamanca, and the Provider of the Bishopric, both connected with my correspondents there, have been arrested by the French.

‘ We hear that there is *hell to pay* at Cadiz; but I do not understand about what.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately.

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Freneda, 16th October, 1811.

‘ I am obliged to trouble you again upon the old subject of General Officers. I was obliged to give General Dunlop

leave to go home, and I doubt his coming out again; and he is really a loss. General Sontag is so ill as to be obliged to go away, and I imagine will never again be fit for service.

‘Leith is not come, and we have no Commanding Officer for the 5th division; I understand that Houstoun will not return, and there will be none for the 7th; and General Campbell’s departure will leave the 6th division without a Commander. We have a brigade or two without Officers also, in consequence of Beckwith’s continued absence (and we are told he will not return), and Mackinnon’s. But these I can manage.

‘I do not know whom to propose for our divisions. Clinton shall have one, either the 5th or 6th; Leith, if he comes, another; and I wish I could get back Dunlop, or some respectable person, if Houstoun does not return, for the 7th. Let me know whether Leith comes or not, and also whether Houstoun returns.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Torrens.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 16th October, 1811.

‘There has been no material alteration in the position of the enemy’s troops since I addressed you last.

‘The army of Portugal are cantoned beyond Plasencia, having one division at Plasencia, with their advanced posts on the Alagon; and the cavalry on the north side of the mountains, which divide Castille from Estremadura, about Peñaranda. I imagine that they communicate with the infantry in Estremadura by Congosto and the Puerto del Pico, the road through which was repaired by the enemy in the year 1809, after the battle of Talavera.

‘It is reported that three divisions of guards belonging to the army of the north have gone to Valladolid, which, however, requires confirmation. The other troops of the army of the north are upon the Tormes.

‘I learn from Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, that the enemy are fortifying the posts which they occupy in front of the army of Galicia; from which, I judge that they have no intention of attempting to penetrate into that kingdom during this winter.

‘ In Lower Estremadura the enemy appear to intend to introduce a convoy into Badajoz, which it is impossible for the allies to attempt to prevent. With this view, probably, one division of the 5th corps, with a considerable body of cavalry, have crossed the Guadiana at Merida, under General Girard; and the remainder of the corps was to the south of that river. But I understand that Soult remained at Seville.

‘ I have received a report that Don Julian Sanchez yesterday carried off a large proportion of the cattle grazing near Ciudad Rodrigo, and destined for the supply of the garrison; and he made prisoner the governor, General Renaud, either by surprise, or in consequence of the latter having endeavored to save the cattle with a very inadequate force.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 16th October, 1811.

‘ Admiral Berkeley has at different times sent to England, either with convoys or to carry troops, all the troop ships of war named in the margin, and the *Agincourt* is now going with the 29th, 85th, and 97th regiments, but none of these ships have returned.

‘ As it is very desirable that we should have the service of these ships, particularly during the winter months, I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if they can be returned.

‘ It would also be very desirable, and a saving in the hire of craft, if there were attached to this army twelve coppered transports, drawing from nine to ten feet water, which could pass the bars of the rivers Mondego and Douro. If these could be sent, a proportionate quantity of the tonnage detained in the Tagus according to my dispatch of the 21st of March might be sent home.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 16th October, 1811.

‘ I enclose the last fortnight and weekly states of the British army, and the morning state of the allied army of the 13th.

‘ You will see that we are not much better in respect to the number of sick; but the disorder continues to be of a very mild description.

‘ I was twice last week at the hospital at Celorico, and I saw no bad cases, but the numbers are astonishing. In the 4th division there are as many sick, absent and present, as there are men fit for duty.

‘ The 40th regiment, out of 1419, have only 652 fit for duty; and the whole number of their recruits, recently arrived from England, are in the hospitals. The 77th regiment arrived in Portugal two months ago, about 800 men, and in the action of the 25th September, they had 250 rank and file; by the return of the 8th, they have 287 fit for duty, and 414 in the hospitals.

‘ The 2d division, which have been all the summer in the Alentejo, are, and have been, the most healthy of all, notwithstanding they suffered so much in the battle of Albuera, which shows how little reliance is to be placed on general reports of the unwholesomeness of climates.

‘ The French have seized Dr. Curtis, of the Irish college, and the Provisor of the Bishopric of Salamanca, who are two of the people with whom my correspondents there communicate. I suspect that they have had orders from Paris to cut us off from all intelligence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 17th October, 1811, 11 A.M.

‘ I received in the night your letter of the 15th. I concur entirely in your giving assistance to General Castaños, and should approve of your adopting a measure which should be more effectual, and should drive Girard from Caceres across the Guadiana again, if you think you can do it without risking the safety of Campo Mayor and Ouguela.

‘It appears to me that you are too strong for Girard in every way, if the other division of the 5th corps have not crossed the Guadiana.

‘If General Castaños, or his troops, enter the Portuguese frontier, our commissariat must provide for them, keeping a regular account of what they issue to them, but only as long as they remain within the Portuguese frontier.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To General Bacellar.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 18th October, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th October, containing three queries from General Conde d’Amarante.

‘In answer to the first, I beg you will inform the Conde d’Amarante, that it is not my intention to prohibit him from passing the frontier in all cases, but, on the contrary, that I wished him to pass the frontier (taking care not to risk his infantry) on any occasion on which he should think he could make a useful diversion with his cavalry in favor of General Abadia, without risking the loss of his cavalry.

‘The second question is answered above.

‘In answer to the third query, I beg that the Conde d’Amarante may understand, that the troops under his command are destined principally to defend the frontiers of Portugal. He must not enter upon any operation combined with, or joined to the Spaniards, which may remove him from the object for which the force under his command is principally destined. Under present circumstances it does not appear probable that the enemy will attack General Abadia.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*General Bacellar.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 19th October, 1811.

‘This letter will be delivered to you by General Renaud, late governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, who is going to Lisbon, on his way to England, as a prisoner of war on his parole.

‘I beg leave to recommend him to your attention, and I

request you to take an early opportunity of forwarding him to England, either in a ship of war, or a transport, or the packet; and that you will desire the Captain of the vessel in which he will go, to apprise the Commissioners of Transports of his arrival as soon as he shall reach any port in England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 19th October, 1811.

‘ This letter will be delivered to you by General Renaud, the late governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, who is going to Lisbon, on his way to England. I beg leave to recommend him to your attentions as long as he may remain at Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 20th October, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th, and I concur in opinion with you, that you have done right in resuming your seat at the Regency.

‘ I have received a most handsome letter from the Prince in answer to mine of the 7th May, upon which I have addressed the Governors of the Kingdom. These will go, I hope, by this post, so that I shall not trouble you further upon them.

‘ I have recommended General Renaud, the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, to you; you will find him a very intelligent fellow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Governor of Almeida.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 21st October, 1811.

‘ Major Sturgeon, of the Royal Staff corps, being employed by me upon the public service, I request that you will let him have from the old carriages, &c., any axletrees or other iron

which he may want, brass boxes from wheels, &c., which he may require; likewise the use of the grinding stones and smith's forges in Almeida, and a certain quantity of timber for the construction of a pile engine, and of a trustle.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Governor of Almeida.*'

'WELLINGTON.'

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Freneda, 21st October, 1811.

'I received yesterday your letter of the 17th. It is very obvious to me, both from the Prince's letter and from every thing that has passed, that he will not dismiss Principal Souza; and the orders which have been lately received here, and the promise which the Prince makes to receive favorably the services of Dom Miguel Forjaz, render the dismissal of the Principal an object of less importance. I have therefore taken advantage of the receipt of the Prince's letter, to put an end to the uncomfortable state in which I have so long stood in respect to the Government. We shall now start fresh, and we must endeavor to carry the business on as well as we can. The recent orders of the Prince certainly give us great advantages, which we have never till now possessed.

'In respect to the military chest, you will be able to judge whether the delay to form it by the 1st November is necessary; whether that necessity has been produced by the real magnitude of the concerns of the Junta de Viveres, or by design, or by neglect to settle the accounts of the late Junta de Viveres; or whether the delay is not unnecessary. As far as I can judge here, the delay cannot be necessary; because, whether the Commissary General or the Junta de Viveres are to supply the wants of the army, the money might as well come from the military chest, as direct from the Treasury. However, if you should think the delay necessary, I recommend to you to be sparing in your issues of money, as there is no reason for abandoning any principle on which we have hitherto acted.

'As I wish to put an end to the whole difference between the Portuguese Government and me, and am not desirous of carrying on the war in the Brazils when peace has been made in Portugal, I beg you not to transmit to England my letter on the subject of ————'s charge against Dom

Miguel Forjaz, which is certainly now unnecessary, and would tend only to revive old disputes, and that if you have sent it, you will write to Mr. Hamilton to request that it may be retained.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will speak to the members of the Regency regarding the case of Borel. I shall be sorry to commence the era of peace by a *coup d'état* such as that which I had in contemplation on this subject. But it must be obvious to the Government that the Prince did not mean that this person should be arrested ; and even if he did, the mode in which the arrest was made was such that I cannot submit to it, and I must adopt some measures which shall show to the public my sense of it. *Among friends* this is better avoided.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'His Excellency

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

' P.S. Upon referring to my dispatch to you of the 11th September*, I conceive that down to the words "neglect and disobedience upon this occasion," in the third paragraph, might go to England ; the rest of the dispatch will only tend to revive the dispute. ' W.'

‘W.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 22d October, 1811, 8 A.M.

‘ I received your letter of the 20th, last night. I think you had better not pass Caceres with your head quarters and main body. When you have driven off Girard, replace the Conde de Penne Villemur at Caceres, and bring back again your troops towards the frontier.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. General Hill.'

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL.

¹ Freneda, 22d October, 1811.

‘ I received by the last post your letter of the 22d September, and I am very much obliged to you for what you have done for Mr. Dalrymple. I propose to keep him here,

* See page 265.

notwithstanding that I am afraid that he will be unwilling to stay when Mr. Kennedy goes. This misfortune will happen very shortly, but I hope he will return soon, as he promises. I have too much reason to complain of Mrs. Kennedy and her sister.

‘ I am very much obliged to you also for the notice you have taken of Campbell, and particularly for allowing him to come to this army. You will find him a very zealous, hard working fellow, who will at least do his best. He is the only person who knows anything about my concerns, and I have no time to attend to them myself. He is besides, very useful as a Staff Officer, particularly in an affair.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Gordon.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 23d October, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th, and I am much obliged to you for the measures which you have adopted to send to England the 29th, 85th, and 97th regiments.

‘ Major General Cooke found it necessary to detain at Cadiz the Regiment de Watteville, after he had sent to Lisbon the horses belonging to the Field Officers of that regiment, and I have desired that application might be made to have those horses sent back to Cadiz, with which I shall be much obliged to you if you will comply.

‘ I have written to England to have small transports sent out, which will be capable of passing the bars of the Mondego and Douro; but, in the meantime, till they shall arrive, it is very desirable that we should have vessels capable of entering those rivers.

‘ I entirely concur with you in the expediency of occupying the Fort Bugio with a detachment of the battalion of marines, and of the marine artillery, and of relieving the detachment every week.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 23d October, 1811.

‘ As the soldiers of this army frequently sleep out of doors, and as, even when in houses, they are obliged to sleep in their great coats, that article of their equipment is worn out in a much shorter period of time than that specified by the regulations (three years) that it should last, and there are no means in this country of replacing them. I therefore request your Lordship that 10,000 great coats (as recommended in the enclosed memorandum) may be sent as an article of store, to the Commissary General, to be issued to regiments as they may have occasion for them; and regular accounts shall be kept of their issue, and forwarded from time to time to the Secretary at War, in order that the price of these great coats may be charged against the great coat fund of the several regiments.

‘ I beg leave to recommend that your Lordship should order that 20,000 stands of arms and 20,000 sets of accoutrements may be sent to Lisbon, in order to supply the casual demands of the army, as well as those of the Portuguese and Spanish Governments, there being at Lisbon at present only 1000 stands.

‘ I likewise beg leave to recommend to your Lordship to order that a division of infantry, now raising in Castille, under Don Carlos de España, to which I have supplied arms and accoutrements, and to which he is paying great attention, may be supplied with blue clothing. It amounts to 4000 men, and it is desirable that this blue clothing should be sent to Oporto, consigned to the British Commissary there, as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 23d October, 1811.

‘ The enterprize of Don Julian Sanchez to carry off the cattle from Ciudad Rodrigo, adverted to in my last dispatch, was very well conducted and very successful. During the night of the 14th he posted his troops near the places at which he had been informed that the cattle from the garrison

were usually brought to graze in the morning ; and he expected that they would come to the ground on the left bank of the Agueda, between the hills on the El Bodon road and the fort, and he placed two detachments of cavalry behind these hills. The governor, General Renaud, had come out of the fort and across the Agueda, attended by some Staff Officers, and escorted by a party of about twenty cavalry, and he was surrounded by Don Julian's detachment as soon as he entered the hills, and was taken, with two of his escort, under the fire of the guns of the place. The remainder of the escort escaped ; one of the Officers attending the governor having been wounded.

‘ Shortly afterwards Don Julian's detachments on the right of the Agueda drove off the greatest number of the cattle which had been sent out to graze, under the guns of the fort, on that side of the river.

‘ The enemy's troops in front of this army have made no movement of importance since I addressed your Lordship last. A detachment of the army of the north, which had crossed the Tormes with a view to plunder the country between that river and the Yeltes, have returned to their cantonments without deriving much advantage from this expedition.

‘ I have directed General Hill to endeavor to force Girard's division, the 5th corps, to retire from Cáceres, as in that position they distress for provisions the troops under the Conde de Penne Villemur and General Murillo, belonging to General Castaños. General Hill was to move from his cantonments on this expedition on the 22d.

‘ By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz to the 15th instant, I learn that Marshal Suchet had entered the kingdom of Valencia, from Tortosa, with 20,000 men, and had advanced as far as Murviedro. He made three attempts to obtain possession of the fort of Saguntum, near that town, by escalade, on the 29th of last month, in all of which he was repulsed with considerable loss, and left behind him his ladders. He was still at Murviedro on the 4th instant.

‘ In the meantime General Blake had thrown himself into Valencia, with 23,000 men, composed of the divisions which he had brought with him from Cadiz and from Murcia, and

other troops; all the strong holds in Valencia were occupied, and the greatest efforts were making to bring a large force into that kingdom, in order to annoy the enemy's communication with his rear. The utmost confidence appears by the accounts to be placed in General Blake, and the people of Valencia appear determined to co-operate in resistance to the enemy.

‘The enemy have not detached from their force in front of this army to aid Marshal Suchet. As far as I have been able to learn, they expect, in addition to the reinforcements which have already joined, sixty five battalions of infantry, being the fourth battalions of the regiments now in the Peninsula.

‘Some of these are of course destined for the regiments in the corps d’armée in the south; and others for the regiments in Catalonia and Aragon, and now in Valencia; but the greater number for the regiments in the armies of the north and of Portugal, and in the 5th corps, which are more immediately opposed to the allied British and Portuguese army; and I understand that they do not purpose to move till these reinforcements shall arrive.

‘I learn from Major General Cooke that he had detached 1200 men from Cadiz, under Colonel Skerrett, to land at Tarifa, and in co-operation with a Spanish corps under General Copons, likewise to be detached from Cadiz, to endeavor to create a diversion in favor of General Ballesteros, against whom the enemy appear to have detached from the lines before the Isla de Leon and from Seville a considerable force. General Ballesteros has taken a position near San Roque, and there is reason to believe that Colonel Skerrett, who sailed on the 10th, will have reached Tarifa; but General Copons’ force did not sail so soon, and had been obliged by the weather to return to Cadiz, and had been re-landed when the accounts came away on the 15th.

‘There has been no movement in the north since I addressed your Lordship last.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 25th October, 1811.

‘ I received yours of the 23d last night, and I now enclose a duplicate of my last note, in case by any accident the original should have miscarried. There is nothing new on this side.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 25th October, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st October, and I shall refer to the consideration of the Commissary General the paper regarding money and supplies from the commissariat, which you enclosed.

‘ Beresford and Dom Miguel Porjaz know their own concerns best, certainly; but, in my opinion, the military chest is a separate concern from the commissariat, and it would be a convenience that it should commence first.

‘ Let the Government send me the bill for the labor in the arsenal. I rather believe it is for the ordnance on the fortified ground between the Tagus and the sea.

‘ I have heard of the exportations of silver by the Americans, which it does not appear to me to be possible to prevent, excepting by laying such high duties upon the import of all articles, including corn, the produce of America, as shall prevent the Americans from resorting to the Portuguese markets.

‘ When the Americans sell their corn at Lisbon, they must receive payment in money; as, owing to the uncomfortable state of affairs between Great Britain and America, they cannot take bills upon England, because that which they would purchase with those bills in England would not be admitted into America. The only remedy, therefore, excepting that of a settlement between Great Britain and America, is for Portugal to lay high duties upon the import of the produce of America.

‘ The question upon this remedy, which will exclude the Americans from the Portuguese markets, is whether the Portuguese can do without the produce of America? or in other words, whether Great Britain and Ireland, the Bar-

bary States, and the Greek islands, can supply the demands of Portugal for provisions? If these demands can be supplied, I should recommend this measure; but it is desirable that you should write to the British Government upon the subject, to let them know how the matter stands. I shall also mention it to Lord Liverpool.

‘Adverting to the mode in which business is done in Portugal, I should doubt whether to affix a stamp upon the Portuguese paper in circulation would be equivalent to the substitution of a new paper instead of the old. The stamp would be the easiest mode of proceeding, but great care should be taken to examine the paper; not to stamp any numbers that have been destroyed, and not to stamp two numbers of the same denomination. I would likewise recommend, that for each 100 numbers there should be a different stamp, the difference to be known only to particular persons. For instance, one stamp from No. 1 to No. 100, another from No. 101 to No. 200, and so on. This is more troublesome, but it increases the difficulty of forgery, which is the object.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Juiz de Fora of Sabugal.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 26th October, 1811.

‘I understand that you have again seized nine mules, and four mule loads of cheese, and have taken eight dollars from some Spaniards who were going to sell their cheese to the army.

‘You may be right, for aught I know, in committing this act of oppression, but I apprise you that your conduct shall be inquired into by the Special Commission, and if you have exceeded your authority, or what the law directs, you shall be punished.

‘I also hereby order you to have the nine mules, and the cheese, and the money, taken care of, in order that the whole may be returned in good order to the Spaniards, in case the Governors of the Kingdom, to whom I have written upon this subject, should so direct.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Juiz de Fora of Sabugal.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Juiz de Fora at Gouvea.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 27th October, 1811.

‘ I have to inform you, that I have ordered for trial, before a General Court Martial now sitting at Guarda, the corporal and private soldier of the 52d regiment, who you complained to me had committed an outrage in pressing cars at Gouvea; and I desire that you will be prepared to send to Guarda, to give testimony before the Court Martial, all the persons who were witnesses of the facts of which you have complained, when the Officer acting as Judge Advocate with that Court Martial shall send to you for them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Juiz de Fora at Gouvea.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 27th October, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st October, in which you enclosed one of the 19th October from Dom Miguel Forjaz, regarding the number of foreigners in the service of the British army now in Portugal. In answer to which, I beg you will inform Dom Miguel Forjaz, that any regulation which the Government shall make upon this subject, which it may be practicable to carry into execution, shall be strictly obeyed.

‘ I request the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom, however, to the following considerations. It appears by the statement of the magistrate of Santarem, enclosed in Dom Miguel Forjaz’ letter of the 19th, that the number of persons employed, even in that town, is very inadequate to the performance of the several duties already imposed upon them; and that these persons can scarcely exist. It is notorious that this is the case in this part of the Kingdom. The magistrates of the towns and villages have no longer any of that description of business for the performance of which they received fees, by which they were enabled to live; and they are now starving: they are indifferent about the tenure of their offices, and they perform their duty with negligence.

‘ This is a subject deserving the consideration of Government, upon which, if they desire it, I will give them my

opinion; but in the meantime, till a remedy is applied, it is desirable that the duties of these same magistrates should not be increased.

‘ Before the first French invasion of Portugal, the laws respecting the passage of strangers throughout the country were very strict, and were put into execution with some vigilance. Whether they were at that time necessary or not is not now the question, but whether it is expedient to revive them and increase their severity at the present moment.

‘ I have been concerned with the affairs of Portugal for more than three years, and I have never known an instance in which anything was to be apprehended from strangers in the Kingdom; and in my opinion, the Governors of the Kingdom have given too much importance to persons of this description.

‘ The policy of Great Britain, or of other countries upon this subject, does not at all bear upon the question, as it may be very necessary to restrain the intercourse of foreigners with the natives of these countries; but it is, in my opinion, quite unnecessary in Portugal.

‘ There is another view of the subject which is peculiar to Portugal, to which the Intendant of Police has not adverted, and that is, there is in Portugal, for its defence, a large foreign army, which must have foreigners of all descriptions attached to it, and following it; and every restriction upon the intercourse of these foreigners with the country must increase the difficulty of defending the country.

‘ The Governors of the Kingdom do not appear to be aware of the immensity of the machine which has been formed in this country for the support of the Portuguese, as well as of the British army, conducted in all its branches by foreigners. Any restriction upon the passage of these foreigners through the country would be very inconvenient to the military system, unless the restriction could be removed by passports. But passports, it is well known, are liable to abuse and fraud, as well as every other institution: and if the description of the person to whom they are given is included in them, in order to guard against fraud, they are attended by such an increase of the detail of business in the departments of the army, as well as in the offices of the several magistrates, who are to examine the

passports and the bearers of them, as would render the operations of the war almost impracticable.

‘ For instance, not only every Officer and his servants, but every conductor and his muleteers must have passports describing the persons of each, which passports must be examined at every stage, and signed by the magistrate examining them. If this is not done, no object will be gained: and I beg the Governors of the Kingdom to consider whether they can prevail upon the magistrates of the country, under existing circumstances, to perform this duty; and whether there are any evils existing or to be apprehended, to avoid which will compensate for the loss of time and the trouble which will be the consequence of this system.

‘ I request you to lay this letter before the Governors of the Kingdom.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

Captain José Clementi Pereira.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th October, 1811.

‘ I enclose you the copy of the answer which I have received to the application which I made to the Governors of the Kingdom some time ago, in favor of the Marquez de Ponte de Lima, and the Marquez de Valença, which I beg you will forward to those noblemen in the most secure manner; you will at the same time inform them, that if they should come here, they will be treated with every attention which I can show them, and that I have no doubt of their safety, if they can prove the case which they stated in their first address to me. Tell them, that if they should experience any difficulty in making their escape, I may be able to assist them, by putting them in communication with one of the parties of Spanish guerrillas, but that in that case they must do exactly what the guerrilla chief may desire them to do.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain José Clementi Pereira.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 29th October, 1811.

‘About the end of last month, when Soult arrived at Seville, Girard came forwards towards the Guadiana, and General Drouet, with the other division of the 5th corps, to Zafra, from Andalusia. That movement appeared to be connected with Marmont’s objects, and Girard afterwards retired. He has since come forward again, however, and at first I thought his object was to throw a supply into Badajoz, which we could not prevent; but he has besides pushed forward to Caceres, and has driven General Castaños’ posts beyond the Salor, by which he has distressed him much for provisions and forage, and it was necessary either to prepare to receive these vagabond troops in Portugal, or to replace them at Caceres.

‘I therefore desired General Hill to make a movement with his troops, and to threaten Girard’s communication with Merida by his right, while with the remainder of his troops he attacked him at Caceres.

‘I have a letter from General Hill of the 26th, informing me that Girard had that morning retired from Caceres on Torremocha. General Hill was at Malpartida, and intended to move on the 27th to Aldea del Cano. As soon as Girard should cross the Guadiana, Hill would return to his cantonments, leaving the Spaniards in the country about Caceres, &c.

‘As Soult will hear of these movements much about the time that he will feel the necessity of reinforcing the corps sent against Ballesteros, I am in hopes that they may be of some use to Ballesteros.

‘There is nothing new here this morning.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Dr. Frunk.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 29th October, 1811.

‘I was much concerned to receive this day your letter by which you apprised me of the necessity that you should go to England for the recovery of your health; and this concern was occasioned not less by my feelings for you per-

sonally, than by my sense of the inconvenience and injury which the army and the public interests will suffer by the loss of your valuable services.

‘ I do not, however, yet lose all hope that you will be able to return to us ; but if you should not, and you should think that I can be of any use to you to forward your views in England, I beg that you will let me know it ; and you will always find me ready to state my sense of your services and merits.

‘ General Stewart will send you the official leave for you to go home.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Dr. Frank.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th October, 1811.

‘ I enclose you a paper on the Portuguese finance, in answer to the paper of the Portuguese Government on the same subject, transmitted in your letter of the 24th. I beg that you will lay this paper before the Government.

‘ You will see by my letter to them of yesterday, that I have insisted upon their establishing the military chest, although not prepared with other arrangements. My opinion upon this subject need not prevent you and Beresford from acting on it as you please.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM.

‘ In considering the paper on the subject of Portuguese finances of October, 1811, it is necessary to advert to the state of the Kingdom and its credit, the probability of success in the war, and the chances which exist that Portugal may again become the theatre of the operations of the war.

‘ It is not necessary that I should enter into details on all or any of these topics ; but it is obvious that the plan which the paper contains of ameliorating the credit of the Government, is founded upon a favorable view of all and of each of them ; which view, it is probable, would not be taken

by these individuals, who must be induced by their own sense of their private interests to adopt the schemes proposed in this paper for the amelioration of the credit of the state.

‘The object of the Government being to pay its debts, and to revive the credit of the state, is a most laudable one, and they shall have every assistance which I can give them to carry it into execution.

‘In the present situation of the Kingdom, however, the first object, even with a view to re-establish the credit of the state, is obviously to secure the funds for carrying on the war. In this view, and with a view to aid the efforts of Great Britain, I proposed to the Government to pay the interest upon paper money, including the *Apolices Grandes*, from the 1st July last; to which proposition the Government have added the objects adverted to in the paper of October, 1811.

‘I am apprehensive, however, that it is impossible at present to go farther than I proposed, and that, however honest and desirable it would be in the Government to find means of paying the arrears of interest on the paper money, and the *Apolices Grandes*, and the debts of the *Junta de Viveres*, and of the Marine, it is impracticable, and at the same time to carry on the war.

‘It is not a matter of indifference to propose a plan to the public for the payment of debts and for the restoration of credit, which shall fail to produce its object. For instance, the Government will propose that certain individuals, creditors of the state, shall have the option of purchasing the lands and estates proposed to be sold in the paper under consideration. I will suppose that these creditors are not satisfied with this discharge of the debts; that they think the lands, under existing circumstances, are worth nothing; and, above all, that it would not suit their interests to risk a farther capital in their improvement.

‘The consequence must be, that the Government not only will not have paid their debts in the opinions of these persons their creditors, but they will have incurred the farther discredit of having endeavored to induce the public to take that in payment of debts which was in reality worth nothing.

‘ On these grounds I earnestly recommend to the Government to proceed in these measures with the utmost caution and circumspection: to propose no measure to the public of which they are not certain that the public will entertain a favorable opinion; and to confine themselves in the first instance to those measures which are absolutely necessary to place their credit in such a state as to enable them to carry on the war, and to aid their ally.

‘ It appears generally admitted that the first of these measures is to pay the interest on the paper money in circulation from the 1st July last, and with regularity from thence forward.

‘ The paper money in circulation bearing interest, including the forged paper, is stated to be 17,250,000 crusades, upon which the half-yearly interest would be 431,250 crusades. Besides this sum, there is some paper in circulation without bearing interest, and the total amount in circulation, including forged paper, is 20,500,000 crusades.

‘ The effect of this measure, combined with others to secure the public against forgery, and the future exactness of the Treasury, as well in paying the interest upon the paper, as in issuing paper in its due proportions to money, according to law; viz., half money and half paper in every transaction, will raise the value of the paper in the market to such a degree as will affect the price of all commodities, and by that means save to Government in its purchases the full amount of the interest which will be paid.

‘ It would likewise be desirable to add to this measure a declaration on the part of the Government that no new paper should be fabricated.

‘ I am not quite certain whether the Government have it in contemplation to pay the arrears of interest on the paper money beyond the 1st of July. This does not appear to be necessary; and I wish here to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to a principle which applies more forcibly to this description of paper, but which may probably with justice be applied to the arrears on the *Apolices Grandes*.

‘ The paper money has always been a circulating security, and has generally (particularly of late years) been at a considerable discount. It is therefore not probable that the

individuals who now hold any portion of it, held that portion in 1808 or 1809, or at any very distant period for which the Government might be disposed to pay the arrears of the interest; nor, adverting to the rate of discount which the paper has borne in late years, can it be supposed that any person who has purchased paper has ever had in contemplation the probability that the arrears of the interest would be paid, and has taken that advantage into consideration, in the price which he paid for the paper. The Government will find the paper money generally in the hands of dealers in bills of exchange or of speculators, who will have bought paper upon hearing of the intention of Government to pay the interest; and the arrears of interest which Government will pay beyond the term stated, viz., the 1st of July, will be so much money gratuitously put in the pockets of these individuals, not one of whom, most probably, is the individual to whom the interest for the past period is really due.

‘ Neither would this measure have any effect in raising the credit of paper money beyond the first moment. If the interest should hereafter be paid regularly, such an accumulated debt on account of interest could never again be incurred, and the public would have no reason to expect such an advantage in future.

‘ The measure next for consideration is the payment of the interest on the *Apolicas Grandes*. It appears that the securities of this denomination, which are extant, as I understand, besides the paper money, amount to 11,818,065 crusades, the half-yearly interest of which appears to be 295,452 crusades; which, added to the half-yearly interest on the paper money, 431,250 crusades, would make a total of interest half-yearly amounting to 727,702 crusades. From this sum the 10 per cent. income tax would be to be deducted, being 72,670 crusades, which would leave the charge upon the public 654,032 crusades. It appears to me that the public revenues would be able to defray this sum, and I would therefore recommend to Government to pay the interest from the 1st July on the *Apolicas Grandes*, as well as on the paper money, and hereafter regularly.

‘ They ought, by a public act, to allot a particular denomination of the public revenue to defray these demands of

state wiped away as with a sponge; that it has been three times invaded; and that the war, with its chances, still continues. The holders of *Apolices Grandes*, even though they are the original lenders to the state, are not unaware of these circumstances, and the Governors of the Kingdom may depend upon it, that there is not one of them who will not consider himself too happy in receiving payment of the current interest; and that there is not a thinking man in Europe who will not be of opinion that the Governors of the Kingdom will have acquitted themselves handsomely by the creditors, and will have redeemed the credit of the state, by the payment of the interest of their debts from the 1st of July.

‘ The next subject for consideration is the payment of the debts of the *Junta de Viveres*, and of the marine; and I acknowledge that I consider this measure more important to enable the Government to carry on the war, than to pay the arrears of interest of the *Apolices Grandes*. Accordingly, I recommend to the Government that, if upon a review of their income and their expenditure, they should have reason to believe that a sum can be spared to pay these debts, they should allot it to their payment in certain proportions by instalments.

‘ One of the consequences of the loss of credit is the increase of price of every article which is purchased, far beyond its real value; by which increase of price, the seller endeavors to compensate to himself for the delay in receiving payment for the interest of his money during the period of delay of payment, and for the risk which he incurs that he will never be paid at all. The Governors of the Kingdom may therefore be satisfied that they will do strict justice to these creditors of the state, if they can find means of allotting a sum to liquidate their demands gradually by instalments, proportionate to the amount of their several demands. The first step towards settlement should be to ascertain the amount of the debts, and this alone will increase the credit of the Government. If it should not be possible to allot a sum to defray these debts by instalment, when their amount should be ascertained, I would rather recommend to mortgage that part of the revenues of the

Brazils which has lately been made over by the Prince Regent of Portugal to the assistance of this Kingdom, to raise a loan in England which should liquidate the whole.

‘In regard to the other measures adverted to in the paper, they would be beneficial at any other time than the present, but at present they are impracticable, without mixing up these questions with those of public credit, which are so very delicate. The Government can easily ascertain the truth of my opinion upon these subjects.

‘Let the lands to be brought into cultivation, or the estates of the crown, be advertised for sale, with all the advantages proposed to be granted to the purchasers; and the Government will find that at present no man will purchase.

‘If no man would purchase, what man would lend his money upon the security of these same lands, or of their produce from cultivation?

‘I am not acquainted with the law adverted to in the paper, which has for its object to prevent the exportation of specie; but I am apprehensive that it cannot be put into execution. The exporters of specie, to the great distress of the army, and the ruin of the country, are the American merchants, who have brought to Portugal articles of the first necessity; these merchants cannot venture to take in payment bills upon England, because the non-importation law in America would prevent them from importing into their own country the goods which they would purchase in England with the produce of these bills.

‘They must continue, therefore, to export specie from Portugal as long as the non-importation law of America shall continue in force; unless the Portuguese Government, upon finding the inconvenience of this drain of the precious metals, shall adopt measures to put an end to the importation into Portugal of the produce of America. The Government should consider whether the country can do without the importation from America; whether His Majesty’s dominions, and his influence with the Greek islands and in the Barbary States, would procure for the country the articles of first necessity which it requires; and if these articles can be procured in this manner, it is a measure of vital importance to put an end to the trade with America.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 30th October, 1811, 10 A. M.

I enclose two letters from Don Carlos, containing an account of the enemy’s intention to collect a force at Frades, near Endinal, I conclude with a view to realize the contribution in the Sierra de Francia.

‘There is nothing new here.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 30th October, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th instant.

‘The enemy has naturally turned his attention to the occupation of Santoña and Santander, as being the only stations that can be called ports on the northern coasts of Spain, which it may be supposed might be used by the British Government, either for the purpose of communication with the guerrillas, or to interrupt the enemy’s communications with the frontiers of France from his armies in Castille.

‘In Catalonia he has likewise turned his attention to the ports on the coast, because there is no practicable road from the frontiers of France through that province excepting by the coast; and in Valencia he has done the same, because the road from Catalonia into Valencia leads by Tortosa along the coast.

‘But the policy and plan of the enemy’s operations do not lead him to the coast; and he might be in possession of the coasts of Galicia, while his tenure of the province would be very insecure; and he might be able to maintain himself in the province, while the allies should be in possession of Ferrol, Coruña, the island of Aroza, and Vigo.

‘It is, however, very desirable to endeavor, in case of accident, to have the means of communicating with the inhabitants of Galicia; but adverting to the importance and known goodness of the harbor, I have always been induced to consider Vigo and the Bayona islands to be the most important point to be secured, if it should be found im-

practicable to secure Ferrol and Coruña. It would be very desirable, therefore, if you would take an opportunity of examining these islands, and of comparing the advantages of their situation and of that of the island of Aroza; and likewise the maritime advantages of the port of Vigo, with those of the river Aroza; and of forming some notion of the measures which it would be necessary to adopt to defend the Bayona islands, compared with those necessary for the defence of the island of Aroza.

‘I am concerned to observe that General Abadia meets with any difficulties from the Junta of Galicia. I have desired General Alava to write to General Castaños upon this subject.

‘Some time ago the Junta of Galicia applied to me for pecuniary assistance, to which application I wrote them the letter of which I enclose the draft, which I suspect that they have never communicated to General Abadia. I beg that you will show it to him, as some of the facts and principles stated in that letter may be of use to him in his discussions with the Junta.

‘I enclose a letter, which I beg you will transmit to Longa.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel •

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Freneda, 30th October, 1811.

‘I have received your letters of the 10th and 15th, and one from General Cooke of the 18th, and I now enclose copies of my dispatches of the 23d and this day, from which you will learn the state of affairs here.

‘I directed Marshal Beresford to send you all the arms we could spare from this country, not exceeding 5000 stands. But we have no accoutrements. Beresford will let you know how many stands he sends you.

‘I do not know whether you are aware that the Spanish Government are sending troops to America. Alava lately showed me a letter to Castaños, in which great credit is taken for the activity with which this force, which I understood was to consist of 8000 men, was getting ready. They

have withdrawn for this service two regiments of 600 men each, from Galicia, who had lately been completed with arms by the British Government. This was done much against the inclination of the Junta and inhabitants of the province; and much to the annoyance of Abadia, who appears to be going on well himself; but he is thwarted by the Junta.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 30th October, 1811.

‘I received last night your letter of the 26th; and I beg that you will tell Dom Miguel Forjaz, that so long as he conducts himself in his office with the fairness and zeal which have characterized his administration since I have been in this country, he shall have my support; and in my opinion, if the Prince Regent’s promise can be relied on, his services will in future be favorably viewed. At all events, the continuation of the uncomfortable situation in which I have lately stood in respect to the Government, can be of no use to Dom Miguel Forjaz. I think I should not have been justifiable if I had not taken advantage of the Prince’s letter to me, and of his recent orders respecting the military departments, to put an end to it; and I am much mistaken if the measure which I adopted will not be of as much use to Dom Miguel Forjaz, as to the cause in general, in the increase of our influence with the Prince, by showing him that at least on our side there is no intrigue.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Freneda, 30th October, 1811.

‘I am sorry to tell you that Dr. Frank, the Inspector of Hospitals, is so unwell as to be obliged to go home; and the department under him is so important, that if, as I fear, he should not be able to come out again, it will be necessary

that we should have the most active and intelligent person that can be found to fill his station.

‘ I am very unlucky in this respect. Excepting in the Quarter Master General’s department, I have had two, and in some instances three different persons at the head of every department in the army. Here have been three Officers second in command: and General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and Officers, have been changed repeatedly; and there is not one General Officer now with the army who came out with it, excepting Hill, and he was at home for six months last year; and Campbell, and he was at home for the same period the year before last, and is now going again; and General Henry Campbell, who was at home for two years.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 30th October, 1811.

‘ The detachment of the army of the north which was at Ledesma, moved from thence towards Salamanca, on the 28th instant, and it is generally supposed that the enemy are about to collect a force in the neighborhood of the Sierra de Francia, with a view probably to realize the heavy contribution which they have laid on the villages in that part of the country.

‘ Excepting that movement, the troops of the armies of the north and of Portugal have made none since I addressed you last.

‘ The last report I received from General Hill was dated at Malpartida de Caceres, on the 26th. General Girard retired from Caceres on that morning, and Lieut. General Hill intended to move upon Aldea del Cano on the 27th. The overflowing of the rivers, in consequence of the rain, is the reason of my not having heard from him for two or three days.

‘ He will return to his cantonments as soon as he shall have placed General Castanos’ posts, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in possession of Caceres.

‘ By the last accounts which I have from Cadiz of the 18th, it appears that General Ballesteros had retired under

the guns of Gibraltar, and that the French were at San Roque, and had taken possession of Algeziras. Colonel Skerrett's detachment had arrived at Tarifa, but the Spanish detachment under General Copons, with which it was intended to co-operate, had not been able to leave Cadiz on account of the weather.

‘ I have received no further accounts from Valencia.

‘ It appears from all the accounts which I have received, that the guerrillas are increasing in numbers and boldness throughout the Peninsula. One party, under Temprano, lately retook, at the very gates of Talavera, Lieut. Colonel Grant of the Portuguese service, who had been taken in the beginning of September in Upper Estremadura, while employed in observation of the enemy's movements. Both the Empecinado and Mina were very successful against some of the enemy's posts and detachments, when their armies were lately collected for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; and Longa was likewise very successful in the neighborhood of Vitoria, in the middle and towards the latter end of September.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 30th October, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Sir William Beresford, containing Brig. General Wilson's application for permission to accept the honor conferred upon him by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ I beg that your Lordship will be pleased to lay these letters before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and that you will obtain His Royal Highness' authority for Brig. General Wilson to wear the Insignia of the Order of the Tower and Sword, of which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal has nominated him a Commander.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 30th October, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose a memorandum, &c., showing the mode in which it is wished that the clothing, &c., should be made, for which I applied to your Lordship for Don Carlos de España, in my dispatch of the 23d instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 1st November, 1811, 9 A.M.

‘I enclose a letter from General Castaños, with its enclosure from General Giron, which contains the only account I have received of General Hill since the 26th. He has done his business very handsomely.

‘I likewise enclose a letter of the 28th from Salamanca, and one from Don Carlos de España, with an intercepted letter from Souham. This last shows the object of the collection of troops at Salamanca; and I think it not improbable that Dorsenne will move with the whole of the army of the north and the Plasencia division of the army of Portugal. Indeed this is almost certain from the number stated in the Salamanca letter to be coming from Toro. They generally diminish numbers at Salamanca; but adding even the numbers stated to the two divisions already upon the Tormes, the force is a good strong one, and forms altogether no inconsiderable part of the army of the north.

‘I propose to endeavor to strike a blow, if possible, upon this occasion, and to bring the army up for that purpose. It is very desirable, therefore, that you should come to the front. I propose to move head quarters to-morrow to Guinaldo; but as you will have to cross one of the bridges of the Coa, notwithstanding that the river is falling, you had probably better halt at Sabugal or Alfayates; or, if you come by the lower bridges, somewhere hereabouts. General Craufurd tells me that the Agueda was fordable yesterday, but that of course was above the junction of the Vadillo. If it should be fordable below the junction of the Vadillo, I shall not move more troops to the right of the Agueda than the Light and 6th divisions. Otherwise I

propose to collect the troops as they come up between the Agueda and the hills.

‘I was very sorry to hear of Captain ——’s conduct. I had intended to delay to make any general rule on the subject of the authority of the Provost, till Captain * * * * should be tried, who has been in arrest above three months for misconduct of the same description. But I find that Captain ——’s is not the only instance that has occurred of similar misconduct and abuse of authority, notwithstanding the conversation which took place on this subject in the army generally at the time of Captain * * * *’s arrest, showed that the authority and duties of the Provost were well understood, and rendered it probable that a similar abuse would not take place. Indeed this conviction, not less than the desire to leave the whole subject open for Captain * * * *’s defence, induced me to delay laying down any general principle upon it.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I find that the letter from Salamanca of the 28th, is not from our friends, but from a person there to one of Don Julian’s commanders. It is probable, therefore, that the report is premature; but at all events there is no harm in our moving. Murray thinks that you had better cross the Coa at the Ponte Sequeiros, and come to Villa Mayor or Alfayates to-morrow.

‘W.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 3d November, 1811, 10 A. M.

‘After I had written to you the day before yesterday, I went to the ford of Molino de Flores, and found that horses could pass there; and I thought it most probable that even then, but certainly if the fair weather continued, the ford of Pastores would be practicable for everything next morning.

‘However, upon my return home, I received further intelligence, which showed that the proposed collection of troops would not be made, and that Thiébault had set out on the 30th from Salamanca, to join the troops collected from Alba, and that they were within six leagues of Ciudad Rodrigo on the night of the 30th. It was useless, there-

fore, to move our troops, excepting those in front, and I thought it just possible that Thiébauld might have been delayed, and that we might have a choice of intercepting the convoy, by crossing at the ford of Pastores yesterday. We were however too late, as the governor and his bullocks arrived in the preceding night. Indeed I saw the enemy's fires in the Sierra de Gavilanes yesterday morning, as I was going from hence towards El Bodon, before daylight.

‘The troops which moved will return to their quarters this day.

‘The enemy went off again before daylight yesterday, and took the road of Salamanca.

‘I have not yet received Hill's report of his affair. His brother came here the day before yesterday, and it appears that Hill completely surprised the enemy. He was at Alcuéscar on the evening of the 27th, within three miles of them, and they did not know it; and he moved before daylight next morning, and formed for the attack within two hundred yards of one of their sentries, who did not see our troops!

‘The result is as stated by General Giron. The name of the General Officer is Brun. They hoped to take Girard.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 3d November, 1811.

‘I beg leave to acquaint you, for the information of the Portuguese Government, that I have directed the Purveyor to the forces to pay the expenses incurred by the University of Coimbra in supplying the British hospitals, &c., the accounts which were enclosed in your letter of the 17th September, with the exception of the charge for bedding and utensils taken from the hospital of the city by the soldiers, which cannot be admitted, as the attendants should not have permitted those things to be taken away, without making a representation on the subject to the proper authorities.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 5th November, 181

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30 October, regarding a ration of wine for the soldiers of the regiments in the garrison of Lisbon, &c.

‘I beg that you will inform the Commanding Officers regiments, that wine forms no part of the soldier’s ration when he receives fresh meat. It has been issued to the soldiers of the army as an indulgence, originally, only when they made long marches, or were exposed to bad weather but by subsequent orders of the late Commander of the Forces more frequently.

‘There are reasons for continuing the issue of wine spirits to the soldiers with the army, which do not apply to those at Lisbon. The pay of the soldiers with the army is unfortunately considerably in arrear, while that of the soldiers at Lisbon is regularly given to them. The former therefore, have it not in their power to purchase anything which might be offered for sale: the latter have not on the means of purchasing what they require of this description, but they can find something to purchase.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, I am unwilling to burthen the public with this additional expense, which it does not appear to me to be necessary to incur.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Peacocke.’

‘WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Freneda, 6th November, 181

‘I hear that measures are in contemplation to alter the clothing, caps, &c. of the army.

‘There is no subject of which I understand so little; and abstractedly speaking, I think it indifferent how a soldier is clothed, provided it is in a uniform manner; and that he is forced to keep himself clean and smart, as a soldier ought to be. But there is one thing I deprecate, and that is a imitation of the French, in any manner.

‘It is impossible to form an idea of the inconvenience and injury which result from having anything like the

cither on horseback or on foot. ——— and his piquet were taken in June, because the 3d hussars had the same caps as the French *Chasseurs à Cheval* and some of their hussars; and I was near being taken on the 25th September from the same cause.

‘At a distance, or in an action, colors are nothing: the profile, and shape of the man’s cap, and his general appearance, are what guide us; and why should we make our people look like the French? A *cocked-tailed* horse is a good mark for a dragoon, if you can get a side view of him; but there is no such mark as the English helmet, and, as far as I can judge, it is the best cover a dragoon can have for his head.

‘I mention this, because in all probability you may have something to say to these alterations; and I only beg that *we* may be as different as possible from the French in everything.

‘The narrow top caps of our infantry, as opposed to their broad top caps, are a great advantage to those who are to look at long lines of posts opposed to each other.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 6th November, 1811.

‘I informed your Lordship, in my dispatches of the 23d and 30th October, of the orders which I had given to Lieut. General Hill to move into Estremadura with the troops under his command, and with his progress to the 26th October.

‘He marched on the 27th by Aldea del Cano to Alcuescar; and, on the 28th, in the morning, surprised the enemy’s troops under General Girard at Arroyo Molinos, and dispersed the division of infantry and the cavalry which had been employed under the command of that General, taking General Brun, the Prince d’Arenberg, and above 1300 prisoners, three pieces of cannon, &c. &c., and having killed many in the action with the enemy, and in the subsequent pursuit. General Girard escaped wounded; and, by all the accounts which I have received, General Dombrowski was killed.

‘I beg to refer your Lordship, for the details of Lieut. General Hill’s operations to the 30th October, to his dispatch* to me of that date from Merida, a copy of which I enclose. I have frequently had the pleasure to report to your Lordship

* *Lieut. General R. Hill, to General Viscount Wellington, K.B.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Merida, 30th October, 1811.

‘In pursuance of the instructions which I received from your Excellency to drive the enemy out of that part of Estremadura which lies between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and to replace the corps under the command of Brig. General the Conde de Penne Villemur, in Caceres, (from which town it had been obliged to retire by the superior force of the enemy,) I put a portion of the troops under my orders in motion on the 22d instant, from their cantonments in the neighborhood of Portalegre, and advanced with them towards the Spanish frontier.

‘On the 23d the head of the column reached Alburquerque, where I learned that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco, and Caceres, and that the Spaniards were again in possession of Aliseda.

‘On the 24th I had a brigade of British infantry, half a brigade of Portuguese artillery (6 pounders), and some of my cavalry at Aliseda, and the remainder of my cavalry, another brigade of British infantry, and half a brigade of Portuguese 6 pounders at Casa de Castellana, about a league distant.

‘On the 25th the Conde de Penne Villemur made a reconnaissance with his cavalry, and drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco; the enemy retired to Malpartida, which place he occupied as an advanced post with about 300 cavalry and some infantry, his main body being still at Caceres.

‘On the 26th, at day break, the troops arrived at Malpartida, and found that the enemy had left that place, retiring towards Caceres, followed by a small party of the 2d hussars, who skirmished with his rear guard. I was shortly afterwards informed that the whole of the enemy’s force had left Caceres, but the want of certainty as to the direction he had taken, and the extreme badness of the weather, induced me to halt the Portuguese and British troops at Malpartida for that night. The Spaniards moved on to Caceres.

‘Having received certain information that the enemy had marched on Torremocha, I put the troops at Malpartida in motion on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by the road leading to Merida, through Aldea del Cano and Casas de Don Antonio, being a shorter route than that followed by the enemy, and which afforded a hope of being able to intercept and bring him to action, and I was here joined by the Spaniards from Caceres. On the march I received information that the enemy had only left Torremocha that morning, and that he had again halted his main body at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear guard at Albala, which was a satisfactory proof that he was ignorant of the movements of the troops under my command. I therefore made a forced march to Alcuescar that evening, where the troops were so placed as to be out of sight of the enemy, and no fires were allowed to be made.

‘On my arrival at Alcuescar, which is within a league of Arroyo Molinos, everything tended to confirm me in the opinion that the enemy was not only in total ignorance of my near approach, but extremely off his guard, and I determined upon attempting to surprise, or at least to bring him to action,

the zeal and ability with which Lieut. General Hill had carried into execution the operations intrusted to his charge ;

before he should march in the morning, and the necessary dispositions were made for that purpose.

‘ The town of Arroyo Molinos is situated at the foot of one extremity of the Sierra de Montanches, the mountain running from it to the rear in the form of a crescent, almost everywhere inaccessible, the two points being about two miles asunder. The Truxillo road runs round that to the eastward.

‘ The road leading from the town to Merida runs at right angles with that from Alcuéscar, and the road to Medellín passes between those to Truxillo and Merida, the grounds over which the troops had to manœuvre being a plain thinly scattered with oak and cork-trees. My object of course was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by these roads.

‘ The troops moved from their bivouac near Alcuéscar about 2 o’clock in the morning of the 28th, in one column, right in front, direct on Arroyo Molinos, and in the following order : Major General the Hon. K. Howard’s brigade of infantry (1st batt. 50th, 71st. and 92d regiments, and one company of the 60th) ; Colonel Wilson’s brigade (1st batt. 28th, 2d batt. 31th and 39th regiments, and one company of the 60th) ; 6th Portuguese regiment of the line, and 6th cazadores, under Colonel Ashworth ; the Spanish infantry under Brig. General Morillo ; Major General Long’s brigade of cavalry (2d hussars, 9th and 13th light dragoons) ; and the Spanish cavalry, under the Conde de Penne Villenur. They moved in this order until within half a mile of the town of Arroyo Molinos, where under cover of a low ridge the column closed, and divided into three columns. Major General Howard’s brigade, and three 6 pounders under Lieut. Colonel Stewart, supported by Brig. General Morillo’s infantry, the left ; Colonel Wilson’s brigade, the Portuguese infantry under Colonel Ashworth, two 6 pounders and a howitzer, the right, under Major General Howard ; and the cavalry the centre.

‘ As the day dawned a violent storm of rain and thick mist came on, under cover of which the columns advanced in the direction and in the order which had been pointed out to them. The left column, under Lieut. Colonel Stewart, marched direct upon the town. The 71st, one company of the 60th, and 92d regiments, at quarter distance, and the 50th in close column, somewhat in the rear with the guns as a reserve.

‘ The right column, under Major General Howard, having the 39th regiment as a reserve, broke off to the right so as to turn the enemy’s left, and having gained about the distance of a cannon shot to that flank, it marched in a circular direction upon the further point of the crescent, on the mountain above-mentioned.

‘ The cavalry under Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine moved between the two columns of infantry, ready to act in front or move round either of them as occasion might require.

‘ The advance of our column was unperceived by the enemy until they approached very near, at which moment he was filing out of the town upon the Merida road ; the rear of his column, some of his cavalry, and part of his baggage being still in it. One brigade of his infantry had marched for Medellín an hour before daylight.

‘ The 71st and 92d regiments charged into the town with cheers, and drove the enemy everywhere at the point of the bayonet, having a few men cut down by the enemy’s cavalry.

and I have great satisfaction in repeating my commendations of him, and of the brave troops under his command, upon the

‘The enemy’s infantry, which had got out of the town, had, by the time these regiments arrived at the extremity of it, formed into two squares, with the cavalry on their left, the whole were posted between the Merida and Medellin roads, fronting Alcuescar; the right square being formed within half musket shot of the town, the garden walls of which were promptly lined by the 71st light infantry, while the 92d regiment filed out and formed line on their right, perpendicular to the enemy’s right flank, which was much annoyed by the well directed fire of the 71st. In the meantime one wing of the 50th regiment occupied the town and secured the prisoners, and the other wing along with the three 6 pounders skirted the outside of it; the artillery as soon as within range firing with great effect upon the squares.

‘Whilst the enemy was thus occupied on his right, Major General Howard’s column continued moving round his left, and our cavalry advancing and crossing the head of the column, cut off the enemy’s cavalry from his infantry, charging it repeatedly, and putting it to the rout. The 13th light dragoons, at the same time, took possession of the enemy’s artillery: one of the charges made by two squadrons of the 2d hussars and one of the 9th light dragoons was particularly gallant; the latter commanded by Captain Gore, and the whole under Major Busche of the hussars. I ought previously to have mentioned that the British cavalry having, through the darkness of the night and the badness of the roads, been somewhat delayed, the Spanish cavalry under the Conde de Penne Villemur was on this occasion the first to form upon the plain and engage the enemy, until the British were enabled to come up.

‘The enemy was now in full retreat, but Major General Howard’s column having gained the point to which it was directed, and the left column gaining fast upon him, he had no resource but to surrender, or to disperse and ascend the mountain. He preferred the latter, and ascending near the eastern extremity of the crescent, and which might have been deemed inaccessible, was followed closely by the 28th and 34th regiments, whilst the 39th regiment and Colonel Ashworth’s brigade of Portuguese infantry, followed round the foot of the mountain by the Truxillo road, to take him again in flank. At the same time Brig. General Morillo’s infantry ascended at some distance to the left with the same view.

‘As may be imagined, the enemy’s troops were by this time in the utmost panic, his cavalry was flying in every direction, the infantry threw away their arms, and the only effort of either was to escape. The troops under Major General Howard’s immediate command, as well as those he had sent round the point of the mountain, pursued them over the rocks, making prisoners at every step, until his own men became so exhausted and few in number, that it was necessary for him to halt and secure the prisoners, and leave the further pursuit to the Spanish infantry under Brig. General Morillo, who from the direction in which they had ascended had now become the most advanced; the force General Girard had with him at the commencement, which consisted of 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry, being at this time totally dispersed. In the course of these operations Brig. General Campbell’s brigade of Portuguese infantry (the 4th and 10th regiments), and the 18th Portuguese infantry, joined from Casas de Don Antonio, where they had halted for the preceding night; and as soon as I judged they could no longer be required at the scene of action, I detached them with the brigade consisting of the 50th, 71st, and 92d

present occasion, in which the ability of the General, and the gallantry and discipline of the Officers and troops, have been conspicuous.

regiments, and Major General Long's brigade of cavalry, towards Merida; they reached San Pedro that night, and entered Merida this morning; the enemy having in the course of the night retreated from hence in great alarm to Almendralejo. The Comde de Penne Villemur formed the advanced guard with his cavalry, and had entered the town previous to the arrival of the British.

'The ultimate consequences of these operations I need not point out to your Lordship; their immediate result is the capture of one General of cavalry (Brun), one Colonel of cavalry (the Prince d'Arenberg), one Lieutenant Colonel (*Chef d'Etat Major*), one aide de camp of General Girard, two Lieutenant Colonels, one *commissaire de guerre*, thirty Captains and inferior Officers, and upwards of 1000 men, already sent off under an escort to Portalegre; the whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and commissariat, some magazines of corn, which he had collected at Caceres and Merida, and the contribution of money which he had collected on the former town, besides the total dispersion of General Girard's corps. The loss of the enemy in killed must also have been severe, while that on our side was comparatively trifling, as appears by the accompanying return, in which your Lordship will lament to see the name of Lieut. Strenuwitz, aide de camp to Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine, whose extreme gallantry led him into the midst of the enemy's cavalry, and occasioned his being taken prisoner.

'Thus has ended an expedition which, although not bringing into play to the full extent the gallantry and spirit of those engaged, will, I trust, give them a claim to your Lordship's approbation. No praise of mine can do justice to their admirable conduct, the patience and good-will shown by all ranks during forced marches in the worst weather, their strict attention to the orders they received, the precision with which they moved to the attack, and their obedience to command during the action. In short, the manner in which every one has performed his duty, from the first commencement of the operations, merits my warmest thanks, and will not, I am sure, pass unobserved by your Lordship.

'To Lieut. General Sir W. Erskine I must express my obligations for his assistance and advice upon all occasions. To Major General the Hon. K. Howard, who dismounted and headed his troops up the difficult ascent of the Sierra, and throughout most ably conducted his column; and to Major General Long, for his exertions at the head of his brigade, I feel myself particularly indebted. I must also express my obligations to Colonel Wilson, Colonel Ashworth, and Lieut. Colonel Stewart, commanding brigades, for the able manner in which they led them.

'Lieut. Colonel Cameron, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercrombie, and Lieut. Colonels Fenwick, Muter, and Lindsay, Majors Harrison and Busche, Major Park (commanding the light companies), and Captain Gore, commanding the 9th light dragoons, Major Hartmann, commanding the artillery, Lieut. Colonel Grant and Major Birmingham of the Portuguese service, Captain Ariaga of the Portuguese artillery (whose guns did so much execution), severally merit my warmest approbation by their conduct; and I must not omit to mention the exertions made by Brig. General Campbell and his troops to arrive in time to give their assistance. General Giron, the chief of General Castanos' staff, and second in command of the 5th Spanish army, has done me the honor to accompany me during these operations,

‘I send, with General Hill’s dispatch, a plan of the ground and of the operations on the 28th of October, by

and I feel much indebted to him for his assistance and valuable advice. Brig. General the Conde de Penne Villemur, Brig. General Morillo, Colonel Downie, and the Spanish Officers and soldiers in general have conducted themselves in a manner to excite my entire approbation.

‘Having now, I hope, accomplished the object of your Lordship’s wishes with the troops under my command, I shall give them one day’s rest at this place, and then return towards the Portuguese frontier for the purpose of replacing them in cantonments.

‘To Lieut. Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General, and Lieut. Colonel Offeny, Assistant Quarter Master General, for the able manner in which they have conducted their departments, and also for the valuable assistance and advice which I have at all times received from them; to the Officers of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General’s departments; to Captain Squire, Royal Engineers, for his intelligence and indefatigable exertions during the whole operations; and to Captain Currie and my personal staff, my warmest thanks are due.

‘This dispatch will be delivered to your Lordship by Captain Hill, my first aide de camp, to whom I beg to refer your Lordship for all further particulars.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General

Viscount Wellington, K.B.

‘ROWLAND HILL, Lieut. General.

‘P.S. Since writing the above report a good many more prisoners have been made, and I doubt not but the whole will amount to 1300 or 1400.

‘Brig. General Morillo has just returned from the pursuit of the dispersed, whom he followed for eight leagues. He reports that, besides those killed in the plains, upwards of 600 dead were found in the woods and mountains.

‘General Girard escaped in the direction of La Serena with 200 or 300 men, mostly without arms, and is stated by his own aide de camp to be wounded.

‘R. II.’

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Corps of the Army under the command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., under the immediate orders of Lieut. General R. Hill, in the action with the French Army near Arroyo Molinos, on the 28th of October, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	—	—	7	6	7
Wounded . . .	7	4	53	11	64
Missing . . .	1	—	—	4	1

The Portuguese loss, but not the Spanish, is included in this return.

Captain Hill, the General's brother and aide de camp, who attended him in the action, and will be able to give your Lordship any further details which you may require. I beg leave to recommend him to your protection.

‘Lieut. General Hill has since returned to his cantonments at Portalegre, having left General Castaños’ troops at Cáceres.

‘It would have been useless for General Hill to push his operations beyond the Guadiana, as Drouet, with the other division of the 5th corps, would have retired before him; and equally so to remain at Mérida. He would not have maintained his position beyond the Guadiana, and he would always have been liable to a hurried retreat by a movement of a superior enemy to the bridge of Badajoz. Neither could he have remained at Mérida without increasing the difficulty and expense of the subsistence of the troops, and augmenting the distance from, and rendering more difficult the communication with, this part of the army. I therefore desired him to return to Portalegre as soon as he should have put General Castaños’ troops in possession of Cáceres.

‘After I had written to your Lordship on the 30th of October, I received information on the 31st that the enemy were making preparations for the collection of a large corps at Salamanca, and for their march in this direction, with a view to convoy in safety a new governor, and a further supply of provisions and stores, to Ciudad Rodrigo, of which preparations the movement from Ledesma, reported in my dispatch of the 30th, was a part.

‘The reports received on the 31st afforded ground for belief that the army of the north, with one division of the army of Portugal, were to be assembled upon this occasion, and I was therefore induced to make arrangements for collecting our army on the right of the Agueda to attack them; but the heavy rains which had fallen just at this period filled the Agueda, and the fords were no longer practicable; and the enemy took advantage of this circumstance to effect their object, by means of one division of infantry, and about 600 cavalry.

‘The new governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, General Barrié,

moved from Salamanca on the 30th of October, and, on the 1st of November, at night, arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo, escorted by one division of infantry, and 600 cavalry, collected from their cantonments on the Upper Tormes, and brought with him a considerable number of cattle for the garrison. The state of the fords of the Agueda, till the morning of the 2d, prevented our troops from making any movement to prevent his communication with the place, and the enemy had marched on their return before daylight.

‘ I have before now described to your Lordship the river Agueda as a military feature in this country. It is difficult for an army to pass this river at any time; but the only road by which it is practicable for an army to pass to the eastward, when the rains have filled the rivers, is by the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the torrent of water in the Agueda during the rains is of that description, that it is impossible to overcome this obstacle. I hope, however, soon to have the means of passing the river in the state in which it is usually in winter.

‘ According to the last accounts of the 22d October, which I have received from Cadiz, General Ballesteros was still encamped under the guns of Gibraltar. No attack had been made upon Tarifa; but the Spanish troops, under General Copons, had not arrived there.

‘ The enemy had made a second attack upon Saguntum, in Valencia, on the evening of the 8th of October, but had been repulsed, it is stated, with considerable loss; and it was believed that Marshal Suchet was about to retire. I have since heard of the march of 9000 men by Calatayud on the 21st of October, by one channel, on their return from Valencia; by another, that they were going to join Marshal Suchet from Aragon.

‘ It is possible that he may have been obliged to retire by the want of provisions; and the second attempt to obtain possession by storm of a post against which he had not broken ground, affords a hope that he was distressed in this manner; but I have no doubt that the French have the means of increasing their force in Valencia to the amount stated, without detaching from the armies of the north, of Portugal, and of the south, which are kept in check by us.

‘In the meantime, I see by accounts of the 11th October, from Valencia, that General Blake began to feel distress for the want of provisions, and of money to purchase them.

‘No movement has been made in the north since I wrote to your Lordship last.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Freneda, 6th November, 1811.

‘I enclose a letter* from General Hill, which, besides his dispatch, shows his wishes regarding his Officers. I particu-

* *Lieut. General R. Hill, to General Viscount Wellington, K.B.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Merida, 30th October, 1811.

‘In my report which accompanies this I have endeavored to give your Lordship as faithful a detail of the occurrences of each day as possible, and I have to request that should your Lordship deem the advantage I have gained over the enemy of sufficient consequence to send an Officer to England with the report of it, my first aide de camp, Captain Hill, may be the bearer of it.

‘Never did troops behave better than those which your Lordship has been pleased to place under my command, and I do feel they are deserving of any mark of approbation your Lordship may feel disposed to confer on them, either by selecting individuals for promotion or otherwise, as to your Lordship may appear most suitable. I beg, however, clearly to be understood, I have held out nothing of the kind to them.

‘I do again most strongly recommend to your Lordship’s protection my aide de camp, Captain Currie, of the 90th regiment, an Officer of eighteen years’ active service. From the manner in which your Lordship was pleased to favor the late memorial of this Officer, I have reason to hope he has been promoted before this; but as there may be a delay, I will thank your Lordship to insure his promotion by a second application.

‘To the zeal and indefatigable exertions of Captain Squire, Royal Engineers, I shall ever feel indebted, and I do most strongly recommend him for that promotion which is so justly due to his merits and to the service. I can assure your Lordship that his knowledge of the Spanish language has enabled me to co-operate most cordially with the Spaniards, and that his military knowledge has contributed very much to our late success.

‘Lieut. Bayley, 31st regiment, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, has been long usefully employed on the staff of this corps of the army. He is an Officer of eleven years’ standing, and I strongly recommend him for promotion.

‘I am happy to add that the greatest harmony subsisted amongst the allied troops during our late operations, and that nothing could exceed the goodwill and friendly disposition of the inhabitants of the district through which we passed. I mention it as a singular instance of fidelity and patriotism, that although the inhabitants of Alencsar in general, as also those of Arroyo Molinos, knew of the arrival of the allied troops in the vicinity of the former place, on the night of the 27th, not a man could be seduced from his duty, and the enemy

larly recommend to your protection his brother, Captain Hill; and I hope that the Commander in Chief will promote his aide de camp, Captain Currie.

‘It would be particularly agreeable to me, if some mark of the favor of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent were conferred upon General Hill; his services have been always meritorious, and very distinguished in this country, and he is beloved by the whole army.

‘At the passage of the Douro, he commanded the detachment which first crossed the river, after General Paget was wounded, which maintained itself against all the efforts of Soult’s corps; and he commanded a division, distinguished himself, and was wounded in the battle of Talavera. He has since commanded a separate corps of this army; he has shown the greatest ability in all the movements which he has made; and nobody could have been more successful than he has been in his late operation.

‘In recommending him, as I do most anxiously, I really feel that there is no Officer to whom an act of grace and favor would be received by the army with more satisfaction than on General Hill.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

remained in total ignorance of our near approach. On the other hand, I was correctly informed of everything going on in Arroyo Molinos during the night.

‘In writing my official report I found it difficult to state the distinct services of some Officers, from the nature of our operations; but I am sure your Lordship will be pleased to hear of the extreme good conduct of Colonel Cadogan and Colonel Abercrombie, two Officers of the greatest promise. The conduct, too, of General Howard has been uniformly praiseworthy. The Marquis of Tweeddale has evinced great zeal and personal bravery, and several other Officers of the staff distinguished themselves. I cannot in justice omit Captain Blaquier of the 60th regiment, who went into the town of Arroyo Molinos, in the night of the 27th, and brought me the most correct information of the enemy’s situation. The commissariat department has been well conducted by Mr. Routh, considering the circumstances under which he acted.

‘Lieut. Hillier, of the 29th regiment, who has been employed on the reconnoitring service for some time past, has been extremely useful on this occasion, from his intimate knowledge of the country which we passed and of the Spanish language.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*General*

‘*Rowland Hill, Lieut. General,*

Viscount Wellington, K.B.,

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 7th November, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th October from Merida, and I congratulate you upon the success of your expedition into Estremadura.

‘I beg leave, at the same time, to return you my thanks for the zèal and ability which you have manifested in carrying into execution the measures which I had recommended to your attention in that province, and I request you to take an opportunity of assuring the General Officers and troops under your command, that I have perused with the greatest satisfaction your report of the patience, perseverance, gallantry, and discipline, of their conduct throughout the late expedition; and that I have not failed to make my sense of these qualities known to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and to His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, as well as to the Portuguese Government.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Freneda, 8th November, 1811, 10 P.M.

‘I have just received your letter of the 7th, 4 P.M. Churchill did not arrive till the afternoon of the 6th, but the delay did not signify, as I stopped the packet, and your brother could not arrive at Lisbon till late on Sunday, or even Monday, on account of the same cause, the badness of the horses on the road. I have likewise perused your letter to Lord Fitzroy Somerset of the 7th; and you will have heard from Churchill, that I concurred in the arrangements you had made respecting Brun’s carriage, the guns, and the horses or mules for them.

‘The money which remains should be given to General Castaños. The Prince d’Aremberg is a great card, being a member of the Confederation of the Rhine, and a Prince of the Imperial family; that is to say, married to Mademoiselle Tascher, Josephine’s niece, who was to have been married to Ferdinand VII. You should take care, therefore, that in any communications he has with his brother, or other

Officers, he has *the attendance* of a sharp English Officer, and the sooner he is sent off the better.

‘ I send you cartels for the exchange of Lieut. Strenuwitz and Captain Nixon, for Lieut. Du Bourg and Captain Margen; and take care that our Officers are at your posts when the French Officers are sent in, otherwise they will play you the tricks they did to me last winter about Percy and Carden.

‘ In respect to Mackworth, he is a Lieutenant, and I cannot allow a Captain to go in exchange for him; but you may name any Lieutenant of those you have taken in exchange, for whom I will give Mackworth a cartel, and the Officer you will name shall either be sent to France, or back to the army; I should prefer the former. If this will not suit, I will write to England, that a Lieutenant may be sent back to France in exchange for Mackworth, and when I shall know his name, I will give Mackworth his cartel.

‘ Tell Captain Larchier that I am sorry I cannot allow him to go, but that I will write to the Commissioners in England to desire that they will exchange him by the earliest opportunity. I beg that you will inform the Comte d’Erlon*, that with every desire to oblige him, I am much concerned that a regard for the interests and honor of my own country, and of the Officers and soldiers placed under my command, will prevent me from complying with his desire that the Prince d’Aremberg, Colonel Hudry, and the *chefs de bataillon*, Veiten and Voirol, should return to the French army on their parole; that I am concerned to state that the Commissioners for prisoners in England have informed me that they have sent to France several Officers prisoners on their parole, not one of whom has ever returned, nor has the same indulgence ever been extended to British Officers prisoners in France.

‘ I am sorry to add to this statement, that in the course of three years, during which I have been opposed to the French armies in the Peninsula, the French Generals have not allowed one Officer to come back upon his parole, excepting Lieut. Mackworth, who was allowed to return by the Maréchal Duc de Raguse.

‘ I beg you also to inform the Comte d’Erlon, that I have

* Général Drouet.

received with the greatest concern the accounts which have reached me of the ill treatment of the prisoners of the allied British and Portuguese army taken by the French army of the south. He who has served in the French army of Portugal knows how I have treated the French Officers and soldiers who have fallen into my hands, and how many of them I have saved; indeed, nobody ought to know this better than Marshal Soult; yet I am sorry to say, that the Officers and soldiers who have been taken by the army of the south have been treated most shamefully.

‘I observe Brito’s intelligence regarding Soult’s movement, which has certainly been occasioned by yours; however, you are in safety, and you have now only to attend to the instructions I sent you to watch the enemy’s movements upon Campo Mayor and Ouguela, and endeavor to ascertain the exact strength of the enemy in Estremadura; and I may probably request you to try what you can do with them again.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Freneda, 8th November, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 22d, and I enclose the copy of my last dispatch and its enclosure; and likewise a private letter from Hill. He has done his business very well. I have desired him to give the guns, mules, and money taken from the enemy to Castaños, so that the Spaniards will be in very good humor with us for a day or two.

‘I believe we had at one time more than 17,000 sick and wounded, but 7000 to 8000 of them were wounded. I never saw any army so unhealthy. Every man that came out from England went to the hospital immediately after, if not before, he joined the army, and several of the old Walcheren cases appeared again. We lost but very few, and they are now recovering, but we have still 14,000 in the hospitals. Notwithstanding, however, that I have sent home about 1000 effective men in three weak regiments, we have 3000 men fit for duty more than we had when the French were here in September.

‘The sickness of our army might as well not have ap-

peared in the Spanish newspapers. But the liberty of the press, as it is called, at Cadiz, is as prejudicial to us as something of the same kind is in England.

‘Lardizabal’s story affords a curious commentary upon the modern notions of liberty. The Cortes began wrong, and they will never be right till they constitute a stout executive Government, and have sense enough to confine themselves to be a branch of the legislature.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 8th November, 1811.

‘You will have seen my answer to the Portuguese Government on one point of the Prince’s letter about Olivença; viz., to order that the Portuguese flag might be kept flying there. In point of fact, the Portuguese and Spaniards were fighting there when the place was taken, and I arrived at Elvas last April, which matter I settled by ordering out the Portuguese, and desiring Castaños to take possession of the place.

‘The other point I did not touch upon; because, in a discussion with the Portuguese Government, I have no concern with His Majesty’s arbitration of their claim upon Spain, that Olivença shall be restored to them.

‘But what is the nature of this claim, and what is Great Britain to arbitrate? The claim is one upon the goodwill of Spain, as Olivença was ceded by treaty, as formally as Trinidad was ceded by treaty to us. There is no difference about the treaty which Great Britain could arbitrate; but His Majesty will have to use his influence with Spain to make the restoration. His Majesty must take care that Spain does not on the same grounds require from him the restitution of Trinidad.

‘In respect to Dom Miguel Forjaz, it is my opinion that he ought to confine himself, in his letter of justification to the Prince, to the charges contained in the Prince’s letter to me, without alluding to private reports, &c. of his being the cause of my being on a bad footing with the Government. It is difficult to say what will be successful and what otherwise, in these Governments of intrigue; but in my opinion,

the broad distinct line is the best. The Prince accuses him of want of zeal and love for his service, and of disobedience to his orders ; and not of fomenting differences.

‘ It is difficult, excepting by protestation, to prove the negative of the first two charges ; and in respect to the last, I should recommend him to defend himself as I have defended him, by saying that he is the Officer of this Government, and can neither obey nor disobey, excepting by their orders, and beg that His Royal Highness will descend to facts, or justify him.

‘ In regard to other points, he ought not to refer to them, or suppose it possible that he can be charged with causing or fomenting differences. They may clear him of the formal charges in the letter of the Prince to me, which is all that is on record against him ; but if I know them at all, they never will allow that I could have quarrelled with Principal Souza, if I had not been misled by Dom Miguel Forjaz. I alone can set that matter right, which I shall do in my answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz, which I shall send him in English.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. By the bye, is it wished that I should answer Nogueira’s paper ?

‘ W.’

To Colonel Lobo.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 9th November, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Hay, who lately passed through Abrantes in charge of the French General, Renaud, who, it appears, having occasion to complain to the Juiz de Fora that the General’s servants were robbed, was sent for by the Juiz, and abused and ill treated by him.

‘ It is always my wish to support the authority of the Portuguese civil magistrates, but I am sorry to say that they in general conduct themselves in so arbitrary and improper a manner towards the Officers of the army, that it is impossible for me to interfere in their favor.

‘ In this case the French General’s servants were robbed in the house of the Juiz de Fora, and what was so natural

as to suspect that the Juiz de Fora's servants had committed the robbery? Is it offensive to a magistrate in whose house an Officer is robbed, to inform the magistrate that his servants are suspected? Is suspicion proof? Or is there anything in such a statement which ought to disturb the temper of a reasonable man to such a degree as to induce him to call an Officer before him to insult him? The fact is, that if the civil magistrates of the country expect the support of authority, they must conduct themselves as magistrates ought, and protect Officers and others from robbers; and I must say, that if there had been any civil police in Abrantes, the French General could not have been robbed in the house of the Juiz de Fora.

‘ I beg that you will communicate these my sentiments to the Juiz de Fora of Abrantes.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Lobo.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 9th November, 1811.

‘ I have not written to you since the 22d, as I had nothing new to instruct you, and I would not interrupt your operations.

‘ Nothing could be more satisfactory to me than all that you did, and I am happy that I had determined to send home your brother with the report of your transactions, before I had heard that it was your wish that I should do so.

‘ He and Churchill will tell you how we are going on here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Freneda, 9th November, 1811, 10 A. M.

‘ I have written to General Graham, to request that the board of Officers may see the horses which he and his staff received from the lots sent out for the Officers of the cavalry; and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Colonel Elley to fix the time at which he will see them.

‘ I am very much concerned to hear such bad accounts of

the —th light dragoons. It is difficult enough, God knows, to find forage for a regiment of cavalry anywhere; but it is not impossible, as the Officers of other regiments have proved.

‘All depends upon the diligence and attention to their duty of the Officers; and I can only say, that if any circumstances exist in the —th regiment to render them less efficient than other regiments, I must take their horses from them, and give them to other regiments who will take care of them, and send the regiment to Lisbon to do duty there, and eventually to England.

‘I shall be sorry to be obliged to adopt these measures by a regiment of which I have reason to entertain a good opinion; but dragoons are worse than useless, if their horses and appointments are not taken care of, and we must get rid of all of this description

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 11th November, 1811

‘I am sorry to enclose a report which I have received from the 7th division regarding the want of bread by the troops. I shall be obliged to you to let me know from what magazine those troops draw their supplies; how that magazine was supplied according to the last returns; and what means of transport there are at the disposal of the Commissaries of the 7th division, particularly of Mr. Carey.

‘It is very desirable that the troops should have at all times in their cantonments six days’ bread and six days corn. Accidents from the swelling of rivers would then be avoided; and in case I should have occasion to move the troops, it would not be impossible.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know also, how the several divisions of infantry, regiments of cavalry, brigades and troops of artillery, now stand for supplies.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘J. Bissett, Esq.,

Commissary General.

‘WELLINGTON.

* Now Sir John Bissett, K.C.H.

To General Don Carlos de España.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th November, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 11th instant, and I have ordered Lieut. Reid, of the Royal Engineers, to proceed to your Excellency’s head quarters, in order to obey such orders as you will give him respecting mining the bridges of Yecla and Cerralvo.

‘ I concur entirely in the opinion of your Excellency, regarding the importance of these points, whether with a view to offensive or defensive operations, and I would occupy them, only that I find it impossible to support my troops from the magazines, at a greater distance from those magazines than they are at present.

‘ If I had the command of money, to pay in ready money for all the supplies which a division or larger body of troops would consume in advance of the Agueda, it might not be inconvenient to occupy the Yeltes and Huelva with one of our divisions, which would effectually secure the points referred to. But I cannot at all times command ready money, and the people in Spain, however well inclined, will not part with their supplies without ready money; and it is impossible for me to pretend to supply a division at such a distance in advance from the magazines. Under these circumstances, whatever may be the inconvenience resulting from the enemy being in possession of the passages of those rivers, we must be satisfied with adopting measures to secure them which may not prove adequate to their object.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ General

‘ WELLINGTON.

Don Carols de España.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 12th November, 1811.

‘ I am much distressed by Strenuwitz’s coming away; however, as he had more reason than another to be alarmed for the consequences of staying with the French, I excuse in him what I would not excuse in another. However, we must put the best appearance on the transaction that we can, and I beg you to write to the Comte d’Erlon, and tell him that as I had already signed and sent to you the cartel for

Lieut. Du Bourg, I would not withdraw it, but desired that that Officer might be sent back in exchange for Lieut Strenuwitz; that I beg, however, to protest against the notion that an Officer who is under charge of a guard is bound, by any implied parole, not to make his escape from that guard; that the contrary has been admitted in a late correspondence which I have had with Marshal the Duke of Ragusa, and that the French General Officers may depend upon it, that as long as they continue the hitherto unheard of mode of confining Officers under a guard, and not leaving them at liberty upon their parole, they must expect that they will take advantage of the favorable disposition of the people of Spain to make their escape.

‘ I enclose a cartel for Strenuwitz, to be given to himself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Freneda, 13th November, 1811.

‘ I see that Colonel —— has published his letter in answer to mine on the affair of the Barba de Puerco, I imagine garbled in the usual Jacobin style, and preceded by a statement, the meaning of which is (as far as I can understand it) to insinuate that I, or my friends, have published my letter. I write in hopes that this will catch you at Lisbon, to intreat you on no account to be drawn into a war in the newspapers with this fellow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
A. Campbell.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 13th November, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th, and I enclose a cartel for Lieut. Mackworth in exchange for Lieut. Miramon. I write to desire that Lieut. Miramon may be sent from England to France, in exchange for Lieut. Mackworth. Pray desire the latter not to throw himself unnecessarily in the way of being taken, till Lieut. Miramon can have arrived in France, which will be in about three weeks. As you have written to Drouet that you would send Du Bourg

for Strenuwitz, it is scarcely worth while to write the letter which I recommended to you yesterday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 13th November, 1811.

‘ I was pretty certain that the establishment of the military chest and other measures were delayed by tricks. If they execute the former measure as I intended, it is quite disconnected with all others, and there is no reason whatever for its delay, excepting to give time for the operation of intrigue at the Brazils.

‘ I do not know what plan — had for Exchequer bills and the fabrication of paper. I have also a plan for Exchequer bills, but not at Lisbon, where they would ruin us and the Portuguese Government also. As for paper, they must positively fabricate no more.

‘ — is a very extraordinary personage; at the same time that he was in ecstasies of admiration of Mr. Pitt’s plans of finance, the foundation of which is credit acquired by honest and plain dealing, and he urged these plans, right or wrong, upon this bankrupt Government; he was urging upon them likewise all the wild, revolutionary plans of America and France, fabrication of paper, selling of crown lands, mortgaging estates of emigrants, &c.

‘ I enclose the draft* of my letter to the Portuguese Government about Olivença. The Princess Carlotta appears to get on apace.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 13th November, 1811.

‘ By the accounts which I have received from Cadiz of the 29th October, it appears that the enemy had retired from Algeziras and San Roque on the night of the 21st October. General Ballesteros had pursued their rear guard, against which he had some success.

* This draft is missing.

‘ Colonel Skerrett conducted with great judgment the detachment of British troops, of which he had the command at Tarifa, and his movements towards the enemy’s communications must have shown them the impracticability of their remaining in the position which they had taken.

‘ The service on which Colonel Skerrett’s detachment was sent from Cadiz having been effected, I propose to suggest to Major General Cooke the expediency of re-calling it, and the Regiment de Watteville will be sent to its destination forthwith.

‘ I have received no further intelligence from the eastern coast since I addressed your Lordship on the 6th instant. I learn from intercepted letters that the enemy have accounts that the army of Murcia had moved upon Cuenca, with a view to co-operate with the guerrillas, in intercepting the communications of Suchet’s corps ; and it is reported that there has been a general insurrection in Aragon, since the troops have been withdrawn from that kingdom for the expedition into Valencia ; but of this I have no certain accounts.

‘ Nothing important has occurred either in Estremadura since General Hill returned to his cantonments, or in this quarter since the governor arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy have augmented their force in Estremadura, but I imagine only with a view to introduce in security a convoy into Badajoz, as I understand that they have barricaded the streets of Merida since General Hill withdrew from thence ; and likewise those of S^{ta} Marta.

‘ It is reported that there are troops in movement towards Benavente, but I have not any intelligence of these movements on which I can depend.

‘ It appears that the country on both banks of the Tagus as far up as Aranjuez, has been made over by the Emperor to Marshal Marmont, for the support of the army of Portugal. This arrangement has reduced the King to the greatest distress, as the produce of that country was all that he had to depend upon ; and he was actually subsisting upon the money produced by the retail sale of the grain forcibly levied upon the people.

‘ This grain having been thus levied and sold by the King, has been seized again by Marmont’s orders, and taken

from the people who had purchased it from the King's magazines, who have been informed that the King had no right to sell it!

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 13th November, 1811.

‘ In consequence of the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 8th August, directing me to order the Commissary General to pay to — —, Esq., the sum of 577*l.* 10*s.*, I considered it proper first to inquire whether Mr. — had received any money from any of the pay departments, British or Portuguese, in this country; and I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received on the subject from Marshal Sir William Beresford, stating that Mr. — received, besides his pay as a — in the Portuguese service, from January to June, 1809, and an allowance for purchasing horses and mules, a sum amounting to 1,200,000 reis, or 337*l.* 10*s.* sterling, from the late Colonel of the Covilhão militia, for which sum he has not accounted.

‘ I beg to receive your Lordship's directions whether I shall order that sum to be paid to the widow of the Colonel of the Covilhão militia, and that Mr. — may receive the balance of his demand of 577*l.* 10*s.*

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 13th November, 1811.

‘ I send you the last morning state of the army in the field, and the last fortnight's state of the British army.

‘ I likewise enclose a very curious intercepted letter, which was in cipher, from Marmont to Foy, which shows how these gentry are going on; in fact each Marshal is the natural enemy of the King and of his neighboring Marshal. Pray take care that this letter is not made public, as it would disclose that we have the key of the cipher.

‘ We laugh at the distresses of the French, and enjoy their robberies and frauds to relieve them, but we are in

great distress ourselves; however, if you have sent me the Exchequer bills which I desired to have, I think I shall be able with their assistance, and by the operation of certain financial measures which I have prevailed upon the Portuguese Government to adopt, to do something.

‘I refer you to the statement of our financial situation, which the Commissary General sends home this day, which is indeed nearly the same as that which I sent you in August; and I beg you to attend particularly to what I stated in a recent letter respecting the purchases of bullion at Lisbon by the Americans. Seven weeks have elapsed since the date of our last accounts from England.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 14th November, 1811.

‘I believe that our train and stores, and the means of moving them, are in the following situation.

‘The Engineer’s stores, with the carts and bullocks, ready to move; the gun bullocks at Lamego, but the guns at Villa da Ponte; the ordnance stores, powder, shot, &c., at Villa da Ponte, but the carts, &c., employed by the Commissary General. I beg that you will order what there are the means of moving to proceed by regular easy stages to Almeida, and that you will send to Mr. Boyes for the bullocks to draw the guns; and as soon as they arrive, let them proceed likewise to Almeida.

‘The ordnance stores must be left where they are, till the means of conveyance for the Engineer’s stores can be sent back to convey them by trips to Almeida, as I fear that it will be impossible to take the cars from the commissariat for that purpose. However, if Mr. Boyes is of opinion that they can be taken without inconvenience, I have no objection; and the ordnance stores for the train may come on as fast as there shall be means of conveyance for them.

‘Let the company of artillery move with such part of the equipment as you may think proper.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major Dickson, R.A.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 15th November, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 6th instant, and I entirely concur with you in the approbation which you have expressed of the conduct of Colonel Skerrett up to the 21st of October, when the enemy retired from his position at San Roque.

‘ It is not my wish or intention to interfere with your discretion in detaching troops from Cadiz. When first I detached troops from this army to that station, I ordered that they should not quit the limits of the harbor; but the events of the war in that quarter may render it expedient that a detachment should be made from Cadiz, and there may not be time to receive my opinion upon the measure. In deciding upon measures of this description in future, however, I wish you to advert to the following points.

‘ First, that the object for which you detach the troops is specified, and important in itself.

‘ Secondly, that there is a prospect that the detachment of the British troops to be sent will have the desired effect.

‘ Thirdly, that they shall be at all times in secure communication with their shipping; for which their Commanding Officer must be held responsible under his instructions, whatever may be the orders he may receive from the Spanish General Officer under whose command he may be placed.

‘ Fourthly, that the British troops detached shall act together in a body under the immediate command of their own Commanding Officer.

‘ When you made the detachment to Tarifa, all the points above recited appeared to me to have been attended to. But I would beg you to observe, that, as soon as the French retired, the object for which Colonel Skerrett was sent was accomplished; and he has remained for no specified object. I would therefore suggest to you, that if there is no specified object for his remaining any longer, he should be withdrawn.

‘ The consequences of his remaining under existing circumstances, must be to involve him and his detachment in the operations of General Ballesteros, which, if they have a specified object, that General, even with the assistance of the British troops, has not the means of accomplishing;

and the British detachment must in the course of these operations be exposed to be cut off from the shipping.

‘ These operations may be very useful to the cause, and highly creditable to General Ballesteros, even though they may not have a specified object, or may not be successful. But it was not my intention when I detached part of the army to Cadiz, nor is it the intention of the British Government, that any detachment of His Majesty’s troops should take part in those operations.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 15th November, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters to the 6th instant, and I now enclose my last dispatch.

‘ I write by this opportunity to General Cooke, to suggest to him the expediency of drawing back Colonel Skerrett’s detachment. I know the Spaniards well, and particularly Ballesteros. They will never stop till they shall have lost that detachment. It may have been very proper to send it to secure Tarifa, or for any special object, taking care that its communication should be always secure with the sea coast. But it will not answer to allow our troops to remain in search of adventures, under the guidance of such men as Ballesteros.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 15th November, 1811.

‘ I think it proper to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I have written to Major General Cooke, in regard to Colonel Skerrett’s detachment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 16th November, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th, and I now return Dom Miguel Forjaz’ papers. I agree that the last,

may, that all the papers in No. 4, allude pretty clearly to him; but excepting the last they have all been answered.

‘The question is, what is Dom Miguel Forjaz’ object? I suppose to remove from the mind of the Prince the notion that he caused and promoted a misunderstanding between the Governors of the Kingdom and me, and to obtain from His Royal Highness an acknowledgment of the erroneous judgment he had formed upon that subject. This object is legitimate, and I think it one which Dom Miguel Forjaz ought to endeavor by all prudent means to accomplish.

‘The next question is, what are these means? I must say, not the topics into which he has entered in his letter of the 8th November, addressed to the Governors of the Kingdom. In that letter, he has entered not only into the origin and cause of the misunderstanding, but has shown much more clearly than I was ever able to show, that I had, that the people of this country had, and that the Prince had, most just ground for complaint of the Bishop and the Principal. But I would ask, is the Prince a person upon whom such a representation is likely to have any effect? Does Dom Miguel Forjaz believe, that when I and the British Government have failed in prevailing upon him to examine fairly these same circumstances, he is likely, even with his stronger statement, to produce a different result? Will not his statement be contradicted, and all kinds of misstatement and sophistry be used to conceal the truth from the Prince, in this case, in the same manner as the same arts were used to blind him in regard to the statement transmitted by me a year ago? What will be the consequence? If the Prince takes any official notice of his paper, it will be to repeat the accusation that he caused the misunderstanding; and probably he will add to it that, after it had been reconciled, he endeavored to foment it again.

‘The worst of this accusation will be, that the world, who never half inform themselves of those matters on which they will pronounce a judgment, will sanction with their opinion this decision of the Prince. I would therefore recommend to Dom Miguel Forjaz to leave out of his letter of the 8th November all that I have marked with pencil, and in lieu thereof, to write what I state in the enclosed paper. This will probably bring a fair answer from the Prince, and

there will be an end to the business. He may depend upon it, that the other mode will not accomplish his object.

‘ Believe me, &c.

*His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I think also the words which I have marked, in regard to the Conde de Linhares, might as well be left out of the letter, as pointing at a motive for Linhares’ conduct which, however true the allusion may be, had better not be made on this occasion.

‘ W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 17th November, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th, and I hope that you are as sorry to leave us as I am to lose your co-operation in our task. I was in hopes that I should have had your assistance till the end of the war; but if you are to go, Government could not make choice of a successor whose appointment will be more agreeable to me.

‘ I am particularly sorry to lose you for the concern on which you are going, as I agree with you in thinking, that you will effect no good purpose*. I shall send you the copy of a letter which I wrote to my brother Henry some time ago upon this subject, which will show you what I thought about it.

‘ I hope it is yet possible that you will not go. The Spaniards never more than half consented to our mediation, and that only upon a condition with which it is impossible that our Government can comply. If they do not now relish the measure, they will get rid of it by the usual way,—by delay; and in the meantime, I hope that you will not quit your present station.

‘ Believe me, &c.

*His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I send you the copy of my letter to my brother, which I beg you to return, as it is the only one I have †.

‘ W.’

* Mr. Stuart had been named as Chief of a Commission for settling the disputes between Spain and her American colonies.

† See letter to the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, 14th July, 1811, page 106.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Freneda, 18th November, 1811, 9 A.M.

‘I just write to mention that I hear from Austin of a collection of troops at Seville, which Victoria likewise mentions in a foolish letter which I have from him.

‘Attend to Ouguela and Campo Mayor in the first instance, and if Soult should be too strong for you in Estremadura, which I should think he can scarcely be, and you cannot hold the position of Portalegre, you have your instructions where to fall back.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. If you do not already correspond with Austin, you had better do so. ‘W.’

To ——— ———

‘SIR, ‘Head Quarters, 20th November, 1811.

‘I have received your two letters, and I concur with you in thinking that the only mode in which you can expiate the injury which you have done to your country, by aiding a cruel foreign enemy to invade it, is by giving me every intelligence in your power. If you do give me such intelligence, I will endeavor to procure for you a pardon for your offences, but it must be real intelligence, of a useful description, and sent with celerity, and frequently.

‘If you will point out the person at Alcantara through whose hands the money is to be sent to you, I will send it, or will adopt any other mode you will point out of supplying you. I gave the bearer of your letters twelve dollars, and I shall reward any person you may employ to bring me letters.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘——— ———.’

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For the Commissary General.

‘Freneda, 20th November, 1811.

‘In consequence of the difficulty of procuring carts for the service of the army in the country, Mr. Kennedy and I had arranged that a number of bullock carts should be con-

structed, to be drawn by bullocks belonging to the public, and to be driven by persons hired into the public service for that purpose.

‘ The patterns of the carts are fixed upon, and they are about to be constructed at Almeida, at Lisbon, and in England, and, if possible, at Oporto and Vianna.

‘ The total number required is 800. Of this number under 200 will be constructed at Almeida. The number which can be constructed at Lisbon, Oporto, and Vianna, must depend upon the quantities of materials at those places respectively.

‘ As, however, some of these carts will soon be finished, it is desirable that as soon as possible the establishments of drivers and bullocks for them should be formed.

‘ Mr. Kennedy and I had settled that the carts should be formed into two grand divisions, each consisting of 400 carts, to be superintended by an Officer of the commissariat; each grand division to be formed into eight divisions of fifty carts each, to be superintended by a commissariat clerk; and each division to be formed into two brigades, each brigade to consist of twenty-five carts. To draw these carts there should be fifty-four bullocks, that is, two bullocks for each cart, and four spare bullocks attached to the brigade. The establishment of people attached to the brigade to load the carts, and drive and take care of the bullocks, should be, one *capataz*, at per diem; one smith, at per diem; nine men, at two pesettas per diem; and fourteen boys, at one pesettas per diem. These allowances to be besides their rations.

‘ The bullocks must be shod; and the Officers of the commissariat attached to the grand divisions and divisions should be directed to supply iron, &c. for that purpose to their divisions; and the carts must be greased, as the wheels are upon iron axletrees; and they must likewise supply grease.

‘ When the bullocks work, it will be necessary that they should receive, besides their forage, about 2½ lbs. of barley, or Indian corn, or rye, every day.

‘ The first measure to be adopted, with a view to the execution of the measure, is to form one grand division of the Officers and people to take charge of it. The Officer of the commissariat should be appointed to it; and one or two clerks, in the first instance, to take charge of divisions in the

grand division; and the *capatazes*, smiths, and drivers, should be hired to take charge of the cattle.

‘The cattle should then be made over to them and shod; and they should be collected in convenient places for shelter and forage till the carts should be prepared for the work. Yokes of the common kind should also be prepared.

‘It would likewise be necessary that sheds should be built to hold the bullocks of one division at every stage on the road between Raiva and Celorico, and at Celorico, in order to give them cover in the winter. The stages need not be less than four leagues, and should not exceed five leagues.

‘*J. Bissett, Esq.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For the Commissary General.

‘Freneda, 20th November, 1811.

‘The difficulties which the army already experience from the want of provisions, notwithstanding the number of mules employed in transporting provisions, point out the necessity of examining, very particularly, into the mode in which those mules are employed, and into the principles on which this branch of the service ought to be conducted.

‘The original formation of the commissariat of this army was one Assistant Commissary, with his separate establishment of clerks, means of conveyance to each brigade of infantry, to each regiment of cavalry, to each troop or brigade of horse or foot artillery, to the head quarters of the army, and to the reserve artillery.

‘The brigades of infantry of the army were afterwards joined together in divisions of two brigades, with a brigade of artillery, and a Portuguese brigade of infantry attached, but the establishment of the commissariat was never altered. When the British commissariat was charged, in the month of March last, with the supply of the Portuguese troops, there was no alteration of this establishment. The increase of business, and the necessary separation and allotment of supplies, rendered it expedient that one person should be at the head of the commissariat in each division, and a Deputy Commissary was appointed to superintend the duties of some

divisions, while those of others were superintended by the senior Assistants with the brigades in the division.

‘It is desirable that this distribution of employment should continue in the commissariat, and that the means of transport for all the troops should be founded on a supposed distance of twelve leagues from the magazine. The mules will go this distance loaded in three days, and unloaded in less time; and it may be reckoned that the supply will be kept up at this distance, by allowing them six days to perform it, and allowing, in addition to the numbers required for the supply, one sixth of the number of mules to be spared.

‘Each mule should be made to carry, on account of the public, 200 lbs.; and, besides this load, he should carry his own corn going from and returning to the magazine, which is 5 lbs. per diem, or 30 lbs. for the six days.

‘Upon this calculation a mule should carry biscuit for 6 days for 33 men; rum for 6 days for 100; rice for 6 days for 200 men; corn for 6 days for 3 horses, and 20 pounds over.

‘The Assistant Commissary attached to brigades of infantry and of foot artillery, and to troops of horse artillery, should therefore have placed at their disposal a number of mules in proportion to the number of men and animals they supply with provisions and forage calculated upon the above mentioned principles.

‘The Portuguese brigades of infantry serving in the British divisions have, or ought to have attached to them, mules to carry three days’ provisions. This is only half the number required, and these I believe are very incomplete. The state of these mules should be inquired into by the Deputy or Assistant Commissary at the head of the department in the division; and there should be placed at the disposal of the Deputy or Assistant Commissary, a sufficient number of mules to supply the Portuguese troops in the division, calculated upon the same principles as for the British troops. The expense of these mules will of course be charged to the Portuguese Government in the expense of feeding their troops.

‘There is attached to each division of infantry and to the cavalry, a number of mules to carry musket and carbine

ammunition, and there are many in the reserve of the artillery. These ought to be used, when the army halts, to carry from the dépôts their own supplies of corn and provisions. As they receive only five pounds of corn per diem, one sixth of their number will supply their corn, and but little more their bread. The bargain with them is that they are to carry ammunition only, but I have no doubt that they would be glad to carry the corn for their mules, in order to be more certain of a regular supply.

‘ In regard to the regiments of cavalry, the necessity of keeping them amply supplied with forage induced Mr. Kennedy to allot to each regiment a mule for every two men and horses which the Commissary attached to it had to supply. This number is rather more than would be allotted to a regiment of cavalry, to keep up its supply at a distance of twelve leagues, upon the calculation above stated for the infantry and artillery ; but it is better that the arrangement should continue as he has settled it.

‘ The means of transport of the army being once arranged upon this determined principle, it will be easy afterwards to apply them as may be thought most expedient. Some of the troops being nearer the magazine than twelve leagues, their surplus means of transport might be applied either to keep the magazines complete, or to form an entrepôt at a convenient distance for the use of those which are most distant, or in such other manner as the Commissary General may think proper, observing always to keep the proportions for the supply of a certain body according to the distance the mules have to go, and the time they will take going the distance.

‘ Thus, a mule 6 days going and returning will supply 33 men with bread ; 5 days, 40 men ; 4 days, 50 men ; 3 days, 66 men ; 2 days, 100 men ; and as the number may be diminished in proportion as the distance decreases, so the number must be increased in proportion as the distance from the magazine increases.

‘ *J. Bissett, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Freneda, 20th November, 1811, 12 at noon.

‘ I enclose a letter from Major General Craufurd, to which I beg to draw your particular attention.

‘ I request you to let me have a return of the number of mules employed with the Light division, and Captain Ross’ troop of horse artillery ; and a return of the number of persons and animals receiving rations in that division and the troop. Likewise the state of the magazines at Celorico, between the 10th and 20th instant.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. Bissett, Esq.,
Commissary General.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Freneda, 20th November, 1811.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s letter of the 21st ultimo, requesting me to inform you of the grounds upon which I had determined that no deductions for rations should be made from the pay of persons holding the situation of Assistant Provost Marshal ; and I beg to acquaint your Lordship that I have always considered persons so employed to be entitled to the same advantages as Staff Officers, whose pay, according to the book of General Regulations (page 64), is not liable to deduction on account of rations.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Right Hon.
the Secretary at War.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Freneda, 20th November, 1811.

‘ I have nothing to tell you in addition to what is contained in the enclosed dispatch, excepting that since I sent it off I have received a *Madrid Gazette* of the 10th, which contains a proclamation of Blake’s to the city of Valencia, of the 26th, from which it appears that he was beat on the 25th, having left the town to endeavor to raise the siege of

Saguntum! I suppose Mahy had joined him before the action.

‘There is nothing new from England to the 15th October.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 20th November, 1811.

‘I have received a report that General Ballesteros had made a second successful attack upon the enemy between Bornos and Xerez on the 5th instant. The details of this affair have not reached me, but I have no doubt that it took place, and that its result was favorable to the Spanish troops.

‘There is a report in the *Madrid Gazette*, that Marshal Suchet had beat General Mahy between Liria and Valencia on the 25th of October, and taken prisoner General Mahy, whose corps were dispersed. It was also stated that Marshal Suchet had summoned Valencia on the 27th. These reports do not appear to be official, and they are contradicted by other reports from Madrid, and by other reports which I have received from the south, which state that Suchet has been obliged to retire into Aragon. I am not exactly apprised of General Mahy’s plan of operations, or of the time of his march. But it appears to me that on his approach to Valencia, he would not have been on the line between Liria and Valencia, but on the right of the Chelva.

‘The last letters which I have received from Mr. Wellesley are dated the 6th instant, and he had not then received the accounts of General Ballesteros’ last success, nor of affairs in Valencia since the 11th of October.

‘No movement of any importance has taken place in Estremadura or in this quarter since I addressed your Lordship on the 13th instant. By a letter of the 11th, from Sir Howard Douglas, I learn that accounts had been received on that day from the Junta of Mondoñedo, stating that the enemy had entered Oviedo on the 6th instant.

‘I am afraid that the Spanish division in the Asturias had left the passes of the mountains unguarded, otherwise it is impossible that the French could have reached Oviedo without opposition, and that the first intelligence of their

movement should have announced their arrival in that city, and should have been received from the civil Junta of Mondoñedo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 20th November, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship’s dispatch of the 1st October (No. 61), and I beg to acquaint you, that the regiments named in the margin* sailed for England some time ago.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 20th November, 1811.

‘ I enclose the last weekly and morning states. The capture of the Prince d’Aremberg has occasioned a request from the Marquesa de S^{ta} Cruz, that an endeavor might be made to exchange him for the Marques de S^{ta} Cruz, a Grandee of Spain, who was seized by Buonaparte at Bayonne, I believe in 1808, and has been confined ever since in a fortress in Italy. It would be very desirable, if possible, to effect the exchange of the Marques de S^{ta} Cruz; but I do not recommend that the Prince d’Aremberg should be given for him: he is too great a card to be so thrown away. Besides, I should suppose that if Government were disposed to allow him to return to France in exchange for any person not an Officer, they would name Lord Beverley.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 21st Nov., 1811, 9 A.M.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 20th, and its enclosures, which I return.

‘ Upon the examination of the state of the means with the Light division, to the demands for supplies, on the prin-

* The 29th, 85th, and 97th.

ciple of the memorandum which I sent you yesterday, it appears that they have 4736 men, which number would require—

Mules to supply them with bread at 12	}	144
leagues - - -		
„ with spirits		48
„ with rice, &c.		24
		<hr/> 216

And they have 398 horses, whose corn	}	116
would require - - -		
		<hr/> 332

To this add spare one for every six - 55

		<hr/> 387
Number with the division - - -		340

Wanting - - -		<hr/> 47
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‘ I imagine that the muleteers and their mules, as well for carrying provisions as for carrying ammunition, are included in the number of 4736 men, and of 398 horses. If that is the case, it will turn out that this division is well supplied with means of transport.

‘ In respect to Captain Ross’ troop, they have, including muleteers, 243 men, requiring mules—

For bread - - -		71
For rum - - -		24
For rice - - -		12
		<hr/> 107

And they have 206 horses, requiring	}	69
mules - - -		
		<hr/> 176

To which add spare one for every six 29

		<hr/> 205
They have - - -		97

Wanting - - -		<hr/> 108
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‘ It is obvious, however, that the muleteers, probably, for the ammunition of the division, are included in the number

of men, and, probably, of horses, in this return, and therefore they may be complete. I have gone into this calculation just to apply the principle of the memorandum which I sent you yesterday. Let me know how many men and horses of both these returns are hired muleteers and their mules.

‘ But there is another view to be taken of this subject; and that is the distance which these troops are from the magazine. They are at least fifteen leagues from Celorico, and they cannot be less than fifteen leagues from St. João da Pesqueira. This distance will require eight, or probably nine days, for a communication. Some measures must be adopted, therefore, to supply these troops with one-third more of bread and corn than their mules can carry to them from these magazines, even supposing they are sufficiently supplied for a distance of twelve leagues from the magazines. And these measures are either a supply of money, or an additional number of mules, or to send them every week three days’ supply from hence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Bissett, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 22d November, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th, with the enclosure, from Mr. Boyes. I beg that you will tell Mr. Boyes that I am very much obliged to him for the zealous desire which he manifests to forward our stores, but that I cannot allow the depôt at Celorico to remain unsupplied, at least till that of St. João da Pesqueira is fully supplied. I request him to correspond on this point with the Commissary General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R.A.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 22d November, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 9th, I have heard from General Trant that there are at Oporto fifty-nine axletrees, and twelve more can be made, and boxes for the wheels;

so that I have ordered there the pattern cart, and have desired that seventy-one carts may be made there. I have not yet heard that there are any axletrees, or that any can be made at Raiva.

‘ The tools are arrived, and the work is begun at Almeida. I have given Mr. Bissett a memorandum, of which I enclose a copy, for the formation of the establishment. Probably some of the brigades might be formed at Lisbon.

‘ Marshal Beresford has been so kind as to give me over some axletrees, boxes, &c., which were found on the Zezere; and he promised to inquire whether there were any more at Lisbon. Trant tells me that sixty-four were sent from Oporto; and I think it probable that there will be many; and some at Santarem, and others at Pernes, where the French destroyed carriages. You had better speak to Marshal Beresford upon these subjects.

‘ I trust that your health is improved. I have written to the Admiral to beg that he will give a passage in a ship of war to General Campbell, of which you and Pakenham might avail yourselves to get to England, as I should be sorry to hear of your ending your career in a French prison.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above, I have received a letter from Sir William Beresford, from which I learn that the greatest number of the axletrees have been used; and I am not certain that there are more than fifty, even including those on the Zezere, and a few more expected from Abrantes.

‘ You had better order Major Aird to make as many carts as there are French axletrees for, immediately. Then to set to work and make our old axletrees and boxes into carts; choosing of these, those of the first instance which come nearest to the French size. He must take care, however, in casing our axletrees, not to mount the carriage too high above the centre of the wheels.

‘ Desire him to let me know how many French axletrees that will answer he will find in the arsenal, and how many of our old axletrees.

‘ W ’

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 22d November, 1811.

‘I have received your letters, Nos. 9 and 10, of the 29th of October and 11th of November.

‘Without knowing more than I do of the state of Galicia, and of the military positions in that province, it is not possible for me to give an opinion upon the plan of operations which you detailed in your conference with the Junta of Galicia. In reference to the subject generally, and with a view to what passed before in that kingdom, I believe that it would be advisable that General Abadia should fall back towards the frontiers of Portugal, leaving open the high road to Coruña and Ferrol.

‘The enemy cannot then interrupt his communications by operations upon either of his flanks; and, unless they should be very strong, they will not like to venture as far as Coruña, or even Lugo, by the high road, if General Abadia can maintain himself upon the Sil, or upon the Minho. They cannot be strong in Galicia as long as we remain here.

‘In regard to your opinions on the financial measures in Galicia, I am convinced that the Government must raise a revenue in money. It may be very proper, besides, to make the proprietors of carts, mules, and other animals, perform certain services in their turns, either for the payment of the usual hire, or for a smaller payment, or for no payment at all. But these services ought not to be in lieu of the payment in money of the required dues to the State.

‘Since I have received your letter of the 11th, I have received a report that the French had retired again from the Asturias. This may be true; as Lieut. General Hill’s movements in Estremadura in the end of October have created a general alarm, which probably extended so far north.

‘Dorsenne has certainly returned to Valladolid.

‘I cannot imagine how the first report of the enemy’s invasion of Asturias, and arrival at Oviedo, should have been received from the Civil Junta of Mondoñedo, if the division in that principality made any resistance; or how the French could at this season have penetrated the pass^{es}

of the mountains at all, even if the troops were in their posts.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a dispatch of the 17th October from the Secretary of State, announcing that certain supplies had been sent to Coruña, which I beg you will issue to the troops under General Abadia.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain — — —.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 22d November, 1811.

‘ I send you separate answers on the subject of the noblemen, and of the Capitão Mor of Zibreira.

‘ I beg you to take care how you communicate with the Portuguese in the French army. They are in desperate circumstances; and men in those circumstances do anything, however bad and traitorous.

‘ Do not let any one of them know where you are, on any account; and be particularly cautious that a second individual of them does not discover that you are in correspondence with one of them. Be assured, that those who have betrayed their country are not to be trusted in any manner.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain — — —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain José Clementi Pereira.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 22d November, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letters of the 20th, and I am very much obliged to you for your intelligence, and very well satisfied with all that you have done. Give such reward as you may think proper to the person who took the letter, and brought the answer from the two noblemen, and I will pay it; and pay likewise to the party d’El Medico any expenses they may have incurred, which shall likewise be defrayed by me. Assure the noblemen that they will be well received by me.

‘ Tell the party d’El Medico, that if they want ammunition, or anything that I can give them, and will send means of conveyance here for it, they shall have it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain José Clementi Pereira.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Don Carlos de España.

‘MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, ‘Freneda, ce 22 Novembre, 1811.

‘J’ai reçu il y’a deux heures votre lettre d’aujourd’hui : et j’ai envoyé des ordres à nos troupes qui sont dans ces environs de se rassembler demain matin du côté de Guinaldo, El Bodon, Pastores, etc., et celles de l’autre côté de la rivière à Zamarra.

‘J’irai moi-même à Guinaldo demain ou le lendemain matin ; mais je crois le lendemain.

‘Je vous conseille de faire rassembler votre infanterie à San Felices el Grande pour être préparé à passer la rivière, ou à co-operer avec nos troupes, si nous pouvons passer la rivière au gué de Pastores.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘Général

‘WELLINGTON.

Don Carlos de España.

‘P. S. Je compte que l’ennemi marchera demain, et arrivera dans ces environs le 25. Don Julian fera bien de les observer.

‘W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Freneda, 22d November, 1811.

‘By some accident I did not receive your letter of the 13th till two days ago, and it was necessary that I should speak to Fletcher before I could send you a satisfactory answer.

‘When the pontoons came from England, I applied to have with them a number of the artificers belonging to the civil branch of the ordnance ; and I understand they have with them a certain number of firemen, &c. ; and I intended to make up the establishment when I should want to use them, by requesting your assistance to give us a few Portuguese or English seamen.

‘In addition to what we have, I understand that we are to have a regular pontoon master from the Ordnance ; and it would be very desirable when we shall want to use the pontoons, to have the assistance of about twenty seamen, either English or Portuguese, for whose services I shall be very much obliged.

‘ Unfortunately, we cannot use the pontoons to form a bridge over the rivers of the Coa and the Agueda. The bridge which I am constructing for the latter river is one upon loaded *chevalets*, which I hope will stand in the ordinary state of the river during the winter. When the great floods come down, we must take up our bridge; and indeed I do not propose to keep it in the river, excepting when I want to use it.

‘ I think it not impossible, however, that I may want to use the pontoons before the winter is over.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Bishop of Castello Branco.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuento Guinaldo, 25th November, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose some letters which I have received on the subject on which you did me the honor to write to me; from which it appears that the Commanding Officer of the 3d dragoons having already had a communication with you on the subject of the conduct of the soldiers at Ninho de Assor, you had expressed your satisfaction with his explanation, and that you did not intend to complain to me. I am apprehensive, therefore, that the answers to the inquiries which I had made, which answers I enclose, do not relate to the transaction on which you wrote to me.

‘ If they do not, or if you are not satisfied with the explanations contained in these answers, I beg you to inform me of it, and I will have the subject inquired into by a Court Martial, before which it will be necessary that the witnesses should attend.

‘ I am inclined to believe that the inhabitants of Ninho de Assor, having been displeased that the party of dragoons should have taken away their forage, misrepresented and made an exaggerated complaint to you. It is very unfortunate that the people of Portugal cannot have the advantage of the assistance of a large foreign army to defend their country, without incurring some inconvenience. The horses of the cavalry must have forage, paying for the same, or they will die, and this country will derive no advantage from all the expense which has been incurred in bringing them here.

It may be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Ninho de Assor to supply any part of this forage, even though it is paid for, but the others must bear this inconvenience, or they must bear the greater evil of submitting to the French.

‘I have stated these circumstances to you as they have occurred to me, being, however, determined to maintain the discipline of the army, and not to allow the soldiers to insult the religion, or to injure the property of the inhabitants of the country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Bishop of Castello Branco.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To General Don Carlos de España.

‘à Fuente Guinaldo,
ce 25 Nov., 1811.

‘MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘Je viens d’avoir l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 24, et je serais bien aise de pouvoir aider les peuples de la Sierra de Francia, si c’était en mon pouvoir.

‘Il faut que je vous dise cependant que c’est avec la plus grande difficulté que je peux faire subsister les troupes dans les positions qu’elles occupent à présent. Je tire tout des magasins sur la mer. Le pays ne me fournit absolument rien. Les Espagnols ne donnent rien sans qu’on paye argent comptant, malgré qu’ils sachent bien que nous n’avons jamais manqué de payer nos dettes; et quand nous avons de l’argent, et que les Espagnols veulent nous donner quelques provisions, c’est à un prix si énorme, que nous sommes fournis à meilleur marché de la mer, malgré les frais de transport.

‘Il ne m’est donc pas possible d’étendre mes postes permanens dans le Sierra de Francia, où mes troupes et leurs chevaux mourraient de faim: et je vous dis la vérité quand je vous assure que je ne crois pas que les soldats ou leurs chevaux qui sont à présent à Zamarra ont de quoi manger; parceque les habitans de Saugo, Martiago, Robleda, Zamarra, Atalaya, Serradilla, &c., où nous avons dépensé tant d’argent pendant l’été, ne veulent rien donner à présent sans argent comptant. Il n’est pas facile de prévenir les courses de l’ennemi entre les avant postes des deux armées. Il faudrait étendre les postes de l’armée pour les empêcher définitivement de lever des contributions dans la Sierra de Francia; et comme je vous l’ai expliqué je ne puis étendre

les miens. Sous ce point de vue c'est malheureux que les armes, pour lesquelles je vous ai donné les ordres au mois d'Août, ne sont pas encore arrivées, et que vous n'avez pas de troupes Espagnoles à mettre dans la Sierra, auxquelles les gens du pays peut-être donneraient des vivres.

‘ Il y a une autre raison pour laquelle il ne faudrait pas à présent s'avancer dans la Sierra. Si l'ennemi apprend que nous sommes préparés pour empêcher l'entrée du convoi, il ne bougera pas de Salamanca, et nous manquerons un beau coup, qu'il est probable que nous pourrions lui porter.

‘ Cependant j'ai écrit au Général Craufurd, qui est à Zammarra, pour savoir l'état exact de ses vivres, afin que si je trouve que c'est possible, et qu'il n'y ait pas d'inconvénient à faire une marche sur la Sierra, je puisse lui en donner l'ordre.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *General*

Don Carlos de España.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th November, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from my brother, which I beg you to forward. I wish you would make the trumpeter give a detailed account of all he knows of Lieut. King's death.

‘ I beg that you will inform the Comte d'Erlon that I had always been disposed to consider the persons belonging to the civil departments of the armies as not liable to be considered as prisoners of war when taken, till I read the correspondence between a Commissioner appointed by His Majesty, and one appointed by the French Government, to regulate the exchange of prisoners, in which I see the peers of the realm, and individual travellers of all descriptions, seized in France, and in other countries, when the war commenced, were to be considered as prisoners of war, and to be exchanged as such for French Officers and soldiers; that when travellers are considered as prisoners of war, I cannot consider the persons belonging to any civil department of the army in any other light; and that I shall not allow one of them to be returned to the French army unless exchanged.

‘ I have no objection to an exchange, either partial or general; but, before I consent to it, I beg to have the names,

in writing, of those it is intended to exchange for the prisoners in our possession belonging to the civil departments of the French army.

‘ I have requested General Castaños to inquire into the circumstances of Lieut. King’s death.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Desire Rooke to give the Officer who goes in with the next flag of truce a copy of the orders upon this subject.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo,

27th November, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ I have nothing to tell you that is not contained in the enclosed dispatch. If the French had come forward with another convoy on any day after the 24th, I think we should have cut them off. We cannot prevent them from making excursions to the Sierra, without occupying it with our posts, and the Spaniards will not support our troops, and I cannot support them at such a distance from our magazines. As it is I cannot stay much longer where we are, and I must immediately make another distribution: but I shall remain in this quarter till the winter has fairly set in.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 27th November, 1811.

‘ Having received intelligence that the enemy were about to move towards Ciudad Rodrigo with another convoy of provisions, and having heard that a body of troops marched from Salamanca to the Sierra de Francia, on the 22d and 23d instant, I ordered our advanced guard across the Agueda to Zamarra, and closed up the cantonments of the army in general, and moved the head quarters to this place. I have reason to believe that the enemy have since retired from the Sierra de Francia; and I think it probable that they will have heard of our movements; and that if they entertained the intention of moving a convoy to Ciudad

Rodrigo, they will now abandon it till the rain shall have again swelled the Agueda. If I should find that they do not move, I propose to send the troops back to their cantonments, or to others in which it will be easy to subsist them.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 20th instant, I have heard that General Blake, having been joined at Valencia by the army of Murcia, under the command of General Mahy, had moved out of Valencia on the 24th of October, and had attacked Marshal Suchet on the 25th. He was repulsed; and, according to the French accounts, they have taken General Caro and General Loy, and 4500 prisoners, and some cannon.

‘ General Blake states, in his proclamation to the people of Valencia, that his retreat had been made in good order. On the 26th, at night, the castle of Saguntum capitulated; and it is stated that Suchet summoned Valencia on the 27th.

‘ The castle of Saguntum has made as brilliant a defence as any that has been made since the commencement of the war in Spain. The enemy made several attempts to obtain possession of it by assault, before they brought up their cannon to attack it regularly; and two attempts to carry it by storm, after the breach was made, previous to the action of the 25th of October, in both of which, as well as in all the attacks before the breach was made, they were repulsed with considerable loss. The garrison conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry on all these occasions.

‘ I have not heard what passed between the battle of the 25th and the capitulation of the 26th; but adverting to the good conduct of the garrison, and as the enemy were ill provided with heavy cannon to support their attack, the place would probably have held out, if the action of the 25th of October had not been fought and lost. If I am right in this conjecture, the Spaniards will owe the loss of another kingdom, and the allies disadvantages of which the consequences cannot be calculated, to the insatiable desire of fighting pitched battles with undisciplined troops, led by inexperienced Officers.

‘ By a letter from Sir Howard Douglas, of the 14th, I learn that, as I had imagined, the passes of the Asturias were not guarded, and that the enemy turned by La Ventana. The troops which were in the pass of Pajares

(the Spanish head quarters), retired to Campomanes. I imagine that the object of the enemy's movement into the Asturias is to disperse the assembly of troops under General Mendizabal in the mountains of Santander, in which I am afraid they will succeed. If they had intended to attack Galicia through the Asturias, they would, from La Ventana, have pressed more vigorously upon the right of the Spanish troops in that principality, and would not have gone to Oviedo in the first instance.

'According to the last accounts from Cadiz, General Ballesteros was still at Bornos on the 13th; and I imagine that General Copons and Colonel Skerrett were at Casa Vieja. According to accounts from Captain Everard, of His Majesty's ship *Sophia*, the enemy, on the 17th, moved a body of troops, consisting of 1500 men, from Conil upon Vejer, which will probably have obliged Colonel Skerrett to retire again upon Tarifa.

I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

'MY DEAR LORD,

'Fuente Guinaldo, 27th November, 1811.

'I enclose the last weekly state, and the last morning report.

'You see that the army does not become much more efficient, notwithstanding that the number of sick upon the return diminishes. We have sent home a great number of men, besides the 29th, 85th, and 97th regiments, and some have died: the troops are certainly better, however, but not in a state to undertake any operation of magnitude. Any movement, and particularly exposure to the night air, throws them into the hospitals again.

'The newly arrived dragoons are particularly inefficient, so much so, that I have been obliged to leave them all, the five new regiments, in their cantonments, in our recent movement, and have brought forward only the six which have been here during the whole service: this shows the advantage of troops inured to climate and service.

'Believe me, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*'

'WELLINGTON

To General Don Carlos de España.

‘ Fuente Guinaldo,
ce 28 Nov., 1811.

‘ MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

‘ Je n’ai pas reçu de nouvelles du détachement de l’ennemi qui est venu à la Sierra depuis qu’il a quitté Alverca. Ce détachement a marché de Salamanca le 22, et est arrivé à Alverca le 24. Le 23, votre Excellence m’a écrit une lettre dans laquelle vous dites m’avoir envoyé un papier avec ces nouvelles. J’ai reçu cette lettre le 23 dans la nuit, mais le papier n’y était pas ; et je n’ai rien su de l’ennemi que dans la journée du 24. C’était alors trop tard de faire quelque chose ; et d’ailleurs nous n’avions point de vivres.

‘ Les mêmes difficultés de vivres rendent très important que je remette les troupes tout de suite dans leurs anciens cantonnemens : mais pendant que la rivière donne des gués, je crois que je pourrai empêcher que l’ennemi puisse faire entrer rien à Ciudad Rodrigo, pourvu que premièrement on vous donne avis de la marche du convoi, s’il est possible, un jour avant qu’il ne marche ; et que secondement vous m’en donniez avis aussitôt que vous le recevrez.

‘ Je changerai mon quartier général demain à Freneda. J’en donnerai avis à votre Officier qui est à Lumbrales ; et je ferai changer le relais qui est à présent à Gallegos.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Don Carlos de España.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th November, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th, enclosing a regulation for the means of transport, of which I approve, excepting the 2d section of the 6th article. As I explained in my late letters to the Government, it is impossible to carry into execution those provisions of any arrangement which are in favor of the owners of transport, unless the army should be sufficiently supplied, and every man should be obliged to bring forward his carriage when required.

‘ The 2d section of the 6th article should be struck out of the regulation.

‘ I also think the penalty of non-attendance not sufficient. Half the nation would prefer to be in prison for a fortnight to going to serve with the army with his cart. The penalty of non-attendance should be the full value of the cart and

bullocks, which the magistrate should be authorized and required to sell on the spot, and to report that he had done so to the head inspector.

‘There is likewise another very common crime not adverted to in this regulation, and that is deserting with the stores laden in the cart, after having been received into the service. The punishment for this offence ought to be the forfeiture of the cart and bullocks to the public, payment of the value of the stores, to be levied by sale of house and goods of the owner of the cart, and banishment for years to the coast of Africa.

‘These punishments may appear severe, but depend upon it that the only chance the people have is, that there should be the means of enforcing this regulation.

‘There is also another point to be adverted to in this regulation, and that is the duties it enforces upon the magistrates. The magistrates of this country are in a very unfortunate situation. They are originally charged with judicial duties; they had fees by which they gained a livelihood, their salaries being trivial. They gained nothing by the performance of their duties of police; but the bad probably gained something by the omission to perform them.

‘The confusion which has resulted from the different invasions of the country have almost put an end to the judicial duties of the magistrates; at the same time that the duties of police, particularly those which have relation to the operations of the armies, have been vastly increased, such as the supply of quarters, provisions, means of transport, guides, &c. &c., for which the *Juiz de Fora* is called upon at every moment. The consequence is that the *Juiz de Fora* has much to do, and nothing to live upon; and I hinted some time ago to the Government the expediency of taking into consideration their situations during the continuance of the war. I think, however, that this regulation would afford an opportunity of doing something for these magistrates, without any very great additional expense to the public, by authorizing them to demand and receive as a fee for every carriage they should produce at the place required, the sum of 200 reis. This would tend to ensure the execution of the regulation, which is what is required.

‘I am doing a great deal to lighten the demand for

carriages from the country for the service of the British army. First, I am building 800. Secondly, I have discovered that the Douro can be made navigable even into Spain, with very little trouble, and I have ordered the necessary work to be performed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. The regulation, when passed, should be well translated and printed, and let me have several copies of it. I shall take care to enforce it in this army. It should take effect at some short period after it is promulgated.

‘ W.’

To Senhor João Carlos Oliveira Pimentel.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fuente Guinaldo, 28th November, 1811.

‘ Having lately sent an Officer of Engineers to survey the Douro from St. João de Pesqueira to Barca d’Alva, he has reported to me that the river is already navigable to that point for large boats, with some inconvenience, and at certain seasons of the year; and that it might be made navigable with convenience at all seasons, by a certain degree of labor. I have given directions to Captain Ross, of the Royal Engineers, the Officer who surveyed the river, to adopt the measures which are necessary to render it navigable; and I beg you to give him such assistance as you can to enable him to perform this service.

‘ Understanding that you have from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent the power to destroy the mill dams in the river Douro, which are the principal obstruction to the navigation, I request you to co-operate with Captain Ross in the performance of this work.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Senhor*

João Carlos Oliveira Pimentel.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Juiz, or other Magistrate of Villa Nova do Foz Coa, Torre de Moncorvo, Freixo de Nemão, and St. João da Pesqueira.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Freneda, 29th November, 1811.

‘ I have employed Captain Ross, of the Royal Engineers, to perform certain works upon the Douro, in order to render

the river navigable as high up as possible for the service of the army. I beg you to give him such assistance of workmen, with their tools, as he may require for this work, he paying them their hire. For this you will be responsible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Juiz of*

Villa Nova do Foz Coa, &c.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 2d December, 1811.

‘ I received at the same time your letters of the 24th and 28th, and by the same post a dispatch from Lord Liverpool, of which I enclose a copy, regarding the troop ships and small transports for the Douro and Mondego; and a letter, of which I enclose an extract, regarding the subject to which yours of the 24th relates; the last is exactly of the same purport with that which you have received from Mr. Yorke.

‘ In answer to the last paragraph of your letter of the 24th, I assure you that I shall be very sorry if any change is made in your situation, which is not wished for by yourself.

‘ I shall write to my brother again respecting the employment of the ships of your squadron exclusively in carrying the money from Cadiz for this army.

‘ I observe that you have had some correspondence with Captain Holloway, of the Engineers, regarding the construction of furnaces for hot shot in the sea batteries of the Tagus. I am desirous that this work should be performed by the Portuguese engineers, as being necessary for the completion of the old works of the country. If I were to allow our engineers to perform any work (not immediately necessary for our own accommodation) in the ancient fortifications of the country, I should have to incur an expense nearly equal to the subsidy, as there is nothing which the Portuguese Government would not throw upon us. I have therefore drawn the line as above stated.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

*Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to His Royal Highness
the Commander in Chief.*

‘MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘Freneda, 2d December, 1811.

‘I have received your letters of the 28th October and of the 3d November, and I am very much obliged to His Royal Highness for attending to my requests in favor of Brig. Generals Murray, Hulse, Pakenham, and Mackinnon. The arrangement for the rank of the British Officers in the Portuguese service was not made according to my opinion, but I am inclined to believe it was right. It has worked well, at all events, which is the best test of its soundness, and it requires only a little attention in bringing the troops together, in order to avoid inconvenience from those parts of it which one would wish to be otherwise than they are. Anything would be better than an alteration at present.

‘I am obliged to you for attending to our wants of General Officers. — did not succeed very well when he was here before, but I dare say he will do so now. I have a high opinion of General Kempt from all that I have heard of him. We have now more than we can well dispose of, particularly if Beckwith comes out again; and there are two with whom we could dispense with advantage. — and —. They are both respectable Officers as commanders of regiments, but they are neither of them very fit to take charge of a large body. I understand that — wishes to return home to unite himself with a lady of *easy virtue*; and — has been very ill lately, and I think might be induced to go. I shall try if I can get them away in this manner, as I would not on any account hurt the feelings of either.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 3d December, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 29th, and I concur in your giving the Portuguese Government 20,000*l.*, or any sum you please. It is well, however, to continue the threat to pay no more till the military chest shall be established.

‘I desired that 50,000 dollars of the sum recently received from Cadiz should be paid to you.

‘ I shall desire Mr. Bissett to receive the 24,000 dollars for the marine stores sent to Algiers.

‘ I intended to write to you this morning, to recommend that the Government should take up my proclamation of April last, as the ground of their proceeding in respect to the concealment of property by the people. This appears to be Nogueira’s opinion, and I see that they propose sending me the papers on the subject, so that I shall be able to put the business in such a train as not to create unnecessary alarm.

‘ You will have seen that the Marquez de Valença and the Marquez Ponte de Lima and Colonel Vasconcellos, went from Guinaldo towards Lisbon some days ago.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 4th December, 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of this date. I have received one or two reports of a general movement by the enemy to this quarter with another convoy. They must come before long, or the place will be distressed.

‘ Admiral Berkeley has written to me again upon the employment of the ships of his squadron to carry our money from Cadiz and Gibraltar to Lisbon. As the Officers and men of this squadron perform all the duties of the army, it is but fair that they should enjoy any benefit to be derived from the service. At all events, it is not fair that they should perform all the severe and unpleasant duty, and that those of another squadron should enjoy the benefit. On these principles I settled that a ship of the Admiral’s squadron should go to Cadiz periodically to bring away the money which Mr. Duff might have for us; but it has frequently happened that it has been sent in one of the vessels of the squadron at Cadiz, even though one of Admiral Berkeley’s squadron has been waiting there; and in a recent instance, the Admiral says, that in the order given by —, it was stated that the vessel was sent by your particular desire.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire

Duff to send this money by the vessel which Admiral Berkeley will send for it periodically. If this should not be done, it would be better that we should not suffer the inconvenience of sending the vessel.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Freneda, 4th December, 1811.

‘I received only by the last post your letter of the 3d October. Lest it should be imagined that I have any desire that Admiral Berkeley should be relieved, I mention that it is impossible for two Officers to be on better terms than we are. I have always found the Admiral not only disposed to give us every assistance in his power, but to anticipate and exceed our wishes in this way. I know that the Duke of Richmond and Lord Bathurst are anxious that the Admiral should remain, and I would submit to many inconveniences to gratify them; but it would really be unjust to Admiral Berkeley to say otherwise than that he anticipates all our wishes, and that we go on very well with him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 4th December, 1811.

‘According to the intention which I communicated to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 27th November, I withdrew our advanced guard across the Agueda on the 29th, and again extended the cantonments of the army.

‘The impossibility of finding subsistence on the spot, and the difficulty of procuring means of transport in Portugal to move forward our magazines from the places at which the rivers ceased to be navigable, have obliged me at present to extend the cantonments, particularly of the cavalry, farther than would be expedient on military considerations. But offensive military operations in the present season are almost impracticable, and I hope that I have kept in this neighborhood a force sufficiently large to prevent the enemy from undertaking anything.

‘ Don Carlos de España has informed me that he attacked the enemy on the 28th of November, on their retreat from the Sierra de Francia, between Miranda and Endrinal, with a detachment of Don Julian Sanchez’ infantry, and a detachment of the Regiment de la Princessa. On their arrival at Endrinal they were attacked by Don Julian Sanchez with his cavalry, and were obliged to form in a square.

‘ Don Carlos informs me that the enemy suffered considerable loss, and that his troops got possession of some of the money of which the enemy had plundered the inhabitants of the Sierra de Francia.

‘ Don Carlos de España mentions particularly the conduct of Lieut. William Reid, of the Royal Engineers, who attended him upon this expedition, having before been employed to perform a service under his directions.

‘ I have received no intelligence either from Galicia or from Cadiz, or from Valencia, since I addressed your Lordship on the 27th of November. It appears that the troops which have entered Asturias belong to General Bonet’s division of the army of the north, which division was employed to observe the army of Galicia at the period at which the armies of the north and of Portugal were collected in September for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 4th December, 1811.

‘ I enclose the last morning reports. The cold weather has occasioned an increase of deaths in the hospitals lately; this was to be expected; but I have not heard of any bad description of sickness.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 4th December, 1811.

‘ I have a report that Suchet has suffered severely by a sortie from Valencia, and by an attack upon him from the Valencian peasantry, and had been obliged to retire upon

Murviedro. Reports of this description have generally been the forerunner of accounts of some serious disaster to the Spaniards, and I am very apprehensive that Valencia is lost.

‘ The loss of this place is of great importance; the greater number of the grandees of Spain have estates in Valencia, upon the revenues of which they have subsisted since they have lost everything elsewhere. It may be expected, therefore, that the loss of this kingdom will induce many to wish to submit to the French yoke. The probability that the fall of Valencia would immediately follow the loss of Tarragona, was the cause of the ferment at Cadiz in the commencement of the last summer. This ferment was directed against us, and the failure of the operations in which we had been engaged was stated to be the cause of it; but as the fall of Badajoz, which was certainly the most fatal event of the war, created no impression at Cadiz, notwithstanding that it was the result of treachery, it cannot be believed that the failure in retaking it was the cause of the ferment at Cadiz, in the summer. It was the fall of Tarragona, which having opened the road to the remaining estates of the grandees, created a wish to submit among this order and their adherents; and as this misfortune could not by any misrepresentation be attributed to the English, the attention of the public was turned with great dexterity to the operations in which they had not succeeded.

‘ We may expect a similar ferment on the present occasion, and a more general inclination at Cadiz to submit to the French; but this is not the only view in which the loss of Valencia is a misfortune. I am afraid that, although Blake has found no resources in that province, that his army was starving, and that he could get no money to buy the provisions which were expected in the port, excepting by loans raised upon the credit of Mr. Tupper, my brother’s agent there, the French will find in Valencia the resources of money and provisions of which they stand so much in need.

‘ There is also another view in which the loss of Valencia is a serious misfortune, and that is, that this conquest, unlike the others which the enemy have made in Spain, will promote the concentration of their forces. Even if Suchet should not be able to press on farther to the southward than Valencia, and Soult should not be able to extend his troops

so as to communicate with Suchet through Murcia, Suchet will be able to communicate, by a shorter route than he had, with the armies of the centre and of Portugal, and with the troops in Castille; he will be on the back of the Empecinado, Mina, and others, and will cut off the supplies which they have received through Valencia.

‘ If the people of Valencia should submit as soon as the military force in the kingdom will be subdued, which, from what I hear of them, I think probable, Suchet’s force will then be disposable on the left of Soult, or to support the armies of the north and of Portugal, more immediately opposed to us.

‘ However, notwithstanding this misfortune, if it should have occurred, and its probable consequences, I do not despair of the result of the contest. Buonaparte is still far from making the conquest even of that part of the Peninsula of which he has the military possession, and the people of the country are still disposed to resist whenever they see a prospect of advantage; we shall soon find new modes of communicating with, and supplying, the guerrillas, even if the old should be cut off; and, in truth, the devastation which attends the progress of the enemy’s arms, and is the consequence of their continuance in any part of the country, is our best friend, and will in the end bring the contest to a conclusion.

‘ The whole country between Madrid and the Alentejo is now a desert, and a still smaller proportion of the land has been cultivated this winter. The argument of the people of the country is, that it is better to rob than to sow and have the produce of their harvests taken from them; and the French begin to find that they cannot keep their large armies together for any operation that will take time, and that when we can reach them they can do nothing with small bodies.

‘ The misfortune is that we experience nearly the same difficulties; we cannot venture to undertake anything with a small body, and a large body would starve. But we have advantages in the Peninsula which the French cannot enjoy; we have possession of all the navigable rivers, of which we make use to convey our supplies, as far as they will carry, and the naval power of Great Britain protects the arrival of these supplies, and the formation of our magazines on the

coast. It is true that the rivers carry only to a certain distance from the coast, and we have hitherto been able to supply ourselves with difficulty on the frontiers of Portugal; but I have now in hand various measures to increase our means, and to enable us to establish ourselves still farther in the country, whatever may be the state of the local resources; one of these is to render the Douro navigable up to the junction of the Agueda, which I hope to effect in a short time.

‘ Besides this, I hope to be able to report to your Lordship, in the course of next month, that Almeida is re-established as a military post. I found, upon examination, that Sir Brent Spencer’s explosion had not done so much damage as he had supposed, and indeed the injury was almost confined to the dispersion of the people collected to repair the damages done by Brenier, and to the delay, till I had again examined the place, of all measures to re-establish it.

‘ The financial arrangements, which I hope will soon be carried into execution at Lisbon, will likewise improve our situation, and increase our resources for a forward operation. However well inclined the Spaniards are, they will give nothing without payment in ready money; and when I assembled the troops some days ago, we should soon have suffered distress if I had not separated them again, because we had no ready money; and the Spaniards, as usual, would give nothing except for ready money payments.

‘ The object of our arrangements at Lisbon is to increase the value, raise the credit, and of course promote the circulation of the Portuguese paper. This measure will enable us to use it in our payments at Lisbon, and in the lower parts of Portugal; and we shall have for our expenses on the frontier a great part of the specie which was before expended in these payments. To this add, that the improvement in the value of the paper will reduce the money price of all the articles which we purchase in Portugal.

‘ Our situation is improving therefore; and whatever may be the fate of Valencia, if the Spanish nation still hold out, I think they may yet be saved.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To — —.

‘ SIR,

‘ Head Quarters, 5th December, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23d November, and I enclose the duplicate of one which I wrote to a person who made me a communication respecting you some days ago. You appear to have written your letter of the 23d November under a misapprehension. You think that the Government are inclined to pardon you: so far from it, that if they can catch you, or have you caught, you will be hanged; and I therefore recommend you to keep out of the way, and to take care of yourself. In the enclosed letter I have stated the only means by which you can hope to receive a pardon for your crimes; and I can undertake to solicit your pardon on no other terms.

‘ In order to comply with these terms, and to perform the service which I require from you, it is not necessary to put you in communication with any of the persons you mention. You have only to send your letters to the advanced posts of this army, and there is no occasion for any answer from me. I must tell you, however, that if I were to attempt to put you in communication with the Spanish Officers you mention, such is their well founded detestation and mistrust of every Portuguese who has anything to say to the French, that notwithstanding their confidence in me, they would refuse to comply with my proposition.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ — —.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 5th December, 1811.

‘ I shall not move Byng from his brigade if I can help it; but we have many General Officers coming out, all of whom will require commands.

‘ I have orders to complete the 1st batt. 39th regiment to 1200 rank and file, by drafts from the 2d battalion, and to send the latter home. I was actually writing you the orders to make this arrangement, when I received your letter announcing that the ophthalmia prevailed in the 1st battalion; but when they recover so far as to induce you to think that you can mix them with the other troops without danger of

infection, I request you to carry these orders into execution. Let me know when you do so, that I may give out the orders.

‘ You will do well to open all the letters coming to me from Austin.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General H. Clinton.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Freneda, 5th December, 1811.

‘ I was in hopes that I should have had the advantage of your assistance in this country, and I had intended to request you to take the command of the 7th division of infantry, when I thought that General Macfarlane was coming likewise; and of the 6th division, when I found that he was destined for Sicily.

‘ I was concerned to find, by your letter of the 16th November, which I received this day, that Lord William Bentinck had desired to have your assistance likewise in Sicily, and as the Commander in Chief has permitted me to allow you to go there, and it appears by your letter that you are desirous of joining Lord William Bentinck, I cannot bring myself to detain you, notwithstanding that I am much in want of your assistance. I am not aware of Lord William's objects in Sicily, but if you should think it desirable to return to this country, I shall be happy to have your assistance.

‘ I beg to be kindly remembered to Mrs. Clinton, if she should be with you, and that you will

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
H. Clinton.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 6th December, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d. I propose that those for whose use the carts are hired, shall pay the fee of 200 reis to the magistrate for producing them; and I shall authorize the commissaries, and others of the British army, to charge this fee in their accounts (properly vouched), by the same General Order in which I shall publish the regulation of the Government.

‘I enclose a letter which I have received from Lord Liverpool, in answer to one which I wrote to him upon the effect produced upon the circulation of Portugal, by the state of our affairs with America, and upon the remedy which I proposed in case those affairs should continue as they now are.

‘From the statement in this letter, you will see that the harvest in Great Britain has been so little favorable, that Portugal cannot expect any supply of corn from thence. It will therefore be desirable that you should take your measures in time to keep this country supplied from the Mediterranean and from America till the next harvest.

‘We have always in store for our army three months’ provisions, and I am about to order the Commissary General immediately to make arrangements to get a supply for three months’ more, independently of what he may get from England.

‘The supply of the Portuguese army is not so important as that of the nation; and I am afraid we must submit to a drain of specie for that object. But the rise in the value of paper, and its increased circulation, owing to the financial measures, which ought not to be delayed, will, I hope, enable us to afford this expenditure of specie.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 7th December, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 18th and 21st ult., Nos. 12 and 13.

‘I regard to the first, I beg you to observe, that before the allies are called upon to protect the guerrillas by retaliating upon the enemy the injuries they do to those who are prisoners, it is proper that the Spanish Government and the regular Spanish armies should protect them; and that the several guerrilla parties should protect each other.

‘We have frequently heard of declarations that injuries should be retaliated; and but few instances of those declarations being carried into execution, notwithstanding that the French murder the Spanish prisoners every day.

‘ When the Spanish Government and armies shall take up this subject as they ought, it will rest with the British Government (not me) to determine whether they will enter into this system of retaliation in favor of the Spaniards.

‘ In answer to your second letter, I concur with you in opinion that the Spaniards gave but little opposition to the entry of the enemy into Asturias. Then they call upon me to make a movement for their relief. I am perfectly aware of the advantage which the enemy derive from their position in the Asturias; but no movement which I could make could relieve that province, supposing that I could make a movement. Bonet’s division, by which the Asturias has been occupied, was never brought against this army. That division observed the army of Galicia while the army of the north came to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. Till the army of Galicia shall be capable of moving, Bonet’s division is equally well situated for observing the army of Galicia in Asturias as in Leon; and no movement which I could make could induce that division to leave the Asturias.

‘ But it is impossible for me to move more forward than I am at present. The Spaniards invariably forget that a large army must be supplied; and although they cry out loudly for assistance, they invariably refuse and omit to supply with provisions those who go to give it to them; which same provisions are afterwards forced from them by the enemy. The British army are therefore necessarily obliged to subsist on their magazines on the rivers; and they cannot communicate with their magazines at a greater distance from them than they are at present.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Magistrate of the Town of —.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 7th December, 1811.

‘ Complaints have been made to me, that the soldiers of the cavalry sell their clothes, arms, and accoutrements, and the forage for their horses, to the inhabitants of the town of —, to obtain money to purchase wine. I have given directions that those guilty of these practices may be punished; but as there would be no sellers if there were no

purchasers, I beg you to give notice to the inhabitants of the town and district of —, that if anything belonging to a soldier of the British army is found in the possession of any one of them, the person will be sent to my head quarters, in order to be brought to trial before the Special Commission, and punished.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Magistrate of the Town of —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 7th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that a duel was fought on the 11th of November last, by Captain **** and Captain —, of the — regiment, in which the former received a wound, of which he has since died.

‘ The duel was fought within the Portuguese territory.

‘ I request you to lay the enclosed papers on the subject before the Portuguese Government, and to inform them that Captain — is in close arrest, and that he shall be given up to stand his trial when the Government of the country shall think proper to ask for him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *Charles Stuart.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Freneda, 7th December, 1811.

‘ I am very much in want of such Officers as General Clinton and General Macfarlane. One of our divisions is in itself a complete army, composed of British and foreign troops, artillery, departments, &c.; and it requires some discretion and sense to manage such a concern. But when Lord William Bentinck expresses a wish to have the assistance of those Officers for the conduct of such a business as I imagine he has in hand (for I do not know what it is), I could not think of detaining for a moment General Clinton, respecting whom His Royal Highness left me an option.

‘ Accordingly, having received a letter from General Clinton by the same post with yours of the 17th, expressing

his wish to proceed to Sicily, I wrote him the answer of which I enclose the copy, giving my consent to his going there.

‘ I have given leave to Sir William Erskine to go home to lease his estate; and General Cole wants to go, and will go before long. Murray also, I am sorry to say, is desirous of going for a short time.

‘ All that I am afraid of is, that on some fine day I shall be found with this large army, without the assistance which is necessary to conduct it. However, I must do my best.

‘ I propose to place General Tilson under General Hill. The 6th and 7th divisions are without Commanding Officers, and the 4th will be equally destitute when General Cole shall go. The cavalry with General Hill is under Major General Long.

‘ When I say that the 7th division is without a Commanding Officer, I ought to add, that I am perfectly satisfied with Alten, who is now the senior, and indeed the only General Officer with that division. But no business can be well conducted by anybody who is to conduct it only for a time. The 6th division is commanded by Major General Burne, and the 4th will be commanded by Major General Kemmis, when General Cole shall go.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 7th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, containing demands of the Portuguese Government against — —, and — —, late of the Lusitanian Legion.

‘ I proposed, for your Lordship’s decision, in my dispatch of the 13th November, 1811, a mode of settling the demand against — —; and I request to have your Lordship’s decision on that subject, and on the demand against — —.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 8th December, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th, and I am happy to find that the revenue holds out. I am convinced that, if the Government works in earnest, we shall soon have it in a very prosperous state.

‘ I observe that the marine cost, last month, above 500 contos. Surely this expense is now useless. It would be better to apply the money to pay the ransom to the Dey, and to get rid of the necessity of maintaining a navy, and of incurring this expense.

‘ I do not know what to do with the 15,000 dollars which the committee for the charities have sent to me. First, Mr. Briscall, whom I charged with making inquiries, has been taken ill, and is gone to Lisbon. Secondly, I find that the rich persons, in easy circumstances, and the poor, are equally desirous, and claim a right, to partake of the charity. The curates in the villages, who are the legitimate sources of intelligence regarding the wants of individuals, declare that they are afraid to omit the names of any in a list of persons distressed by the war. They say that the rich and powerful insist upon sharing with others; and the curate of this very village says that a legacy of corn came into his hands, to be distributed to the poor of the village, in which rich and all insisted upon sharing alike.

‘ I acknowledge that this has given me a very bad opinion of the Portuguese; and if I cannot devise some mode of finding out who are the really distressed, I shall send the money back, with the exception of 200 dollars, which I have given to General Pack to lay out for the poor people of Freixo, Azinhal, &c. Up to this moment, the people have suffered but little. They gain a good deal of money by performing little services for the troops; and there is a market in every village in which they are cantoned. This is better for the people than millions in charity.

‘ I see in the newspapers that the Bishop of Guarda has reckoned every person in his diocese as distressed, in the same manner as my curates; and he calculates the assistance which each can receive, out of the money placed in his hands, at five reis, which is about a farthing! I am tho-

roughly convinced that there are five persons out of ten in his diocese, who are richer in money at this moment than they were in the year 1808. Their houses are probably not in such good repair, their furniture not so good or so plentiful, nor their stores so full of corn, wine, oil, and garlic, as they were then; but there is no want of money.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 10th December, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th.

‘ I am very sorry to say that I differ with the Government on all their measures of finance; and I am much afraid that they will not only defeat their own objects, but will entirely prevent me from deriving any advantage from those measures in the British finance in this country.

‘ The first measure goes to perpetuate the circulation of fictitious paper. Is it intended that all the circulating paper money shall have the stamp of all the subordinate offices, or of one only? If of all, then the paper must circulate through all the offices before it can be worth anything. If of one only, then it is in the power of any office to circulate any fictitious paper they please.

‘ The *Portaria*, mentioned as the second measure, will be just as inoperative as the ancient law, if the intrinsic value of the paper, or, in other words, the credit of the Government, is not improved by the measures which they will now adopt.

‘ The third measure is not fit to be considered by a Government, and shall not have one moment of my consideration. The Government that jobs in stock on its own account can never acquire credit!

‘ The fourth measure goes to debase the copper coinage. Let the copper be issued at its value, and be exchanged for paper at the regular rate of exchange, and there will be no difficulty in making it current. The measure of issuing it at a depreciated rate in respect to other coins for paper, can have the effect of raising the value of paper only for a moment.

‘ The fifth measure will be good in eight months hence ; that is to say, in about ten months after I had recommended it, and after the Prince had ordered it to be adopted.

‘ If it is proper and right to pay the interest on paper money, why not pay it from the 1st of July ? Who will believe that the interest will be paid on the 1st of June, 1812 ? Not I, certainly : and if the Government do not adopt some serious steps to raise the credit of this paper, I have in contemplation a measure which will destroy the whole fabric at once ; and that is, to give orders that it may not be received in payment for bills upon England. Why should the British army support the credit of a paper for which the Government will do nothing ? I had lately nearly 500,000*l.* in this paper : that is to say, a good large proportion of the whole ; but unless its credit is raised, that shall never again happen.

‘ In regard to the sixth measure, I protest against the whole of it, excepting that part to pay the interest on Apolices from the 1st July. I object entirely to the creation of new paper or new funds, before the old paper is provided for. As for the scheme of discriminating between the old holders and new purchasers of Apolices, and of canvassing the prices paid for Apolices, it is the most wild and extravagant, the least practicable, the most unjust, and most inconsistent with the principles of financial policy, that has ever yet come under my view.

‘ I beg the Government to advert to my first letter to them on the 3d October, on the subject of the interest on paper money, which is the foundation of all their proceedings on this subject. I repeat, that unless they can improve the credit of the circulating credit in Portugal, Great Britain cannot maintain the contest in the Peninsula, not for want of means, because, thank God ! Great Britain was never in so prosperous a state ; but because the state of the world will not allow her to procure a sufficient quantity of specie.

‘ If Great Britain should be obliged to withdraw from the contest, or if I should think proper to adopt the measure which I have above pointed out in regard to paper money, (and I must adopt some measure of the kind, if the circulating value of the paper money is not improved,) what will become of their fine spun and stock jobbing theories for the improvement of their credit ?

‘I can give no opinion respecting the taxes on the farmers, till I know exactly what they are. Generally speaking, it is a gross error to believe that the country is so much distressed as is stated. I would also observe upon all Principal Souza’s plans, that they are drawn with a view to a state of peace. Portugal is at war, and must be at war; and great sacrifices must be made, and every nerve and resource must be strained to carry the country through its difficulties. It will afterwards be time to think of improvements. This is the only country in the world which, having such an enemy to oppose, and such a cause to fight for, would think of leaving any resource unapplied to the purposes of war.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 12th December, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters to the 27th November.

‘The result of General Ballesteros’ expedition could not be different from what it has been. He advanced without plan or object, and without force sufficient to effect anything important. He was necessarily obliged to retire as soon as a sufficient force was brought against him; and in the meantime, his own and the British troops have suffered from the privations to which they have been liable, and exposure to the weather at this season of the year.

‘It is a mistake to suppose that these sufferings, and the consequent deficiency of numbers, are confined to our troops. Our Officers are not yet brought to consider these evils with indifference; and the trouble which the care of the sick of the British army brings upon our Officers, draws their attention to the diminution of the numbers of the British troops, while no care being taken of the sick of the Spanish army, the Officers know nothing about them; and although we do not hear so much of sickness, and of diminution of numbers, from the Spanish Officers, it may be depended upon, that no men can bear hunger and fatigue, and the exposure to wet and cold in this season of the year, without

suffering from it; that all suffer equally, probably those most who are the least clothed, and have been least fed and taken care of before.

‘I am concerned to observe that Colonel Skerrett attributes the necessity for the retreat of General Ballesteros and himself in the end of November, to General Hill’s return to his cantonments in the end of October. We, in this part of the Peninsula, have never had any knowledge of the plan or object of, or the means for General Ballesteros’ operations; and General Hill’s expedition was planned without any reference to what was passing in the bay of Gibraltar. General Hill had an object which he executed, and then returned to his cantonments according to the orders he received. These orders were given, because it was known that General Hill could not stay any longer without uselessly exposing his troops to the wants and hardships of which Colonel Skerrett complains, and which are inseparable from all operations in the Peninsula, particularly in Spain.

‘Although we may be blamed for the necessity of the late retreat of General Ballesteros, &c., it is certainly true that General Daricau’s detachment has arrived in Estremadura, and that there are more of the enemy’s troops now in that province south of the Guadiana, than there were when General Hill withdrew from Merida. So far, it will be admitted, that since General Hill’s operation, some troops have been removed from Andalusia; and certainly none have returned thither.

‘I have thought it proper to advert to these opinions, which, as usual, will be used as topics of abuse against the British Government, in order to make known to you these matters of fact, as an answer to them.

‘Mr. Wellesley has stated to me that it was possible that the Spanish Government might require the assistance of 800 or 1000 men to garrison Carthagená. Adverting to the importance of this place as a naval station, I have taken upon myself to allow that number of men to proceed to Carthagená, till the pleasure of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent can be known.

‘Accordingly, if Mr. Wellesley should desire it, I request you to send thither the 2d batt. 67th regiment, and

the battalion of foreign detachments, or, in lieu of the latter, five companies of the Regiment de Watteville, if it should be your opinion that they are more to be depended upon than the battalion of foreign detachments. You will also send there one Captain and two Subalterns of engineers and one company of artillery.

‘Colonel Lambert* is to go in command of these troops, till I can relieve him by the arrival of a General Officer in this country. You will send with them an Officer of the commissariat, and a sufficient number of Officers of the medical department, supplied with medicines: but until further orders these troops are to be considered as a detachment from the garrison of Cadiz.

‘I enclose a copy of the instructions† which I gave to the detachment which was sent from this army to Cadiz, which must be the guide for the troops at Carthagena, as far as they may be applicable. I wish that it should be stipulated that the British detachment should occupy the castle on the height at the entrance of the harbor, as being the most important position, that from which it is most easy to communicate with the sea, and the most healthy situation.

‘I beg that the Officers of the engineers and artillery may immediately be employed to make out and send me plans and descriptions of the place, returns of the ordnance, ammunition, and stores, which it contains, and accounts of its capacity for defence. I request that the attention of the senior Officer of engineers may be turned in particular to the height on the right of the entrance of the harbor; and that he will report whether that height can be occupied by field works in such a manner as to be tenable; and particularly, whether from that height it is practicable to have a secure communication with the harbor.

‘I likewise wish the same circumstance to be reported in regard to the fort on the height on the left of the entrance of the harbor; and the nature of the communication between the two, the breadth of the harbor to be passed, the means of passing, &c.

* Lieut. General Sir John Lambert, K.C.B.

† See letter to B. Frere, Esq., Torres Vedras, 5th February, 1810, vol. v. p. 488; and letter to Major General the Hon. W. Stewart, Viseu, 27th February, 1810, vol. v. p. 523.

‘The attention of the medical department must be turned to the state of the health of the existing garrison and of the inhabitants of Carthagera; and if the yellow fever should still prevail there Colonel Lambert must not land. The medical gentlemen must report on the nature of that disease, whether it is practicable by any precautions, such as burning infectious clothes, &c., to prevent its return in the next hot season, or to mitigate or guard against its effects. They will particularly advert to the situation of the fort which I wish the British troops to occupy, and will see whether it would be possible to prevent the communication between that fort and the town, so as to prevent infection.

‘If Colonel Lambert should find the place attacked when he shall arrive there, he will decide to land or not, according to his view of the chances which may exist that the assistance of the detachment under his command may save the place, if there should be provisions and ammunition sufficient to last during the siege. He will likewise advert to the possibility of embarking; and, if it should be practicable, he will embark his detachment before the place shall capitulate, supposing it to be reduced to such an extremity. But if he should be of opinion, on his arrival, that the assistance of his detachment may save the place, he is not to be prevented from landing to aid in its defence by a notion of the possibility that he may not be able to re-embark.

‘In that case he will endeavor to prevail with the governor to send away the most valuable ship timber and naval stores in the transports which will take his detachment; but if he should not succeed, or if it should be impracticable to embark those stores, he will insist with the governor, before he will land, as a condition on which alone he can land, that before the governor shall enter into any terms of capitulation with the enemy, or before he shall stand a storm, all the ship timber and naval stores, ships, craft, &c., in the place or harbor, shall be burnt.

‘Mr. Wellesley will give Colonel Lambert the necessary letters to the governor of Carthagera.

‘The troops must take with them 200,000 rounds of musket ammunition, besides 60 rounds per man in their pouches.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Cooke.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Dom Miguel Forjaz.

SIR,

Freneda, 12th December, 1811.

I have received your letter of the 29th November, regarding the mistake which appears to have occurred in England in respect to the grant of the favors of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal to Brig. General Wilson, the governor of the province of Minho.

As a British subject, Brig. General Wilson could not accept the honor conferred upon him by His Royal Highness, excepting by the permission of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Great Britain and Ireland, in the name and on behalf of His Majesty; and I applied for this permission for him in a dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated the 30th October, being convinced, as well from the communication I had with that Officer, as from the communication I had with the Governors of the Kingdom, that His Royal Highness intended to confer upon him that mark of his favor.

It is possible that His Royal Highness had likewise conferred upon Sir Robert Wilson the same mark of his favor; and that knowing that he was not in Portugal, His Royal Highness did not communicate that circumstance to the Governors of the Kingdom. It might have been made known to Sir Robert Wilson through His Royal Highness' Ambassador at the Court of London; and Sir Robert Wilson might have obtained by personal application the permission of his own Sovereign to accept it. It is not improbable, however, that a mistake has been made in the names of the two individuals; that the permission of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Great Britain for myself and others to accept these honors and distinctions, has been published in the "*London Gazette*" in consequence of some communication to the British Government, besides those which I addressed to the Secretary of State in my own case, that of Marshal Sir William Beresford, Conde de Trancoso, that of Brig. General Trant, and that of Brig. General Wilson, to all of which I have received answers, excepting the last.

Under these circumstances, it appears to me desirable that the Governors of the Kingdom should have an explana-

tion with His Royal Highness' Ambassador at the Court of London upon this subject; and I entertain no doubt that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal intended to confer this honor upon Brig. General Wilson, the governor of Minho. I propose to address the Secretary of State upon the subject.

'In regard to Marshal Sir William Beresford, Conde de Trancoso's letter, it is proper that it should be transmitted to be laid before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Dom Miguel Forjaz.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

'MY DEAR HENRY,

'Freneda, 12th December, 1811.

'I have received your letter of the 27th, and since, those of the 18th and 30th. I believe General Cooke is right in allowing Colonel Skerrett to remain at Tarifa, under the circumstance which existed in the end of last month. But I do not know what the plan of the Spaniards is, and what they are about. They appear inclined to throw upon us the burthen of occupying and supplying with provisions all the places to the southward, while they are to keep the command of them; and we are to depend for the safety and honor of our troops in those places, not only upon those Commanding Officers in the field, but upon the Commanding Officers in the places.

'We have a strong interest in the success of the war, but the people of the Peninsula have a stronger; and although I feel no inclination to refuse the assistance of the King's troops when it is necessary, I think that that necessity should be clearly made out; and that when it is to be attributed to the deficiency of system in the Spanish Government and Officers, they should be made to feel this deficiency upon every occasion on which they require our assistance.

'We went to Cadiz to be auxiliaries in the garrison; and the King's troops were placed under the orders of the Governor, on the positive conditions which were agreed to, and have never been altered. One of these was, that our

troops should not go beyond the harbor. We are now obliged to occupy Tarifa with part of the garrison of Cadiz. We take the field with General Ballesteros upon no known plan, and with no defined object; and then when General Ballesteros and all retire upon the enemy advancing, I am told that they have retired, because General Hill, who had accomplished the object of his expedition, had returned to his cantonments. I knew nothing of General Ballesteros' plans or objects; and General Hill's expedition could have nothing to do with General Ballesteros. Since General Hill's expedition, and his return to his cantonments, the enemy's force in Estremadura have been much increased, instead of being diminished. General Hill, however, did not return because he was pressed by the enemy, but because he began his operation with a defined object; which object he accomplished; and as usual, in Spain, he began to feel distress for want of provisions; and if he had stayed, and the enemy had been reinforced, he might have been distressed in his retreat.

‘But we are not only called upon to occupy Tarifa, but Carthagera. Is it not proper to make the Spanish Government, and the nation, and the world feel the shameful neglect of that place of which they have been guilty? If 1000 men are wanting for Carthagera, is it proper that our garrison of Cadiz should be called upon to supply them? If new fortifications are wanting, ought we to defray the expense of constructing them? These are the questions which occur every day in all our concerns with these nations of the Peninsula; and I can only say, that if we are induced by a sense of our own interest in maintaining the contest, to give them this extraordinary assistance, we ought to make them feel it as a favor, and we ought to represent to them the disgraceful neglect of which they are guilty, in coming upon us at this late period for assistance to garrison and fortify Carthagera.

‘I write to General Cooke to desire, that if you should require it, he will send 1000 men to Carthagera, detaining at Cadiz the Regiment de Watteville. I particularly request, however, that these men may not be sent to Carthagera unless the Spanish Government should request this assistance as a favor, and that all the conditions which I made

with the late Regency before I allowed the troops to land at Cadiz, are consented to in respect to the garrison of Carthagea. I besides require, that our troops at Carthagea should occupy the fort (the name of which I do not know) which is situated on the height which commands the harbor.

‘ I write upon these points to Major General Cooke.

‘ I have ordered four casks, containing twenty four dozens of claret, round to Cadiz for you.

‘ I had written to England at the request of General Castaños, to desire that endeavors might be made to have the Marques de Santa Cruz exchanged. But as he is in Buonaparte’s clutches, I do not think there is any chance of success. Between ourselves, I think the Prince d’Aremberg, being a member of the Confederation of the Rhine, and married to Mademoiselle Tascher, the intended of Ferdinand VII., is too great a card to give up for the Marques de Santa Cruz.

‘ I will take care that General Doyle’s recruits shall march through Portugal by a convenient route, and shall be well provisioned on their march, whenever there are any to march. But having spoken to General Castaños and General Giron on this subject, they tell me, that since the embarkation of troops for America, the people of Estremadura and Castille have become more unwilling to enlist as soldiers, and particularly unwilling to go to Cadiz.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of this day.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have reports this day from Badajoz and from Salamanca, that Suchet had retired from Valencia. If this is true, it may not be necessary that we should occupy Carthagea. However, I hope that the Spanish Government will not any longer neglect that place; and if they will attend to it, and ask as a favor that our troops should be allowed to go there, I have no objection to sending there 1000 men.

‘ I have omitted to recommend to you to suggest to the Admiral to employ some of his craft with the Spanish craft at Cadiz, to observe San Lucar, and any other point at

which the French can communicate with the coast of Barbary, to prevent the import of provisions. It is really most important to make their armies feel the distress which they make the rest of the world feel.

‘W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 12th December, 1811.

‘I addressed your Lordship on the 30th of October, and begged you to request the permission of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, for Brig. General Wilson, of the Portuguese service, to accept the honor of Commander of the Order of the Tower and Sword, conferred upon him by the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘The permission of His Royal Highness has since appeared in the “*London Gazette*” of the 26th October, for Sir Robert Wilson to accept the Order of the Tower and Sword; and the Secretary of the Local Government of Portugal has written to me a letter, of which I enclose the copy and copies of its enclosures, expressing the opinion of the Government that some mistake had been made. I likewise enclose the draft of my answer, which I had written before I had adverted to the date of the “*London Gazette*,” which was four days previous to the date of my letter to your Lordship regarding the honor conferred upon Brig. General Wilson.

‘I entertain no doubt now, that the British Government had received intimation of the honors conferred upon His Majesty’s subjects by the Prince Regent of Portugal, through some channel besides myself; and it is possible that the Prince Regent of Portugal may have intended to confer the Order of the Tower and Sword upon Sir Robert Wilson as well as upon Brig. General Wilson.

‘But there is no doubt whatever, that the person referred to by His Royal Highness in his letters to this country, is Brig. General Wilson (Lieut. Colonel of the Royal York Rangers), and I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship, if you will obtain the permission of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent that he may accept this honor; and if you will have the mistake in the “*London Gazette*” of the

26th October rectified, if the order has not likewise been conferred on Sir Robert Wilson.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 12th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter, and its enclosures, which I have received from Lieut. General Graham, regarding the grant of medals to Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby, Lieut. Colonel Jackson, Lieut. Colonel Acheson, Major Busche, and Major Hope.

‘ These Officers are so highly meritorious, and their conduct has been so conspicuously good, that I beg leave to recommend them to your Lordship’s consideration.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 12th December, 1811.

‘ When the enemy retired from the neighborhood of Gibraltar and Tarifa, as reported in my dispatch of the 13th ult., I concluded that Colonel Skerrett’s detachment would return to Cadiz, and I directed that, according to your Lordship’s orders, the Regiment de Watteville should be sent to Ireland. But Colonel Skerrett having still continued detached from Cadiz, as your Lordship will have seen, the Regiment de Watteville is still at that place.

‘ I have now the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Mr. Wellesley regarding the expediency of occupying Carthagena with a detachment of British troops, to which I have answered, that should the Spanish Government request as a favor, that a British detachment should be sent to Carthagena, I would consent to send a detachment.

‘ Accordingly, I have directed Major General Cooke to send there, if required by Mr. Wellesley, the battalion of foreign detachments, or five companies of the Regiment de Watteville, and the 2d batt. 67th regiment, and a company of artillery, and Officers of engineers, to report the state of the place, in order to enable His Majesty’s Government

to decide whether they will keep the detachment there or not.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Major General Cooke upon this subject; and I beg to have your Lordship’s orders regarding this detachment as soon as may be convenient.

‘ I should not have sent the troops to Carthagena, only that I have reason to believe, that before this time the disorder, which has prevailed there, has disappeared. Before the next summer, we shall have opportunities of ascertaining its exact nature; and whether it will be possible to prevent its return, or to mitigate or to guard against its effects by precautions. It will be in the power of His Majesty’s Government to withdraw the troops, if they should think proper, before the return of the season in which they would be liable to this sickness: and in the meantime the troops may save this important place for the allies.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 12th December, 1811.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance in this quarter since I addressed you on the 4th instant. I have received reports, that in the beginning of the month, Marshal Marmont had collected some of his troops at Naval moral: but if these reports are correct, I believe he did so only because he heard that our cantonments had been closed up in the end of last month. Marmont’s head quarters are again at Talavera de la Reyna. I understand that the troops at Plasencia are suffering from want; but it is the common practice of the French Generals to collect in store a quantity of provisions to answer for a sudden movement, while the troops are left to provide for themselves as they can; and it frequently happens that, as in this case, the troops are suffering from want, while I know that there are considerable quantities of provisions in store.

‘ I have received accounts from Cadiz to the 30th November. General Ballesteros had been obliged again to retire under the protection of the guns of Gibraltar; and Colonel Skerrett had retired to Tarifa. It appears that the

enemy have brought some troops from Granada to act upon General Ballesteros, as well as the division under General Semelé, belonging to the 1st corps.

‘The official accounts from Valencia come down as far as the 20th of November. The enemy had not at that period made any progress in their attack upon General Blake’s position in front of the town. The chiefs of guerrillas, Duran, El Empecinado, and Espoz y Mina, had been very active and successful in their operations against the enemy. It appears by the accounts which I have received from the latter, which are confirmed by the enemy’s correspondence which has been intercepted, that he had beaten a force sent against him, consisting of 1100 men of the garrison of Zaragoza, on the 17th of October, and had taken 650 prisoners, and that only three men of the enemy had escaped. The prisoners have arrived at Coruña.

‘It is generally reported, that in consequence of the successes of the guerrillas, Marshal Suchet had been obliged to retire from Valencia, after blowing up the castle of Saguntum. This report has come by so many different channels, from different quarters, that I hope it is founded in fact.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Captain ———.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 14th December, 1811.

‘I sent you by your messenger, on the ——— of last month fifty dollars, an ass, and baskets, according to your desire, and I gave him ten dollars for his trouble.

‘I will with pleasure make you the monthly allowance which you desire, and will pay it in such manner as you may point out; and I beg you to send me intelligence of all that passes that comes to your knowledge. It would be particularly desirable to receive it from the head quarters of the French army.

‘You will continue to employ the old messenger till you can get a better. If I were to send you one he might be discovered, and the consequences might be fatal to you.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain ———.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

' Freneda, 14th Decomber, 1811.

‘ I enclose a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Stuart, regarding the conduct of the Spanish Minister at Lisbon, upon which I request you to have a conference with Don E. de Bardaxi.

‘I beg you to tell Don E. de Bardaxi at the same time, that if the Spanish mission at Lisbon will promise to discontinue the purchase of arms there, and will let me know the names of the agents they employ there for that purpose, if they should be English or Portuguese, I will give them twice as many arms and sets of accoutrements as they can estimate they will purchase in any named time.

‘ Return the enclosures, as I have no copies of them.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

'The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.'

WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

' Freneda, 14th December, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant.

‘As long as the person at the head of the Spanish mission at Lisbon was one of a conciliatory disposition, it was desirable that all the questions which could arise between the British and Spanish nations at Lisbon should be settled by amicable discussion between the Ministers of the two Courts, without reference to the Portuguese Government, in order to avoid the irritation which always attends discussions between a Portuguese and a Spanish agent.

‘But I believe it is quite unusual to settle diplomatic matters in that manner. The British Minister at the Court of Lisbon has to conduct the business of his Government only with that to which he is deputed; and if he has any complaint to make of the Spanish Minister, or of the conduct of any Spanish subject at Lisbon, he should make it to the Portuguese Government, with whom it would rest by their interference with the Spanish Minister to give redress on the matter complained of. I recommend this

mode of transacting business to your attention in future, so long as the Chevalier de Salmon shall be the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

‘ Accordingly, I request you to draw the attention of the Portuguese Government to the purchase of arms and accoutrements by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon. I have reason to believe that the purchases from British soldiers are not very numerous, but each of them is very inconvenient, as it must be attended by the punishment of the soldier who sells his arms; and I would prefer to give the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires two new stands of arms and sets of accoutrements for each one that he could expect to purchase by continuing this practice, rather than it should continue. I have written to Mr. Wellesley on this subject, and have desired him to make this offer to the Spanish Government, to induce them to order that it may be discontinued.

‘ The Portuguese Government are particularly interested in effectually putting an end to the purchase of arms at Lisbon, as it is positively a fact that no Portuguese soldier ever goes into hospital without selling his arms and accoutrements. If there were no purchasers for these articles, this practice would be necessarily discontinued, to the great advantage of the service.

‘ In regard to the particular point of difference with the Chevalier de Salmon on the present occasion, I have communicated with General Castaños, who knows that it is the common practice of all armies, that when a soldier, *unknown*, has committed an outrage, whole regiments are paraded to enable the person making the complaint to point out the person against whom he complains. It is so common a practice, and so much a matter of course in this army, that I am seldom called upon to interfere; but the Commanding Officers parade their men on the first requisition. In a very recent instance, some soldiers having committed an outrage in their shirts and trousers, a whole brigade were paraded, dressed in a similar manner, to enable those complaining to know and point out those who injured them.

‘ General Castaños is so convinced that this is the practice, that he has sent orders to the Officer commanding the

detachments of Spanish troops at Lisbon, to show to the serjeant of the Chasseurs Britanniques the men of his detachment, in order that he may point out the soldier from whom he received his wound.

‘According to the mode of doing business, which I recommend to you in the commencement of this letter, in relation to the Spanish mission at Lisbon, it will be necessary in future that, when Major General Peacocke has any reason to complain of any of the Spanish troops, he should make his complaint to General de Noronha, who will give such orders upon the subject as he may think proper, as he is the General commanding the troops at Lisbon.

‘If the matter is of that description that the interference of the Government is necessary, it will then of course be General Peacocke’s duty to lay the subject before you, to be communicated to the Portuguese Government.

‘I would recommend, however, to General Peacocke, to confine his complaints on these subjects to a mere statement of facts. Reflections do not add to the force of facts, at the same time that they occasion and increase irritation between Officers of allied nations, who ought to be friends.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 16th December, 1811, 10 A.M.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me have the state of the supplies, with the several divisions of infantry, brigades of artillery, and regiments of cavalry, to the latest period to which each can be made up.

‘As General Graham is always liable to be called away from the 1st division, it would be desirable that he should have attached to him a commissariat establishment, with mules, &c., for the use of the General and his Staff, with bread, &c., and corn for their horses. The mules might be taken from that brigade of the 1st division, with which the General has been estimated for hitherto. It does not appear that there would be any necessity that the person with General Graham should have bullocks attached to him, as

he can always get meat from any division with which he may be.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. Bissett, Esq.,
Commissary General.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 17th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an extract* of a letter from the Secretary of State, pointing out the deficiency of the crops of corn for the consumption of the people of Great

** Extract of a Letter from the Earl of Liverpool to Lord Wellington.*

‘ London, 21st November, 1811.

‘ I am sorry to be under the necessity of informing you that, owing to a blight in the month of June, the crops of wheat and of barley (especially that of the wheat) are now ascertained to be very far below an average crop. You are probably aware that in an abundant year we cannot do more than feed ourselves; but upon the occasion of former scarcities, we have had the resource of importation from other countries, particularly from those bordering on the Baltic. In the actual situation of Europe, it is doubtful how far this resource will be available at all, probably not to any great extent; and even if available, the corn will be to be purchased by some exportation of specie, which, in other views of the subject, will be greatly inconvenient to us, under the present circumstances.

‘ I have thought it right that you should be apprised of this state of our affairs at home.

‘ You will perceive by this statement, how little you can depend upon any supply of corn from this country. I have desired that inquiry may be made as to the quantity of rice in hand, and may perhaps be able to send a supply of this article, though not to a very large extent, but your chief dependence must be upon America, the Barbary Powers, and the Mediterranean; and I strongly recommend that no time should be lost in making the necessary arrangements for a supply from these quarters.

‘ I am aware of the inconvenience that must arise from the exportation of specie to meet these demands. But the only remedy which occurs as applicable to this evil, is an endeavor to make the purchases by British manufactures instead of by coin. And if this could be accomplished, a double advantage might be gained. Notwithstanding the prohibition of the Americans, there are some articles of this country which must have become really matters of necessity to them, and which they must be desirous therefore of procuring at some risk. It is to be hoped, likewise, and there is some reason to believe, that the glut of British manufactures which has existed in South America for two or three years, owing to the overtrading of our merchants, is in a great measure at an end; that there may be expected, therefore, a demand to a limited extent, from that quarter; and that the advantage of a trading voyage may therefore prove a strong inducement to the Americans to bring their supplies to Spain and Portugal, as on the export of their raw produce their own internal prosperity and resources essentially depend.’

Britain in the current year, to which I request you to advert in reference to the demands for supplies of corn for the army.

‘Adverting to the length of time which was likely to elapse before the army would receive from England those supplies which would be procured there, after the demand for them should be made from hence, Mr. Kennedy and I had agreed that there ought to be in store in Portugal, at all times, a supply for the consumption of the army for three months. But as it now appears that we cannot expect to procure corn from England, I recommend that you should have in store a supply of bread, corn, and forage for six months, and of the other articles which can be procured from England, for the period formerly determined on.

‘It would be desirable to have inquiries made, whether oats could not be procured at a cheap rate in Ireland. If they should be procured there, however, it is desirable that they should be shipped in bags, and not in bulk, as is usually practised. If the latter mode of shipping them be adopted, they generally heat in the hold of the ships; and if the oats should be at all serviceable upon being landed, they do the horses but little good.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘J. Bissett, Esq.,
Commissary General.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Freneda, 17th December, 1811, 10 A.M.

‘I concur with you that the report on the 39th is satisfactory, and that you should move the 2d battalion to the cantonments of the 1st, preparatory to the transfer of the drafts on the 25th instant, for which I shall give orders.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Freneda, 17th December, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 9th instant.

‘The establishment of a telegraph communication from the mouth of the Guadiana to Elvas might be very convenient under certain circumstances; but, on the other hand,

as the line must be carried along the frontier, it would not be difficult for the enemy to intercept it. Under these circumstances I am unwilling to recommend to the Portuguese Government to incur an expense to provide for a possible convenience, with the amount of which I am entirely unacquainted.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know if you have any notion what the expense of this line of telegraphs will be.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 17th December, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 12th, and I recommend to you to renew your measures in America, so far as to send there bills for 400,000*l.*, to be laid out in purchases of corn; to adopt those which you propose for the purchase of rice to the amount of 200,000*l.* in the northern provinces of the Brazils; and further, to make an effort to get grain from the coast of Africa.

‘This grain must be paid for in bills upon England, if possible. If we cannot get it for bills, we must endeavor to send money; but I cannot enter into the detail of sending colonial goods or merchandize to pay for corn. The merchants of England will of course send colonial goods and merchandize where they can sell it with advantage, and they will do what they will think most advantageous with the the money. We have no colonial goods to send to barter for corn, nor would it be expedient to have a store of them at Lisbon, with a view to such a traffic.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 17th December, 1811.

‘Adverting to the enclosures in your letter of the 11th, I observe that the sum for the military chest is about 5430 contos during the year, or about 400 contos a month, or

about 1,000,000 of crusades. I very much fear that that will not be sufficient for the expenses.

‘ I beg to observe that the demand of our commissariat for supplies to the Portuguese troops comes to about 50,000*l.* every month, and I have before me at this moment a demand for supplies for the Portuguese army for one month, amounting to 90,000*l.*: the two together make 140,000*l.* To this sum must be added, as regular demands, pay and supplies to the regiments at Cadiz. The monthly amount of the subsidy, at 2,000,000*l.* a year, would be 166,000*l.*; so that you see that we could not pay in money, with propriety, more than 20,000*l.* to 25,000*l.* in any one month.

‘ It is really necessary and desirable that you, and Beresford, and Dom Miguel Forjaz, should examine with minuteness every part of the estimate of the military expenditure, and see what can, with propriety, be struck off. There is a vast sum spent in the north for no reason whatever.

‘ I think also that it would be very desirable that Beresford and Dom Miguel Forjaz should examine very particularly the demands for supplies on our commissariat. We feed the whole army, excepting two brigades here, and two brigades and one brigade of cavalry in the Alentejo; yet they have demanded corn and flour for bread, besides rice in lieu of bread, sufficient for above 70,000 men, for one month’s consumption! Where have they 70,000 men? They have besides demanded 57,600 lbs. of salt pork, and a sufficient quantity of corn to supply 7000 horses for a month, although I believe they have not 700 horses fit for service in the world!

‘ This must be either a joke or a mistake, or else I suspect that the Principal calls upon the commissariat for supplies for his agricultural schemes; but it will not answer to have these supplies taken out of the military chest.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Sir,

‘ Freneda, 18th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which General Castaños has sent to me by General Alava, in which the Spanish Minister at War has suggested that you should

make some movement to draw the enemy's attention from General Ballesteros, and from Tarifa.

‘As far as I am able to judge of the enemy's position in Estremadura, they have no troops belonging to the 5th corps between the Guadiana and the Tagus. Drouet's headquarters are, I believe, at Almendralejo, and it is probable that a considerable body of the corps are near that place. There appears to be a brigade in and about Zafra, and I imagine that some of the troops are at La Serena.

‘There appears to me no military difficulty in your advancing to Merida, excepting the want of subsistence.

‘The garrison of Badajoz, although, I believe, of the same strength as it has been for the last six months, is not so well composed, being principally German troops. It must be observed, however, that the French battalions which were in the garrisons have been added to Drouet's army, and increase the force of the enemy in the field.

‘Although the garrison of Badajoz is not so well composed as it was, it will still be necessary to observe the *débouché* which the bridge of Badajoz affords, in case you should make a movement upon Merida.

‘In your movement upon Merida, I would likewise beg to draw your attention to the position of the army of Portugal, on the north side of the Tagus. There are at least two divisions of that army within a short distance of the bridge of Almaraz; and all the cavalry are cantoned between Arzobispo and Guadalupe, on the left of that river.

‘The principal difficulty, however, which occurs to me, in making a movement upon Merida, consists in the want of supplies. I believe there is still sufficient in the country to supply the troops under your command; but the people in Spain will not give us those supplies without payment in ready money, notwithstanding that the French may come the next day to take them without any payment; and it is impossible to procure money to pay on delivery the enormous sums required for every article which the troops want. The march to Merida will increase your distance from your magazines to such a degree, as to render the supply of the troops from them very difficult and precarious.

‘Of these matters, however, you must be the best judge; and if you should be of opinion that you can maintain your

troops on the march to Merida, and during a reasonable period which it may be desirable that you should remain upon the Guadiana, in order to draw the attention of the enemy from General Ballesteros, I should wish you to make this movement, adverting always to the bridges of Almaraz and Badajoz.

‘ Upon your arrival on the Guadiana, you will be able to judge for yourself, from the accounts you will receive of the state of the enemy’s force, whether it is in your power to strike a blow against Drouet ; and if you should think that you can strike this blow, you have my authority to make the attempt.

‘ You will observe, however, from what I have above stated to you, particularly of the position of the division of the army of Portugal, that it will be necessary that you should make this attempt at an early period after your arrival on the Guadiana, if you are to make it at all.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 18th December, 1811.

‘ General Alava has delivered to me the letter which the Secretary at War addressed to your Excellency on the 4th instant, suggesting the expediency that Lieut. General Hill should make a movement with his corps, to draw the attention of the enemy from General Ballesteros, and from Tarifa.

‘ I beg leave to inform your Excellency that I have never received from any quarter any information regarding the objects or plans of General Ballesteros’ operations, or the means which were afforded to him of effecting those objects, notwithstanding that it is obvious that it might be in my power to aid them in various ways.

‘ There exists no military reason whatever why General Hill’s corps should not be between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and even upon the Guadiana, taking the military precaution of observing the *débouché* of the bridge of Badajoz, and the movements of the army of Portugal by the bridges of Almaraz and Arzobispo, if the people of Estremadura would supply the troops with provisions.

‘ But your Excellency is aware that the people of Spain

will not part with their supplies without payment in ready money of an enormous price for every article which the troops require, notwithstanding that experience has taught them that the British nation invariably pay their debts; and that they know that those supplies, which they withhold from us with a certainty of payment, at some future and no remote period, will be forced from them by the French, without payment at all.

‘It is obvious that, in the existing state of the world, and as long as the unfortunate dispute between Spain and her colonies continues, and no effort to reconcile them, it is impossible to procure specie to pay, upon receipt of the articles, for everything the troops require. It must be equally obvious to your Excellency, that it is impossible for the British troops to subsist from their own magazines at the increased distances which it is necessary that they should move from them, in order to render to the Spanish nation the additional assistance which it is in their power to give them from time to time.

‘Under these circumstances, I have ordered General Hill to move forward upon Merida, if he should be of opinion that he can subsist his troops during that movement, and during the reasonable time which it will be necessary that he should remain upon the Guadiana, in order to be of any use to General Ballesteros.

‘If he should find himself able to move upon Merida, he will cross the Guadiana or not, to attack Drouet, according to the information which he shall have of the numbers and position of his troops, and to his view of the chance of success.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*
Don F. X. Castaños.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 18th December, 1811.

‘Lieut. General the Hon. G. L. Cole, and Major General Murray, are going to England, and are anxious to avail themselves of the safe opportunity of one of the troop ships, or a ship of war.

‘They will be at Lisbon in the course of a week; and if

any ship should be going at about that time, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will aid them with your good offices with the Captain to obtain a passage.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 18th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which has been sent to me by General Castaños from the Spanish Minister at War, and the copy of my answer, and the copy of instructions which I have sent to General Hill, to endeavor to divert the enemy’s attention from General Ballesteros, and from Tarifa.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of my dispatch to the Secretary of State of this date.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 18th December, 1811.

‘ I have not received any letters from Mr. Wellesley since the 30th of last month; but General Castaños, who is in this neighborhood, has accounts from Cadiz to the 4th instant. From these it appears that the guerrillas in Aragon and Navarre, and Guadalaxara, Duran, Espoz y Mina, and El Empecinado, having co-operated in the blockade of Daroca, in Aragon, that place had fallen into their hands, with 2500 prisoners. I have not been made acquainted with the date of this event, but I believe it to be certain.

‘ Marshal Suchet, however, still persevered in his endeavors to obtain possession of Valencia, and I understand that on the 25th the enemy had opened their fire on some of the posts occupied by General Blake’s army for the defence of the city.

‘ From these circumstances your Lordship will observe that the report communicated in my last dispatch has no foundation in fact.

‘ The enemy continued in front of General Ballesteros,

who was still under the protection of the guns of Gibraltar. It is also reported that the enemy intended to attack Tarifa.

‘In consequence of the suggestion of the Spanish Minister at War, conveyed to me by General Castaños, that General Hill should make a movement with his corps, to draw the enemy’s attention from General Ballesteros and Tarifa, I have directed General Hill to move upon Merida, if he should find that he can make this movement without distressing the troops for subsistence, while engaged in it, or during the time that it will be expedient that he should remain at Merida, in order to be of any service to General Ballesteros.

‘I have likewise authorized Lieut. General Hill to attack General Drouet, who commands the 5th corps, if upon his arrival at Merida he should find that he can do so with any prospect of success.

‘The enemy have made no movement of any importance in front of this army, nor in the north. A few battalions and squadrons have passed the Tormes, and have collected at San Muñoz, but I imagine it is with the intention of plundering the country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Freneda, 18th December, 1811.

‘I have received your letter, marked private and confidential, of the 21st November, to which mine of the 4th December, regarding the expected fall of Valencia, may be deemed in some degree an answer.

‘I am sorry to say that, notwithstanding what I told you in my last dispatch, I much fear that Valencia will fall; the guerrillas have done wonders to save that place, and if Blake had conducted his operations with as much prudence as they have theirs with skill, and if he had opposed the enemy with solid strength in front, while the guerrillas were cutting off their communication with the rear, Suchet must in the end have retired; and the expedition into Valencia, which, next to the expedition into Portugal, is the most important that the enemy could undertake, would have had a termination proportionally disastrous to them; as it is, I fear that Suchet

will persevere, and that his perseverance will be crowned with success. In this case, the successes of the guerrillas will have produced no effect, excepting in the numbers of the enemy they have killed and taken.

‘ My letter of the 4th will have informed your Lordship of the effect of the fall of Valencia, and my view of our situation.

‘ Ever since September we have continued to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo as far as was practicable, and the place has received nothing from the country, excepting by the convoy which entered on the 1st November, when the Agueda had filled; the consequence is, that the garrison are very ill provided with some necessary articles, and others will be expended by the 20th of February; at that time the garrison will have neither bread nor meat, so that you may see that this fine convoy brought but little more than four months’ provisions for the garrison, and the army which escorted the provisions took about 120,000 rations, being two days’ supply for themselves, or two months for the garrison, when they passed by on their return from the expedition to El Bodon, which reduced the stock in the garrison to what I have above stated.

‘ It has been quite impossible for us to do anything else than blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, as we have since September. First, the army have not till lately been in a state of health to make any forward movement, even for a limited object.

‘ Secondly, if the troops had been in health, we have always been so cramped for the want of provisions, and the Spaniards are so unwilling to furnish any, excepting for ready money payments, notwithstanding that they know that the French will take for nothing all that they can find, that it has been with difficulty I have been able to keep the troops in the situation in which they now are, and above half the army are behind. Being obliged then to keep the troops stationary, and at certain distances from their magazines, I preferred to remain on this frontier to returning to Estremadura, after the month of September. The country on this frontier is the most healthy during the season which has elapsed; by continuing on this frontier, I have protected Abadia’s arrangements, as the enemy did not and could not know that, even if they had not been on the Tormes, I should

ave experienced great difficulty in getting to Salamanca, nor did they know how sickly our troops were till they learnt it from the English newspapers.

‘ Lastly, by continuing on this frontier I was enabled to re-establish Almeida as a military post, and to perform other works, and make other arrangements, which will facilitate and render less expensive our communications in the commencement of the year.

‘ As Almeida is becoming a place of security I have brought up there our battering train; and in order to prevent the enemy from turning towards Valencia, I have directed materials for a siege to be prepared, and I propose to lay down our bridge upon the Agueda. I am also making every effort to get up the stores of our train to Almeida, and

I can succeed, I shall be in a situation to attack Ciudad Rodrigo on any day I please, without risk or inconvenience; and if the weather should permit, I will attack the place before its stock of provisions be consumed.

‘ Whether I can take Ciudad Rodrigo or not, I think it will be expedient to remove our operations to the southward by the end of February or early in March. Our army will by that time be very healthy, and in strength; that is the season in which it will be most practicable for us to carry on our operations on the frontier of Estremadura, and in the southern countries, both on account of the plenty of forage for our horses, and of the wholesomeness of the climate; and I think it possible that if I can bring the whole army together on one point, the enemy will not be able to prevent me from getting possession of Badajoz. At that time also, I expect that I shall not only have Almeida in security as a military post on this frontier, but that Don Carlos de España’s Spanish division will be formed and equipped, and that Badajoz will be able to stand alone while I shall leave him.

‘ These are my present notions, of which your Lordship will make what use you please; but I acknowledge that I should prefer that they were not even hinted to the public, not only because they will not bear disappointment, but because they cannot go before our public in any shape, without at the same time getting to the knowledge of Buonaparte and his Officers.

‘ I enclose the last weekly and daily states. I have to

apologize to your Lordship for addressing you upon this paper, but I have no other.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I am very much obliged to your Lordship for your kindness to my little boy. ‘ W.’

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 19th December, 1811, 5 P. M.

‘ I find that there are at Villa da Ponte 1058 barrels and 200 boxes of gunpowder, which might be brought up to Almeida by 630 mules; and we shall want, besides, 686 barrels of gunpowder for our magazine at Lamego, which can be carried by 343 mules. Total required, 973 mules, to move up our powder.

‘ I do not exactly recollect how many mules there are with the reserve ammunition, but excepting the one sixth to go to the magazine to fetch corn for them, I should wish that as far as this number were sent to bring up this powder. If there should not be enough attached to the reserve ammunition, those attached to the ammunition with the cavalry and the 5th and 6th divisions, shall be sent to assist, with the exception of the one sixth, to carry their corn to them from the magazines.

‘ I have other plans in contemplation for the removal of our shot, so as to relieve you entirely from the weight of the removal of the stores of the train.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *J. Bissett, Esq.,*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Commissary General.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 20th December, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 19th, and I am much obliged to you for having entered into a consideration of that which I had the honor of addressing you on the 18th, as it is probable that your Excellency’s sentiments will attract the attention of the Ministers of both the allied Governments.

‘There is nothing, however, so desirable, as that the exact state of the facts should be ascertained, particularly on a point so important as the means of subsistence of an army; and there is no point to which it is so desirable that the Government and Legislature of your country should turn their attention, and on which they should have authentic information. For this reason principally I trouble you with an answer to your letter.

‘When I stated to your Excellency, in my former letter of the 18th, that experience ought to have shown the people of Estremadura that the British nation always pay their debts, I referred to the transactions of the army which was under my command in that province in 1809. I acknowledge that it did not occur to me that the British troops under Marshal Beresford had left any debts unpaid in that province in the spring of 1811.

‘There may, however, be some without my knowledge, into which circumstance I will inquire, and I will let your Excellency know the result. If there are any, your Excellency may depend upon it that they will be paid in their turn. But whether there are debts of the British army in Estremadura or not since last spring, the necessity that the allied Governments should know the truth, render it expedient that the people should not be flattered on this occasion; and I declare that the province of Estremadura did not give to the army under Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford adequate supplies, or supplies at all in proportion to their means. I know that the army which fought the battle of Albuera were in the greatest distress on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of May, for want of provisions; and the Captain General Blake, in a conference which I had with him at Albuera, declared to me that the troops under his command had been very ill supplied from the time he had arrived in the province. I arrived at Elvas, and took the command of the army on the 19th of May, and I know that the British army were supplied, from that time to the 17th of June, almost every day, with bread and corn brought from the Tagus. I also know that when General Blake crossed the Guadiana, he was so distressed for provisions as to be obliged to request me to supply him on the day he should arrive at Jurumenha, which I was obliged to refuse.

And yet it is well known that an army of 60,000 French troops, with about 7000 cavalry, found subsistence for a month in that province, after the allies had retired from it.

‘I likewise recollect that when means of transport were required from the province of Estremadura for the siege of Badajoz, the supply was trifling, in comparison with the demand and want; and infinitely so in comparison with the means of the province, and in comparison with what was procured from the Alentejo. The same want of transport was felt when the wounded were to be removed from Albuera. I do not mention these circumstances as matters of complaint, but in order to make known the truth, and that the Spanish Government and Legislature may turn their attention to the subject, and may apply a remedy.

‘I am entirely convinced that there is no want of goodwill in the people. But they have no faith in our promise of payment for their property, or in their own Government, and they prefer to trust to the hopeless chance of being able to preserve their property from the enemy, to giving it to the Spanish army or to the British army, on promises of payment, by which they might enable both to render the most essential service to their country; and at all events they would place resources out of the reach of the enemy.

‘It is very desirable that the Government and the Legislature should turn their serious attention to this important subject.

‘I am likewise very much obliged to your Excellency for your observations on the proposed operations of Lieut. General Hill. The corps under the command of this Officer has been moved forward solely at the suggestion of the Minister at War, to divert the attention of the enemy from General Ballesteros; and it remains to be seen for what object it is desirable that General Ballesteros should be enabled to remain where he is.

‘I admit that the object which you suppose from the statements in the newspapers, for the operations of General Ballesteros, is one very desirable in every point of view; and the question is, whether he has a force at all equal to attain it, in whatever degree the enemy’s attention may be diverted from him; and if he has not, whether the force under his command ought not to be employed elsewhere. I can give

no opinion, however, upon these points, as I have no information either of his force or of his plans. I agree with your Excellency in thinking that the only danger which General Hill can apprehend, is on the side of the bridges on the Tagus, and I have instructed General Hill accordingly. But I cannot pretend to guard General Hill from that danger sufficiently to recommend to your Excellency to detach General Morillo into La Mancha.

‘I could guard General Hill from an attack from the Tagus only, by my moving forward in the valley of the Alagon and Tietar, or by a similar movement into Castille. Both these movements are impossible under existing circumstances. All that I can do is to maintain my army in the situation which it now occupies, until I can increase the means of transport to such a degree as to insure its subsistence in a more forward situation. I am exerting all the means in my power to effect this object, and it will be fortunate for the Peninsula if the measures which I shall adopt with this view shall be accompanied by corresponding measures on the part of the Government, to place at our disposal the resources of the provinces.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*
Don F. X. Castaños,

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

[*For the Commissary General.*

‘Freneda, 21st December, 1811.

‘It was intended by Mr. Kennedy and me that Major Aird should superintend the construction of as many bullock carts at Lisbon, according to the pattern lately sent down by Mr. Bissett, as there should be found materials for.

‘These materials are iron axletrees taken from the French carriages, of which there are fifty at present in the arsenal at Lisbon; and brass boxes taken from the wheels of the French carriages, of which there are 100 in the arsenal of Lisbon; the whole of which Marshal Sir William Beresford assured me should be delivered over for this service to whomsoever should be appointed to construct the carts.

‘There are besides twenty five iron axletrees and fifty

two brass boxes on the Tagus, which were likewise to be delivered over for this service; and I send herewith a list of articles which Marshal Beresford assured me we should have, to be employed in the same manner.

‘I enclose directions from Major Sturgeon, detailing the manner in which the axletrees are to be cut, and to what dimensions. The brass boxes must of course be cut to fit the nave of the wheel according to the pattern on the car. The car must be made in every respect according to the pattern.

‘Major Aird will report, if it should be necessary, that this work should be performed in the Portuguese arsenal, that I may write to have permission given for this purpose. But it is very desirable that, if possible, the work should be performed without applying to the Portuguese arsenal for more than the materials above referred to, and those stated in the enclosed list.

‘It is most desirable, indeed absolutely necessary, that no more time should be lost about this work, which, owing to unfortunate circumstances, has now been delayed for two months.

‘I shall hereafter send instructions respecting making carts of the axletrees taken from the English carriages.

‘*J. Bissett, Esq.,*

Commissary General.

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 22d December, 1811.

‘I received your letter of the 14th only yesterday, and that of the 18th this day. It is not easy to form a precise notion of what is intended upon a financial subject, in which the detail is everything, without having under view the proposed regulation itself.

‘First, I entirely agree that whatever measure may be adopted, it is necessary that the paper money in circulation should be stamped, and the whole ought to be stamped within a limited period. I accordingly give orders that all the paper in our possession may be taken to the proper office to be stamped.

‘Secondly, I do not understand what is meant by stamping the paper every time it passes through one of the Govern-

ment offices, accompanied as that measure is by the consequence of postponing the payment of interest for a year after the period at which the paper will appear by the stamp to have passed through the hands of Government.

‘ The circulation of this paper is compulsory, the law of the country making a tender of half paper and half money a legal tender ; and I conclude that the meaning of this regulation is, that when the paper is paid to Government under the law, the difference between the value of paper and the value of coin is compensation to the holder of the paper for his interest due to that moment. It is really impossible to reason seriously upon such a scheme.

‘ The mode of proceeding should be to stamp the old, or make a fresh issue of good paper instead of the old, to pay the interest on all the real paper, from the 1st of July, or even the 1st of October last, and declare the intention of Government to pay it with regularity every half year in future, and to close for ever the paper manufactory, and to allot a certain fund for the payment of the interest regularly.

‘ This is a plain, simple measure, the consequence of which would be, that the value of the paper in the market would rise, and the price of commodities to be purchased by it would fall. The price of paper would not only rise, because every man would feel that it was worth something, but because men in purchasing it, for instance, in April, would be disposed not only to give the price of the paper, but to make an allowance to the seller for the three months’ interest which had been incurred from the 1st of January to the 1st of April, and at last the amount of interest due would be calculated and allowed upon every transfer of paper money, as it now is in England upon Exchequer bills.

‘ But how will it be by this scheme of the Government? No interest will be paid upon paper that passes through the offices. The amount of the interest, therefore, can never be calculated in the sale of the paper, because probably the interest will never be paid, as the paper probably will get into the hands of Government, in the course of circulation, before the year will expire, at the end of which the interest might be claimed. The consequence will be, as is intended, that the holder of the paper will be inclined not to put it in circulation.

‘ But this measure which is to have the effect of checking the circulation of the paper will of course keep down its price. The holder, who has been compelled by law to take paper, must keep it by him in order to make anything by it. After all, he can make only 5 per cent. per annum by the interest; whereas, in any employment of his capital he ought to make 10 per cent., and might make above 20. If he is an individual not engaged in trade, it may be very inconvenient to him to be without his money so long as it will be necessary that he should remain in order to receive the interest upon his paper, and the consequence of this notable scheme will be, that paper will be as much avoided in all pecuniary transactions as it is at this moment, and the value of it in exchange must remain as it is, notwithstanding the expense which Government will incur by paying some of the interest; for, after all, some of the interest will be demanded from them.

‘ This scheme will not answer my purpose, and it is quite beneath a great Government. If the Government will adopt the simple measure which I have above proposed to them, and will pay only three months’ interest on the paper in circulation on the 1st of January, I will order the Commissary General to give a receipt for all the interest which will be due on that day on the paper in our hands.

‘ If they do not adopt some such plan as this, I shall certainly put a stop to the trade in paper altogether, by refusing to receive it in payment for our bills of exchange.

‘ In regard to the Apolices Grandes, I have not time to develop the effect of Principal Souza’s scheme. But it is totally inconsistent with every notion of financial policy that I have ever formed, and equally so with justice, which must be the foundation of every financial scheme.

‘ The interest on the Apolices ought to be paid from the 1st of July, as well as that on the circulating paper money, and there they ought to be left. The interest should hereafter be secured and paid regularly.

‘ I thought that you had, as you ought to have, in your possession in Mr. Bell’s chest, the money in metal and paper which I had at different times ordered the Commissary General to pay over to you, but from your letter I imagine that we have kept it, and, as usual, have spent it.

'I have desired the Commissary General to send orders to Mr. Pipon to pay you as large a sum in metal as he can, and to allow the discount of the day on all the paper he is obliged to give you, as I conceive that the Portuguese Government are entitled to the subsidy in sterling money, and not in currency. In this I may be wrong.

' Believe me, &c.

' *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

' WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Freneda, 23d December, 1811.

' I had some conversation yesterday with Major General Anson, regarding the horses of his brigade, and it appears to be very desirable that some effort should be made to supply those of the 16th dragoons in particular. That brigade have been on this duty for about a month, and came in good condition, and in that time they have lost fifty six horses.

' Believe me, &c.

' *J. Bissett, Esq.,*
Commissary General.

' WELLINGTON.

' P.S. I think it would be desirable to look into the disposition of the mules of the 16th dragoons, as they are not so well supplied as the 14th, although the latter are farthest off.

' W.'

To Lieut. General Hill.

' MY DEAR HILL,

' Freneda, 23d December, 1811, 8 A. M.

' I received last night your letter of the 21st.

' From all the letters which I have received from Cadiz, it appears to me to be very desirable that you should make a movement, to endeavor to divert the enemy's attention from Ballesteros and Tarifa.

' I do not think that your measures at Jurumenha would answer that purpose; you might certainly cross the Guadiana at that place at present (though that is doubtful), but the enemy know well that you must recross as soon as the river will fill; and the movement of the army of Portugal would equally oblige you to retire, and you would find your retreat across the Guadiana by flying bridges excessively

tedious. Your measures at Jurumenha, unless you could cross the Guadiana immediately, would produce no effect as a diversion for Tarifa, &c. ; those of Merida may.

‘ I believe that the road from Portalegre on Merida, by Albuquerque, passes the head of the Gevora, and of the Salor ; the other river which you mention I am not acquainted with. If this be the case, your retreat from Merida would always be secure ; if it should not be the case, it would only be necessary, after the first impression should be made, and if you should determine not to attack Drouet, to place your troops, on the first appearance of rain, *en échelon*, from Merida, the great body being behind the river which is to be passed, and the smaller at Merida, having all the means to pass the river by the smaller body prepared beforehand.

‘ If the Guadiana should be fordable, I agree with you in thinking that the Jurumenha plan would answer best, as an immediate diversion ; but still for your retreat and communications, I would recommend to you to turn your back upon Merida when across the Guadiana, from knowing that you cannot depend upon a flying bridge on the Guadiana.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain —.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 24th December, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter. I am much concerned that you should imagine that — had been ill treated. You are certainly mistaken upon this subject. I have desired that he may be paid ten dollars, and sent back to you satisfied. I likewise sent you by him fifty dollars in gold coin.

‘ In respect to your pardon, you cannot expect that it should be given to you immediately. I told you that I must be able to assure the Government that you had served your country with zeal, and had given useful information. You cannot suppose that the two or three letters which you have written to me will enable me to secure your object.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain —.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 24th December, 1811, 8 A. M.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday morning, I have received a report that the 6th division of the army of Portugal moved from Plasencia across the Tietar on the 21st. I do not yet know the object of this movement. The baggage, artillery, hospitals, &c. belonging to this division had been moved some days before to Navalmoral.

‘ There are various reports respecting their ultimate destination; some that they are going to Valencia; others that they are to cross the Tagus. I will let you know if I should learn anything positive.

‘ I have not yet heard whether the movement has been general, or confined to this one division.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Lord William Bentinck.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 24th December, 1811.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 14th November; and I am very much obliged to you for the detail into which you have entered respecting the affairs of which the conduct has been entrusted to you.

‘ I had heard generally of these affairs before, but I have had no opportunities of acquiring information upon them, and have turned my attention but little to them; and if I could form an opinion upon them I should mistrust it. I have, however, long considered it probable, that even *we* should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has passed in Spain and Portugal; and that *we* should be actors and advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.

‘ Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the sword they must not return it till they shall have completely accomplished their object. They must be prepared and must be forced to make all sacrifices

to the cause. Submission to military discipline and order is a matter of course ; but when a nation determines to resist the authority, and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and to risk all in a contest which, it should be clearly understood before it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.

‘ The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army. Above all, to form a Government of such strength as that army and people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon which Spain has split ; and all our measures in any other country which should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in print ; but I have never known it produce anything but confusion. In France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe, and establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in *ricas* and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the attempt to discipline the armies ; and its existence has been alleged ever since as the excuse for the rank ignorance of the Officers and the indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.

‘ I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if possible, a good, government ; but, above all, a strong one, which shall enforce them to do their duty by themselves and their country ; and let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures to raise it.

‘ I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quantities only by the contributions of the people ; and although Great Britain can and ought to assist with money as well in other

modes every effort of this description, the principal financial as well as military effort ought to be by the people of the resisting country.

‘ I agree entirely in opinion with you about the foreign Austrian Officers. They ought to have been taken into the pay of Great Britain bodily on the day they were removed from the service of the Emperor; and Government should have adopted this measure, on the same principle that I recommended them three years ago, to make three stands of arms for one they made before, and to turn Great Britain into a magazine of military stores, in order to be able to supply with Officers, arms, and stores, those nations which should be inclined to resist the tyranny of Buonaparte.

‘ I entertain a high opinion of the Princes of the Austrian family; and it is entirely consistent with my notion that a person of the high birth and great qualifications of the Archduke Francis* should be placed at the head of any country disposed to resist Buonaparte. But he must understand that he must never lay down his arms, even though reduced to be the head of a gang of robbers, till he shall have attained his object.

‘ I know as little about the politics of Sicily as I do about anything else. It has always appeared to me that we had no right to go farther in the first instance than stop the subsidy; and at the same time maintain our position in the country. I should think that this measure would bring the Queen to her senses, if she is not in communication with Buonaparte. If it does not, we shall save our money and shall not be worse off than we are; and we shall be prepared to take advantage of the course of events.

‘ If the measure of stopping the subsidy should succeed, and you should be able to form an army in that country, I beg to draw your attention to what I have above stated regarding the necessity of making the country contribute a revenue to support its military force.

‘ In consequence of an intimation from the Duke of York that you wished General Clinton to join you, and a letter from General Clinton expressing his desire to go, I have written a letter to wait for him at Lisbon, in which I have

* Afterwards Duke of Modena.

consented to his going. He has not yet, however, arrived at Lisbon.

‘ I beg you to present my best compliments to Lady William, and to

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Lord W. Bentinck.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 25th December, 1811.

‘ I have great pleasure in forwarding to you a dispatch from the Earl of Liverpool, conveying to you the approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of your conduct, and of that of Colonel Skerrett, which I beg you will communicate to the Colonel.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 25th December, 1811.

‘ The 6th division of the army of Portugal broke up from Plasencia on the 21st instant, and marched across the Tietar, in the direction of Navalmoral; but I have not yet heard whether the other divisions of the army of Portugal, which were cantoned about Bejar, and in the province of Avila, have moved.

‘ I cannot learn the object of the movement, but it appears to have been unexpected, and occasioned by the arrival of an Officer with dispatches from Madrid. I have long expected that the distress of the troops for want of subsistence would have rendered it necessary, as that part of the province of Estremadura is entirely exhausted.

‘ I have no intelligence upon which I can rely of the state of affairs in Valencia. It is certain that no troops have been detached from this quarter into Valencia, unless the movement of the 6th division from Plasencia should be only a part of a more general movement in that direction, of which, however, I have no intelligence.

‘ Nothing of any importance has occurred in the north of Spain.

‘ I have letters from Mr. Wellesley to the 19th instant ;

but I imagine that I have not received some dispatches from Cadiz, which probably have been sent round by Lisbon.

‘The object of the enemy’s movements in the Sierra de Ronda appears to have been to hem in Ballesteros upon Gibraltar with one body of troops, while, with another, they should attack Tarifa with heavy artillery. The enemy remained at San Roque from the end of last month till the 12th instant, when they retired to Los Barrios; and General Ballesteros had advanced to San Roque on the 13th, Colonel Skerrett being still at Tarifa.

‘It is reported that the French had retired entirely from that part of the country; but Colonel Skerrett, who wrote on the 13th, appeared to be of opinion that the enemy would still make an attack upon Tarifa, and that their movement was with a view to concentrate their force for that object, and to approach nearer to their magazines. The heavy artillery for the attack of Tarifa was between Vejer and Facenes.

‘It appears probable that the enemy will persevere in making their attack, which they had certainly intended.

‘Major General Cooke adverts to two attempts made by the enemy to penetrate the pass of La Peña, in both of which they failed. I have not yet received the reports of these affairs.

‘I have not yet heard that General Hill had moved, in consequence of the orders which I reported to your Lordship in my last dispatch that I had sent to him.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Freneda, 25th December, 1811.

‘I enclose the last weekly state, and the last morning report.

‘Unless the 6th division of the army of Portugal has been obliged to move by distress for provisions, I do not know what to make of that movement.

‘It is reported that the troops which were at Boulogne under Ney are coming into Spain; but a letter from my correspondent at Salamanca states that 15,000 of them had

arrived at Bayonne, and had returned to the northward. If this is not the case, it is possible that Ney's troops may be considered a relief for the army of Portugal, to keep us in check, and that the army of Portugal may be moving towards Valencia.

‘ Against this conjecture, however, I have to mention, First, that the troops in Avila, &c., have not moved, at least I have not heard of their movement. Secondly, I was informed some days ago that the 1st division of the army of Portugal had passed the Tagus into La Mancha, and I then imagined that they were going to Valencia; but I have since heard that they had returned.

‘ It is reported that there was a very severe battle at Valencia on the 2d; and it is just possible that Suchet may have been obliged to retire in consequence of this loss, and of the mischief done to him by the guerrillas in Aragon. It is also said that an attack had been made upon Barcelona by the troops in Catalonia.

‘ The desertion from Suchet's army is immense; and if he has sustained any serious loss in the action of the 2d, he would be obliged to retire, and in that case Marmont would naturally close his cantonments towards Madrid.

‘ You will observe that this is conjecture upon conjecture, and upon report; but I cannot account for these marches and countermarches in any other manner; and it is certain that if the march of the 6th division had been occasioned by the want of provisions, it would not have been so unexpected as it was by all those who give intelligence.

‘ I am continuing our preparations to attack Ciudad Rodrigo with the utmost activity, and I shall act according to circumstances.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For the Commissary General and Major Dickson, and the Officer of the Ordnance Department in charge of the Powder.

‘ Freneda, 25th December, 1811.

‘ Six hundred barrels of the powder now in store at or near Lamego must be sent up the Douro in boats, as far as

it can be brought : a careful person should accompany each boat, and see that the powder is preserved from the wet.

‘ The Commissary General is requested to report the progress of these boats.

‘ Major Dickson will send off a copy of these orders to the Officer of the ordnance department in charge of the powder.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

MEMORANDUM

For the Commissary General and Quarter Master General.

‘ Freneda, 25th December, 1811.

‘ Four hundred tents now at Coimbra must be sent up to Almeida as soon as may be practicable. They must be brought in boats to Raiva, and thence brought forward on 100 of the provision mules attached to the 5th division to Almeida.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Major Dickson, R.A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 26th December, 1811, 9 A.M.

‘ I have ordered that the 600 barrels of powder at Lamego may be brought up by the Douro; and I understand that 53, 53, 33, 99, and 300 mules, that is, 538 mules altogether, have gone to Villa da Ponte to bring the powder from thence. I do not recollect how much there was at Villa da Ponte when the mules were ordered there; and I understand from Colonel Fletcher, that some carts loaded with powder have arrived at Almeida since I saw you. I am therefore unable to answer a question put to me by General Graham, whether the mules of the general reserve with the 1st division should make a second trip; that is to say, the 115, of which only 99 went. I have told General Graham in a letter which the bearer has in his possession, that you would let him know if it was necessary that the mules should make a second trip, and I beg you to let him know accordingly.

‘ If you are at all doubtful whether sufficient arrangements have been made to bring up the powder from Villa da Ponte, it is better that they should go; and if you have

had any of the bags made for carrying shot, about which you and I conversed the other day, you might give some of them to these mules, and let them bring loads of shot if all the powder should be brought up; or you should be satisfied that the arrangements for bringing it up will be sufficient. In this case also, you will let General Graham know that it is necessary that the mules should return to Villa da Ponte.

‘Be so kind as to let me know how much powder and shot there is at Almeida, and how much at Villa da Ponte; and the weight of each article at the latter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Dickson, R.A.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R.A.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Freneda, 27th December, 1811, 11 A.M.

‘I received last night your two letters of yesterday. Let the quantity of powder required from Pezo da Regoa come by water, whether any has been sent to Villa da Ponte or not.

‘I understand, that in the quantity of powder in Almeida, is included that brought yesterday by the mules of the 1st division; but that the shot which passed the Coa yesterday is not included.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Dickson, R.A.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Freneda, 27th December, 1811, 12 at noon.

‘I enclose the report of Captain Ross, from which you will see that the Douro is navigable to Barca d’Alva.

‘I have perused Mr. Purcell’s letter upon the transport with the Light division. Be so kind as to refer Mr. Purcell to the General Orders, from which he will see that the Surgeons of regiments have an allowance to keep a mule to carry their chests. A mule is allowed by the public to a Quarter Master, to carry the regimental intrenching tools; and when any of these are worn out in the public service, they have been replaced by my orders. But it is a most extravagant mode of replacing them to use the hired mules for this purpose.

‘ I have ordered the Quarter Master General to call for returns of the intrenching tool mules with the regiments of the Light division.

‘ I beg to observe upon the appropriation of the mules with the Light division, that in the winter it appears to me to be entirely unnecessary to kill the meat for the whole division, or a whole brigade, at one place. Much transport would be saved by killing meat at the quarters of each regiment. I would also observe that the mules employed for the carriage of the reserve ammunition might perform a part of the duty of carrying supplies to those troops of the division which are detached to a distance, and that part of this duty might be performed by the carts of the country.

‘ In the conversation which I had with you the other day, I told you that I thought 400 bullocks would be sufficient for the duties of the siege. I rather believe we must have the whole division of 800. 400 of them might as well bring up with them the carts which have been bought, possibly with their loads.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. Bissett, Esq.,
Commissary General.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Considering that we are about to give our transport a little work, would it not be desirable to give them the third of a month’s pay, on the plan that you and I settled some days ago?

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 29th December, 1811, 11 P.M.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have this day received from Lord Liverpool, from which you will learn the gracious intentions of the Prince Regent in respect to yourself, Captains Currie and Squire, your brother, and Lieut. Baillie.

‘ It may fall to my lot to be the instrument of conveying to you the honor intended for you, as I have acted in a similar capacity in respect to others; but I assure you that I shall perform this duty in respect to you (if it should devolve upon me) with at least as much satisfaction as I have upon any former occasion.

‘ I have received official letters from the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief upon your action, which I propose to publish in the General Orders of the army.

‘ I have nothing authentic of Brenier’s division, excepting that they are gone to Naval moral, and I believe higher up the Tagus. The division which was at the head of the Tormes, marched upon Avila on the 26th, and it is said that the division which was at Avila was to march likewise.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th December, 1811.

‘ In respect to the telegraphs along the Guadiana, the first thing to be done will be to have the country surveyed by one of the gentlemen of the telegraph establishment, and the stations for the several telegraphs fixed; when this shall be accomplished, we can have an estimate of the expense framed. I would beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of mentioning your wishes on this subject to Dom Miguel Forjaz, that he may order one of the Officers of the telegraph establishment to fix the stations for the telegraphs as proposed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th December, 1811.

‘ I enclose the extract of a letter from my brother, in regard to the shipment of the money for this army in the vessels of the Cadiz squadron. You will see that he is not unaware of my desire that it should always come in one of your vessels; but it is desirable that they should go to Cadiz at fixed periods.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Freneda, 31st December, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 26th December. In regard to the military expenses of this Kingdom in general, it is my opinion that the Portuguese Government have proceeded on a principle entirely unjustifiable, and such as never was adopted by a nation involved in war, particularly not when the war was for its existence as a nation.

‘ The mode of proceeding generally adopted, is first to see what the military expenses really would be; and to supply all those expenses, leaving the residue to defray expenses of the civil, political, agricultural, and other departments. But the mode of proceeding adopted by the Portuguese Government, has been first to provide fully for all the other expenses of the state, and to leave the residue with the British subsidy for the military expenses.

‘ This will not answer my purpose, and for that reason I am excessively anxious that the detail of all the estimate should be particularly examined, in order that we may form a judgment of what the military expense really is; and then, if the Government will not provide for it, in preference to every other expense, excepting the payment of the interest on the debt, I shall recommend to the British Government to withdraw their subsidy.

‘ I now enclose some memorandums on the estimate of the expenses to be paid from the southern treasury in January, which, of all the documents of this description I have ever seen, is the most scandalous. Nine regiments of militia, which do not give 6000 men under arms, cost nearly as much as nine regiments of the line, two battalions of caçadores, and two regiments of cavalry!

‘ Under the two heads 6 and 7 are included the pay of the only persons who ever do a day’s duty, or who ever can be expected to fire a shot. The expense of their pay is about 30 contos, and the estimate for the others is 37 contos. I do not mean to say that many of the persons whose pay is estimated in the latter sum, may not be usefully employed, and are paid even less than they ought to be. But the mere statement of the subject shows the necessity of strict examination. I believe it never before

happened, that the mere pay of non-combatants and pensioners, and paymasters of a portion of any army, cost more than the army itself. For this reason, I again recommend a most close examination of the details of all the estimates.

‘ I see clearly the force of your objections to the existing constitution of the military chest. It ought to be formed to defray the current expenses of the military body properly so called; and the pensions and expenses ought to be defrayed from some other fund. I was aware of this defect when the formation of the establishment was under discussion; but certainly, not of the degree to which it will operate upon the funds, if “the stay-tape and buckram” in all the estimates is to amount to the same proportion of the expense as it does in the estimate for the southern treasury.

‘ If, however, I had known of the extent of these demands, I should not have known how to manage them, without placing them in the first instance in the military chest. If I had attempted to arrange them on any other plan, I should have embarrassed the discussions on the formation of the military chest to such a degree, that that establishment would never have been formed. We must now let it work as it is formed.

‘ Do you, and Mr. Stuart, and Dom Miguel Forjaz, examine with the most minute detail, all the estimates, and see what expenses are necessary, and what are not. As soon as that is done, I shall propose a reform of the plan to go to such points as may appear to require amendment, and that will oblige the Government to find means to pay the expenses of their army, next to the interest of their debts.

‘ It is most evident that the whole subject requires close and accurate investigation. Even you and Mr. Stuart do not understand one another upon it.

‘ What expenses are estimated in 1130 contos for January? You appear to think that the expenses incurred by our commissariat are not included; Mr. Stuart must think they are included; as in calculating the means to defray the expense of the estimates, he supposes 600 contos the largest amount of a monthly payment of the subsidy that could be issued to the military chest from the chest of “Aids.”

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1811.

The Notes to the Memorandum are in the Manuscript.

‘ Freneda, 28th December, 1811.

‘ The last memorandum on the operations in the Peninsula, brought them down to the end of the year 1810, when a division of the 9th corps, with other troops, which had before endeavored to join Massena from the frontiers of Castille, through Lower Beira, arrived, and took their station on the right of the enemy’s army at Leyria. These troops, supposed to be from 8000 to 10,000 men, had been annoyed on their march by Colonel Wilson’s detachment on the Alva*.

‘ The other division of the 9th corps under Claparède, amounting also to about 10,000 men, remained on the frontier, and by their manœuvres kept General Silveira in check during the march of the division under Drouet, by the valley of the Mondego. Silveira attacked their advanced guard at Ponte do Abade, on the 30th December, 1810, and was defeated; and he was himself attacked and defeated at Villa da Ponte on the 11th of January; and he retired, first to Lamego, and thence across the Douro†. Claparède advanced upon Lamego, but General Bacellar having placed the divisions of militia, under the command of General Miller and of Colonel Wilson, on his flanks and his communications, he was obliged to retire, and went to Guarda, to which place he had been ordered by Massena‡.

‘ But the principal occurrence in the commencement of this year was the movement, from Andalusia, of a large force into Estremadura, in order to create a diversion in favor of Massena.

‘ The army of the south, under the command of Soult, consisted of the 1st corps, which was engaged in the operations of the siege of Cadiz; of the 4th corps, which was at Grenada; and of the 5th corps, one division of which, under Gazan, could with difficulty maintain its ground in Estremadura against the Spanish division of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, whilst the other division, under Girard, was

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 3d of January.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 17th of January.’

‡ ‘ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the end of January and beginning of February.’

employed in the Condado de Niebla, and in keeping open the communication between Seville and the besieging army of Cadiz. The whole amount of the army of the south could not be less in the beginning of the year than 50,000 men*.

‘Soult broke up from Cadiz with about 5000 men on the 21st December, and collected at Seville the troops destined for the invasion of Estremadura. He had with him about 20,000 men†, including a very large body of cavalry; to oppose which there were the Spanish divisions of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, which amounted to about 10,000 men, a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and about 1500 Spanish cavalry, making altogether about 2300 cavalry. There were, besides, Spanish garrisons in Badajoz and Campo Mayor, Alburquerque, and Valencia de Alcantara; and Don Carlos de España’s brigade, about 2000 men, which was on the right of the British army near Abrantes, was considered disposable for service in Estremadura.

‘If this corps had been left entire, and had been prudently managed, it would have been fully sufficient, even though not joined by the other troops belonging to the army of the Marques de la Romana, incorporated with the British army, to prevent the enemy from passing the Guadiana, which was full at that season of the year.

‘But the first measure adopted by the Spanish Government, on the same day, the 21st December, that Soult broke up from Cadiz, was to order Ballesteros, with a part of his division, into the Condado de Niebla. Notwithstanding that we received at Cartaxo, on the 29th December, the accounts of Soult having broken up from before Cadiz, the Spanish General Mendizabal did not hear of this circumstance for some days afterwards; and the first he heard of it was from us. He was quite unprepared for his retreat, which was hurried; and he retired in a manner different, and making a different disposition, from that which was recommended and ordered.

* ‘By a return of the 25th March, it appears that this army then consisted of 48,619 men; of which number 7744 were cavalry. This was after the battle of Barrosa, and after the siege of Badajoz, the battle of the 19th February, &c. It may be presumed that it was more than 50,000 men in the beginning of the year.’

† ‘The 5th corps alone had about 12,000 infantry; and 5000 brought from the siege of Cadiz and the cavalry, would make his army 20,000 men.’

‘ He had been ordered to break the bridges of Merida and Medellin, and to defend the passages of the Guadiana. He retired upon Badajoz and Olivença; and the engineer Officer who was sent to destroy the bridge of Merida, instead of obeying the orders he received, made a report which was sent to Cartaxo to the Marques de la Romana, and asked for orders. The town of Merida itself was not defended; and the consequence was, that an advanced guard of French cavalry took Merida, which post 400 French troops had held in June in the year 1809, against the whole Spanish army, with this additional disadvantage, that the river Guadiana was then fordable, and that the Spanish troops were in possession of all the avenues to the town*.

‘ General Mendizabal, in making his retreat upon Badajoz and Olivença, threw 3000 men of General Ballesteros’ division into the latter, the others having marched under General Ballesteros by order of the Government, into the Condado de Niebla. The division of General Mendizabal retired upon Badajoz, with all the cavalry, excepting a small body which marched upon Merida.

‘ There were various reports of the movements of the French; and in fact it was but little known in what direction, and with what object, they were moving. It was at one time positively stated, that they had passed the bridge of Merida on the 15th of January, and that they were moving towards the bridge of Almaraz, on the Tagus; at another time it was reported that they were encamped at Caceres; but at last it was found that they did not cross the Guadiana in any force, but blockaded the troops of General Ballesteros’ division in Olivença.

‘ This blockade was made on the 15th, and continued till the 23d of January, when the garrison surrendered. Two or three attempts were made by General Mendizabal to raise the blockade, but without success; and as the garrison at last surrendered, before the enemy had attacked the place, and without being distressed for provisions, it is believed that the place was sold.

‘ During the month of January, the Marques de la Romana was taken very ill at Cartaxo, of which illness he died on the 23d of that month. He had ordered Don

* ‘ See the reports of that period,’

Carlos de España's brigade to march as soon as he heard of the danger of Ballesteros' detachment from the advance of the French troops, and he afterwards ordered that the remainder of the troops which had been incorporated with the British army should move from Villa Franca, where they had been cantoned. They moved on the 20th of January.

‘From the period at which we had heard of the movement of the French from Cadiz, and particularly, latterly, I had frequent conversation with him regarding the situation of affairs in Estremadura; and as he was unwell, I wrote, in the shape of a memorandum, my opinions on the plan of operations to be pursued, as well for the objects of the war in general, as for the particular purpose of saving Olivença, or rather for relieving the troops in that place, respecting whom the Marques was particularly anxious *.

‘The Marques died three days after he had received this memorandum; but not till after he had circulated it among the Officers under his command, and had desired them to attend to it. A reference to the memorandum, and to the letters and dispatches of that day, will show how far they attended either to the first or to the last †.

‘After two attempts were made to raise the blockade of Olivença, the place surrendered on the 23d January; and the enemy invested Badajoz, on both sides of the Guadiana, on the 27th of January, and broke ground on the left of the river on the 29th ‡.

‘The Spanish Generals were not decided respecting the measures which they should adopt in the circumstances in which they stood. But at length the troops, which had quitted the allied army on the 20th of January, were ordered to advance to Badajoz. They immediately re-established the communication between Elvas and Badajoz, obliging the French cavalry to retire beyond the Evora; and then having entered the town, they attempted to raise

* ‘See memorandum of the 20th January, in letter to Mr. Wellesley, of the 23d January, in the Foreign Office.’

† ‘See correspondence with Mr. Wellesley in the months of January and February, 1811, with enclosures in the Foreign Office, viz.: January 6th, 13th, 26th, 23d, and 28th, all private.

‘See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of January 5th, 12th, 19th, 26th, and 28th, and February 2d.’

‡ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 9th February.’

the siege by making a sortie upon the enemy's works. They were driven back with loss; and having remained in the town, the communication between Elvas and Badajoz was again cut off by the enemy's cavalry*.

‘The Spanish troops however came out of the town again on the 9th of February, and at last took the position on the heights of San Christoval, which was recommended to them. They did not however adopt any measure to fortify this position, nor did they adopt any of the other measures recommended to them, particularly that of sending away from Badajoz the bridge of boats, the want of which was afterwards found to be so fatal to the cause.

‘The Spanish army, about 10,000 strong, and having besides about 2000 cavalry, including General Madden's Portuguese brigade, remained in the position at San Christoval, till the 19th February, having the Evora in their front, and that river and the Guadiana between them and the enemy, on which day they were surprised by between 5000 and 6000 French troops, and totally destroyed as a military body; their camp and artillery being taken, and the whole body not killed or taken dispersed, except the Portuguese brigade of cavalry, and a few hundred Spaniards. About 2000 of the troops escaped into Badajoz †.

‘An examination of the letters written at this period to Mr. Wellesley and the Secretary of State, will show my anxiety for the relief of Badajoz, and the measures which I recommended for that object. The most effectual measure of any would undoubtedly have been to detach a body of British troops to that part of the country; but a moment's reflection on the relative numbers of the two armies at that time on the Tagus, and on the extent and nature of the positions which we had to occupy, will show that it was impossible to venture to detach, from our army at least, till the reinforcements then expected should have arrived in the Tagus.

* ‘If the French had sent a sufficient body of cavalry to the right of the Guadiana, they would have taken the whole army without firing a shot. See the memorandum of the 20th January.’

† ‘See dispatches to Mr. Wellesley, and their enclosures, of the 2d, 3d, 10th, 17th, and 23d February, all in the Foreign Office.

‘Those to Lord Liverpool of the 2d, 9th, 16th, and 28th February.’

‘ Massena had come into Portugal with 72,000 men, of which he had lost 10,000 at the battle of Busaco, and its consequences ; and it is a large allowance to suppose that he had in January lost 10,000 more by deaths, prisoners, deserters, and killed, in various little affairs which had occurred. This would reduce his original number to 52,000 men ; and an aide de camp of his, who was taken in December, reported that the army had that number before Drouet joined*.

‘ To this number Drouet, in December, and Foy, in January, added about 12,000 men, making 64,000 ; and Claparède was at Guarda with between 8000 and 10,000 men ; of the 64,000, about 14,000 may have been sick, as the army were very sickly ; and there would have remained on the Tagus, fit for service, about 50,000 men.

‘ The British army, on the 20th January, consisted of 41,040 men ; of which number there were sick, 6715 ; on command, 1974 ; prisoners of war, 1586 ; and there remained present, fit for duty, 30,765. Of this number, the 2d batt. 88th (485) were at Lisbon, and the 2d batt. 58th, at Torres Vedras ; leaving about 30,000 for service ; of which number 2655 were cavalry.

‘ The Portuguese army, joined with the British for service in the field, at the same time amounted to about 32,000 effective men, exclusive of the garrisons of Abrantes and Elvas, in each of which there were two regiments of infantry, one regiment of infantry at Cadiz, and one regiment of infantry (the 24th) with General Silveira. The object of the French General at this time was undoubtedly to pass the Tagus ; and he had his choice of making the attempt in a course of about thirty miles from Santarem to the Zezere, and even higher than the junction of that river. It was necessary to guard that whole course of the river ; for which it is conceived that 14,000 men could not be deemed more than sufficient.

‘ The remainder of the army, about 40,000 men, was on the right of the Tagus, opposed to the whole French army ; and it must be observed, that if the enemy had been able to advance, either with their 50,000 men, or after being joined

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 29th December, 1810.’

by Claparède, they would have been opposed by very unequal numbers, as some days must have elapsed before the troops on the left of the Tagus could have been brought across the river.

‘ The detachment which it would have been necessary to make, in order to effect any good at Badajoz, or even to have been in safety, adverting to the mode in which the Spanish troops have usually conducted themselves, ought to have been about 13,000 men; which numbers, it is obvious, could not be spared from the army from the end of January to the 19th of February.

‘ Reinforcements to the amount of 6000 or 7000 men were daily expected, which afterwards arrived in the beginning of March. It was hoped that the Spaniards would risk nothing, and would be able to hold out till these reinforcements should arrive, when it was intended to detach a sufficient force to effect the object at Badajoz, before anything else should be attempted against Massena*.

‘ The delay of all measures against Massena’s position continued to be absolutely necessary on account of the state of the roads and rivers in the country; even if our force had been deemed sufficient to attack him.

‘ The result of the battle of the 19th February, however, destroyed all hopes of being able, even when the reinforcement should arrive, to make such a detachment from the army as should be able to relieve Badajoz; more particularly as the Spaniards, having neglected to remove the bridge from Badajoz to Elvas, the troops which should attempt to relieve Badajoz had no choice left, in respect to the mode of crossing the Guadiana. They must have passed by the bridge of Badajoz.

‘ It was then determined to attack Massena as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, by which time it was hoped that the roads and rivulets would become practicable. In the meantime the governor of Badajoz was requested to hold out to the last moment.

‘ Massena, however, retired from his position on the night of the 5th of March, before our troops, which had arrived at Lisbon in the 1st day of March, could join the army. The

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 14th March.’

British troops were immediately put in motion in pursuit of the French army; those on the left of the Tagus, by Abrantes and the Zézere; and those on the Rio Mayor river, by the different routes leading in the direction which the enemy had taken.

‘ A letter was written to General Leite, the governor of Elvas, from Santarem on the 6th, to request him to apprise the governor of Badajoz of Massena’s retreat, and to assure him that support and relief would be sent to him without loss of time.

‘ This support was accordingly ordered to march on the 8th, as soon as the enemy’s retreat was found to be decided*.

‘ When the enemy retired, it appeared at first that their intention was to go by the road of Thomar and Espinhal, leaving Coimbra on their left; and it was not certain that they had taken the high road by Pombal, till the 9th. On that morning a most favorable report was received of the state of affairs at Badajoz. It appeared that the garrison had not suffered; that the fire of the place was superior to that of the enemy; and that one of the enemy’s six battering guns had been dismounted by the fire of the place. Under these circumstances, when it was found on the afternoon of the 9th, that the enemy had collected their army in a strong position at Pombal, it was deemed expedient to order the 4th division, and General De Grey’s brigade of cavalry (which had been ordered to march on the 10th to join the 2d and General Hamilton’s division, on the left of the Tagus, as soon as the bridge should be laid for them), to march upon Pombal, to co-operate in the attack which it was intended to make upon the enemy on the 11th.

‘ These troops accordingly joined, and the enemy retired; but the garrison of Badajoz surrendered on the 10th of March.

‘ The mode of the enemy’s retreat on the 11th, and the fact that they were still stronger than we were, and might have taken up the position of Coimbra and the Mondego, unless hurried beyond that town, caused the continued detention of the 4th division, and General De Grey’s

* ‘ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th March.’

brigade of cavalry, till the operations of the 13th forced the enemy past Coimbra, and enabled us to communicate with that town.

‘ The troops for Badajoz were immediately put in motion to return to the south, but unfortunately we that night heard of the fall of that fortress on the 10th. These accounts were accompanied by reports of the enemy immediately threatening Campo Mayor; and even if it had not been desirable to prevent them from extending their conquests on that side, the fall of Badajoz facilitated to such a degree their entry into Portugal, and Badajoz was so much nearer to Lisbon than the point at which we then found ourselves, that it would have been impossible to continue the pursuit of Massena even for one march, without providing for the security of our right flank, by placing a large corps on the Tagus.

‘ Thus, then, it was still necessary to make this detachment, notwithstanding that the original object for which it was destined was lost*.

‘ The pursuit of Massena was continued with uniform success from that period till he finally crossed the Agueda on the 9th of April. Our reinforcements, however, were not all arrived in Portugal, and those which had arrived, did not join the army till the end of March. Even then we were infinitely inferior to the enemy in numbers, particularly when he approached the frontier, and was joined by Claparède’s division of the 9th corps from Guarda. Our movements were, therefore, necessarily cramped, and we were obliged to proceed with caution, when the utmost activity would have been desirable.

‘ Let anybody now advert to the difference of the result of Massena’s invasion of Portugal, if the operations on the Guadiana in the month of January had been carried on as they ought; if the Spanish Regency had not drawn Ballesteros from Estremadura at the moment that province was attacked; if his troops had not been shamefully sold in Olivença; if the battle of the 19th of February had not been lost, and the Spanish army annihilated; and, finally, if Badajoz itself had not been shamefully sold to the enemy

* ‘ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th, 16th, 21st, 27th March; 2d, 9th, 18th April.’

on the day after the governor was informed that relief would be sent to him.

‘As soon as the French were driven across the Agueda, Almeida was invested; and it will be seen in a subsequent part of this memorandum, that the enemy made an attempt in May to relieve the place. What would have been the result of that attempt, nay more, would it ever have been made, if we had had 22,000 men in the ranks, which were at that time in Estremadura?’

‘If our attention had not been preferably, and with part of our army necessarily, carried into Estremadura, in consequence of the events in that province, in the months of January, February, and March, what would have been the result of an attempt to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo in May, after the fall of Almeida, by the concentrated force and resources of the allied army?’

‘But other circumstances occurred, not yet adverted to in this memorandum, which show still more clearly the fatal effects of the Spanish system of military operations. Notwithstanding that General Ballesteros was weak, and that he ought never to have been removed from Estremadura, he held his ground against a French corps which attacked him on the 25th of January. A part of the French force in Estremadura was consequently withdrawn from that province, and the force engaged in the siege of Badajoz was reduced*.

‘Another event occurred highly advantageous in all its circumstances to the state of affairs in Estremadura. In consequence of the diminution of the force before Cadiz in December, 1810, the British and Spanish authorities conceived that a fair opportunity offered of making an attack upon the blockading army by the besieged. This attack was fixed for the 28th of February, but owing to contrary winds, and a variety of circumstances, could not take place till the 6th of March†. On that day the battle of Barrosa was fought, four days before the surrender of Badajoz; and

* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 9th February.

‘He had further successes in an action fought in the end of February.—See dispatch to Mr. Wellesley of the 3d March.’

† ‘See letter to General Ballesteros, enclosed in a letter to Mr. Wellesley, of the 2d February.’

in all probability, if Badajoz had held out one day longer, the enemy would not have remained to take possession of the place *.

‘ The troops which were detached from the army at Condeixa on the 14th of March, did not arrive at Portalegre till the 22d of that month. Campo Mayor, which had been regularly attacked by the enemy on the 14th, surrendered on the 22d. Marshal Sir William Beresford, having collected his corps, advanced against the enemy; surprised them at Campo Mayor on the 25th, which place they abandoned. Their cavalry fled into Badajoz, leaving behind them a regiment of infantry, and all their cannon. Unfortunately the excessive impetuosity of the troops (the 13th light dragoons in particular) prevented Sir William Beresford from taking the advantage which he intended to take of these events. Some of the 13th dragoons were taken on the bridge, between the *tête du pont* and the gate of Badajoz †.

‘ The instructions to Sir William Beresford were to pass the Guadiana as soon as he should have possession of Campo Mayor, and to blockade Badajoz, till the means for attacking the place regularly could arrive. Unfortunately here again our operations were frustrated by the conduct of the Spaniards. One of the objects particularly recommended to their attention was to send to Elvas the bridge of boats that was in Badajoz ‡. This had been repeatedly desired before, and the reasons for urging the measure again were particularly stated in that memorandum. This was the only bridge in the possession of the allies; and if it had been at Elvas, Marshal Beresford could have passed the Guadiana, and have blockaded Badajoz on the 26th March, and in all probability the place would have fallen into our hands as Campo Mayor had, or as Almeida subsequently did, as it was at that time unprovided with stores or with provisions.

* ‘ All the enclosures in the dispatches to Mr. Wellesley of the 2d, 3d, 10th, 17th, 23d February, of the 3d, 26th March, and 20th April, are worth reading on this subject.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 2d April, with enclosures.’

‡ ‘ See memorandum of the 20th January, in the letter to Mr. Wellesley of the 23d.’

‘ As it was, he could not pass the Guadiana till the 4th April, and could not advance till the 6th or 7th ; and in the intermediate time the enemy threw into the place all the provisions and stores which it required to last till the enemy were enabled finally to relieve it in the middle of June.

‘ When the French crossed the Agueda on the 9th of April, they left Almeida to its fate, and it was immediately invested and blockaded by our troops. The enemy retired beyond the Tormes, some of them even beyond the Duero, and abandoned Ciudad Rodrigo as well as Almeida. Our army, however, was scarcely strong enough to maintain the blockade of Almeida, and certainly could not have maintained that of Ciudad Rodrigo *. Indeed the state of the Agueda rendered it impossible for us to draw supplies across that river.

‘ The enemy having passed the Duero, Almeida being invested, and matters appearing tolerably quiet on the frontiers of Castille, the head quarters were moved on the 15th of April into Alentejo, and arrived at Elvas on the 20th. Sir William Beresford had crossed the Guadiana on the 4th of April, and had blockaded both Badajoz and Olivença. The garrison of the latter place having refused to surrender, guns were brought from Elvas, and Lieut. General Cole forced the place to surrender on the 15th of April †.

‘ In the meantime Sir William Beresford advanced with the 2d division of infantry, and General Hamilton’s division, and the cavalry, as well to force the enemy to retire from Estremadura entirely, as to give support to General Ballesteros, who had been obliged to retire into that province from the Condado de Niebla.

‘ Marshal Beresford surprised the enemy’s cavalry on the 16th of April, at Los Santos, and defeated them with considerable loss ‡.

‘ Badajoz was reconnoitred on the 22d, and the general plan for the attack was fixed. But unfortunately the rain

* ‘ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 9th and 15th April.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 25th of April.’

‡ ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 25th of April.’

which had fallen in the third week in April, swelled the Guadiana considerably; and the bridge which Marshal Sir William Beresford had constructed under Jurumenha, with great trouble and difficulty, and after much delay, was swept away in the night of the 23d of April.

‘ Marshal Sir William Beresford was consequently instructed to delay the operations of the siege till he should have re-established the bridge, or till the river should become fordable.

‘ The Marshal was likewise instructed and authorised to fight a battle, in case he should think it expedient, in order to save the siege of Badajoz; and these instructions applied as well to the corps under General Blake, which landed about this time at Ayamonte*.

‘ All these arrangements being made, the head quarters were again transferred to the frontiers of Castille. They quitted Elvas on the 25th of April, and arrived at Alameda on the 28th. Intelligence had been received that orders had arrived from Paris, for Massena to make an attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida; in which attempt Marshal Bessières was to co-operate with part of the army of the north †.

‘ The enemy’s army was collected at Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of April, but the same fall of rain which had swelled the rivers in Estremadura, likewise swelled those in Castille, and they did not advance till the 2d of May ‡.

‘ They attacked us at Fuentes de Oñoro on the 3d and 5th, but could make no impression upon us, and at length retired on the 10th, and the whole were across the Agueda on that night §.

* ‘ See instructions to Sir William Beresford in dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d May (A).

‘ See letter to General Castaños in the same dispatch.’

† ‘ It is a curious circumstance, and shows what good intelligence we had, that these accounts were received at Elvas, together with accounts of the day Massena was to set out from Salamanca, and our head quarters arrived at Alameda in Castille on the day before Massena arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo.’

‡ ‘ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 1st, 8th, 10th, and 15th of May.’

§ ‘ The enemy never had such a superiority of numbers opposed to the British troops as in this action. They had all the infantry of the four corps which had been in Portugal, and all the cavalry. In addition to which they had three

‘ In the middle of the night of the 10th, after the blockade was completely resumed in force, General Brenier, the governor of Almeida, blew up the place, and made his escape with his garrison across the bridge of Barba de Puerco. This event was to be attributed to a variety of unfortunate circumstances.

‘ First, the Officer commanding the Queen’s regiment, who was close to the place, was not aware of the nature of the explosion which he heard, or that the garrison escaped, and made no movement.

‘ Secondly, the Officer commanding the 4th regiment, who had been ordered to Barba de Puerco, at 1 o’clock on the 10th, when the French retired, missed his road; and although the distance he had to march was only three miles, he did not reach Barba de Puerco till the morning of the 11th, after the French had arrived there.

‘ Thirdly, the 8th Portuguese regiment had been ordered to march from its cantonments at Junça to Barba de Puerco, in case an explosion should be heard. These orders were obeyed; the regiment marched to Barba de Puerco, and arrived before the French, and before Major General Campbell, with the 4th and 36th regiments; but finding nothing there but a piquet of cavalry, and the Commanding Officer believing that he had mistaken the nature of the explosion, returned again to his cantonments*.

‘ The 3d and 7th divisions were ordered off to Estremadura on the 13th and 14th; and accounts having been received on the 15th that Soult was about to advance from Seville, the head quarters were again removed on the following day to Elvas, where they arrived on the 19th. Sir William Beresford had invested Badajoz on both sides of

fresh regiments of cavalry, which could not have less than 1200 men, and 900 cavalry of the guard.

‘ We had, British cavalry . . .	1,331
„ infantry . . .	18,000
Portuguese cavalry . . .	300
„ infantry . . .	10,142

But we had two divisions, the 5th and 6th, and General Pack’s brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry on the left, either forming or protecting the blockade, and these troops were not engaged. The enemy had about five to one of cavalry, and more than two to one of infantry engaged.’

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 15th of May.’

the Guadiana on the 4th, and he broke ground on the 8th. He lost some men on the right of the river, in front of the *tête du pont*, on the first day, and a considerable number in a sortie made by the enemy on the 10th. On the 12th, the Marshal heard of the collection of a large body of troops by Marshal Soult, in the neighborhood of Seville, and of their march towards Estremadura, and he immediately raised the siege; and, according to the instructions and recommendation left with them, he and the Spanish Generals collected their troops on the Albuera rivulet*.

‘ The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th May, on the ground pointed out in those instructions. That which was most conspicuous in the battle of Albuera was the want of discipline of the Spaniards. These troops behaved with the utmost gallantry, but it was hopeless to think of moving them. In the morning the enemy gained an eminence which commanded the whole extent of the line of the allies, which either was occupied, or was intended to be occupied, by the Spanish troops. The natural operation would have been to re-occupy this ground by means of the Spanish troops; but that was impossible. The British troops were consequently moved there; and all the loss sustained by those troops was incurred in regaining a height which ought never for a moment to have been in possession of the enemy†.

‘ After the battle of Albuera, the enemy retired leisurely to Llerena and Guadalcanal‡.

‘ It was obvious, from the immense superiority of cavalry which they showed in that battle, and that, as the allies were but little superior in total strength, and had beaten them with difficulty, and could derive no great advantage from their success, it was hopeless to attack Soult in the position which he had taken at Llerena. There was nothing to prevent him from retiring upon Seville, or even upon the

* ‘ See reports of Sir William Beresford, enclosed in a dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d of May.’

† ‘ This is stated, because it has been matter of dispute whether the Spaniards had or had not occupied the height before the French were on it. They were certainly ordered to occupy the ground, and their piquets were on it; but it is not clear that they had occupied it in sufficient strength before the French troops were on it.’

‡ ‘ See dispatches from Marshal Beresford, enclosed in dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 22d, 23d, and 24th May.’

troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, if he should have found himself so pressed as to render that measure necessary; and the arrival of reinforcements, which it will appear he had reason to expect, would have placed in a state of risk the troops which would have obliged him to take this step. But this reasoning supposes that Soult would have considered himself under the necessity of retiring from the strong position of Llerena and Guadalcanal, in consequence of the measures which we might have adopted in Estremadura in the end of May. I believe there is no foundation for this hypothesis.

‘The allies’ troops, which were sent from the frontiers of Castille, and arrived at Campo Mayor on the 23d and 24th of May, were rather more than equal to the loss sustained in the battle of Albuera, and in the first siege of Badajoz. It had been obvious in the battle of Albuera, that we could not reckon upon the Spaniards in any affair of manœuvre, and therefore that we could not rely upon them in such an operation as the attack of Soult’s army in the positions of Guadalcanal and Llerena*.

‘But the effect of these operations, even if well executed, could only be to force Soult to fall back for a time; and here the question arose whether it was worth while to attempt it. It was known that Drouet had marched with seventeen or nineteen battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to the army of Portugal, from Salamanca, on the 16th or 17th of May, destined for a reinforcement to Soult; and it was calculated that these battalions would join Soult on or about the 8th of June†.

‘Under these circumstances, it was deemed better not to lose the time between the 25th of May and the 8th of June by an attempt to attack Soult, which appeared hopeless; and to take advantage of our superiority in the battle of Albuera, and in the early arrival of our reinforcements, to make a vigorous attack upon Badajoz.

‘Accordingly, the place was reinvested on the 25th of May, and the fire was opened on the 2d of June‡.

‘There appeared every ground for belief that we should

* ‘See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 22d and 24th May.’

† ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d of May.’

‡ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 30th of May.’

have been able to obtain possession of the place before the day on which it was possible that Soult could advance for its relief. It is certain that its possession depended upon the possession of the outwork of San Christoval, which commanded the point of attack in the castle. This outwork was deemed to be in a state to be taken by storm on the 6th, and again on the 9th. Both attempts failed; and the question whether Badajoz could be taken or not in the time which remained, during which the allied army could be applied to that operation, came to be one of means, upon which we were decidedly of opinion that we had it not in our power to take the place; and therefore we raised the siege on the 10th, although we continued the blockade till the 17th*.

‘ While the operations of the second siege of Badajoz were going on, accounts were received that Marshal Marmont was about to move from Salamanca into Estremadura, in order to aid Soult in his operations for the relief of Badajoz†.

‘ The first movements of the army were upon Ciudad Rodrigo, into which place Marmont introduced a convoy on the 6th of June. Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer retired across the Coa; and Marmont then turned about, and marched through the Puerto de Baños, to Plasencia. Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer made a corresponding movement on Castello Branco, at which place he received intelligence of the enemy having had posts on the Alagon, and the cavalry in Coria, and some doubts were entertained of their intention to cross the Tagus. The head of their army, however, crossed that river on the 12th, and arrived at Truxillo on the 13th; and the advanced guard was at Merida, and in communication with Soult, on the 15th.

‘ Soult had broken up from Llerena and Guadalcanal on the 12th, as soon as he was joined by Drouet; and he moved upon Zafra, and his advanced guard to Los Santos, on the 13th. The allied army were immediately concentrated upon

* ‘ I believe the failure in the attack upon San Christoval is like many other events to be attributed to the want of experience in the British army. First, the battery to break the wall ought to have been placed on the crest of the glacis. Secondly, if it was not, care ought to have been taken from the commencement to prevent the enemy from clearing the rubbish while the fire was continued upon the wall.’

† ‘ See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 6th, 13th, and 20th June.’

Albuera, with the exception of the 3d and 7th divisions, which kept the blockade of Badajoz. But the accounts of the arrival at Truxillo of the advanced guard of the army of Portugal having arrived at Albuera, and Soult * having made a movement from Zafra on Almendralejo, having thus shown that he knew of the arrival of that army, it was deemed expedient to retire across the Guadiana.

‘As far as we could form a judgment, the French had at that time assembled in Estremadura 60,000 men, of which 7000 were cavalry.

‘The British army consisted of

Cavalry, 1,671

Infantry, 11,812

‘The Portuguese,

Cavalry, 900

Infantry, 12,885

and General Blake had about 8,000 men.

‘The head of Sir Brent Spencer’s column did not join till the 20th, the 5th division not till the 24th. The strength of the whole army, when collected together, was,

British infantry, 25,123

Portuguese infantry, 18,926

British cavalry, 3,197

Portuguese cavalry, 1,200 †

‘It would have been impossible for the allies to maintain the blockade of Badajoz with the strength which they could produce against that of the enemy, in the days which intervened between the 17th and 24th of June; nor could the allies pretend to attack the enemy in Estremadura, composed as they were, being, after all, even including the Spaniards and Sir Brent Spencer, inferior in numbers, particularly of cavalry, and very inferior in composition.

‘These circumstances were stated in a conference with General Blake on the 14th June, at Albuera, and in a previous letter to him; and he was urged either to co-operate

* ‘Soult brought to Zafra little more than his advanced guard and cavalry. The main body of the army marched direct from Llerena upon Almendralejo and Merida.’

† ‘This account includes the 5th division and Barbacena’s brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which did not arrive at Portalegre till the 24th of June. The 5th division consisted of about 5000 men. In this account artillery is not included.’

with the allied British and Portuguese army; or, having crossed the Guadiana at Jurumenha, to move down the right bank, and to cross that river at Mertola, and to endeavor to obtain possession of Seville, while the enemy's attention should be drawn to us on the frontier of Alentejo. General Blake preferred the last operation, and he recrossed the Guadiana on the 22d of June*.

‘But, instead of moving at once upon Seville, he attempted to obtain possession of Niebla on the 30th of June, where the enemy had only 300 men, in which attempt he failed†; and Soult having, towards the end of the month of June, discovered General Blake's movement, and detached a body of troops into Andalusia, General Blake embarked at Ayamonte on the 6th of July‡.

‘While this was going on, the allied British and Portuguese army took a position on the 19th of June between Elvas and Campo Mayor. The particular object in taking this position was to protect those places, and to insure the arrival into them of the convoys of provisions and stores destined for their supply§. The enemy reconnoitred the position of the army on the 22d June, but they never showed any inclination to attack it||.

‘The armies remained opposite to each other till the 14th July, when Marmont retired across the Tagus, and cantoned his army about Plasencia, &c., and along the Tagus to Talavera; and Drouet removed the 5th corps to Zafra. Before these troops separated, the allies were certainly stronger than the enemy in infantry: the enemy were strongest in cavalry; but the attack of the enemy would have answered no purpose, excepting to oblige them to retire from Estremadura. That object was likely to be accomplished without incurring the risk of an attack with inferior numbers of cavalry, and without exposing the troops to the inconvenience of making long marches in Estremadura in that season.

‘The enemy having retired from Estremadura, the ques-

* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 22d of June.’

† ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 11th of July.’

‡ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 18th of July.’

§ ‘See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 20th and 27th June, and 4th July.’

|| ‘See dispatches of the 18th July and 25th July.’

tion regarding the future operations of the army was maturely considered, and it was determined to remove the seat of the war to the frontiers of Castille*. The grounds of that decision were,

‘First, that in that season we could not venture to undertake anything against Badajoz.

‘Secondly, that we were not strong enough to venture into Andalusia.

‘Thirdly, that from all the information I had received, the strength of the northern army was less than that of the south, and that the army of Portugal, which was destined to oppose us in whatever point we should direct our operations, was not likely to be so strongly supported in the north as in the south.

‘In this supposition I was mistaken. The army of the north, even before the reinforcements arrived, was stronger than that in the south; but it must be observed that there is nothing so difficult as to obtain information of the enemy’s numbers in Spain. There is but little communication between one town and another; and although the most minute account of numbers which have passed through one town can always be obtained, no information can be obtained of what is passing in the next. To this add, that the disposition of the Spaniards naturally leads them to exaggerate the strength and success of themselves and their friends, and to despise that of the enemy, and it will not be matter of surprise that we should so often have been misinformed regarding the enemy’s numbers.

‘The first intention was to remain in the cantonments of the Alentejo, which had been taken up as soon as Marmont had retired, till the train and stores should have been brought up from Oporto, to make the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. The march of the troops would consequently not have taken place till the beginning of September. The movement was made in the end of July and beginning of August, for the following reasons.

‘In the end of July it was discovered, that notwithstanding Marshal Bessières had evacuated the Asturias and Astorga when Marmont moved into Estremadura in the

* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 18th July.’

beginning of July, and had thereby increased the disposable force under his command, Don Julian had been so successful in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, that up to that moment the enemy had not been able to keep open any communication with the place, or to supply it at all with provisions.

‘A return of the supplies in the place, when it was left by Marmont in the beginning of June, had likewise been intercepted, from which it appeared that the provisions would be exhausted by the 20th of August*. It was therefore determined to send the army across the Tagus immediately, and to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should not have been supplied; and if it should, to canton the army in Lower Beira, till the train and stores should have arrived†.

‘We did not receive intelligence that the place had been supplied till we went so forward as to disclose our design against the place. But there were two other reasons for taking up cantonments for the summer in Castille rather than in Lower Beira: one was, that in Castille we could procure supplies of provisions, which we much wanted, and we could procure none in Beira; the other was, that by threatening Ciudad Rodrigo, we were likely to relieve Galicia, and General Abadia’s army, from the attack with which both were threatened by the army of the north.

‘We accordingly made the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo in the first week in August, and continued it from that time forward. The train for the siege would have arrived at Almeida, in the first week of September‡. But before that period, accounts were received of the arrival in Spain of the enemy’s reinforcements. It was also discovered by an intercepted return of the army of the north, that they were much stronger than they had been supposed in July, when the plan was determined upon to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo§. Under these circumstances, and as Almeida was not in a state to give security to the heavy train and its stores, it was determined not to bring the equipment for-

* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 1st August.’

† ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 8th August.’

‡ ‘See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th and 21st August.’

§ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 28th August, for the accounts of the enemy’s reinforcements and strength. See dispatches written to Lord

ward, and to confine our efforts to the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo*.

‘ In the third week of September, the enemy collected the whole army of the north, (with the exception of Bonet’s division, which observed Abadia’s movements on the side of Galicia,) and two divisions from Navarre, which had recently come from Calabria, and five divisions, and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, to escort a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo†. They had not less than 60,000 men‡, of which more than 6000 were cavalry, to which we could oppose about 40,000. If we had fought a battle to maintain a blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, we must have had the river Agueda, and the place in our rear; and if defeated, a retreat was impossible.

‘ Although we did not fight a battle to protect the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the army was assembled on the left of the Agueda, and a partial engagement, highly honorable to the troops, was fought at El Bodon on the 25th of September.

‘ The object of taking a position so near to the enemy was to force them to show their army. This was an object, because the people of the country, as usual, believed and reported that the enemy were not so strong as we knew them to be; and if they had not seen the enemy’s strength, they would have entertained a very unfavorable opinion of the British army, which it was desirable to avoid. This object was accomplished by the operations at the close of September.

‘ Although the removal of the army from the Alentejo did not accomplish all the objects which were in view when the movement was made, it had the effect of obliging the enemy

* ‘ For the account of all that passed in respect to putting Almeida in a state of repair, see dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 5th of August. The place is now nearly entirely re-established as a *Place d’Armes*.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of the 29th September.’

‡ ‘ Besides these 60,000 men, General Foy was at Plasencia with one division of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the centre, with which he co-operated with Marmont, and actually ascended the mountains by the Pass of Perales and Poyo on our right. For the state of the strength of the allied army in the field, see the *Morning Star*, sent to Lord Liverpool every week since the month of July. The 2d and General Hamilton’s divisions of infantry, and the 2d division of cavalry, have always been in the Alentejo, with the exception of General De Grey’s brigade of the latter, while it continued on the strength of that division of cavalry.’

to collect their whole force for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, and to abandon all their other operations and objects*. The army of the north were obliged to discontinue their operations against Abadia, and still further, to call to their assistance two divisions which had recently arrived from Calabria, and were employed in Navarre against the guerrilla Mina. Mina's success in Navarre has consequently been extraordinary, and his numbers have rapidly increased.

' After the operations for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, it was determined to persevere in the same system till the enemy should make some alteration in the disposition of their force, and to continue to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo with an attack, in order to keep a large force of the enemy employed to observe our operations, and to prevent them from undertaking any operation elsewhere.

' To this system we were forced, not less by the relative force of the two armies, than by the extraordinary sickness of our own troops. All the soldiers who had recently arrived from England, and all those who had been in Walcheren, and vast numbers of Officers, were attacked by fever, not of a very violent description, but they were rendered unable to perform any duty, and those who recovered relapsed upon making any exertions. Even if an opportunity had offered, therefore, for undertaking anything on this side, the unfortunate state of the army would have prevented it.

' It would not have answered to remove the army to the frontiers of Estremadura, where a chance of effecting some

* ' See dispatch from Sir H. Douglas, of 5th September.

' There is nothing more comical than the lies published in the *Moniteur* about the expedition to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, excepting that our newspapers do not notice them. It is not possible that either Marmont or Dorsenne could have written such nonsense as has appeared with their names affixed to it. They say that they heard of our approach to the Coa in the beginning to September; we approached the Coa on the 6th of August, and they knew it at Salamanca on the 14th. They then say, that in consequence of this knowledge, acquired in the beginning of September, Dorsenne attacked Galicia; he attacked Abadia in Galicia on the 25th August. Marmont then took four guns on the 25th September; but he forgets to say that we retook the only two which he had taken for a moment. The comical part of that story is, that Major Gordon, who was in the French head quarters on the 26th, offered to lay a wager that the *Moniteur* would mention that the guns had been taken, but would omit the sequel of the story.

' See the dispatches and *Morning States* sent to Lord Liverpool in October, November, and December.'

important object might have offered *; as in that case General Abadia would have been left to himself, and would have fallen an easy sacrifice to the army of the north. We availed ourselves of the opportunity which offered of striking a blow against Girard in Estremadura, by which the country between the Tagus and the Guadiana was relieved from the enemy †.

‘ But little notice has been taken in this memorandum of the operations of the Spaniards, which having been confined principally to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, have been but little influenced by those on the western side. Tortosa was surrendered by treachery on the 2d of January, as Lerida had been but a short time before. The troops under Suchet then prepared to attack Tarragona, which place was taken by storm on the 28th June.

‘ In the course of the winter it had appeared, by an intercepted letter, to be Soult’s intention to attack Carthagea, in order to be prepared to attack Valencia on both sides in concert with Suchet. He attempted to carry this intention into execution in the month of July, after he had obliged General Blake to embark at Ayamonte. General Blake, however, went with his army by sea to the coast of Murcia, and landed it there in August, while Soult moved in that direction by Granada. It appears that General Blake quitted the army as soon as it had formed a junction with the army of Murcia, called the third army, and he proceeded to Valencia, leaving General Freire in the command of the troops in Murcia. The French advanced from Granada, but the Spaniards did not retreat in time, and their loss was very great ‡. They had time, however, to re-assemble their dispersed divisions, and the people in Murcia took arms, and partly on this account, partly on account of the prevalence of the yellow fever at Carthagea, and throughout Murcia, and partly because the movement of the allied British and Portuguese army upon Ciudad Rodrigo rendered necessary a concentration of the French forces in the Peninsula, Soult

* ‘ See Sir Howard Douglas’s dispatch of 29th October, in answer to a question upon that point.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 6th November.’

‡ ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 18th September.’

returned to the westward, and arrived at Seville on the 17th September*.

‘In the meantime, Suchet, having been joined by reinforcements from France, and having dispersed the troops which General Lacy had attempted to collect in Catalonia, penetrated into the kingdom of Valencia†. General Blake had been since August preparing for the defence of that city, and he collected there the army of Valencia, and others from Aragon and Catalonia; and latterly, General Mahy marched from Murcia to join him with the troops which General Blake had brought from Cadiz, and a part of the third army, *i. e.*, that of Murcia.

‘Suchet having gained possession of Oropesa, commenced an attack on the castle of Saguntum on the 29th September‡. He made several attempts to obtain possession of this castle by storm, in all of which he failed, and at last, having brought up a few heavy guns, he broke ground regularly before the place, and made a breach in its wall. He made several attempts to carry the breach by storm, in all of which he failed.

‘As soon as General Blake was joined at Valencia by the troops from Murcia, under General Mahy§, he moved out from Valencia on the 24th October, and on the 25th attacked Suchet, and was defeated, with the loss of some prisoners and eight pieces of cannon. The French immediately summoned the garrison of Saguntum to surrender, which they did upon capitulation. Suchet advanced upon Valencia, and it is understood that he opened his fire upon a part of the intrenched position occupied by Blake in front of the town on the 25th of November||. It is likewise stated, that on the 2d of December, there was a severe action at Valencia, in which the French suffered considerably.

‘These circumstances, and the movement of Marmont’s army towards Toledo, as is supposed, to aid Suchet, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of Ciudad

* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 9th October.’

† ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 23d October.’

‡ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 6th November.’

§ ‘See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of 13th, 20th, and 27th November.’

|| ‘See dispatches to Lord Liverpool of 4th, 12th, 18th, and 25th December.’

Rodrigo. By these measures we shall bring Marmont back, and probably oblige the army of the north to re-assemble.

‘ Since Suchet has been in Valencia, the guerrillas have been very active and enterprising in Aragon and Navarre. Mina defeated a detachment of 1100 men, sent against him, only three of whom escaped; and besides other advantages of small amount, he and the Empecinado, and Duran, having joined, it is reported that they had taken the garrison of Daroca, consisting of 2400 men.

‘ When General Blake embarked on the 6th July from the mouth of the Guadiana, he left there General Ballesteros with a division of troops, which likewise embarked, and went to the Sierra de Ronda on the 24th of August*. He has been very successful against the French by his light operations in rear of the army, blockading Cadiz; and he has always a secure retreat open upon Gibraltar†. In order to aid General Ballesteros, and to give additional security to Tarifa, Colonel Skerrett, with about 1200 men, was detached thither from Cadiz on the 10th of October. By this measure the French were obliged to retire from San Roque on the night of the 21st of October, in which position they had kept Ballesteros blockaded under the the guns of Gibraltar; and Ballesteros did them much mischief in their retreat, and in a subsequent attack which he made upon one of their detachments at Bornos‡. He was afterwards again obliged to retire in the end of November under protection of the guns of Gibraltar; and Colonel Skerrett, and the Spanish General Copons, to Tarifa. The object of the French on this occasion was to attack Tarifa, while they should keep Ballesteros blockaded§. But they had commenced to retire on the 12th December.

‘ From this memorandum it will be seen, that if the Spaniards had behaved with common prudence, or if their conduct had been even tolerably good, the result of Massena’s campaign in Portugal must have been the relief of the south of the Peninsula.

‘ We had to contend with the consequences of the faults

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 4th September.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 23d October.’

‡ ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 13th November.’

§ ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool of 25th December.’

of some, the treachery of others, and the folly and vanity of all. But although our success has not been what it might and ought, we have at least lost no ground, and with a handful of British troops fit for service, we have kept the enemy in check in all quarters since the month of March,

‘Till now they have gained nothing, and have made no progress on any side. It is to be apprehended that they will succeed in Valencia; but I believe there is no man who knows the state of affairs in that province, and has read Suchet’s account of his action with Blake on the 25th of October, who does not believe that, if Blake had not fought that action, Valencia would have been safe. Are the English Ministers and Generals responsible for the blunders of Blake?’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 25th December, 1811, 10 A.M.

‘I enclose some letters received this morning from my brother and General Cooke.

‘There are obviously some dispatches missing, as both my brother and General Cooke advert to circumstances of which I have no knowledge; and from the want of the other dispatches, which are doubtless gone by Lisbon, I do not understand parts of these.

‘I have nothing new on this side. All accounts confirm the march of the French from Plasencia towards Navalmoral on the 21st. It is believed that they have been obliged to retire, having eaten up the country.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. It appears by accounts from Madrid, which General Castaños showed me, that Foy had returned to Toledo. I cannot comprehend these marches and countermarches. It can scarcely be that Suchet was so roughly handled in the affair stated to have taken place on the 2d, as to have been obliged to retire; and that Marmont concentrates towards Madrid in case Blake should be tempted to move up from Valencia.

‘There were preparations on the 10th for the King’s movement from Madrid; and you will observe that this date does not disagree with that of the arrival of the courier, and the consequent preparations at Plasencia, mentioned by my Portuguese correspondent. ‘W.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Freneda, 26th December, 1811, 9 A.M.

‘I enclose the letters and dispatches from my brother of the 13th, from the perusal of which you will be better able to understand those which he sent me on the 19th.

‘I likewise enclose General Cooke’s letters to the 13th.

‘General Castaños told me yesterday that he had heard that the army of Portugal were to be assembled about Toledo. I imagine that this is only a report from the Alcaldes.

‘I write to Major Dickson at Almeida with this, to request he will let you know whether it is necessary that the mules should return to Villa da Ponte; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will have them sent for another load, if Major Dickson should report it to be necessary.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For Mr. Bisselt, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, and Major Dickson.

‘Freneda, 1st January, 1812.

‘1. The cars sent by General Alava, now employed in collecting at Las Agallas the fascines, gabions, and pickets, made by the Light and 3d divisions, and all the cars at the cantonments occupied by the Light division and Major General Colville’s brigade in the 3d division, to rendezvous at Las Agallas on the 5th, to be loaded with gabions and fascines and pickets on the same day, and to move on the following morning to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘2. Lieut. Colonel Fletcher will charge the Officer of engineers at Las Agallas with the management of this concern.

‘3. The ninety cars unemployed and in readiness (see separate memorandum), and the sixty six, expected to arrive

this day, are to be sent on the 2d to Almeida; fifty of them are to be loaded with the small stores required by Major Dickson, 106 must be loaded with what is required by Colonel Fletcher, and to move on the 3d to Gallegos.

‘4. All the carts in the cantonments occupied by the 3d division, except Major General Colville’s brigade, by the 4th division, including those sent by General Alava and General Pack’s brigade, by Major General Stopford’s brigade, and the forty carts expected from Don Julian, are to rendezvous at Gallegos on the 5th, on which day they are to be loaded with fascines and gabions.

‘5. The sixteen cars at Salices are to be loaded with fascines and gabions on the 5th.

‘6. The fifty carts which will have brought the small stores of the artillery to Gallegos (see separate memorandum) on the 3d, are to be unloaded the same day, and to be loaded at Gallegos with fascines and gabions.

‘7. The carts mentioned in the 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th articles, are to move to Ciudad Rodrigo, loaded with engineers’ stores and materials, on the 6th.

‘8. The mules (fifty) in the engineers’ department to be sent on the 2d to Almeida, to be loaded with engineers’ tools, and to proceed on the 3d to Gallegos, on the 4th to return to Almeida for the remainder of the tools, on the 5th to Gallegos, and on the 6th to Ciudad Rodrigo,

‘9. 53 mules with the 1st division,

48 ” ” 3d ”

51 ” ” 4th ”

68 ” ” 7th ”

102 ” ” Light ”

to proceed to Almeida on the 3d, and to be loaded with powder and shot in their proper proportions, and to proceed on the 4th to Gallegos.

‘10. The gun bullocks now grazing at and in the neighborhood of Celorico to go to Almeida as soon as possible, to draw the guns from Almeida to Gallegos on the , and from Gallegos to Ciudad Rodrigo on the .

‘11. In proportion as the mules belonging to the reserve ammunition of the 5th and 6th divisions and cavalry shall arrive at Almeida with powder and shot from Villa da Ponte, they are to be loaded with powder and shot in their

due proportions, and sent on the first day to Gallegos, and on the 2d. to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ 12. The carts now employed with Major Sturgeon, and the new carts, are to be sent to Almeida as soon as he shall have done with them, to be loaded with powder and shot in their due proportions, and to carry those articles to Gallegos, there lay them down, return the following day to Almeida, and the following day bring fresh loads to Gallegos.

‘ 13. The mules mentioned in the 9th and 11th articles will be employed to carry this powder and shot forward from Gallegos to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ 14. The carts mentioned in the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th articles, are to return to Gallegos and Las Agallas on the day after they shall have quitted those places, to be re-loaded with fascines, gabions, &c., and to proceed on the following day to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ N.B. It is desirable that the mules mentioned in the 9th articles should lodge the ammunition (small-arm) at the following places on their way to Almeida.

‘ That of the 1st division, Alameda.

3d and 4th ditto, Gallegos.

7th ditto, Sabugal.

Light ditto, Guinaldo.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

MEMORANDUM

For Mr. Bissett, Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, and Major Dickson.

‘ Freneda, 1st January, 1812.

‘ Ninety cars are now at Freneda, and sixty six expected from Brigadier Alava, to be sent on the 2d to Almeida to be loaded; 106 with engineers’ stores and fifty with small stores of the artillery, to carry these articles on the 3d to Gallegos, return on the 4th to Almeida and load with powder and shot; return on the 5th to Gallegos and lay down the powder and shot, and to be re-loaded with engineers’ stores, to proceed to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 6th.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To the Right Hon. the Secretary at War.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 1st January, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of medicines and materials required for the service of the army in this country; and I will thank your Lordship to give directions that this requisition may be immediately attended to.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Secretary at War.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 1st January, 1812.

‘ The division of the army of Portugal, cantoned about the sources of the Tormes, broke up with precipitation on the 26th December, and marched in the direction of Avila; and it is reported that the division cantoned at Avila were making preparations to march likewise; but they had not marched on the 29th. I have not yet heard that the army of Portugal have passed Talavera. They have their posts still at Naval moral.

‘ I have received reports that the cavalry of the guard had returned to France, and that the infantry of the guard had likewise moved from Valladolid in a northerly direction. I conclude that all these movements have for their object to support Suchet’s operations in Valencia; or even to co-operate with him, by keeping in check the guerrillas from whom he has received so much injury.

‘ I propose therefore to make an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo, in which, if I should not succeed, I shall at least bring back some of the troops of the armies of the north and of Portugal; and shall so far relieve the guerrillas and the Spanish armies in Valencia.

‘ I have had no accounts upon which I can rely, of the state of affairs at Valencia, since the 20th of November. But I hear from Madrid that Suchet was still before the place on the 10th of last month.

‘ Lieut. General Hill moved on the 24th and 25th of December, but I have not yet heard of his arrival at Merida.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 25th December, I have received the dispatches from Cadiz which had not

then reached me. It appears that Colonel Skerrett had, at the requisition of General Ballesteros, embarked at Algeziras on the 29th November, and had gone to Gibraltar to aid General Ballesteros in an attack upon the enemy.

‘ He had however returned to Tarifa on the 2d December, having learned from an intercepted letter that the enemy’s object was certainly to endeavor to obtain possession of that post. They had made no attack upon it on the 13th December; and General Castaños, who had letters from Cadiz of the 20th, informs me that General Ballesteros was at Los Barrios, according to the last account.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocks.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 2d January, 1812.

‘ Mr. Stuart has communicated to me your letter to him, of the 28th December last, upon which I think it proper to give you some instructions.

‘ As the Officer commanding His Majesty’s troops at Lisbon, you ought to have no official communication with any person, excepting myself, and the Lieutenant General commanding the Portuguese troops in the province of Estremadura, under whose command you must necessarily be, and with whom you were directed to communicate by my letter of the 23d June, 1809.

‘ Even the Commanding Officer of His Majesty’s troops in this country is ordered to have no communication with the servants of the Portuguese or Spanish Governments, excepting through His Majesty’s Minister, at their Courts respectively; and I have been most cautious in abstaining from any communication with the Portuguese Government on any concern of the British army, excepting through Mr. Villiers or Mr. Stuart.

‘ According to the rules for the conduct of the military service, all your communications with Mr. Stuart or the Admiral, or any other independent British authority, should be carried on through me; but these authorities, as well as I, have thought it most convenient for the King’s service, that you should communicate directly with them respectively; and it is desirable that this practice should continue.

‘ But I am particularly anxious that the King’s commands in regard to all communications with the servants of the Portuguese and Spanish Governments should be strictly adhered to; and that you should have no communication, upon a public subject, with any servant of the Portuguese Government (excepting the Lieutenant General commanding in the province of Estremadura) unless through His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon.

‘ In regard to the Spanish Minister at Lisbon, you have nothing to say to him, nor he to you, on any public subject. If you conceive that you have any reason to complain of any Spanish Officer or soldier at Lisbon, you will make your complaint known to the Lieutenant General of the province; if of any other individual of the Spanish nation, you will state the case to His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon, who will make such representations on the subject as he may think proper to the Portuguese Government.

‘ I write to the Portuguese Government in regard to the Spanish troops casually at Lisbon being considered independent of the Lieutenant General commanding in the province of Estremadura.

‘ I have sent to General Castaños regarding the order to the Spanish Officer commanding the Spanish detachments at that place, to have his troops paraded in order that the soldier may be pitched upon who committed the outrage on the serjeant of the Chasseurs Britanniques, and I have been assured that it was sent, and that it will be repeated.

‘ I will however let you know when I shall hear that the Government have settled that all the Spanish detachments at Lisbon are placed, as they ought to be, under the general superintendence of the Lieutenant General commanding in the province of Estremadura.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 2d January, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th December. I think the proclamation drawn by Dr. Nogueira will answer; and it ought to be completed at an early period.

‘ I clearly understand Dr. Nogueira’s plan on the paper money ; and it is evident that the paper money must be stamped whenever it comes into the possession of the Government ; that a year’s interest must be paid at a time ; and that the paper must have been a year out of the hands of the Government before any interest is due upon it.

‘ This is the constitution of paper money ; and the holders of these securities have no right to expect that the Government will alter this constitution for their benefit.

‘ The question remaining to be discussed is, from what time the Portuguese Government will resume the practice directed by the Alvara of the 23d July, 1797 ?

‘ The first point for information is, whether the Government have continued to stamp the paper in proportion as it has passed through their hands, since they have discontinued the payment of the interest. If they have, there will be no difficulty in commencing now to pay the interest on all the paper money now in circulation, excepting the want of money in the hands of the Junta de Juros. If they have not been in the habit of stamping the paper money, and it is now to go through the progress of being stamped, it is obvious that, under the law, the measure of paying the interest, from which measure alone I expect that any advantage will be derived, must be delayed for twelve months !

‘ I rather believe, however, that they have been in the habit of stamping the paper on every occasion on which it has passed through the hands of the officers of the Government ; and if this be true, I earnestly urge them to begin paying the interest due upon the paper from the beginning of this month. If they adopt that measure, I shall order that all the interest due upon the paper, in the hands of the commissariat, shall be remitted, or in other words, that our paper shall go to the Treasury to be stamped.

‘ I do not see any reason, however, why all the paper which may, at any time hereafter, come into our hands, should of course go to the Treasury to be stamped ; and I shall not consent to that part of the arrangement.

‘ In urging the Government to commence paying the interest in the beginning of this month, I shall appear unreasonably tenacious of my own opinion against the clear statements and reasoning of Dr. Nogueira’s paper.

‘ But I am of opinion, that when a Government propose to act on the principle of good faith towards their creditors, and see the necessity of taking measures to support the credit of their paper currency, they should lose no time about it: they should carry into execution without delay the principle, whatever it is, on which they propose to act.

‘ I am clearly of opinion that a country, in the situation in which Portugal is, should consider the maintenance of her military establishments, and the defence of the country, the first objects, because upon these depend not only the credit of the Government, but the existence of the inhabitants. But after a sufficient revenue has been raised to defray the expense of the military establishments, then the pecuniary credit of the Government becomes an object of anxiety. The measures to find funds to support that credit then take their natural station in the order of the duties of the government of the Kingdom; and when once it is determined to pay the interest of the debts of the state, and on the paper money in circulation, the funds to pay that interest must be first provided for.

‘ I contend for it therefore, that if the Junta de Juros have not funds sufficient to defray the interest due, some of the civil establishments should be put down in order to supply the Junta with funds sufficient, after it has been determined that it is expedient to pay the interest, of which no man entertains a doubt.

‘ I have already informed the Government how important it is to the financial concerns of this army, and to enable the British Government to pay the subsidy, that the Governors of the Kingdom should come to a right decision upon this subject; and I have only to add, that if this decision does not raise the credit of the paper money, I must prevent the commissariat from receiving those securities in payment for the purchase of bills upon England.

‘ In regard to the estimates for the army for the month of January, I refer you to a letter which I wrote on the 31st of December, to Sir W. Beresford. I am aware that an estimate is not an account; but the only way to put a stop to extravagance and waste, is to look close into the estimate of any expense, and to endeavor to bring it as near as possible to the real expense.

'I am glad to find that you reckon upon your 600 contos only for the expenses of January.

'Believe me, &c.

'*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R. A.

MY DEAR SIR,

'Freneda, 3d January, 1812, 3 p.m.

'General Alava has just informed me that forty-five carts have arrived here, of which we had before no intelligence. I have desired that they may go to Almeida to-morrow, to be employed next day in the manner pointed out in the separate memorandum of the 1st, for the cars on the 4th, 5th, and 6th instant.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Major Dickson, R. A.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

MY DEAR SIR,

'Freneda, 3d January, 1812, 3 p.m.

'General Alava has just informed me that forty-five carts have arrived here, of which we had before no intelligence. I have desired that they may go to Almeida to-morrow, to be employed next day in the manner pointed out in the separate memorandum of the 1st instant, for the cars on the 4th, 5th, and 6th instant.

'General Pack has been with me this day, and tells me, that unless we can assist him either with money or provisions, he must go to the rear. Could you let him have as much as 3000 dollars, which I should take care should be repaid *here* by the Portuguese Government?

'You are aware that we feed a Spanish battalion of 800 men in the province of Tras os Montes. Could we without inconvenience feed another battalion in the same province?

'Believe me, &c.

'*J. Bissett, Esq.,*
Commissary General.'

'WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

MY DEAR HENRY,

'Freneda, 3d January, 1812.

'I enclose my last dispatch. I propose to invest Ciudad Rodrigo on the 6th, and to break ground, if possible, on

that night. The weather is however now very bad; the whole country being covered with snow. Hill was very near surprising Dombrowski at Merida on the 30th.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, I find that La Peña’s brother did not bring a letter from the Spanish Government for King Joseph, but a verbal communication to the purport I mentioned. He has, however, been afraid to go and deliver the message; but I do not know for what reason he was not made to write it down, as Castaños intended he should, and then send it by another hand.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 4th January, 1812.

‘ I have perused the letter from Don Carlos de España, which your Excellency put into my hand yesterday, in regard to the distresses of the troops under his command; and I am much concerned that they are of a nature to induce that Officer to desire to relinquish his situation, more particularly as it is entirely out of my power to adopt any of the measures which he proposes for their relief.

‘ Don Carlos de España must have known that I had not the command of money in sufficient sums even for the wants of the troops under my command; he must have known that I have been obliged to send three divisions, and almost all the cavalry of this army to the rear, because I am unable at present to feed them in front. And I am astonished, that on the eve of a great operation, which will require the exertion of every disciplined soldier who can be brought to the front, he should propose that I should be called upon to supply money, which he knows I have not, or food, which he knows I cannot get, for the support of 4000 recruits.

‘ Eight hundred of these recruits are now in Tras os Montes, and are supplied by a British Commissary attached to them at great inconvenience and expense. I am willing to undertake to supply 800 more with provisions, provided they are sent into Tras os Montes, and provided a sufficient number of mules are attached to and sent with them, to carry the supplies which they will require from the magazine

at St. João da Pesqueira to the station which these troops will occupy in Tras os Montes.

‘ I have to inform your Excellency, that I have received intelligence that 4000 great coats, and other articles for 4000 men, being part of the requisition made by Don Carlos de España for these same men, have been embarked in the Thames, and may be expected daily at Oporto. I conclude, however, that as Don Carlos proposes that these men should be disbanded, he will not now require these articles.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*
Don F. X. Castaños.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 4th January, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of my correspondence with Don Carlos de España in the month of November last ; also of the letters which have lately passed between me and General Castaños on the subject of the application of the Minister at War, that General Hill’s corps should make a forward movement, with the object of creating a diversion in favor of General Ballesteros.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Don Carlos de España, which General Castaños put into my hands yesterday, on the subject of the destitute state of the division under his command ; and the copy of my answer to General Castaños.

‘ W.’

MEMORANDUM.

‘ Freneda, 4th January, 1812.

‘ 1. Eighty carts only of those which left Almeida yesterday, and are now at Gallegos, to be sent back to Almeida, to be there loaded with articles for Colonel Fletcher, and to proceed to Gallegos on the 6th.

‘ 2. Forty carts of those now at Gallegos to come to Freneda on the 5th, to be loaded with stores of Colonel Fletcher’s at Freneda, and to go to Gallegos on the 6th.

‘ 3. The forty five carts which were sent to Almeida this morning, to be loaded with powder and shot and to go to

‘As soon as the Government shall pay the interest on their paper, I have in contemplation a measure to relieve us from the weight of circulating it. I doubt, however, whether it will relieve us from the loss on the exchange on our bills on England. Our money here would still cost us from 15 to 20 per cent.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 6th January, 1812, 10 A.M.

‘I enclose a letter from Salamanca, and one from my brother.

‘I have not got the details of the state of affairs at Tarifa, or any letter from General Cooke; but I see by the papers enclosed in my brother’s letter that the French still persevere in their plans in that quarter.

‘I have a letter from General Hill of the 2d, from Al-mendralejo. Drouet had retired from thence, and Hill had taken at that place and Merida about 600 fanegas of wheat. He intended to return to Merida on the 3d or 4th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. The last of the engineers’ stores left Almeida this morning, but it is impossible to say how far they will go this afternoon. If they reach Gallegos we may invest the place to-morrow. If they do not, it would be advantageous to defer the operation till the 8th.

‘I am going to Gallegos this day.

‘Since writing the above, I find that it will be impossible to invest the place till the 8th.

‘W.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Gallegos, 6th January, 1812.

‘I have received your letters of the 30th December and 2d January, and I have omitted to answer the first, till I could inform you of the state of affairs at Tarifa.

‘I heard from my brother yesterday to the 24th December, and it appears by letters from Puerto Real, and Puerto S^{ta}.

Maria, of the 19th, that the enemy still persevered in their attack on Tarifa. I think it probable, however, that Drouet's retreat, combined with the bad weather, will have induced them to abandon that object for the present; it is, however, desirable that you should continue to keep up the alarm which you have occasioned, till you shall hear that they have abandoned their projects on Tarifa.

'It appears to me that you have nothing to apprehend at present from the army of Portugal. It is very desirable that you should endeavor to discover the state of the enemy's works, and their force, at the Puente de Almaraz; it would aid all my plans very much, if we could destroy their bridge and works at that point. You will recollect that the top of the Sierra de Mirabete, where there is a tower, commands the ground the whole way down to the river.

'I am about to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, in which enterprise I shall succeed, or I shall bring back towards this frontier the whole army which had marched towards Valencia and Aragon. By these means I hope to save Valencia, even if I should not succeed in getting this place; if I should get this place, we shall, I hope, make a fine campaign in the spring.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. General Hill.*

'WELLINGTON,

'P. S. Since writing the above, I have received a letter from General Cooke, from which it appears that about the 20th the enemy were before Tarifa, but they had not brought up their heavy artillery.

'W.'

To Dr. Frank.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Gallegos, 7th January, 1812.

'I am very much obliged to you for your account of my little boy, and for your kindness in going to see him. I trust that your own health is re-established.

'You will be glad to hear that the health of the troops is much improved, though not yet what I could wish it to be. We lost a great many men upon the change from warm to cold weather; but the whole of our casualties in this year, including some bloody affairs, amounts only to 6000 men.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Dr. Frank.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 7th January, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th December, on the subject of the want of guns and of shot at Cadiz.

‘ These frequently occurring demands upon the finances of Great Britain deserve serious attention, particularly as they must be defrayed from the funds applicable to maintain this army. It would be much better for Great Britain at once to give a subsidy to the Spanish Government, providing for all their wants, than thus to take upon ourselves the maintenance of small establishments, which in the aggregate cost more than any subsidy could amount to, while the obligation to Great Britain is not felt.

‘ I beg that the Commanding Officer of the artillery and engineers at Cadiz will make an estimate of what iron guns are required to arm the lines at the Isla, &c., specifying what the arsenals at Cadiz can and will afford; and you will be so kind as to make a request to the Secretary of State to send to Cadiz the overplus.

‘ I likewise beg that the Commanding Officer of the artillery will estimate what quantity of shot and shells the different guns will require, specifying what the arsenals at Cadiz and the Isla can and will supply.

‘ I likewise beg that an estimate may be formed of the expense to be incurred in the maintenance of the artificers proposed to be maintained at the foundry on the Isla; and a calculation made of the expense of manufacturing a certain weight of shot and shells at this foundry.

‘ I beg you to send these estimates and calculations to the Secretary of State, in order that his Lordship may decide whether it is better to continue to support this establishment—or to export shot and shells from England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 7th January, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of an answer which I have written to a letter from Major General Cooke of the

24th December, of which he will have forwarded a copy to your Lordship, on the want of guns, shot, and shells, for the works at Cadiz and the Isla.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 7th January, 1812.

‘ The contents of my last letters will have inclined you to expect that by this time I should have invested Ciudad Rodrigo. I thought that I should, after a fair calculation of the work to be done preparatory to that operation, and of the means at my disposal to perform it ; but after every allowance is made, we must expect disappointments where we have to deal with Portuguese and Spanish carters and muleteers, and therefore I cannot invest the place till to-morrow.

‘ What do you think of empty carts taking two days to go ten miles on a good road ? After all I am obliged to appear satisfied, or they would all desert !

‘ I shall not write my weekly report till I shall return from investing the place to-morrow.

‘ At this season of the year, and depending upon Portuguese and Spaniards for means of having what is required, I can scarcely venture to calculate the time which this operation will take, but I should think not less than twenty four or twenty five days. If we do not succeed, we shall at least bring back upon ourselves all the force which has marched away ; and I hope we may save Valencia, or at all events afford more time to the Asturians, Galicians, &c. If we do succeed, we shall make a fine campaign in the spring.

‘ According to your Lordship’s desire I will endeavor to have a communication with General Lacy in Catalonia. I have not a sufficient knowledge of affairs on the eastern coast to be able to decide whether it would be practicable to employ a detachment in that quarter with advantage, on the principles of my dispatch to General Cooke, a copy of which I enclosed to your Lordship.

‘ I have frequently turned over in my mind the practicability of making an attack (combined land and sea) upon Barcelona, but I understand the place is one of the first

order. It is sufficiently garrisoned, and an attack would require a very large and efficient force, and much time would necessarily elapse in the operations. In this time the French Government would have it in their power to send, even from France, an army for its relief.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 8th January, 1812, 7 A.M.

‘ I think you had better leave the reserve ammunition of the 1st division at Pinhel.

‘ Have you heard anything of 100 carts purchased by Mr. Boyes, drawn by the public bullocks? They were to be loaded with shot at Villa da Ponte, and to come on from thence.

‘ The sixty you mention had better return to Villa da Ponte for fresh loads as soon as they can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I hear that some of your guns are moving.

‘ W.’

Instructions to General Officers commanding Divisions employed in the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Gallegos, 8th January, 1812.

‘ The Commander of the Forces proposes to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, and in order that the troops may suffer as little as possible from exposure to the weather, he intends that the operations shall be carried on by each of the divisions of the army employed, alternately, for twenty four hours.

‘ Brig. General Pack’s brigade, with the exception of the 4th caçadores, will do duty with the Light division.

‘ The 4th caçadores will do duty with the 1st division.

‘ When a division is ordered for the duty of the siege, each of the battalions belonging to it is to march from its cantonments before daylight in the morning. The troops from the several cantonments of the division separately, by the shortest and most convenient route, which the General

Officers commanding divisions are requested to ascertain. The troops will be able to cross at the fords above La Caridad, and all the fords below the ford of Los Carboneros inclusive. The troops are to have with them a day's provisions cooked, and they are to be followed by two days spirits, and no other baggage.

‘ A sufficient number of men to cook the provisions for the day the division is relieved are to be left in the cantonments.

‘ As soon as the first battalion of the relieving division shall arrive on the ground, the General Officer commanding the division which has performed the duty for the preceding twenty four hours, will commence the relief, by sending off to their cantonments a proportionate number of troops, those of course first which have the greatest distance to go to their cantonments, and the relief will proceed in proportion as the troops shall arrive.

‘ The chief Engineer will require daily from each division,
20 miners,
30 artificers, or persons accustomed to work,
with a proportion of non-commissioned officers.

‘ These men will be fixed upon before the troops march from their cantonments, and are to be placed under his directions (with a list of their names and the regiments to which they belong) on the arrival of the troops on the ground.

‘ Each regiment is to take along with it the intrenching tools belonging to it.

‘ There will be orders daily respecting the working parties, covering parties, guards, &c.

‘ The musket and rifle ammunition attached to the Light division is to be taken to the ground the first day, and remain there. The 9 pounders attached to the 4th division will likewise be taken to the ground on the first day, and remain there. The artillerymen are to be relieved daily, by those belonging to the brigades and troops attached to the 1st, 4th, and Light divisions.

‘ The Engineers will order to the ground a sufficiency of cutting tools, to enable those men not immediately on duty to supply themselves with firewood. These tools to be handed over from the relieved to the relieving division.

‘ Each division to be attended by the medical staff be-

longing to it. A place will be fixed upon to which men who may be wounded are to be carried to be dressed, and means will be provided for removing them from thence to their cantonments.

'To the General Officers commanding Divisions in the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.'

· WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R. A.

· MY DEAR SIR,

· Gallegos, 9th January, 1812, 5 P. M.

· You will have heard that we carried the redoubt on the hill of San Francisco last night; and we have opened our parallel within 600 yards of the place. Colonel Fletcher expects to be ready for the guns possibly by the 11th, at night, or 12th in the morning, as he intends to begin his batteries this night.

· I think it probable that the gun bullocks will have arrived this day. If they should, I beg you to make an effort to get the guns here in one day. They will certainly require a day to go from hence to the ground of the siege.

· Believe me, &c.

'Major Dickson, R. A.'

· WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

· SIR,

· Gallegos, 9th January, 1812.

· I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 6th instant, and I beg leave to congratulate you upon the success of the detachment under Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby.

· As your advance to Merida must by this time have had all the effect expected from it, and as I observe that General Drouet has retired upon Llerena, I request you to move your corps back to the frontiers of Portugal, and place it with its right at Portalegre, its centre and your head quarters at Niza, and two brigades of infantry at Castello Branco.

· My reason for wishing you to take this position is, that I think it probable that when the enemy shall find that I have attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, they will endeavor to divert my attention from that operation by movements, by the valley of the Alagon, towards the frontier of Lower Beira.

‘ The effect of these movements would be entirely frustrated by your being in the position pointed out, as you will be able to cross the Tagus, at least as fast as the enemy can advance, by the vale of Plasencia.

‘ It is very desirable to destroy the enemy’s works at Merida; and I recommend to you to destroy them if you should find that you can do so without inconvenience. As you will probably move by cantonments, those troops which will leave Merida the last night be employed to perform this service.

‘ I am desirous, however, that no time should be unnecessarily lost in marching the troops to the position I have above pointed out.

‘ I invested Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday, and broke ground before the place last night.

‘ I enclose the extract of a letter to the Secretary of State, giving an account of a very handsome operation performed by a detachment of the Light division, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Colborne.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 9th January, 1812.

‘ According to the intention which I informed your Lordship that I entertained, I invested Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday.

‘ Since the enemy have had possession of the place, they have constructed a palisaded redoubt on the hill of San Francisco, and have fortified three convents in the suburbs, the defences of which are connected with the work on the hill of San Francisco, and with the old line by which the suburb was surrounded. By these means the enemy have increased the difficulty of approaching the place; and it was necessary to obtain possession of the work on the hill of San Francisco before we could make any progress in the attack. Accordingly, Major General Craufurd directed a detachment of the Light division, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Colborne of the 52d, to attack the work, shortly after it was dark. The attack was very ably conducted by Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and the work was taken by storm in a short time. Two Captains and forty seven men were

made prisoners, the remainder of the garrison being put to the sword in the storm. We took three pieces of cannon.

‘ I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and of the detachment under his command, upon this occasion. I am happy to add that our loss in this affair has not been severe: six men having been killed; Captain Mein of the 52d, Lieut. Hawkesly, 95th, and Lieut. Woodgate, 52d, and fourteen men, having been wounded.

‘ The success of this operation enabled us immediately to break ground within 600 yards of the place, notwithstanding that the enemy still hold the fortified convents; and the enemy’s work has been turned into a part of our first parallel, and a good communication made with it.

‘ It is impossible for me to conjecture the length of time which will be required to bring the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo to a successful conclusion. Our means of transporting our stores and materials depend upon the Portuguese and Spanish carters and muleteers, and the movements of this description of persons are very uncertain. The weather, also, which may be expected at this season of the year, may interrupt or retard our progress; and the enemy may have time to bring back to this part of the country the troops which had been removed from hence in order to aid the operations of Marshal Suchet in Valencia, and I may be obliged to raise the siege. If this effect alone should be produced, we shall have rendered a great service to the Spaniards.

‘ I think it probable that Marmont will return immediately, as I understand that great doubts were entertained by the Ministers and Generals at Madrid of the expediency of his movements to the eastward, in consequence of intelligence which had been received that I had constructed a bridge on the Agueda; and that in the end of last month he had not left Madrid.

‘ I have arranged our operation in such a manner as that, I hope, the troops will not suffer from the inclemency of the weather.

‘ Lieut. General Hill arrived at Merida on the 30th December. He had hoped to surprise General Dombrowski (who I had been led to imagine was killed in General Hill’s last affair with the enemy) in that town; but his advanced

guard was discovered on the 29th by a patrol from a small detachment of the enemy which happened to be at La Nava, which effected its retreat to Merida, notwithstanding the efforts of a detachment of Lieut. General Hill's cavalry to prevent it.

‘ General Dombrowski retired from Merida in the night, leaving a magazine of bread and 160,000 lbs. of wheat in the town, and several unfinished works which the enemy had been constructing.

‘ On the 1st, General Hill moved forward with the intention of attacking General Drouet, who commands the 5th corps, at Almendralejo. This General, however, retired upon Zafra, leaving a magazine in the town, containing 450,000 lbs. of wheat and some barley. On the 3d, Lieut. General Hill sent a detachment, consisting of the 28th regiment, and two squadrons of the 2d hussars, and one squadron of the 10th Portuguese cavalry, to Fuente del Maestre, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby. Our cavalry defeated a body of the enemy's cavalry which was there, having taken two Officers and thirty men prisoners.

‘ Lieut. General Hill having found that General Drouet had retreated upon Llerena, and that it would be impossible for him to follow to a greater distance, returned to Merida on the 5th, in order to place his troops in better cantonments during the bad weather. I have the honor to enclose letters from Lieut. General Hill of the 30th December, 2d and 6th January, giving an account of his operations, returns of killed and wounded, &c.*

* *Lieut. General R. Hill to General Viscount Wellington, K.B.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Merida, 30th December, 1811.

‘ In pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, I put the troops under my orders in march from their several cantonments, and entered this province on the 27th instant, by Alburquerque, Villa de Rey, and San Vicente; and by the intelligence which I received from various quarters, I was led to entertain the most sanguine hopes that I should have been able to surprise the enemy stationed in this town. I was, however, disappointed in my expectations, by finding in La Nava, on our approach to that village yesterday, with the column from Alburquerque, a party of the enemy, consisting of about 800 voltigeurs and a few hussars, being part of a detachment which had arrived there the night preceding, apparently on a plundering excursion, the remainder whereof has proceeded to Cordevillas, another village about two leagues distant.

‘ By accounts which I have from Cadiz to the 27th of December, I learn that the enemy invested Tarifa with a force

‘ A patrol from La Nava fell in with the head of our column, and gave the alarm to the detachment, which immediately commenced its retreat towards Merida, followed by the cavalry of my advanced guard, consisting of between 300 and 400 of the 13th light dragoons and 2d hussars.

‘ As I considered the intercepting of the entire of this party to be of the greatest importance to our ulterior operations, I directed the cavalry above mentioned to make every effort to effect it, or at least to check its march until the arrival of some infantry.

‘ The intrepid and admirable manner, however, in which the enemy retired, his infantry formed in square, and favored as he was by the nature of the country, of which he knew how to take the fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting anything against him; and after following him for upwards of a league, and making an ineffectual attempt to break him, I judged it advisable to give over the pursuit, and he effected his escape with the loss of about twenty killed, and as many wounded, from four 9 pounders, which, by the great exertions of Major Hawker, and his Officers and men, got within range, and followed him for some distance, but were unable to close upon him, owing to the deepness of the country.

‘ One wing of the 71st light infantry, under Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cado-gan, also exerted themselves in a most laudable manner to overtake the enemy, but were at too great a distance to admit of their accomplishing it in any reasonable time.

‘ The arrival of the above mentioned party at Merida made the enemy acquainted with our approach, of which I have reason to think he was before entirely ignorant, and he in consequence evacuated the town during the night, leaving unfinished some works which he was constructing for its defence, and we entered in the course of the day.

‘ I regret to state that we had two men killed and some wounded in the affair of yesterday, of which I enclose a return.

‘ I have the honor to be &c.

‘ General

‘ R. HILL, Lieut. General.

Viscount Wellington, K.B.

‘ P.S. Since writing the above, it has been reported to me that 180 fanegas of wheat have been found in the depôt of this town, belonging to the French, besides a quantity of bread.

‘ R. H.’

Extract of a Letter from Lieut. General R. Hill to General Viscount Wellington, K.B., dated Ahmendrajo, 2d January, 1812.

‘ Since my letter to your Lordship from Merida of the 30th ult., I have the honor to report, that from all the information I had received, I had reason to suppose that Drouet was concentrating his troops at this place; I consequently moved on yesterday for the purpose of attacking him. On my approach to the town, I found that the greater part of the enemy's troops had moved off the preceding day, in the direction of Villa Franca, and that his rear guard was on its march, covered by his cavalry, which skirmished with the hussars of my advanced guard, and retired after receiving a few rounds from the horse artillery. In this town we found a few stores, of which the enclosed is a return. I thought it possible the enemy might have afforded me an opportunity of doing something here.

of about 5000 men on the 20th of December, covering their operations against that place by another corps at Vejer,

Lieut. General R. Hill to General Viscount Wellington, K.B.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Merida, 6th January, 1812.

‘ My letters of the 2d and 3d instant would acquaint your Lordship of my having, on the 1st instant, marched with the corps under my command to Almendralejo, in the hope that Comte d’Erlon, who had collected the greater part of his troops at that place, might have given me an opportunity of coming in contact with him, as well as of my disappointment in that respect, he having previously fallen back in the direction of Llerena, leaving only a small rear guard in Almendralejo, which retired also on our approach. I have the honor to acquaint your Lordship that it was my intention to have followed the enemy, and failing in my desire to bring him to action, to have given him every possible annoyance in his retreat; but the dreadful state of the weather, the condition of the roads (which are daily becoming worse), and the consequent difficulty of getting up my supplies, render any further operations on my part impossible for the present, without incurring risks and making sacrifices greater than could have been justified by the occasion, or by your Lordship’s instructions. I therefore determined, after halting two days at Almendralejo, and occupying Villa Franca and Fuente del Maestre, to put the troops in cantonments in this town and neighborhood, there to await a more favorable opportunity of acting; trusting that the alarm occasioned to the enemy by the movement already made will have in part effected one of the objects for which I was instructed by your Lordship to take the field. A part of the troops accordingly returned here yesterday, and the remainder are now on their march; the enemy being, by the last accounts which I have received, also in full march towards the south, his rear guard having left Zafra and Los Santos yesterday.

‘ I have the satisfaction to enclose for your Lordship’s information a letter from Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby, detailing the particulars of a successful attack, made by some of the 2d hussars and Portuguese cavalry, acting under his orders, at Fuente del Maestre, on a body of the enemy’s dragoons, which reflects the greatest credit on Lieut. Colonel Abercromby who directed, and the Officers and non-commissioned officers and men who executed it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ General

‘ R. HILL, Lieut. General.

Viscount Wellington, K.B.’

Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercromby to Lieut. General R. Hill.

‘ SIR,

‘ Merida, 5th January, 1812.

‘ In obedience to your orders, I marched on the 3d instant from Almendralejo at noon, with the column you did me the honor to place under my command, and reached Fuente del Maestre at a little after 4 o’clock in the evening of that day. On my arrival I learned that some of the enemy’s cavalry were still in the neighborhood; and having passed through the town, I halted the column, and proceeded to reconnoitre in front. About 100 of the enemy’s horse were discovered on the Los Santos road, who, apparently ignorant of our force, formed squadron, and advanced towards us. The Portuguese cavalry exchanged a few shots with them until the hussars were brought up; the enemy then halted, and showed a disposition to charge: in this, however, he was quickly frustrated. The two squadrons of the hussars were formed on the right, and one squadron of

under the command of Marshal Victor. Their artillery for the attack of Tarifa had not arrived on the 26th December. Colonel Skerrett was engaged with the enemy on the 20th, with the piquets of the British and Spanish infantry and of the garrison, and a detachment of the 95th. On the 21st Captain Weir, of the 11th regiment, with his company, destroyed one of the enemy's piquets; and, on the 22d, Colonel Skerrett made a sortie from Tarifa, in co-operation with the Spanish troops under General Copons, in order to oblige the enemy to show their force, on which occasion the enemy sustained considerable loss.

'The object of Lieut. General Hill's movement into Es-

the 10th Portuguese cavalry on the left. Instantly the enemy were charged on one flank by the squadron of Portuguese, under Lieut. Colonel Campbell, and by Captain Cleves' squadron on the other. The right hussar squadron remained in reserve. A few minutes decided the contest. The enemy, being completely routed, left in our hands two Officers and thirty men, besides several killed. The squadron which remained in reserve was then sent in pursuit, as far as prudence would allow.

'No language of mine can do sufficient justice to the gallantry of Lieut. Colonel Campbell, as well as that of Lieut. Hutchinson, and the other Officers and men composing the squadron of Portuguese cavalry. Suffice it to say that on this occasion the hussars under Major Busche upheld the high military character they are so universally known to possess.

'This little affair has been achieved with very trifling loss on our side.

'Enclosed I have the honor to transmit to you a list of the killed and wounded.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Hill.'

'A. ABERCROMBY, Lieut. Colonel.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Second Division of the Army under His Excellency General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., in action with the Enemy near Fuente del Muestre, on the 3d of January, 1812.

	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	—	—	1	2	1
Wounded . .	1	2	17	5	20
Missing . . .	—	—	—	1	—

tremadura was to divert the enemy's attention from General Ballesteros and from Tarifa; and as General Drouet has retired upon Llerena, making some sacrifices, I conclude that Soult has either been ordered, or is determined to persevere in his attack upon Tarifa.

‘ From the accounts which I have received of that place it appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy shall be equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the island contiguous to Tarifa, for which object Colonel Skerrett's detachment does not appear to be necessary. I do not believe that the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without which the town will be entirely useless to them; and indeed if they had the island, as well as the town, I doubt their being able to retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them with which General Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their neighborhood to protect them.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have desired General Hill to return to Portalegre, and to place his corps between that town and Castello Branco. My reason for giving him these orders is, that I think it not improbable that the enemy, finding that they will not have time to concert an operation between the armies of the north and of Portugal, and knowing that neither of those armies separately can venture to attempt the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, will try to alarm me for the safety of my communication with General Hill, and with Lisbon, by movements in the valley of Plasencia, by Lower Beira.

‘ General Hill's movement towards the Tagus will check all these plans; and, whatever may happen, it will be a great convenience that he should be nearer this army during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 10th January, 1812.

‘ I request you to inform General Abadia that I am now engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which we are car-

rying on with the greatest activity. We broke ground before the place on the 8th at night, within 600 yards, having carried a redoubt by storm on that evening at that distance. We shall open our fire, I hope, on the 13th, from the first parallel.

‘ It would be very desirable if General Abadia would endeavor to make some movement to draw the attention of the enemy from us ; as I think it probable that they will collect their whole force to endeavor to interrupt our operations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 15th January, 1812.

‘ We have continued our operations against Ciudad Rodrigo since I addressed you on the 9th instant.

‘ We opened our fire from twenty-two pieces of ordnance, in three batteries in the first parallel, yesterday afternoon ; and we opened an approach to, and established ourselves in our second parallel, 150 yards from the place, last night.

‘ This measure had been facilitated by Lieut. General Graham having surprised the enemy’s detachment in the convent of S^{ta} Cruz, close to the body of the place, on the night of the 13th. The right of our approaches was protected and secured by this operation. Major General the Hon. C. Colville, who commands the 4th division in the absence of Lieut. General the Hon. G. L. Cole, likewise attacked the enemy’s post in the convent of San Francisco last night, and obtained possession of that post, and of the other fortified posts in the suburbs, where our troops are now lodged. Our left is protected and secured by this operation. Two pieces of cannon were taken in the convent of San Francisco.

‘ It appears that the preparations and movements which I first made with a view to the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo had the effect of inducing the enemy to move back from La Mancha.

‘ The divisions of the army of Portugal, two of which had gone as far as Cuenca, and the other to San Clemente, returned to Toledo in the beginning of this month ; and they

are now on their march, it is stated, towards Valladolid, to which place Marshal Marmont went on the 5th from Talavera. One division of infantry still remained on the 12th instant at Naval Moral, having detachments as far back as Talavera; and it is reported that a second division remained about Talavera.

‘ It appears that the governments of Valladolid and Salamanca, called the sixth and seventh governments, have been placed under the directions of Marshal Marmont, and that what can be plundered from those provinces is allotted for the support of the troops under his command; and the army of the north are to be confined to the northern provinces.

‘ Preparations to a certain extent are making at Salamanca for the movement of troops in this direction; and I have reports that troops were to be collected at Salamanca on this day. It appears, however, that the enemy did not even know at Salamanca that we had attacked Ciudad Rodrigo till the 13th; and it is not probable that a sufficient force can be collected to oblige us to raise the siege, at least for some days.

‘ I purpose, therefore, to continue the siege as long as I shall think there is any prospect of success, and till I shall be certain that the enemy have brought together such a force as to render success hopeless, and the situation of the army critical.

‘ We have had, till now, very fine weather, and the troops have suffered but little from exposure to it. I enclose the returns of the casualties to the 14th instant.

‘ It is impossible for me, even now, to tell how much longer the operations will last. No time has been lost yet; and your Lordship may be certain that every exertion will be made to bring them to a successful termination.

‘ I have received no authentic accounts of the state of affairs in Valencia; but I have reason to believe that, as late as the 24th December, the enemy had not been able to make any progress in their attack upon that place. It is supposed that, unless powerfully supported, Marshal Suchet must retire.

‘ By the accounts from Cadiz to the 29th December, it appears to be supposed that the French had not been able to

get their guns up to Tarifa, having been prevented by the bad weather, which continued to prevail generally throughout the Peninsula till the 5th and 6th of this month.

‘ By accounts from Lieut. General Hill to the 11th instant it appears that General Drouet had been reinforced from Seville, and had advanced again towards Zafra. I think it probable that General Hill will have moved on the 12th or 13th towards the frontiers of Portugal, according to the orders which I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 9th instant, I had sent him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 15th January, 1812.

‘ My dispatch will give you all the intelligence which I can send you from hence regarding ourselves. I have to add to it, that I have a letter from Madrid of the 3d, stating that General Darmagnac had written from the frontiers of Valencia that the Toulon squadron had been defeated. Probably he may mean that the convoy from Toulon to Barcelona had been taken. But the *squadron* is positively stated; and it is possible that Admiral Emeriau may have been caught in one of his “*promenades navales.*”

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 20th January, 1812.

‘ I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 9th, that I had attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, and in that of the 15th, of the progress of the operations to that period, and I have now the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that we took the place by storm yesterday evening after dark.

‘ We continued, from the 15th to the 19th, to complete the second parallel, and the communications with that work and we had made some progress by sap towards the crest of the glacis. On the night of the 15th we likewise advanced, from the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill towards the convent of San Francisco, to a situation from

which the walls of the *fausse braie* and of the town were seen, on which a battery for seven guns was constructed, and these commenced their fire on the morning of the 18th.

‘ In the meantime, the batteries in the first parallel continued their fire; and, yesterday evening, their fire had not only considerably injured the defences of the place, but had made breaches in the *fausse braie* wall, and in the body of the place, which were considered practicable; while the battery on the slope of the hill, which had been commenced on the night of the 15th, and had opened on the 18th, had been equally efficient still farther to the left, and opposite to the suburb of San Francisco.

‘ I therefore determined to storm the place, notwithstanding that the approaches had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire. The attack was accordingly made yesterday evening, in five separate columns, consisting of the troops of the 3d and Light divisions, and of Brig. General Pack’s brigade. The two right columns, conducted by Lieut. Colonel O’Toole of the 2d caçadores, and Major Ridge of the 5th regiment, were destined to protect the advance of Major General Mackinnon’s brigade, forming the 3d, to the top of the breach in the *fausse braie* wall; and all these, being composed of troops of the 3d division, were under the direction of Lieut. General Picton.

‘ The fourth column, consisting of the 43d and 52d regiments, and part of the 95th regiment, being of the Light division, under the direction of Major General Craufurd, attacked the breaches on the left in front of the suburb of San Francisco, and covered the left of the attack of the principal breach by the troops of the 3d division; and Brig. General Pack was destined, with his brigade, forming the fifth column, to make a false attack upon the southern face of the fort.

‘ Besides these five columns, the 94th regiment, belonging to the 3d division, descended into the ditch in two columns, on the right of Major General Mackinnon’s brigade, with a view to protect the descent of that body into the ditch and its attack of the breach in the *fausse braie*, against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct to oppose their progress.

‘ All these attacks succeeded; and Brig. General Pack even surpassed my expectations, having converted his false attack into a real one; and his advanced guard, under the command of Major Lynch, having followed the enemy’s troops from the advanced works into the *fausse braie*, where they made prisoners all opposed to them.

‘ Major Ridge, of the 2d batt. 5th regiment, having esca- laded the *fausse braie* wall, stormed the principal breach in the body of the place, together with the 94th regiment, com- manded by Lieut. Colonel Campbell, which had moved along the ditch at the same time, and had stormed the breach in the *fausse braie*, both in front of Major General Mackinnon’s brigade. Thus, these regiments not only effectually covered the advance from the trenches of Major General Mackin- non’s brigade by their first movements and operations, but they preceded them in the attack.

‘ Major General Craufurd, and Major General Vandeleur, and the troops of the Light division, on the left, were like- wise very forward on that side; and, in less than half an hour from the time the attack commenced, our troops were in possession, and formed on the ramparts, of the place, each body contiguous to the other. The enemy then sub- mitted, having sustained a considerable loss in the contest.

‘ Our loss was also, I am concerned to add, severe, parti- cularly in Officers of high rank and estimation in this army. Major General Mackinnon was unfortunately blown up by the accidental explosion of one of the enemy’s expense ma- gazines, close to the breach, after he had gallantly and suc- cessfully led the troops under his command to the attack. Major General Craufurd likewise received a severe wound* while he was leading on the Light division to the storm, and I am apprehensive that I shall be deprived for some time of his assistance.

‘ Major General Vandeleur was likewise wounded in the same manner, but not so severely, and he was able to conti- nue in the field.

‘ I have to add to this list Lieut. Colonel Colborne of the 52d regiment, and Major George Napier†, who led the

* The wound was mortal.

† Major General George Napier, C.B., Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, On the return from the trenches to the cantonments of the 52d, at El Bodon, on

storming party of the Light division, and was wounded on the top of the breach.

‘ I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship the uniform good conduct, and spirit of enterprise, and patience, and perseverance in the performance of great labor, by which the General Officers, Officers, and troops of the 1st, 3d, 4th, and Light divisions, and Brig. General Pack’s brigade, by whom the siege was carried on, have been distinguished during the late operations.

‘ Lieut. General Graham assisted me in superintending the conduct of the details of the siege, besides performing the duties of the General Officer commanding the 1st division; and I am much indebted to the suggestions and assistance I received from him for the success of this enterprise.

the morning of the 17th January, Major Napier and Lieut. Gurwood expressed to each other their mutual desire of an opportunity for personal distinction in the event of Ciudad Rodrigo standing an assault; and they decided to submit their intentions to their friend and Colonel, now Lieut. General Sir John Colborne. After mature deliberation, a letter was addressed to Major General Robert Craufurd in the following terms:

‘ In the event of Ciudad Rodrigo standing an assault, and that the Light division should be employed in it, the following Officers of the 52d are desirous of offering their services :

‘ MAJOR G. NAPIER to command the Storming Party.

‘ LIEUT. GURWOOD *” the Forlorn Hope.*’

This paper, being recommended by Colonel Colborne, was carried by them in the evening to the quarters of Major General Craufurd, to whom it was sent up—no answer was returned.

The order for the march of the division to the trenches, out of its turn, soon after daylight on the morning of the 19th, afforded the hope that it was to be employed in the assault; but it was only on the arrival of the division at La Caridad, when the orders from head quarters were received for the formation of a storming party of 300 men, with a proportion of Officers, that the intentions of Major Napier and Lieut. Gurwood were made known, as being appointed to specific commands in the assault. It was very apparent that the same desire in many of their brother Officers, checked only by the unwillingness to be taxed with presumption, had been thus anticipated; and Major Napier and Lieut. Gurwood watched, with increased anxiety, the tri-colored flag on the tower near the lesser breach that it might not be struck, and expose their announced demonstration for self-distinction to disappointment. This was a nervous excitement absorbing all thoughts in the soldier, who saw reputation and honor just within his grasp. Success, however, soon banished this, to give way to feelings difficult to be imagined, still more so to be described.

In the subsequent and more dangerous assaults of Badajoz, Burgos, and San Sebastian, the senior Officers of each rank claimed privilege and preference; but the breaches being insulated and better defended, unfortunately none successfully survived the storm of them.

‘The conduct of all parts of the 3d division*, in the operations which they performed with so much gallantry and exactness on the evening of the 19th in the dark, afford the strongest proof of the abilities of Lieut. General Picton and Major General Mackinnon, by whom they were directed and led; but I beg particularly to draw your Lordship’s attention to the conduct of Lieut. Colonel O’Toole, of the 2d caçadores, of Major Ridge of the 2d batt. 5th foot†, of Lieut. Colonel Campbell of the 94th regiment‡, of Major Manners of the 74th, and of Major Grey of the 2d batt. 5th foot§, who has been twice wounded during this siege.

‘It is but justice also to the 3d division to report that the men who performed the sap belonged to the 45th, 74th, and 88th regiments, under the command of Captain Macleod of the Royal Engineers, and Captain Thompson of the 74th, Lieut. Beresford of the 88th, and Lieut. Metcalfe of the 45th, and they distinguished themselves not less in the storm of the place than they had in the performance of their laborious duty during the siege.

‘I have already reported, in my letter of the 9th instant my sense of the conduct of Major General Craufurd, and of Lieut. Colonel Colborne, and of the troops of the Light division, in the storm of the redoubt of San Francisco, on the evening of the 8th instant. The conduct of these troops was equally distinguished throughout the siege; and in the storm, nothing could exceed the gallantry with which these brave Officers and troops advanced and accomplished the difficult operation allotted to them, notwithstanding that all their leaders had fallen.

‘I particularly request your Lordship’s attention to the conduct of Major General Craufurd, Major General Vandeleur||, Lieut. Colonel Barnard of the 95th¶, Lieut. Colonel Colborne**, Major Gibbs††, and Major Napier of the 52d,

* Lieut. Mackie, 88th, now Major Mackie, commanded the ‘forlorn hope’ of the assault of the great breach.

† Killed in the assault at Badajoz.

‡ The late Major General Sir James Campbell, K.C.B.

§ Colonel Grey, C.B.

|| Lieut. General Sir John Vandeleur, G.C.B.

¶ Lieut. General Sir Andrew Barnard, K.C.B.

** Lieut. General Sir John Colborne, K.C.B.

†† Major General Gibbs, C.B.

and Lieut. Colonel Macleod of the 43d*. The conduct of Captain Duffy of the 43d †, and that of Lieut. Gurwood ‡ of the 52d regiment, who was wounded, have likewise been particularly reported to me. Lieut. Colonel Elder and the 3d caçadores were likewise distinguished upon this occasion.

‘The 1st Portuguese regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Hill, and the 16th, under Colonel Campbell, being Brig. General Pack’s brigade, were likewise distinguished in the storm under the command of the Brigadier General, who particularly mentions Major Lynch.

‘In my dispatch of the 15th, I reported to your Lordship the attack of the convent of S^{ta} Cruz by the troops of the 1st division, under the direction of Lieut. General Graham, and that of the convent of San Francisco, on the 14th instant, under the direction of Major General the Hon. C. Colville. The first mentioned enterprise was performed by Captain Laroche de Starkerfels, of the 1st line batt. King’s German Legion, the last by Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, with the 40th regiment. This regiment remained from that time in the suburb of San Francisco, and materially assisted our attack on that side of the place.

‘Although it did not fall to the lot of the troops of the 1st and 4th divisions to bring these operations to a successful close, they distinguished themselves throughout their progress by the patience and perseverance with which they per-

* Lieut. Colonel Macleod was subsequently killed in the assault of Badajoz.

† Colonel Duffy, C.B.

‡ Lieut. Colonel Gurwood, the compiler of this work. Lieut. Gurwood, 52d reg., led the ‘forlorn hope’ of the Light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards took the French governor, General Barrié, in the citadel; and, from the hands of Lord Wellington, on the breach by which he had entered, he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by the Duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless been one of the distinguished consequences resulting from this service; and Lieut. Colonel Gurwood feels pride, as a soldier of fortune, in here offering himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in future wars.

The detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the lesser breach is of too little importance, excepting to those who served in it, to become a matter of history. The compiler, however, takes this opportunity of observing, that Colonel William Napier has been misinformed respecting the conduct of the ‘forlorn hope,’ in the account given of it by him, as it appears in the Appendix of the fourth volume (first edition) of his ‘History of the Peninsular War.’ A correct statement, and proofs of it, have been since furnished to Colonel W. Napier, for any future edition of his work, which will render any further notice of it here unnecessary.

formed the labor of the siege. The brigade of guards under Major General H. Campbell, were particularly distinguished in this respect.

‘ I likewise request your Lordship’s attention to the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, the chief Engineer, and of Brigade Major Jones, and the Officers and men of the Royal Engineers. The ability with which these operations were carried on exceeds all praise; and I beg leave to recommend these Officers to your Lordship most particularly.

‘ Major Dickson of the Royal Artillery, attached to the Portuguese artillery, has for some time had the direction of the heavy train attached to this army, and has conducted the intricate details of the late operation, as he did that of the two sieges of Badajoz in the last summer, much to my satisfaction. The rapid execution produced by the well directed fire kept up from our batteries affords the best proof of the merits of the Officers and men of the Royal Artillery, and of the Portuguese artillery, employed on this occasion; but I must particularly mention Brigade Major May*, and Captains Holcombe, Power, Dynely, and Dundas, of the Royal Artillery, and Captains Da Cunha and Da Costa, and Lieut. Silva, of the 1st regiment of Portuguese artillery.

‘ I have likewise particularly to report to your Lordship the conduct of Major Sturgeon of the Royal Staff corps†. He constructed and placed for us the bridge over the Agueda, without which the enterprise could not have been attempted; and he afterwards materially assisted Lieut. General Graham and myself in our reconnaissance of the place on which the plan of the attack was founded; and he finally conducted the 2d batt. 5th regiment, as well as the 2d caçadores, to their points of attack.

‘ The Adjutant General, and the Deputy Quarter Master General, and the Officers of their several departments, gave me every assistance throughout this service, as well as those of my personal Staff; and I have great pleasure in adding that notwithstanding the season of the year, and the increased difficulties of procuring supplies for the troops, the whole army have been well supplied, and every branch of

* Colonel Sir John May, K.C.B.

† Killed near Vic Bigorre in 1813.

the service provided for during the late operations, by the indefatigable exertions of Mr. Commissary General Bissett, and the Officers belonging to his department.

‘The Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, and Don Julian Sanchez, observed the enemy’s movements beyond the Tormes during the operations of the siege; and I am much obliged to them, and to the people of Castille in general, for the assistance I received from them. The latter have invariably shown their detestation of the French tyranny, and their desire to contribute, by every means in their power, to remove it.

‘I shall hereafter transmit to your Lordship a detailed account of what we have found in the place; but I believe that there are 153 pieces of ordnance, including the heavy train belonging to the French army, and great quantities of ammunition and stores. We have the governor, General Barrié, about seventy eight Officers, and 1700 men, prisoners.

‘I transmit this dispatch by my aide de camp, Major the Hon. A. Gordon*, who will give your Lordship any further details you may require; and I beg leave to recommend him to your protection.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. I enclose a return of the prisoners and of the ordnance which have been taken on this occasion. I have not yet been able to collect the returns of the killed and wounded. I therefore transmit a list, containing the names of those who have fallen, according to the best information I could obtain, and shall forward the returns to your Lordship as soon as possible.

‘W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Gallegos, 22d January, 1812.

‘I have the honor to enclose the returns of the killed and wounded of the troops engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which it was not in my power to transmit to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 20th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

* Killed at Waterloo.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., during the siege and in the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, from the 8th to the 19th of January, 1812.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	9*	11	158	—	178
Wounded	70	35	713	—	818
Missing	—	—	7	—	7

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 20th January, 1812.

‘ You will receive with this the account of the successful termination of our operation, in half the time that I told you it would take, and less than half that which the French spent in taking the same place from the Spaniards, as you will see by referring to the dispatches of that period.

‘ Marmont is collecting his army. He was to be at Salamanca to-morrow, and he talks of raising the siege with 50,000 men on the 29th.

‘ I enclose you a copy of a letter from Mr. Stuart, which contains bad news, and a paper published at Cadiz, giving accounts of the same events.

‘ It is not true that a single man of Marmont’s army, or Dorsenne’s, has gone to Valencia; and if — and his army are taken, I attribute this event to —’s ignorance of his profession, and —’s cowardice and treachery.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

* Among the killed was Captain Dobbs, 52d regiment, who had distinguished himself at the bridge of Marialva, and in the affair of Sabugal, where he recovered the howitzer taken by the 43d regiment, but retaken by the enemy. He was killed in the assault of the lesser breach. Captain Dobbs was a fine fellow, and a first-rate soldier; possessing qualifications which would have done honor to a much higher rank than that in which he died.

To His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 20th January, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to transmit by Major the Hon. A. Gordon extracts of two dispatches, and the copy of one of this day’s date to the Secretary of State, giving an account of the operations of the siege and of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo. I likewise enclose copies of letters from Major General Craufurd and Lieut. Colonel Colborne, recommending the Officers who conducted the attack of the redoubt of San Francisco on the 8th instant.

‘ I beg leave to recommend to your Royal Highness’ favor the Officers mentioned in the enclosed dispatches.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness
the Commander in Chief.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Lady Sarah Napier.

‘ MY DEAR MADAM,

‘ Gallegos, 20th January, 1812.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that your son George was again wounded in the right arm so badly last night, in the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, that it was necessary to amputate it above the elbow. He, however, bore the operation remarkably well; and I have seen him this morning, quite well, free from pain and fever, and enjoying highly his success before he had received his wound. When he did receive it, he only desired that I might be informed that he had led his men to the top of the breach before he had fallen.

‘ Having *such* sons, I am aware that you expect to hear of those misfortunes which I have more than once had to communicate to you; and notwithstanding your affection for them, you have so just a notion of the value of the distinction they are daily acquiring for themselves, by their gallantry and good conduct, that their misfortunes do not make so great an impression upon you.

‘ Under such circumstances, I perform the task which I have taken upon myself with less reluctance, hoping at the same time that this will be the last occasion on which I shall have to address you upon such a subject, and that your brave sons will be spared to you.

‘ Although the last was the most serious, it was not the

only wound which George received during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo: he was hit by the splinter of a shell in the shoulder on the 16th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Lady Sarah Napier.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lord Aylmer.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 20th January, 1812.

‘ Your brother in law, General Mackinnon*, was unfortunately blown up by the explosion of one of the enemy’s magazines on the ramparts of Ciudad Rodrigo, after he had led the storm of the breach by his brigade. I have recommended his widow, and children, if he has any, to Mr. Perceval; and I have informed him that measures should be taken to apprise him of the state of the circumstances in which they have been left. You must perform this task; and wait upon Mr. Perceval, and tell him that you do so by my desire.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lord Aylmer.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 21st January, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to transmit, by Brig. General Alava, a copy of my despatch to the Secretary of State, giving an account of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Brig. General Alava having been with me throughout these operations, will be able to add such details as I may have omitted; and I beg you to inform the Spanish Government that I am much indebted to him, and to Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, and Don Julian Sanchez, for the success of this operation.

‘ The people of Castille have shown on this, as indeed on every occasion in which I have had anything to do with them, their detestation of the French yoke, and their desire to contribute to the defeat of the enemy by every means in their power.

* He was buried by the Officers of the Coldstream Guards at Espeja.

‘ I have given the place, and all it contains, over to the Captain General Castaños, who is in this part of the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I also enclose copies of my dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 15th instant, and of this date.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 21st January, 1812.

‘ I have received reports stating that Marshal Marmont, having arrived at Valladolid on the 11th, had heard about the 15th of the operations against Ciudad Rodrigo. I see, by an intercepted letter, that he intended to be at Salamanca on this day, and I have been informed that he had given directions for the collection of his army on the Tormes by the 25th, and he expected to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo by the 29th. General Dorsenne was to accompany Marshal Marmont to Salamanca on this day, but I have not heard that any of the troops of the army of the north were likely to be on the Tormes, excepting Thiébault’s division.

‘ The division of infantry under General Bonet has been withdrawn from the Asturias, and has been added to the army of Portugal. These troops are now on their march towards the Tormes, and had passed Benavente when I last heard from that quarter. The division under the command of General Souham, which has always continued in Castille, between the Tormes and the Douro, since the enemy relieved Ciudad Rodrigo in September last, has likewise been added to the same army. This division is strong, and I should imagine the two would amount to about 13,000 men. These reinforcements would increase the army of Portugal to about 45,000 men, as it is certain that the whole have returned from the eastward, and are between Valladolid and the Tagus. These troops, with Thiébault’s division, are what Marmont can now collect upon the Tormes, and it is reported that they will amount to 50,000 men.

‘ I am concerned to have to inform your Lordship that Marshal Suchet attacked General Blake’s position in front of Valencia, on the 26th of December. The divisions of

Villa Campa and Mahy, and General Freyre's cavalry were cut off from General Blake and Valencia, and General Mahy retreated to the position of Alcira, across the Jucar; these troops having suffered considerably in the action, and having lost all their artillery. By accounts from Alicante, of the 1st, it appears that General Mahy was retreating upon that city.

‘ It is not known what had occurred in Valencia, or on the right of the army, on the 26th, but firing was heard in the city on that day and the 27th. It is stated that Marshal Suchet had been reinforced by troops detached from Madrid, and in a report of General Mahy's, from Alcira, of the 27th ultimo, published at Cadiz on the 11th instant, I see that he states, that Marshal Suchet had been reinforced by troops from the army under the command of Marshal Marmont. But what I have above stated of the army of Portugal will show your Lordship that, although a part of the army of Portugal marched in the direction of Valencia, the whole have returned and never entered that kingdom.

‘ By accounts from Cadiz to the 10th instant, I learn that the enemy had broken ground regularly before Tarifa, and having brought up their heavy artillery opened their fire upon the place on the 29th December, and immediately effected a breach in the walls. They attempted to carry this breach by storm on the 31st of December, but were beat off by the gallant troops under the command of General Copons and Colonel Skerrett, composing the garrison; and notwithstanding that by a continued fire from that day to the evening of the 4th January, the enemy had completely laid the town open, they did not venture to assault it again, but retired in the night of the 4th instant, leaving behind them seven pieces of cannon and two heavy howitzers, and all the carriages and stores collected for the siege.

‘ I do not send your Lordship Colonel Skerrett's reports, as I understand from Major General Cooke that he has transmitted them*; but I cannot refrain from expressing my

* *Major General Cooke to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.*

‘ My Lord,

‘ Cadiz, 29th December, 1811.

‘ I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the copy of my last dispatch to General Lord Viscount Wellington, with the papers enclosed in it, relative to the situation of affairs at Tarifa.

admiration of the conduct of Colonel Skerrett, and the brave troops under his command, nor from recommending them to the protection of your Lordship.

‘ I have not received anything from thence since the 24th, at which date the French had not brought up their artillery ; and there has been so much rain during the last two days, that they may have met with great difficulties.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ GEO. COOKE, Major General.

Extract of a Letter from Major General Cooke to General Viscount Wellington, K.B., dated Cadiz, 27th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to transmit copies of dispatches from Colonel Skerrett to the date of the 24th.

‘ The enemy’s troops, in addition to those employed immediately against Tarifa, extended across the plain to Veger, where Marshal Victor had his quarters with a strong corps. I do not learn anything of General Ballesteros since my last.’

Colonel Skerrett to Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Tarifa, 24th December, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to report that, on the 20th instant, the enemy invested this town with from 4000 to 5000 infantry, and from 200 to 300 cavalry. As it was not advisable to fight so superior a force, I resisted him for an hour with the cavalry and infantry, Spanish and British piquets of the garrison, reinforced by a company of the 95th, and two 6 pounder field guns, of Captain Hughes’ brigade. The loss of the enemy was considerable. On the 21st, Captain Wren, of the 11th, destroyed with his company a small piquet of the enemy. On the 22d, I made a sortie at the request of General Copons, and in conjunction with his troops, with the intention to ascertain the numbers of the enemy, by inducing him to show his columns. His light troops suffered considerably from our shells. The enemy is now making his approaches at a long musket shot from the town: but the ground so completely commands us, and is so favorable to him, that our small guns have little or no effect upon him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ J. B. SKERRETT, Colonel.

Major General Cooke to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cadiz, 31st December, 1811.

‘ I have received a dispatch from Colonel Skerrett, dated yesterday, of which I enclose a copy. It appears that the enemy had brought up four 16 pounders and some howitzers, and had opened their fire against the wall on the 29th. The shipping had been driven away by the gales of wind.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ GEO. COOKE, Major General.

Colonel Skerrett to Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Tarifa, 30th December, 1811.

‘ In my last I had the honor to state that the enemy had invested this town on the 20th instant; since which period he has rapidly carried on a regular parallel and approach against the wall of the town, which I consider as doing much honor to the garrison.

‘ I have several times found it necessary to drive back the enemy’s advance,

‘The troops under the command of Lieut. General Hill have passed the frontiers of Portugal, and the left of them

and to interrupt his works, in which we have met with a slight loss, and the enemy, from being exposed to the fire of a few small guns we possess on the towers, has suffered considerably. It was only on these occasions that we materially annoyed the enemy; for the wall of the town is so completely commanded, that, in a few hours’ work, he has everywhere much better cover than ourselves.

‘The enemy yesterday opened his fire at half past 10, and continued to batter in breach at a distance of about 300 yards, with four French 16 pounders on the east wall, near the Retiro gate, and four howitzers, and other smaller pieces playing on the island and causeway. He continued a constant fire until night, the first and each shot passing through the wall, and through some of the houses in the rear of it. Before night a practicable breach was effected. He this day continued to widen the breach, and, I imagine, will not attempt the assault until it is extended to the tower on each flank (a space of about forty yards). I have traversed the streets and taken the only measure by which there is a chance of preserving the place—that of defending the houses. The enemy’s force employed in the siege is stated at 10,000; probably this is in some degree exaggerated. A constant fire of musketry is interchanged. I have particularly to regret the loss of the service of Lieut. Gaunter, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, a very intelligent and brave Officer, who is severely wounded.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Cooke.’

‘J. B. SKERRETT, Colonel.

Major General Cooke to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘I beg to congratulate your Lordship upon the complete failure of the enemy’s expedition against Tarifa, and to refer you to the enclosed copy of my letter to General Lord Wellington, conveying Colonel Skerrett’s reports of the French having been repulsed with great loss in assaulting the breach which they had effected in the wall, and of their having retreated on the night of the 4th, leaving their heavy artillery and a quantity of stores on the ground.

‘Your Lordship will see that Colonel Skerrett, and the brave troops under his command, have thoroughly done their duty. He has expressed his sense of the effectual co-operation of the Spanish troops under General Copons, who in his report gives his full approbation of the conduct of Colonel Skerrett, and the British troops under his orders, upon this, as he has done upon former occasions during the last three months.

‘Captain O’Donoghue, of the 47th regiment, acting aide de camp to Colonel Skerrett, has charge of this dispatch, and will give your Lordship any details relative to the late events at Tarifa.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘G. COOKE, Major General.

Major General Cooke to General Viscount Wellington, K.B.

‘MY LORD,

‘Cadiz, 10th January, 1812.

‘I last night received a dispatch from Colonel Skerrett, dated the 1st instant, of which I have the honor to transmit a copy, reporting the defeat of a strong column of the enemy on the day before, in an assault of the breach which they had made in the wall of Tarifa.

‘I received at the same time intelligence from Lieut. General Campbell, that

are, I believe, this day at Castello Branco. General Drouet had not arrived at Merida, according to the last accounts.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

the French had broken up from before the place in the night of the 4th, leaving their artillery, &c., and retiring by a pass of La Peña, under the fire of the navy.

‘ I have this morning received Colonel Skerrett’s report of that most satisfactory event, by his aide de camp, Captain O’Donoghue, and I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the copies of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General*

‘ G. COOKE, Major General.

Viscount Wellington, K.B.’

Colonel Skerrett to Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Tarifa, 1st January, 1812.

‘ In my last I had the honor to state that the enemy commenced to batter in breach on the 29th December, since which period until yesterday he kept up a heavy fire of cannon on the breach, and of shells on the town, causeway, and island. At 8 o’clock on the morning of the 31st December a strong column was seen rapidly advancing to the breach; our musketry several times checked the enemy; and the firm front and intrepid behaviour of the troops, in less than an hour, gained a complete victory. The most bold of the enemy fell near the foot of the breach, and the mass of the column made a precipitate retreat.

‘ The situation of the enemy’s wounded, with which the ground was covered between his battery and our fire, where they must inevitably have perished, induced me, from motives of compassion, to hoist a flag of truce to carry them off. Some were brought into the place over the breach, but from the extreme difficulty attending this, I allowed the enemy to carry the remainder away. General Laval, the French Commander in Chief, expressed his acknowledgment for the conduct of the British and Spanish nations on this occasion, in the most feeling and grateful terms. We have made prisoners ten Officers, and twenty or thirty soldiers; the enemy’s loss has been very severe. The column that attacked the breach was 2000 men, composed of all the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the army. The enemy invested this town on the 20th of December; since which period, 1000 British, and 700 or 800 Spanish troops, with only the defence of a wall, which appears to have been built as a defence against archery, and before the use of gunpowder, have resisted an army of 10,000 men, with a regular battering train of artillery, and have at last defeated and repulsed them.

‘ The wall of the town has the additional disadvantage of being commanded within half musket shot, and flanked or taken in reverse in almost every part.

‘ The conduct of all the troops has been admirable; and that of Lieut. Colonel Gough *, and the 2d batt. of the 87th regiment, exceeds all praise. Equal credit is due to the indefatigable exertions of Captain Smith’s † Royal Engineers, to whom much of our success is due. I have on all occasions received the greatest assistance from the military experience and the great exertions of Lieut. Colonel Lord Proby, second in command.

‘ We have to regret the loss of two Officers killed, Lieut. Longley, Royal Engineers, and Lieut. Hall, 47th regiment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ J. B. SKERRETT, Colonel.

* Major General Sir H. Gough, K.C.B.

† Colonel Sir Charles Felix Smith, C.B., &c.

To General Victoria.

' SIR,

' Gallegos, 22d January, 1812.

' I received your Excellency's letter of the 8th instant. I

Colonel Skerrett to Major General Cooke.

' SIR,

' Tarifa, 5th January, 1812.

' In my letter of the 1st instant I had the honor to relate the particulars of our proceedings here, and of our victory at the breach. Since that period, the enemy has kept up a partial fire, and the breach was yesterday completely open for a space of twenty five or thirty yards.

' From the movements of the enemy last night, I was induced to suppose he intended another assault, and the garrison waited in eager expectation to give him another proof of British valor. To our astonishment, this morning at daylight the columns of the enemy were already at a distance, having taken advantage of a dark and stormy night to make a precipitate retreat, leaving in our possession all his artillery, ammunition, stores, &c.

' I immediately ordered Major Broad, with a part of the 47th regiment, to follow the enemy; he took possession of his artillery, waggons, and a quantity of stores, time enough to save them from the flames, the enemy having set fire to them. We have made some prisoners. From the number of dead found on the ground the enemy occupied, his loss on the whole must have been very great.

' Marshal Victor was present in the French camp to give orders for the retreat.

' We have thus seen the greatest effort the French are capable of making frustrated by 1800 British and Spanish troops, with only the defence of a paltry wall; and an army of 10,000 men, commanded by a Marshal of France, retreating from them silently in the night, after having been repulsed and defeated, leaving behind all their artillery and stores, collected at a great expense and by immense exertions.

' I enclose a return of artillery and stores taken from the enemy.

' The unremitting vigilance and exertion, the zeal and intrepidity, of every individual of this garrison, is above praise.

' I have the honor to dispatch this by my acting aide de camp, Captain O'Donoghue, of the 47th regiment, who is in possession of every information relative to my proceedings at this place, an Officer of great merit and considerable length of service.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' Major General Cooke.'

' J. B. SKERRETT, Colonel.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the troops under the command of Colonel Skerrett, at Tarifa, from 24th December, 1811, to 1st January, 1812.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	2	—	8	6	10
Wounded . . .	6	—	56	9	62
Missing . . .	—	—	1	—	1

had received the most positive information that Don João Leal, who was employed by you to get intelligence of the enemy's movements, was a spy employed by General Philippon, the governor of Badajoz. There can be no doubt of this fact, and I therefore directed that he should be arrested; and he must be given over to the person who will demand him on the part of General Castaños, in order to be tried as a spy.

‘ If I could entertain a doubt upon the fact of his being a French spy, the nature of the intelligence which he gave to your Excellency, and which you communicated to me, would have convinced me of it. I have never seen anything of the kind so impudently false and extravagant; and it is obvious that he communicated it to you that he might have, through your protection, the means of acquiring real intelligence for the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Victoria.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Gallegos, 22d January, 1812.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know by return of post whether the duty at Fort St. Julian can be done without the battalion of marines now stationed there.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Gallegos, 22d January, 1812, 11 P.M.

‘ Major Gordon will have shown you my dispatch to the Secretary of State, containing the account of the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ It appears that Marmont is assembling his army upon the Tormes, and I saw this day an order for the preparation of rations at Baños for 20,000 men, which looks like the march of a column into the valley of the Alagon. We have not yet received your distribution, but I shall be obliged to you if you will place three brigades of the 2d division, including the Portuguese brigade, at and about Castello Branco, extending towards Idanha à Nova: send the heavy 6 pounders across likewise. If I should see occasion to

move these troops, I shall do so by orders from hence, and you can join them afterwards, before they can come in contact with the enemy.

‘ Send a squadron or two of cavalry across the Tagus to look out to their front towards Zarza la Mayor.

‘ I suspect, that if Marmont should move upon this army, either by way of saving appearances, or really to endeavor to regain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, before we can have put the place in order, he will turn us by the Puerto de Perales; in that case, I propose to cut off the troops which he will employ in this operation, unless they should be very numerous. I intend that you should move upon Moraleja, &c., while the troops of this army, keeping their front upon the Agueda and Bayllo, shall attack the corps which will come up by Perales, and drive them back upon you. If you should have three brigades at and in front of Castello Branco, and the rest cantoned in column, ready to follow, you will be fully prepared for all that I propose for you. I think it most probable, however, that when Marmont shall have heard of our success, he will not move at all.

‘ Our trenches and batteries will be effaced to-morrow, and the trenches will be in a state of defence against a *coup de main* to-morrow, or next day, and the town provisioned and in order.

‘ Marmont was to be at Salamanca yesterday, his army was to be on the Tormes the 25th, and he expected to raise the siege on the 29th. The orders for the preparations for the march of troops by Baños, are for the 21st, 22d, and 23d, but there were no movements on the Tormes on the 20th, and none at Navalnoral on the 19th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 22d January, 1812.

‘ General Abadia will have been apprised from General Castaños’ head quarters of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 19th. I have been so much occupied since that I have not been able to write to you.

‘ He will have heard from other quarters of the march of

Bonet's division from the Asturias; and I conclude, that if those troops should not have been relieved by a body equally numerous, General Abadia will have taken possession of that province. General Bonet's and General Souham's divisions are added to the army of Portugal; and will hereafter be employed in watching our movements. I suspect that the guards will not be employed in the Asturias; and I doubt that Dorsenne has any other troops to send there, excepting a very bad and weak division, composed of detachments of regiments of the line, under the command of General Thiébault.

‘Having taken Ciudad Rodrigo, it is very desirable that I should move from this quarter. If General Abadia cannot move forward so as to divert the attention of the enemy from me, or from other quarters, can he in the months of March and April, when all the streams will be full, defend Galicia? Pray let me hear from you in answer to this question soon.

‘The French are talking of moving in this direction; but they had not heard of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. If they should move this way, I hope to give a good account of them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel
Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For Major General Borthwick, Major Dickson, and J. Bissett, Esq.

‘26th January, 1812.

‘1. As soon as the gun bullocks shall have brought in the ordnance to Almeida, it is desirable that the sixteen 24 pounders carronades (howitzers) should be sent off to the Alentejo by eight bullocks to each.

‘They might go by easy stages, and the 150 bullocks required to draw the bridge might accompany them, in order to assist in their removal.

‘2. Twenty 24 pounder guns and their carriages, and six spare carriages, with their necessary small stores, should likewise be removed from Almeida to Barca d’Alva. They should there be embarked in boats and sent down to Oporto and thence by sea to Setuval.

‘ 3. A letter has been written to Mr. Boyes, to request him to send to Oporto all the 24 pounder shot and spherical case shot that is at Villa da Ponte, and all the powder (900 barrels) that is at Pezo da Regoa to Oporto; to be there embarked and sent to Setuval by sea without loss of time.

‘ 4. As soon as the timber shall be brought to Almeida from Ciudad Rodrigo, and the bridge shall be brought on the transporting carriages to the same place from the neighborhood of Gallegos, the bullocks should be turned to grass.

‘ 5. 1000 barrels of gunpowder, recently arrived from England at Lisbon, to be ordered immediately to Setuval.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 26th January, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose two memorandums which have been given to me by General Borthwick, commanding the artillery with this army; and as I concur entirely with General Borthwick, I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will direct that we may receive the reinforcements of horses of artillerymen, and of gunner drivers suggested in the enclosed memorandums.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Gallegos, 28th January, 1812.

‘ I have received your very kind letter of the 4th instant, and I beg you will take an opportunity of assuring the Duke of York that I am obliged to His Royal Highness for his recollection of me, as much as if his recommendation of me had been successful.

‘ I should think that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent must have misunderstood Lord Wellesley, when His Royal Highness supposed that he intended to convey to His Royal Highness that a military government was no object to me, and that I had other views. Lord Wellesley must have said that I had never spoken or written to him or any-

body else respecting such an object; but he could not have said that I had other views. Indeed I do not know what views I could have, excepting to serve the country to the best of my ability.

‘I have never stated to anybody a wish to have a military government, because I make it a rule never to apply to anybody in any manner for anything for myself; and I have always been convinced from his known character, as well as from experience, that if it was expedient and proper that I should receive such a favor, the Duke of York would recommend me for it, without any application from myself or my friends.

‘I should have been very happy to receive, at the recommendation of His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, the mark of the favor of the Prince Regent which was proposed for me.

‘I have not much time to attend to my own affairs; and I do not know exactly how I stand with the world at present. The pay of Commander of the Forces, which is all that I receive in this country, does not defray my expenses here, while my family must be maintained in England; and I think it probable that I shall not be richer for having served in the Peninsula. A military government, therefore, would be desirable as an addition to my income.

‘I believe that we shall have General Officers in sufficient numbers, when those recently appointed shall arrive, notwithstanding the loss of Mackinnon and Craufurd, who died of his wounds four days ago. I propose to appoint Clinton or Charles Alten to his situation. It will be very desirable to get rid of — and —, but not in a manner to mortify them.

‘Pack has long wished to return to the British service, but I doubt whether it would come to his turn to have a British brigade, even now that Craufurd and Mackinnon are gone. As soon as it shall come to his turn, I will remove him to the British service, and will apply to have him made a Brigadier General.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Gallegos, 28th January, 1812.

‘ The enemy have not advanced from the Tormes, and we are every day getting on with the re-establishment of Ciudad Rodrigo, so that I hope to have the place in a good state in a few days, and I propose immediately to replace the army in their old cantonments.

‘ I am therefore turning my mind seriously to Badajoz, and Major Dickson goes off to the Alentejo on the day after to-morrow, and I hope to be in a situation to begin our operations there in the second week in March. Among other arrangements, I am sending from hence sixteen 24 pounder carronades, which answer either as 24 pounder guns or 5½ inch howitzers; and I think that by means of part of this equipment you might be enabled to render an important service, which would go a great way towards enabling us to secure our object at Badajoz.

‘ When we shall attack Badajoz, we must expect that the army of Portugal, consisting of eight divisions of infantry, the whole of which are now in Castille, and the army of the south, will co-operate to oblige us to raise the siege. The army of Portugal would naturally cross the Tagus by their bridge at Almaraz, and they would be obliged, at the season of the year in which I propose to undertake this operation, to go round even by Toledo, if we could destroy their bridge and other establishments at that place. This is what I wish you to attempt.

‘ You probably went to look at the bridge of Almaraz when the army were at Jaraicejo in the month of August, 1809. As well as I recollect, the Puerto de Mirabete commands the whole ground to the river, the descent from the Puerto being about a league. The French have there three works defended by fifteen pieces of cannon (8 pounders) and a howitzer; that is to say, one, I believe, at the Puerto, and two others below, to defend the bridge, one being at each side of the river. I am not quite certain, however, of the locality of the works, and some accounts have given me reason to believe that the works, besides the one at the Puerto de Mirabete, are redoubts thrown up for the defence of a small village called Lugar Nuevo, on one side of the river,

and of another called Casas del Puerto, on the left side, and about a mile and a half below the Puerto de Mirabete. If this be true, it would be possible to destroy the bridge without taking the works; and at all events, if it is not true, and that the works are near the river and properly *têtes de pont*, they must be very bad ones, as I recollect perfectly, that the ground falls on the left side to the banks of the river, from the Puerto de Mirabete, and almost an equal distance on the right side.

‘ Under these circumstances, it appears to me that you will have no difficulty in destroying the enemy’s bridge at Almaraz, and I hope that you may have it in your power to destroy their stores and establishments there.

‘ The garrison of the three works consists of 450 men, including artillerymen, sappers, &c., and as long as the enemy remain in Castille, they cannot be assisted or reinforced. If I should find that the enemy move from Castille again into Estremadura, I could easily apprise you of their movement in time to stop you, if it should be necessary.

‘ The equipment which you should take with you for the purposes of this operation, should be eight or ten ladders, from eighteen to twenty feet in length, about twenty felling axes, and three or four crowbars; a coil of good rope might be of use to enable you to tow the boats to a situation in which you could burn them. Besides, I would recommend you to take four or five of the 24 pounder carronades, which are going into the Alentejo for the purposes of the siege of Badajoz: these carronades are mounted upon travelling carriages, with axletrees of the same span as the Portuguese artillery and the carts of the country; they can therefore travel anywhere, they weigh the same in travelling as our 9 and heavy 6 pounders, and are drawn by eight horses; they are now travelling with bullocks, but I will to-morrow send you the route by which they are to march, and I recommend to you to send horses belonging to your heavy brigade, or to your horse artillery, to meet and bring them up to you quicker than the bullocks can bring them; each of them has on its carriage every thing for its use, excepting shot, powder, and cartridges, and it is desirable that you should without delay adopt the following measures to procure these articles.

‘ You should send to Elvas to have selected from the stores

there, 100 *English* 24 pounder shot for each carronade that you will take. I say *English* 24 pounder shot, because any thing larger will not fit them ; you should likewise draw from the stores of the army, either at Elvas or Abrantes, fifty 5½ inch shells for each, and about twenty 5½ inch spherical cases for each, if there are so many ; the stores at Elvas will supply the quantity of powder sufficient for these shot and shells. The Commissary must get mule carts, if possible, to carry these stores upon your expedition, if not bullock carts ; thirty or forty shot or shells will go in a cart easily ; that part of the equipment taken from Elvas, might be given out to be for the use of Campo Mayor, Ougucla, and Alburquerque.

‘ I should hope that all the preparations would be made by the time that the carronades would arrive at Portalegre. I would then recommend the following disposition to you : that General Hamilton and the Portuguese division, and Portuguese cavalry, should observe the garrison of Badajoz ; that Generals Morillo and the Conde de Penne Villemur should observe the bridge of Merida, and the movements of the 5th corps in Lower Estremadura ; while you should move with the 2d division, the British cavalry, and such part of the 6 pounder brigade, and of the horse artillery, as should be equipped, after equipping the howitzers as above desired, by Caceres direct upon Jaraicejo, and thence upon the Puerto de Mirabete.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. You will of course collect your corps from this side of the Tagus whenever you please.

‘ W.’

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 28th January, 1812, 11 P. M.

‘ I much fear that we must send the 24 pounder guns into the Alentejo. I wish you would come here to-morrow morning at an early hour.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS AGAINST BADAJOZ.

For Major General Borthwick, Major Dickson, Colonel Fletcher, and the Commissary General.

‘ 28th January, 1812.

‘ Major Dickson will proceed to Setuval in order to arrange the removal of the ordnance and stores from Setuval to Elvas, passing by Elvas. He will require to go to Elvas seven days; to go to Evora two days; to Alcacer do Sal one day; to Setuval two days: in all twelve days.

‘ Mr. Bissett will be so kind as immediately to order an intelligent Commissary to Setuval, with directions to make the preparations of boats to convey the heavy ordnance and stores from Setuval to Alcacer do Sal.

‘ The same Commissary is likewise to communicate with the magistrates of Evora and Alcacer do Sal and Setuval, to procure bullocks and carts to remove the ordnance and stores from Alcacer do Sal to Elvas.

‘ Supposing these arrangements to be ready by the time of Major Dickson’s arrival at Setuval, and that he can immediately commence removing the ordnance and stores from the transports, it will then take seven days to remove the ordnance and stores from the transports to the boats, four days to arrive at Alcacer do Sal; four days to prepare to move from Alcacer do Sal; twelve days to march to Elvas: in all thirty eight days.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 29th January, 1812.

‘ I have seen Fletcher, who says the 18 pounders will answer if we cannot get 24 pounders, carronades, nine feet long; and I have written to the Admiral, to request him to send 24 pounders to Setuval of these dimensions, if he can get them at Lisbon; if he cannot, to send 18 pounders of these dimensions, each of them with 700 rounds of Carron shot.

‘ You will do well before you leave Almeida, to arrange that all the 18 pounder carriages, and the deficiency of 24 pounder carriages, should be put in order; and the guns taken off of them preparatory to travelling.

‘ I have sent your memorandum to the Admiral, in respect to yokes and transporting carriages to be sent to Setuval. But you will do well to write yourself to General Rosa.

‘ I write to Major Tulloh to find out if there are any 24 pounder or 18 pounder Carron guns nine feet long at Elvas. If there are, it is of course useless for you to bring up from Alcacer more than will be necessary to make, with them and our sixteen guns, thirty six pieces.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Gallegos, 29th January, 1812.

‘ The carronades will be at Sabugal on the 2d February, at Pedrogão on the 5th, and at St. Miguel d’Arche on the 6th. You will do well to have horses there on the 4th, so as to be able to bring them off the moment they arrive. An Officer should come with the horses, who should be able to see that he takes with the carronades all that they will require.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Gallegos, 29th January, 1812.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of this day.

‘ I propose to attack Badajoz, and I think it probable that I shall be in readiness to invest the place in the second week in March. Of course I shall have collected to oppose me everything that can be brought from the south as well as from the north. Indeed in Marmont’s army they are already talking of moving in that direction.

‘ I have always been of opinion that the best situation for Ballesteros’ corps would have been the Condado de Niebla, as he would have been more immediately in communication with us. But whether in Niebla or in Ronda, it is absolutely necessary that the whole of Soult’s force should not be brought upon us with impunity.

‘ It may depended upon that all demonstrations towards the French lines at Cadiz are useless. They are too strong

to be even looked at by such a force as that under the command of Ballesteros, or by anything which can be added to his force.

‘ But this is not the case with Seville. I believe that Ballesteros, provided with three or four 18 pounders, and ammunition for them, scaling ladders, &c., would easily lay open any works the French may have constructed at Seville; and it may be depended upon, that if he will only be as active in destroying the stores, &c., which he will find at Seville, as I have known him to be in the destruction of property, he will raise the blockade of Cadiz as effectually as if he were to force the French lines in front of that place.

‘ Ballesteros should be reinforced to the utmost extent without loss of time. This expedition, and the advantages likely to result from it, should be held out to him, and measures should be taken to equip him for it, either from Cadiz or Gibraltar, in such a manner as to ensure his success.

‘ By well timed and vigorous measures he may be of the utmost use to us; and he need incur no risk, as he need not quit his den at Gibraltar till he shall find Soult in movement against me.

‘ I have received from Government the approbation of the orders which I had given respecting Carthage. They have, however, called my attention to the state and safety of the Balearic Islands. I believe General O'Donnell has been appointed to command in those islands. I could write to him if I could depend upon this report being true; but I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate with him, and let me know in what way he may think I can be useful to him.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 29th January, 1812.

‘ Major General Craufurd* died on the 24th instant, of the wounds which he received on the 19th, while leading

* He was buried at the foot of the little breach. The Commander of the Forces, and all the Officers of the besieging army, attended the funeral, which, from place and circumstances, was more than usually impressive.

the Light division of this army to the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ Although the conduct of Major General Craufurd on the occasion on which these wounds were received, and the circumstances which occurred, have excited the admiration of every Officer in the army, I cannot report his death to your Lordship without expressing my sorrow and regret, that His Majesty has been deprived of the services, and I of the assistance, of an Officer of tried talents and experience, who was an ornament to his profession, and was calculated to render the most important services to his country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gallegos, 29th January, 1812.

‘ Marshal Marmont arrived at Salamanca on the 22d instant, and the 6th division of infantry of the army of Portugal were collected in the neighborhood of Alba and Salamanca on the 23d and 24th.

‘ General Souham’s division, with about 600 cavalry and some artillery, were sent to Matilla on the 23d, and patrolled to San Muñoz and Tamames. The movement of this division was intended to ascertain the fact of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, and they retired again to the Tormes on the 26th.

‘ I heard this morning that Marshal Marmont had moved yesterday from Salamanca, in the direction of Valladolid, with all his troops, excepting one brigade of Souham’s division. But I am not certain that this report is founded.

‘ I have not heard that Bonet’s division had crossed the Douro.

‘ We have been employed in repairing the damages which our fire had done to Ciudad Rodrigo. For some days it has not been possible to take the place by a *coup de main*, and I hope that in a short time the works will be in a good state of defence.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the account published by the enemy in the Madrid Gazette of the 13th January, of the affair with the Spanish army near Valencia, on the 26th December.

to undertake anything, they broke up from Castille and the western parts of Estremadura, and marched off towards Valencia and Aragon, the former to assist Suchet, and the latter to endeavor to check the guerrillas. I immediately pushed forward the preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; invested the place and broke ground on the 8th, and we took it by assault, as you will have seen, on the 19th of January.

‘ Marmont returned upon hearing of our first movements, and collected about 50,000 men on the Tormes about the 23d and 24th of the month, but he has advanced only a reconnaitring party from thence; and it appears that he will not attempt to prevent us from putting the place again in a state of defence. It is already provisioned; and has been for some days in such a state as that it could not have been carried by a *coup de main*.

‘ I have likewise restored the works of Almeida, so that I shall have this frontier as good as it ever was; and I hope to be able to get the whole army together, when I shall have a better chance with these gentlemen.

‘ We proceeded at Ciudad Rodrigo on quite a new principle in sieges. The whole object of our fire was to lay open the walls. We had not one mortar; nor a howitzer, excepting to prevent the enemy from clearing the breaches, and for that purpose we had only two; and we fired upon the flanks and defences only when we wished to get the better of them, with a view to protect those who were to storm. This shows the kind of place we had to attack, and how important it is to cover the works of a place well by a glacis. The French, however, who are supposed to know everything, could not take this place in less than forty days after it was completely invested, or than twenty five days after breaking ground.

‘ March came here about a month ago, remarkably well; but he has had two slight attacks of fever since he arrived, from one of which he is now recovering. He is very liable to catch cold, and with the cold he always has fever. This must be a consequence of his disorder in the summer; but I hope that he will be quite well before the hot weather shall set in. If he should not be so, I shall certainly send him home.

‘ Pray remember me most kindly to the Duchess and all your family, and

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Duke of Richmond.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 31st January, 1812.

‘ I request that on the receipt of this letter you will apply to Admiral Berkeley, for tonnage to take to England the battalion of marines, and the marine artillery, which are at Lisbon, &c., not belonging to the ships under the command of Admiral Berkeley.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Baron Constant.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 31st January, 1812.

‘ I return Sir F. D’Ivernois’ books, which I have perused with the greatest satisfaction. I had never read any of his works, excepting a pamphlet upon Finance, in a book called “*Offrandes à Buonaparte* ;” but I have long come to the same conclusion as he has respecting the state of the French finances, and respecting the plunder resulting from the war being the cause for its continuance. I enclose the drafts of my proclamations to the Portuguese nation on this last subject, which show my opinion upon it.

‘ In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they called a *levée en masse* ; and put every man, animal, and article in their own country in requisition for the service of the armies. This system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation among whom such a system was established should have been anxious to carry the war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and afforded the means of success ; and with the war they carried, wherever they went,

* Baron Constant de Rebecque, C. B., &c., afterwards Lieutenant General in the service of the King of the Netherlands. He had been some time at the Head Quarters of the army under Lord Wellington, attached to the Prince of Orange.

the system of requisition ; not, however, before they had, by these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the sources of national prosperity at home.

‘Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence at least, the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes ; in other instances, besides these articles they have received pay ; and from Austria and Prussia, and other parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought to be added the plunder acquired by the Generals, Officers, and troops ; and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest evil that ever fell on the civilized world.

‘The capital and the industry of France having been destroyed by the Revolution, it is obvious that the Government cannot raise a revenue from the people of France adequate to support the large force which must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new Government, particularly in the newly conquered or ceded states ; and to defend the widely extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and inclination must lead them to attack it. The French Government, therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource ; and that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French Revolution has entailed upon the present generation.

‘I have great hopes, however, that this resource is beginning to fail ; and I think there are symptoms of a sense in France either that war is not so productive as it was, or that nations who have still something to lose may resist, as those of the Peninsula have ; in which case, the expense of collecting this resource becomes larger than its produce.

‘One symptom of a sense of the failure of these resources is, that Napoleon has recently seized upon the territories of Rome, Holland, and the Hanse Towns, and has annexed these States to France. By these measures he has departed from a remarkable principle of his policy. In the early periods of his government he had not extended the

dominions of France beyond what were called her natural limits of the Rhine, the Ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. It appeared that he was aware of the dangers to which all widely extended empires are liable; and he was satisfied with governing by his influence all these States, and those of the Confederation of the Rhine. He must at the same time have made up his mind to draw no resources from these States, excepting those of a military nature, stipulated by treaty; and, indeed, the hopes of avoiding future plunder could have been the only inducement to these several States to enter into the Confederation.

‘The futile disputes with his brother, the Pope, or the Senates of the Hanse Towns, cannot have been the cause of this departure from a remarkable principle of his early policy.

‘He might easily have settled these disputes in any manner he pleased. Neither was it the dictate of a wild and extravagant ambition. If it was, why did he not seize upon poor Switzerland? The fact was, it was not safe or convenient to plunder Austria, Prussia, Russia, or Denmark; but he wanted the resources of Holland, the Hanse Towns, and Rome for his treasury, and therefore he seized them to himself.

‘As to Spain, it is completely plundered from one end to the other. The cultivation in some parts, as you must have seen, is entirely annihilated; and in all parts, by the accounts of the French Officers, has much decreased. There is no commerce; and I have but little doubt that another year of diminished produce will have the effect of distressing the French armies exceedingly, and, possibly, may be attended with more important consequences. I know that the French Officers were of opinion last September that they could not last much longer.

‘I do not believe that the French armies in Spain have ever drawn from the country much more than their subsistence and means of transport. In some parts of the country, more productive than others, they levy from the people more subsistence than the troops there stationed can consume, and they sell the overplus by retail, at low prices; and this money defrays some of the necessary expenses for hospitals, intelligence, &c., or is carried to other parts, where on account of the small number of troops and the difficulty

of procuring provisions by requisition, they are obliged to pay for them. In other parts also they levy contributions in money; but generally in small sums, and not more than sufficient to defray the expenses which in all armies must necessarily be defrayed in money.

‘It appears by a letter from the Duque de Santa Fé of the 19th of June, 1810, that the French army in Spain had up to that period cost the imperial treasury 200 millions of livres. I think it probable that the whole pay of the army has within the last year at least been sent from Paris in specie; and I believe that it has for some time before; and I know that the extra allowances to General Officers, and other expenses which are laid upon the *Contributions d’Espagne*, are as much in arrear as other expenses; and I have in my possession warrants to the Intendant General of Marmont’s army, signed by Marmont, directing him to take by force, if it was necessary, money for the necessary expenses of the army, from the *Payeur Général*, in whose hands is the pay alone.

‘I have not read Sir F. D’Ivernois’ former works, and I have not had an opportunity of acquiring the accurate knowledge which we all ought to have, at least of that part of the French finance of which the French Government will allow us to have any at all.

‘I do not agree, however, with Sir F. D’Ivernois, either in his estimate of the French force, or in his estimate of its expense. I think both higher than he has stated them.

‘I know that the French Government had in 1810, before the annexation of Holland and the Hanse Towns, 700 battalions of infantry, and 600 squadrons of cavalry, besides artillery and the guards. A battalion cannot be averaged less than 500 men, nor a squadron less than 100 men. Many of both are much more numerous. This would make 350,000 infantry, and 60,000 cavalry.

‘I know that the guards consist of 50,000 men. I have a return of July last of those in Spain only, which makes them 22,000. The artillery cannot be less than 40,000; making the active army in effectives 500,000 men.

‘In this estimate the Dutch troops and those of the Confederation of the Rhine, those of Naples and the Duchy of Warsaw are not included. The Dutch troops have since

been added to the French army; and I should think there are now in that army 800 battalions. Besides these troops *en activité*, there are *gendarmerie imperiale*, *garde nationale*, *gardes côtes*, &c.

‘It is impossible to reason upon any assertion in the truth of which confidence cannot be placed. When the Duc de Gaete, however, said that the Emperor had in his service 800,000 or 900,000 men, it may be supposed that he included the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, of Naples, of Holland, and of Warsaw, as well as those French and foreign troops immediately paid by the Emperor. The uncertainty upon this point, which doubtless prevails at Paris, as well as among us, shows the state to which affairs have been brought in France.

‘In respect to the expense of the French army, I calculate that which must be paid in money to amount to about 20,000,000*l.* sterling, or 500,000,000 of livres. I calculate the mere pay of the number of men I have above mentioned as existing in the service to amount to about 6,000,000*l.* sterling, without including hospitals, or the pay of the Officers of regiments, or of the general Staff. To this sum add the clothing, the arms, accoutrements, the horses for the cavalry and artillery, the ordnance expenses, the provisions and forage, and means of transport in France and Italy for the troops in France and Italy, repairs and construction of fortifications, &c., and it will be found that the sum to be provided does not fall short of what I have stated. I do not include in this sum the provisions and forage, and means of transport, for the troops stationed in Germany and Spain, as those are taken without payment; but I include the pay of these troops as being provided for from Paris, or by the *recettes extérieures*.

‘If I am right in my notions of the numbers of the French army, as I believe I am, I do not think I am wrong in my estimate of the expenses to be paid in money; and it will be seen that the French Government are more distressed than even Sir F. D’Ivernois supposed.

‘I cannot state exactly what sums are now due to the troops in Spain. Large sums have recently arrived from France; but before these arrived they were in arrear from nine to twelve months.

‘As Sir F. D’Ivernois expressed a desire that I should

see his work, and to receive information from me on the interesting subject to which it relates, I have troubled you with this long letter, which I hope may prove satisfactory to him, as showing that I agree entirely with him in his principle and all the main points, although I differ from him in some of the details.

‘ I have omitted to mention, that I believe the French armies in Spain to amount to nearer 200,000 than 150,000 men. They have received in this year reinforcements to the amount of about 50,000 men.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Baron Constant.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Gallegos, 1st February, 1812.

‘ I did not see Lieut. Hillier’s* very clear report to you of the 16th January till this day, when I received your letter of the 30th. It is very obvious to me that unless you can send a detachment to the right of the Tagus, to cut off the retreat of the boats, the principal object of your expedition, which is to destroy these boats, must fail.

‘ I can supply you with the means of sending a detachment across the Tagus, but the first point to be ascertained is, whether wheel carriages can go to the Tagus by any road, excepting by that of Mirabete, or so near Mirabete that they must be perceived. As well as I can recollect of the country, it is impossible to get down to the Tagus with wheel carriages, anywhere between the junction of the Tietar and the junction of the Ibor, excepting by the Puerto de Mirabete. I beg that you will have inquiry made by Lieut. Hillier upon this point.

‘ It would also be well if he were to inquire whether the enemy have any means of moving off the nine boats which are under their work, marked B in his sketch.

‘ If you cannot get down to the Tagus with wheel carriages, excepting by the Puerto, it is not worth while to attempt the operation, for as well as I can recollect, the enemy have in that part of the country a large quantity of oxen. If, however, you can get down to the Tagus, it would be desirable to send over a sufficient detachment to endeavor to surprise and get possession of the work C, while the castle

* Lieut. Hillier, 29th regiment, now Lieutenant Colonel of the 62d regiment.

of Mirabete, or the work A, should be attacked on the left bank, and to cut off and destroy the boats.

‘ We have at Villa Velha six tin pontoons, with all their equipments, carriages, &c. They are very light, and, as well as I recollect, are drawn each by four pairs of bullocks, but Major Squire can tell exactly. You must desire Mr. Routh to provide bullocks to draw them, and with these you can form a flying bridge fully equal to take over the Tagus any detachment which you might think proper to send to the right bank. They would even carry over some of the carronades, if you should think proper to send them, but from Lieut. Hillier’s description of the enemy’s works at the bridge, I should scarcely think it necessary to take these carronades. I should think that under the fire of your heavy 6 pounders and howitzers, and by keeping a heavy fire of musketry upon the parapet, while the storming party should advance, your troops would escalate any of these works. All the preparations, however, for the carronades, as detailed in my letter of the 28th January, might still go on, and Mr. Routh might get the bullocks for the pontoons, and the pontoons might be moved up to Portalegre, as they will be of use in our ulterior operations; but you will proceed upon your expedition, or not, according to the information which you will receive from Lieut. Hillier, whether or not you can get your pontoons down to the Tagus, not passing by Mirabete. I do not believe the work C is commanded by the road on which A stands, but I am quite certain that the work B is completely commanded both by the ground A and C. I was at the old castle of Mirabete; the ascent to it is very rugged indeed, but I should think that no garrison could remain in it against your howitzer.

‘ The enemy have moved towards the Ducro. I have not heard that any have gone into the valley of the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Gallegos, 1st February, 1812.

‘ I have omitted to answer your letters, No. , of the 27th December, and No. 41, of the 7th of January, relating to the

correspondence which you have had with the governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders which you had given Colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I conclude that you referred that correspondence to the Secretary of State, with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty to recall Colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient that you should give Colonel Skerrett the orders in question.

‘ From the report of Colonel Skerrett and Lord Proby, and other information which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders which you gave to Colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject is not at all changed by what has occurred since.

‘ We have a right to expect that His Majesty’s Officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion, but we had no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery, and the walls scarcely cannon proof.

‘ The enemy, however, retired with disgrace, infinitely to the honor of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is useless to renew the discussion.

‘ It is necessary, however, that you should now come to an understanding with General Campbell, regarding the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under Colonel Skerrett. Before you will receive this letter you will probably have received from Mr. Wellesley a requisition to send troops to Carthagena, with which you will have complied, according to my instructions of the 12th December. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that the troops under the command of Colonel Skerrett should return to Cadiz, and if the governor of Gibraltar should think proper to detain them, after you shall have required their return, you will let him know that he is responsible for the consequences.

‘ In regard to Tarifa, at the same time that I have no desire, and have too much to attend to, to enter into discussions upon the subject, it appears to me that the measures to be adopted should be either to secure the heights in front

of the town, or to provide cover for the troops by splinter proofs, &c., and to secure the island.

‘ I have no doubt whatever that the measure last mentioned could be carried into execution without difficulty, and that it would be effectual. Indeed, the enemy would neither be inclined, nor able to remain in the town, if the island were secured.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 1st February, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Major General Cooke, in regard to a discussion which he has recently had with the governor of Gibraltar upon certain orders which he had given to Colonel Skerrett’s detachment to withdraw from Tarifa.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Gallegos, 1st February, 1812.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 20th January.

‘ I am glad to find that the Spanish Government have called upon us to garrison Carthagena, and I only wish they had done so sooner. General Cooke has his instructions upon this subject, and it does not appear to me to be necessary to take any further measures.

‘ In regard to Alicante, Roche has contradicted himself in the same letter. He says that an English governor and 5000 English troops can alone save the place; and in another part he says that he and his troops can save it as long as they are supplied with provisions. Pray take him at his word. Send him provisions, and let him be charged with the defence of Alicante.

‘ It is most desirable to keep the French employed for some time longer on the eastern side of the Peninsula. I think it not impossible that Suchet may be obliged to return to attend to Lacy.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Gallegos, 2d February, 1812.

‘I am going over to Freneda, and enclose the only intelligence I have received since I saw you yesterday. I conclude that the messengers from Salamanca have been prevented from coming by the swelling of the rivers.

‘I wrote to Hill yesterday what I told you I should.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. The rivers are so full, that I am afraid it will be impossible to hunt to-morrow; but if the day should be fair, the hounds will be at Pozo Velho at about half-past 11.

‘W.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 4th February, 1812.

‘I enclose some letters from Cadiz. I have no account whatever from Salamanca or elsewhere; and I conclude that the messengers have been stopped by the swelling of the rivers.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Freneda, 4th February, 1812, 8 A. M.

‘I write to let you know that in consequence of the heavy fall of rain, and other accidents, the carronades, which ought to have been now two marches on the other side of Sabugal, are at Aldea da Ponte, two marches on this side of that place. If, therefore, you should determine to undertake your expedition, and should think the carronades necessary, it will be necessary that you should order the Officer with the horses to wait for them at St. Miguel, or to come on towards Sabugal to meet them. If you should give up the plan, according to what I stated in my letter of the 1st instant, or should not think the carronades necessary, you might recall the horses.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Freneda, 4th February, 1812.

‘You omitted to enclose the intercepted intelligence from Madrid, in your letter to me of the 1st instant. That on the black paper comes, I believe, from a man employed by Mr. Stuart. I do not give much credit to it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To — — —.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 4th February, 1812.

‘I have received your letter, and upon inquiry I find that your complaint is not founded, and that the conduct of Mr. — was regularly investigated. You have also stated another circumstance in your letter which is not true, viz., that your stable could not hold more than your own horse, whereas it appears that it is capable of holding four horses, besides your own horse and ass that are in it.

‘Portugal requiring the assistance of an army to defend the country, the Portuguese must submit to the inconvenience of having Officers and soldiers billeted on their houses, and I only hope they do not believe that we quit our houses in England for the *pleasure* of being billeted in theirs in Portugal. This necessity existing, you acted wrong, and should not have resisted Mr. — in putting his horse in your stable, on which he had a billet, and you had no right to send the horse to another distant stable. Mr. —, however, had no right to use force himself to enforce his billet, and for this offence I have ordered that he may be brought to trial before a General Court Martial, and you will appear as evidence against him, but his horse must remain in your stable, on which it is billeted.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘— — —.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 4th February, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 30th. I agree entirely with you that, notwithstanding all your efforts, matters are

become worse, and I am almost at the end of my inventions and resources to keep them afloat. I have this day written to Dom M. Forjaz a letter which I hope he will show to the Governors of the Kingdom.

‘The object which I had in view for Hill was to destroy the enemy’s bridge and establishments at Almaraz. By this measure I should cut off the communication between the northern and southern armies, and the army of Portugal would have been obliged to go round by Toledo, to raise the siege of Badajoz. This would have been important; but nothing can rouse these people to a sense of their duty. I shall not stay much longer.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. Since I wrote the above Marshal Beresford has been here, and I have gone through the estimates for January with him, which were transmitted in your letter of the 14th of January. It is very desirable to ascertain as nearly as can be done by estimate, what is the expense of the military establishments of Portugal, and to diminish that expense as much as possible. It is difficult to guess at the expense from the estimates for January, and it is quite impossible to say what heads can be diminished, or even entirely discontinued, without seeing the detailed estimates, upon which the general estimates, for the several divisional pay offices and departments have been founded. I have no doubt but that the expense, real as well as estimated, can be much reduced, and I hope brought within the scope of the means of the Government. But this can be done only by a strict examination into the subject.

‘It is impossible for me to go to Lisbon, and equally so for Dom M. Forjaz to come to me. Marshal Beresford is therefore again going to Lisbon, to examine into and settle this subject. But in order that he may not be unnecessarily detained, it is desirable that Dom M. Forjaz should have prepared for him the detailed estimates, on which the general estimates of the several divisional and departmental estimates, for January as well as February, are founded; and all the information and explanation which can be afforded

upon every head of charge in the estimates. He expects to be able to allot seven days to this examination.

‘I have omitted to mention that, provided the Government take measures before the 15th February, to announce to the public, and to commence paying interest on the paper money, it is a matter of indifference to me when they begin to pay, provided it is by the 1st of April. ‘W.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Freneda, 5th February, 1812, 11 A. M.

‘I enclose the only intelligence which I have received. It is certain that Blake is taken, and probably a very large number of men in Valencia.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. The weather does not promise much; but if it should be fair, the hounds will go to-morrow morning to Pozo Velho at half-past 11. ‘W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Freneda, 5th February, 1812.

‘I have received your letter of the 31st January. ——— appears to know me as little as he does you. I had a great deal of conversation with Sydenham upon various subjects, and I am not quite certain that I may not have expressed to him the sense I felt of the disadvantage under which I labored, from not having support in the Brazils to the instruments which we used here for our objects, which sense I afterwards expressed in a dispatch to you. You will recollect that I subsequently requested that you would strike out from the dispatch everything upon that subject, as having made peace in Europe I did not wish to renew the war in the Brazils.

‘I am positively certain, not only that I did not desire Sydenham to make any complaint to Lord Wellesley of ———; but I will go farther, and declare positively that I desired him to tell Lord Wellesley that it was, in my opinion, best to take no further steps to endeavor to have the Principal removed from the Government, as it appeared from the Prince’s letter to me, received in May, that his

removal was so very repugnant to his feelings; that the matters which had been in dispute were at an end; and that I should endeavor to work on as well as I could. You may tell — — — this from me.

‘I do not know what to say to the order for the removal of the Principal. If it were to come direct to Portugal I should say it ought to be obeyed, for the same reason that I said the order for his appointment ought to be obeyed. But it appears that it is sent to England, and entrusted to Lord Wellesley’s discretion, who, I think it likely, will entrust it to ours.

‘We should certainly do better without the Principal. The truth is, the man is mad, and he cannot act with common sense upon any occasion. But if he were removed from the Government, it would be still composed of bad materials; and though we should go on better, as we should get rid of the perpetual talking about affairs and doing nothing, things would still not go on as we should wish. However, upon the whole, I am rather inclined to remove him, but I shall not decide until I shall have considered the matter, and shall have received your opinion in answer to this letter. My own opinion is, that the best remedy would be for the Prince to come himself, but as Romana and I used to say of Ferdinand, “*sin muger.*”

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. In respect to Vasconcellos, I shall be much obliged to you if you will tell Lord Strangford that I am entirely indifferent about him. He left me and went to the Brazils about his own concerns, and carried a letter from me to recommend him to the Prince’s notice, as an Officer who had been in my family. But I neither know nor care about him, and the Prince will do well to send him back to Portugal if he is troublesome to him.

‘W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 5th February, 1812.

‘The weather has been very bad since the 28th of last month, and the roads have become so bad, and the rivers are

so full as to prevent all communication. I have therefore received no late intelligence from the interior of Castille; but I know that the enemy have no troops on this side of the Tormes.

‘ Although I have received reports from various quarters that General Bonet had evacuated the Asturias, and I have reported it to your Lordship, I am inclined to doubt the truth of these reports. It is certain that he had concentrated his troops at Oviedo, between the 15th and 20th of January, and Porlier had occupied Gijon.

‘ General Abadia had put the army of Galicia in movement on the 20th, in order to oblige General Bonet to retire from Asturias.

‘ I understand that there is in the Madrid Gazette of the 28th January, the copy of a letter from General Suchet to King Joseph, announcing his entry into Valencia, General Blake and 16,000 men being prisoners.

‘ No movement of importance has been made in the south.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 5th February, 1812.

‘ The very bad weather which we had lately must have put an end to all our operations and communications by sea, as it has by land; and if it lasts, it must delay the execution of our plans in Estremadura. But I still hope I shall be able to undertake them at an early period.

‘ I cannot promise success; but it is as well to be prepared for the consequences if we succeed; and I would recommend to your Lordship to send to Lisbon 20,000 stands of arms and accoutrements, and clothing and equipments for 20,000 men.

‘ I enclose the morning state.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 6th February, 1812.

‘ Besides the articles already in Ciudad Rodrigo, I should wish to throw in about 10,000 lbs. of rice, and about as much salt fish. I believe you have none of the former

within reach, and none of the latter at all. I enclose a memorandum of what there is in the Portuguese stores of these articles; and if you should desire to receive them from those stores, I will have directions given that they may be at your disposal.

‘It is very desirable that you should send me the returns of the forage drawn, in order that I may at an early period put an end to the abuses which you mentioned.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘J. Bissett, Esq.,

Commissary General.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 6th February, 1812.

‘In addition to the papers transmitted to you in my letter of the 26th ultimo, I have now the honor to forward a letter and its enclosure from Dr. Fergusson, stating that the members of the University of Coimbra disapproved of the demand made by the Vice Rector for payment of the supplies and articles of bedding provided for the sick of the British army who were left under their care; and that it had never been the intention of that body to be reimbursed for what they had voluntarily furnished to the British army.

‘Under these circumstances, I cannot avoid expressing my surprise that an application for the payment of this debt should have been so repeatedly made by the Portuguese Government, without having ascertained the wishes of the University upon the subject.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘His Excellency

Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 7th February, 1812.

‘It is desirable that as fast as the tents shall arrive at Abrantes, they should be sent on to Elvas.

‘It is also desirable, that as soon as the bridge, and the bullocks to draw it, shall arrive at Abrantes, it should be sent on to Elvas.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘J. Bissett, Esq.,

Commissary General.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 7th February, 1812.

‘ I have just received a letter from Admiral Berkeley, from which I learn that all the block carriages which General Rosa has, are at Elvas. It will therefore be necessary that you should order to Alcacer do Sal from Elvas, block carriages for twenty guns besides those for the sixteen 24 pounders.

‘ I do not think it yet decided whether we shall have 18 pounders or 24 pounders; but I rather think the former.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 7th February, 1812, 10 A. M.

‘ I enclose a letter from Salamanca, and one from Grant, received last night.

‘ Maucune’s is the 5th division; and the 25^{me} légère is in the 2d, commanded by Clausel, which you will see is supposed at Salamanca to be going to Talavera.

‘ I enclose the report from Castaños’ head quarters of Abadia’s operations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 7th February, 1812.

‘ I beg you to send 200 men, either British or Portuguese (the latter probably can be sent with least inconvenience), to Castello Branco, and thence forward on the road towards Penamacor, till they shall meet with the carronades, when they are to relieve a similar party of the 7th division. The object of this detachment is to assist the carronades in getting on, and I beg the Officer may be instructed to prevent his men from beating the bullocks, or ill treating the drivers.

‘ I have heard that one of the enemy’s divisions has moved towards Talavera, but I am not certain that this report is true; at all events, they cannot interfere with you, if you should undertake your operation.

‘ I have long intended to write to you about Colonel Inglis; as a Colonel on the Staff, senior to Byng, I must

employ him to command the brigade in which the 57th are, but when the Major Generals all join, I shall be able to make an arrangement which will suit Byng equally well, and will be equally agreeable to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 8th February, 1812, 11 A. M.

‘ Hunting appears out of the question to-day, and I send the bearer to wait till a quarter after 12 at Pozo Velho, and to go thence to Gallegos. I return Whittingham’s letter.

‘ By a letter from Elvas, I learn that the Duque del Infantado, Villa Vincencio, and Henry O’Donnell, Morqueira, and Priver, were appointed Regents. Agar, Blake, and Ciscar, were appointed Members of the Council of State. These accounts are of the 23d, from Cadiz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 8th February, 1812, 12 at noon.

‘ I enclose you a letter from my brother; one from the Junta de Avila, which shows that the enemy are moving troops towards Talavera; one from Salamanca of the 4th and 5th, which is silent on a report which we had received yesterday from the hussars, that the bridge at Salamanca was destroyed; and one from Madrid. I am inclined to believe the report of the capture of Tarragona, and not that of Soria. But you will see that the latter is mentioned in the letter from Salamanca.

‘ I propose to move Stopford’s brigade in a day or two after the guards. This delightful weather will, I hope, dry up the roads; and the heavy ordnance carriages march to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose a letter from Blanckley *, received last night.

‘ W.’

* Lieut. Blanckley, 23d Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Freneda, 9th February, 1812, 8 A.M.

‘I have just now received a report from Plasencia, that Brenier’s division is at Talavera, with detachments at Naval-moral, and Oropesa. I do not think that this intelligence need prevent your expedition, if you should think that other matters suit.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Freneda, 9th February, 1812.

‘I enclose a copy of General St. Pol’s letter, with that part of it which was in cypher deciphered. I likewise enclose a letter from the Senate of Portalegre, upon which I request you to do what may be expedient.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘SIR, ‘Freneda, 9th February, 1812.

‘In answer to your letter (No. 47) of the 25th of January, I request that you will send Major General Ross to Carthagena, to relieve Colonel Lambert in the command of the troops at that place.

‘Major General Ross is to draw a table allowance of thirty shillings per diem.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major General Cooke.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY, ‘Freneda, 9th February, 1812.

‘I have received your letters to the 27th. There is nothing new here; we are going on with the works at Ciudad Rodrigo, of which, as well as of the magazines in the place, we are not only defraying all the expense, but our soldiers are the laborers who execute them. This is what is called Spanish enthusiasm! But I have no doubt of the good will of the people; only of the abilities of their chiefs to call it into action.

‘I enclose a number of a newspaper which has lately made

its appearance ; and I wish particularly to draw your attention to the paragraph inserted in the last page.

‘ The license to publish anything upon military operations, whether true or not, which results from the liberty of the press, is a very great inconvenience, particularly to an army comparatively small, which must seize opportunities to avail itself of favorable circumstances, &c. &c. But that inconvenience is increased tenfold when a military official body publish a newspaper, containing statements and observations upon military transactions. Any editor may happen to stumble upon a fact or reasoning, of which it would be important for the enemy to have information ; but the Staff, the official editors, must be supposed to have the information which they publish.

‘ The contents of the paragraph marked in the enclosed paper are positively false ; but under existing circumstances, the publication is not less likely to have mischievous consequences than if the contents were true. There is no person who knows anything of the state of affairs in this country, who doubts, that if the French believe that paragraph, and choose to make the exertion, they must prevent us from carrying into execution our design, whatever may be the extent of the force which I shall collect. Surely therefore, it is worthy of the attention of the Government at least to prevent official bodies from publishing such mischievous nonsense.

‘ I do not see why the Staff are to publish a newspaper at all ; and if they do, surely what they publish should be strictly and literally true. Is the statement in the enclosed paper regarding the Spanish armies true or false ?

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 11th February, 1812.

‘ I have given directions that cattle may be purchased, to the amount of 15,000 dollars, to be distributed among the villages in this country, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know on what principle you have proceeded in your distributions.

‘ I think I can fix the proportion to be sent to each village ;

but how are those sent to a village to be disposed of? Are they to belong to any particular class of inhabitants, or are they to be common property? If the latter, who is to take care of them? How are the poorer classes to get the proportion of their labor? Would it be advisable to fix a small hire on the use of them, the surplus of which, after paying for their food and the care of them, should be employed to increase the stock of the village?

‘ Let me know what you have done on this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 11th February, 1812.

‘ I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of sending before the end of April the reinforcements which you intended for this army. I am convinced that all the regiments suffered much from receiving their men late in the summer of last year.

‘ It is also very desirable that we should soon have a reinforcement of horses for the artillery; the depôts of the cavalry will of course provide for the several regiments.

‘ While on the subject of the artillery, I would beg to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding to the Engineers’ establishment a corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake anything like a siege for want of assistance of this description. There is no French *corps d’armée* which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners. But we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will desire that the Storekeeper General may take some measures to insure the supply of articles by his department of a better description. Everything in the way of intrenching and cutting tools supplied by his department is so bad as to

be almost useless; and indeed all the stores supplied by this department are nearly of the same description. It would be cheaper for the public to pay larger prices, if that is necessary, in order to get better goods. The troops would be saved much inconvenience, and a vast expense would be saved, which is now incurred in transporting these stores to the army to replace those worn out in consequence of their being so very bad. It is really shameful that the public should be so badly served.

‘ I cannot say that the intrenching and cutting tools supplied by the Ordnance are better.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. The cutting tools which we have found in Ciudad Rodrigo belonging to the French army are infinitely better than ours. Is it not shameful that they should have better cutlery than we have? ‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 11th February, 1812.

‘ In order to facilitate the measures to be adopted to secure a supply of long forage for the cavalry and other horses of the army in the course of the current year, I beg leave to recommend that 1000 scythes with their handles may be sent to the Tagus to the Commissary General, and that they may arrive before the end of April.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 12th February, 1812, 10 A. M.

‘ I have received this morning from General Hill a report on the road to the bridge at Almaraz, from which it is evident, that the object which I had in view for his expedition cannot be accomplished. There is but one road to the river Tagus between the junction of the Tietar and that of the Ibor, and that passes under the tower of Mirabete; so that it would be impossible to get hold of the boats.

‘ I think, however, that it may be desirable hereafter to destroy the enemy’s works on the left of the Tagus.

‘ I received last night from General Castaños a note, in which he tells me, that the report still prevailed at Madrid on the 28th, that Tarragona and Soria had been taken. It was not believed that Valencia had been taken, as the French had prevented all communication with that place, and it was reported that the contest there still continued on the 18th.

‘ The extract which was sent to me of the “ Madrid Gazette,” containing Suchet’s letter to the King, was of the 28th of January.

‘ Montbrun was expected to return to Toledo on the 29th; and it is said that Foy had returned from Valencia with 2000 men. I should think this a mistake, as we had before accounts of Foy’s having marched upon Valladolid.

‘ Upon conversing with General Borthwick and Mr. Lyth, regarding the horses of Captain Thompson’s brigade, they were of opinion that they could draw to Niza the three ammunition waggon empty. Their ammunition, therefore, and the forge cart and wheel cart, only go into Almeida. There is ammunition in Abrantes, and there are fifty French horses at Coimbra, and some at Lisbon. I hope, therefore, that we shall be able to equip this brigade again as it ought to be.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Freneda, 12th February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th, and I agree with you in thinking that you would not succeed in obtaining possession of the enemy’s boats on the Tagus near Almaraz, although you might destroy their works. This last is not so important an object, and, at all events, this is not the moment at which it ought to be attempted; but it is desirable that we should keep this object in view; that we should have, as far as possible, all the preparations made for the operation; and that we should endeavor to acquire all the information to be procured on these works; but it will be desirable that you should not draw away the six boats from Villa Velha during the period at which the river will

be swelled, and then not farther than Niza till I shall request you to do so.

‘ I enclose some information which I have received regarding the works on the Tietar and Tagus. The drawing is by a different person from him who has sent the written account. You will see that in some trifles they do not agree exactly; but the man who made the drawing was in the works as a workman. I have examined him, and he is positive on all the points to which he has spoken. Let me have these papers again.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Lieut. Hillier to report whether the right or the left bank of the Rio del Monte is the highest at the bridge on the high road from Jaraicejo to Truxillo, as well as where the road from Deleytosa to Truxillo crosses the same stream.

‘ I shall likewise be much obliged to you if you will have the course of the different streams examined which fall into the north bank of the Guadiana, between what is called the Rio Burdalo in the map, which falls into the Guadiana above Merida, and the Gevora, and see whether any of them would afford a position which would cover the siege of Badajoz on that side of the Guadiana. The upper part of the Rio Burdalo might be looked at; the lower possibly could not; but it would be desirable to know which bank is the highest.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 12th February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th, and I have perused with much interest Dom M. Forjaz’ paper on the estimates, which is perfect as to arrangement, but not very satisfactory as to the amount of expense. The truth is, and it will very soon be discovered, that all the departments have gone on a very large scale of estimate of their expenses, and the real amount cannot now be discovered.

‘ I see that Cardozo estimates a ration of bread at 120 reis, and one of *étape* at 100 reis. Then he estimates carriage for the whole. But the rations cannot cost this sum if he does not include the expense of the carriage.

‘ Then I do not know how he makes out 70,000 rations to be issued, besides those issued by the British commissariat. I imagine he includes the whole effective militia as being under arms, whereas there is but little of it; and he takes the gross numbers of the army without striking off those in the hospitals, provided for in the hospital estimates, or the regiment at Cadiz; but we shall, at last, get to the bottom of this subject, and shall know pretty nearly what is the real expense of the army. The provision for it will be more difficult.

‘ I am certain that the Government will at last be obliged to set seriously to work to reform the abuses in the Lisbon Custom House. I am informed that smuggling now prevails to a greater degree than ever, particularly by the Americans. The revenue produced by the Customs, particularly of the outports, is ridiculously small; yet the Customs are the principal branch of the revenue. The tobacco contract should likewise produce much more than it does, and so should the income tax. The naval expenses must be entirely discontinued.

‘ I rather believe it would be better for us to supply the flour, &c. required by the Portuguese commissariat than that your bills should come into the market; but upon this point Mr. Pipon can give you an opinion. At all events we might give as much as is required at present.

‘ If ever the Bishop should return to Oporto, he will be worse than ever he was. His return must be prevented *coute qui coute*; and I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this, my opinion, to Lord Strangford.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 12th February, 1812.

The enemy have but few troops at Salamanca and in the owns on the Tormes; and it appears that Marshal Marmont has cantoned the right of his army on the Duero, at Toro and Zamora, the centre in the province of Avila; and that one division, the 6th, has returned to Talavera and the valley of the Tagus.

‘ I have not received the reports of General Abadia’s movement from Galicia. I understand that he was about to attack Astorga, but that he retired to Villa Franca in the beginning of the month; and General Cabrera, who had advanced to La Bañeza, fell back upon Puebla de Sanabria, in consequence of the enemy being in strength at Benavente.

‘ I conclude that the right of the army of Portugal had moved upon Benavente from Zamora, and he communicated with Bonet, who it is stated had evacuated the Asturias. I am not certain, however, of this last fact, notwithstanding that it has been so often repeated; and it is now said that some of Bonet’s troops are at La Bañeza.

‘ The detachment of the Conde de Amarante’s troops, which had occupied Puebla de Sanabria when General Cabrera moved upon La Bañeza, have retired into Portugal, in consequence of the Spanish troops having retired.

‘ I have not received any late intelligence from the eastern coast.

‘ I have received reports from Madrid, as well as from other quarters, that General Lacy had taken Tarragona on the 18th of January, and that the guerrillas had taken Soria; but it is impossible to give credit to reports of this description, notwithstanding that these reports have arrived from so many distinct quarters, that they would appear entitled to some credit.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 12th February, 1812.

‘ I have omitted to reply to your letter of the 8th of January regarding a successor to Admiral Berkeley. Of the two persons proposed, I believe that Admiral Martin would suit us best.

‘ I hope that it is not likely we shall have to embark; and even if we should, it would be desirable that the Admiral on the station should be not only a man capable of making the necessary arrangements, but one of a conciliating disposition.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 12th February, 1812.

‘ I have considered the objections stated in your letter of the 18th December to the proposition which I had made that a certain sum in Exchequer bills should be deposited in the hands of the Commissary General; and I am still of opinion that if Parliament could be brought to consent to the measures which must be adopted in order to carry this arrangement into execution, it will be expedient to try it.

‘ If we should be successful in our operations in the next month our further operations will be stopped, unless we can command more specie than we have been able to command hitherto. We cannot expect to subsist almost exclusively on our magazines if we should be able to remove the seat of the war farther into Spain; and however well inclined the people of Spain, we may depend upon it that we shall get nothing from them excepting for payment in money.

‘ I would not recommend that the Exchequer bills should be used in payment for supplies, for that would be, in fact, to pay interest for all our debts for which we now pay none, without diminishing in any degree the price of the article to procure which the debt has been incurred. But I think it not unlikely that there may be at Lisbon persons in possession of capital, who would lend it upon a British public security; and I have but little doubt that there are persons of this description in Spain. It is perfectly true that if they knew how to set about it, they may get British securities without taking them from the commissariat, but they certainly do not know how to set about it; and I am convinced that there are some riding about with their money in a portmanteau, and others with their money buried, because they do not know how to convey it to England, in which country all know that it would be safe.

‘ I may be mistaken in my expectations of getting anything for these bills; but I think the experiment is worth a trial, and it can do no harm.

‘ You will observe that I do not propose to use these securities in any other manner than to raise money on loan, consequently there is not much chance of their being so numerous as to be liable to forgery. Nor would they in any

manner come into competition with the Portuguese paper. The Portuguese paper is forced into circulation by the law; and its price is kept up, first, and principally, by our receiving it in its legal proportion in payment for bills upon the Treasury; and, secondly, by the prosperous state of the war in respect to Portugal. The price of the Portuguese paper is connected with the rate of exchange. When the discount on Portuguese paper falls, the discount on our bills on the Treasury rises, and *vice versâ*. The value of the Portuguese paper will rise when the Portuguese Government shall perform their engagements and pay the interest on it; but I do not see how it can be affected by our borrowing money on Exchequer bills, unless, indeed, we should be able to borrow so much on these bills as not to render it necessary to draw upon the Treasury, which is not very probable.

‘Although I think we shall be able to raise some money on these bills, I do not think that the sum will ever be so considerable as that we shall experience any difficulty in paying the interest. This must of course be provided for; and we must take care to pay the interest whatever may be the inconvenience. Upon the whole, I think there is a chance that this measure will give us a resource, and I am anxious that it should be tried.

‘Another measure which I have had in contemplation is to endeavor to prevail upon the merchants in Lisbon, Oporto, Cadiz, Coruña, and the principal trading towns of Spain and Portugal, to take the notes of the Bank of England as cash. This would give us a very great resource.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 13th February, 1812.

‘I agree with you and Marshal Beresford in thinking that it would be desirable to lighten the military expenses as much as possible; but to remove the payment of certain allowances, which must be paid, from one chest to another, is not lightening the military expenses, but multiplies business; and it will afford to the Treasury an excuse for not applying to the military chest all sums that can be spared from other services. I am afraid that the pensions

to *reformados*, &c. must be paid, and if that is the case they might as well be paid by one chest as another.

‘I am rather sanguine in my expectations, that when the actual expense of one month shall have been ascertained, and the arrear put out of the question, it will be found that we are not far short in funds.

‘The departments in which it appears to me that retrenchments can be made are the medical department; the public works, such as repairs and additions to Elvas, Abrantes, &c.; and the workshops under Fava. I suspect also that the pay offices estimate pay for establishments and not actual numbers.

‘Le Cor did not mention the desertion of all our drivers, as he was not aware of it. They have since been replaced by *ordenanza*, who were to relieve each other; but they have deserted as well as the others. It really becomes quite impracticable to carry on any service in Portugal, unless the Portuguese Government will assist with their influence, and will punish those who neglect their duty.

‘I must report my opinion on these subjects to the British Government, and I will not stay after the siege of Badajoz.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 14th February, 1812.

‘I request that the persons you mention in your letter of the 10th February, viz., — — —, the *sergeant major des Sapeurs*, and *Adjudant des Travaux*, and — — —, a French miner, may be sent in charge of a steady non-commissioned officer, whose name I request you to let me know, to Estremoz, there to wait till I shall send for them*.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major General Peacocke.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘MY DEAR COTTON,

‘Freneda, 16th February, 1812, 10 A. M.

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 12th. I have no objection to the arrangement which you propose in respect

* These men were afterwards employed in the new establishment forming called Sappers and Miners.

to the horse artillery, if the Captains of the troops of horse artillery have no objection. I am rather inclined to believe, however, that it would be very inconvenient to the horse artillery to have any persons attached to them who are not mounted.

‘ You will make your own arrangements on this subject respecting the two troops attached to the cavalry. If you wish to attach dragoons to Ross’ troop, or to the troop in the 7th division, I must give orders about it.

‘ I have written to England respecting remount horses for the whole cavalry, and have recommended that they should come out at an early period in the season. It would be very desirable that the horse appointments should be at Lisbon, and a sufficient number of the men at least to bring up the horses as they shall arrive.

‘ I am glad to find you are getting on well with forage. I will speak to the Commissary General about the full ration of corn.

‘ I have ordered Hervey and Slade to begin their march, to go very slow; and to halt, if possible, every second day; the 4th dragoon guards not to move. I shall move the 5th dragoon guards soon into the Alentejo, in order to make room for the other troops on their march; and General Le Marchant’s brigade will be the first assembled. The Germans are ordered to Santarem, and will come up to Golegão.

‘ Believe me, &c.

* *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Captain —— to write his letters to the Quarter Master General in a legible hand. I am obliged to get them copied before I can decide upon what he reports.

‘ W.’

To the Juiz de Fora de Niza.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 16th February, 1812.

‘ I have been informed that a person, by name ——, who had been confined in the gaol of Niza, in irons, and who I had directed might be sent to the head quarters of the Portuguese army, to be tried by the special Commission, for purchasing forage from the artillerymen of General Hill’s

corps, has escaped from the gaol, although he was in irons. I know perfectly well what that means, and that no individual could escape from gaol if the magistrates and gaolers did their duty.

‘ I desire that, immediately upon the receipt of this letter, the gaoler who allowed this person to escape may be put in confinement in the gaol, preparatory to his trial ; and if that is not done, I must adopt other measures to insure the due execution of the laws.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Juiz de Fora de Niza.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Victoria.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 16th February, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I propose to lay siege to Badajoz at an early period in next month ; and I beg that, without loss of time, you will give directions that the fascines, and gabions, and piquets, mentioned in the enclosed paper, may be prepared under the direction of the Officer of engineers who made those for the last siege. The persons who will make them will be paid for each gabion , for each fascine forty, for each piquet reis ; and the same sum for each will be paid for bringing them to Elvas, provided they are brought there by the 4th of next month.

‘ In order to deceive the enemy regarding the application of these materials, in case they should hear of their being made, I request that they may be lodged near the new work which is constructing near Fort St. Lucia ; but I particularly request that you will use your cavalry to prevent all persons, excepting those who will have a passport from Senhor Colonel Brito, from passing the frontier, or from crossing the Guadiana between the junction of the Caya and Jurumenha, in order that the enemy may not hear of our preparations.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Victoria.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. 1800 fascines, six feet long, and one foot thick ;
 1800 gabions, three feet long, exclusive of points, an
 one foot six inches in diameter ;
 1500 fascines, four feet long, and six inches thick ;
 2000 fascine piquets, four feet long. ‘ W.’

To Colonel de Brito Mozinho.

' SIR,

' Freneda, 16th February, 1812.

' I enclose a letter for General Victoria, which I beg you to peruse and deliver to him.

' I beg you to suggest to him the mode of performing the service therein directed in the best manner, and at the same time of keeping the design I have in contemplation secret from the enemy as long as possible.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Colonel de Brito Mozinho.*

' WELLINGTON.

To General Don Carlos de España.

' SIR,

' Freneda, 16th February, 1812.

' I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 13th instant, in regard to the wants of provisions by the garrison which your Excellency intends to place in Ciudad Rodrigo.

' I would beg your Excellency to advert to what has passed upon this subject.

' First, this place having been taken by the British army, I have given it over, with all it contains, to the Spanish Government.

' Secondly, I have placed in it a reserve of 50,000 rations of provisions, which, in addition to the quantity found in the place when it was taken by the British army, amounts to 70,000 rations of provisions, which it is agreed are not to be touched till the place shall be invested by the enemy.

' Thirdly, the breaches in the place are under repair, and various improvements are making to the works of the place, of which I am not only defraying the expense, but the British soldiers are performing the labor. And,

Fourthly and lastly, your Excellency calls upon me to supply provisions for the garrison to be in the place, for five months to come, having already, as you know, a large army under my command to be supplied with every necessary, to be drawn from the sea.

' I mention these circumstances in this form, in order to bring under the eye of your Government the state of this important place, and the manner in which it is thrown upon the resources of the army under my command, and that they and the world may see what is the real nature of the contest

in which we are engaged, and what are the difficulties which are thrown upon me, in consequence of the neglect to adopt proper measures to supply the wants of the Spanish troops.

‘I have now the honor to enclose an order to the store-keeper of the British magazine at St. João da Pesqueira to supply to your Excellency, when you shall send for it, 156,000 lbs. of biscuit, and 25,000 lbs. of rice. The biscuit, at a pound for each ration, ought to last for two months; the rice is all of that description that is in store.

‘I beg to observe to your Excellency that I can supply no meat, nor bacalao: we have none in our stores, not being the rations of the British troops.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General

‘WELLINGTON.

Don Carlos de España.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘SIR,

‘Freneda, 16th February, 1812.

‘I have perused with attention the letter from General Giron of the 14th instant, which your Excellency did me the honor of putting into my hands yesterday.

‘When a great operation, such as the siege of Badajoz, is to be undertaken, it would be most desirable that all the troops which the allies can bring forward should be employed in it, either immediately or in protecting it, as we may depend upon it that the enemy will employ all that they can collect to interrupt it.

‘For several reasons, into which it is not necessary now to enter, those composing the 5th army, adverted to by General Giron, and those under the command of General Ballesteros, cannot be employed either in the operations of the siege of Badajoz, or directly in protecting those operations; and it remains to be seen in what manner they can be employed, so as to divert the attention and forces of the enemy from the measures which it must be expected they will adopt to interrupt the siege of Badajoz.

‘The army of the south, under the command of Soult, is the nearest, is that which has most interest in the preservation of Badajoz, and is that which has it in its power, from local circumstances, to make the movements most likely to interrupt the siege of Badajoz by the allies. If, therefore,

the troops of the 5th army, and those under the command of General Ballesteros, cannot from circumstances be employed in aiding or protecting the operations of the siege, it would be most expedient that they should be employed in operations which should divert the attention of the enemy in some degree from those troops of the allies so engaged; and at all events should produce some benefit to the country.

‘It is my opinion that the most interesting point in Andalusia for the enemy is Seville, and that they cannot maintain the blockade of Cadiz if they should lose possession of that point only for one day, whatever may be the result of the intended operation against Badajoz. I have therefore written to His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz, to suggest that General Ballesteros should be reinforced and equipped from the stores of Cadiz or Gibraltar, in such a manner as to enable him to move upon Seville, in case the enemy should weaken their force in that city.

‘It is my opinion that the employment of the troops under the command of General Morillo, and of the cavalry under the Conde de Penne Villemur, in the Condado de Niebla, on the same object, would have the effect of still further drawing the enemy’s attention from the allies engaged in the siege of Badajoz; and, on the principle above referred to, would be the operation in which they could be employed in which, at the moment, they would render most service to the cause.

‘I have now considered this question solely in reference to the siege of Badajoz, which is the great operation of the moment; but whether it should succeed or should fail, it appears to me that the troops above mentioned would be equally favorably situated for the plan which must be pursued thereafter.

‘In regard to the transfer of these troops to Castille, I would beg leave to observe to your Excellency.

‘First, that it appears that the enemy are fortifying the principal posts on the Tormes and the Douro; and your Excellency is aware that neither the troops of the 5th army, nor those of the 6th army, can be equipped in such a manner as to be able to obtain possession of any of these posts. They would therefore only enter the country in order to quit

it again when the enemy should return in force; and they could not by any possible chance aid in any manner, even by diversion, in the great operation which is now in contemplation.

‘Secondly, I would observe to your Excellency, that from this time till the end of April all operations are impracticable for either party in Castille. The enemy cannot attack Ciudad Rodrigo; neither could the troops under the command of your Excellency perform any operation in which they should be obliged to cross the Tormes, more particularly as the enemy have fortified all the essential posts on that river, and rendered their attainment hopeless.

‘Thirdly, I would beg to observe to your Excellency, that weak as is Don Carlos de España’s division, he has not the means of supporting it. One battalion of 800 men is, and has been for several months, supported by me at Torre de Moncorvo; and Don Carlos has called upon me to supply with provisions, for five months, 2600 men, which he proposes to place in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, besides the reserve of provisions for the garrison in case of attack. How then can your Excellency expect to supply the troops of the 5th army when you bring them to this part of the country? I assure you that the British magazines cannot afford them support.

‘On every ground, then, of the advantage to be derived from the operations of the troops of the 5th army in the great operation which we are about to undertake, of the state of the seasons, and of the difficulties of subsistence, I would recommend that the troops of the 5th army should be sent into the Condado de Niebla: of course your Excellency is the best judge what ought to be done.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain General*
Don F. X. Castaños.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 17th February, 1812, 10 A.M.

‘I enclose the only intelligence which I have received since yesterday. You will see that the 1st and 4th divisions of the army of Portugal are on the left of the Tagus.

‘The mail is come to the 31st.

‘ Alava arrived at Cadiz on the 29th, in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 18th February, 1812*.

‘ I enclose a regulation on means of transport in Portugal, which I request may be strictly observed by the Officers of the British commissariat.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Bissett, Esq.,*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Commissary General.

To Lieut. General Graham.

, MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 18th February, 1812, 9 A. M.

‘ I enclose a letter from Lieut. Blanckley.

‘ Marmont appears to be spreading his army a good deal.

‘ Some of our concerns to the south are going on well. I am not quite so certain of others. Those to whom I was obliged to have recourse to get the ordnance I wanted seem to be of opinion that there is no more occasion for precision in the fire of artillery in a siege than there is in an action at sea !

‘ I hear from General Campbell that he is getting on well. I have desired that he might be told that he might give leave at Lisbon to any of his young men who would return by the 4th of March.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 18th February, 1812.

‘ I have received the translation of the regulation of the means of transport in the Kingdom, which I have perused, and as far as depends upon me it shall be carried into execution.

‘ I observe, however, that although many important alterations have been made in the regulation since it was first submitted for my opinion, only one of those which I suggested has been made, viz., that by which 200 reis for

* General Viscount Wellington was created an Earl on the 18th February, 1812.

each cart supplied should be given to the magistrates; and I am convinced that this regulation, in its existing state, will be, as it is evidently intended by the Government to be, as ineffectual for the purpose of carrying on the war, as the former regulations on the same subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 18th February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 14th, regarding Baron —. As well as I can recollect, you have an order from the Secretary of State to have that person closely observed. It is impossible to recollect everything, but I have a distinct recollection of our being directed to be on our guard respecting this person.

‘ Let the Portuguese Government do with him what they please, excepting to set him at large.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*

Charles Stuart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I find that the letter which I received respecting Baron — was from Colonel Torrens, written at the desire of the Duke of Brunswick. Let him be detained by all means.

‘ It is very desirable that you should send me some more of the translations of the regulations regarding means of transport.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812, 9 A.M.

‘ I enclose a letter from Lieut. Blanckley, from which it appears that the 6th division only are in the valley of the Tagus, and the 2d about Avila. I likewise enclose a letter from the Junta de Avila, from which you will see how the 6th division are cantoned. All the corps mentioned belong to that division.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter of the 3d from our old correspondents at Salamanca, and one of the 6th from another

person. It appears from the latter, as well as from a letter which I have from Silveira, that Bonet has certainly evacuated Asturias, at least with part of his troops.

‘ There are also papers of news from Tordesillas, Valladolid, and Madrid. From the whole of these papers I have a tolerable notion of the position of five of the eight divisions under Marmont’s command, viz., Bonet, at La Bañeza; Souham, Zamora; the 3d division, Maucune, Salamanca, Toro, &c. (the 31st and 47th belong to this division); the 2d division, Clausel, Avila; the 6th division, Brenier, Talavera. I do not know where the 1st, 4th, and 5th are, but I should think the 5th are about Benavente, where Silveira tells me the enemy are in force; and the 1st and 4th in the rear, probably Medina del Campo, and the back parts of Castille.

‘ You will see also that the guards and other troops of the army of the north have marched from Valladolid, but they had assembled in large force to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I send you two papers from Tordesillas and Madrid, marked X, which contain some details not in the first mentioned. You will see how the matter stands respecting Soria.

‘ I am just going over to Ciudad Rodrigo to see how our works are going on, and shall return to-morrow.

‘ A packet has arrived at Lisbon, but we have not yet received the mail.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘ I enclose you some news from Madrid, Talavera, and Toledo, a very interesting letter from Grant, and one from ———, giving an account of the force of the 2d division. It is stated to be much stronger than we before supposed it; and I write to ——— to request him to endeavor to account for its strength by regiments.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from my brother, and one from General Cooke. That referred to by my brother is one in which he informs me that the Cortes had made me a Grandee, which I keep to send to England.

‘ I recommended that Ballesteros should be made as strong as possible, and should be equipped to strike at Seville, when Soult should move against us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose an English newspaper of the 9th, in which you will see the capitulation of Valencia.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, in regard to the wants of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the copy of my answer *, which I beg you to lay before the Spanish Government.

‘ It is very desirable that measures should be adopted to supply Don Carlos de España with money.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from General Giron to Captain General Castaños, which the latter put into my hands some days ago, regarding the plan of operations to be adopted in the month of March, and my answer †, which I likewise request you to lay before the Spanish Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s dispatch of the 31st of January, in which you have enclosed a letter of the 29th, from the Secretary of State, Don E. de Bardaxi, in which the Secretary of State has conveyed to the Officers and troops under my command, and to myself, the thanks of the Cortes for the services which they had rendered to the cause in the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I beg that you will request the Secretary of State to adopt the most respectful mode of assuring that august assembly, that the Officers and soldiers under my command are highly sensible of the distinguished honor which has thus

* See p. 612.

† See p. 613.

been conferred upon them, by the approbation expressed by the Cortes of their services; and I trust that by a zealous discharge of our duty, and by our exertions in the good cause in which we are engaged, we shall continue to merit the approbation of the Cortes.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘ Besides the letter from the Secretary of State, Don E. de Bardaxi, of the 29th January, to which I have replied in another dispatch, your Excellency enclosed one in your dispatch of the 31st January, from the same Minister, of that date, in which his Excellency enclosed the decree of the Cortes, passed at the recommendation of the Regency, by which the Cortes have created me a Grandee of Spain, and Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I have transmitted this letter and its enclosure to England, to be laid before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, and have requested His Royal Highness’ permission to accept the honors which the Cortes and Regency of Spain have been pleased to confer upon me.

‘ In the meantime, I beg you to request the Secretary of State to convey to the Cortes and the Regency my respectful acknowledgments for the favor with which they have viewed the services of the Officers and troops under my command, and for the high honors conferred upon me, by which they have marked their sense of these services.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘ You will see from my dispatch of this day, &c., what is going on. I think it proper, however, besides, to send you a very curious paper, which I received last night from General Castaños.

‘ He some time ago sent me word that he requested I

would supply his head quarters with provisions, as he had none, to which I consented. Shortly afterwards he went, and fixed himself in Ciudad Rodrigo, although I particularly desired that Ciudad Rodrigo might be considered solely a *place de guerre*, and that nobody might go there excepting the garrison. When I was there the other day to see the works, I found that his head quarters were drawing from the commissariat of our 5th division, which were working there, 290 rations, besides 180 rations which another party of them were drawing from Fuentes de Oñoro. At this time there were no Spanish troops in Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘I sent O’Lalor over to remonstrate upon this extravagant waste at a place where it is very inconvenient to give anything, and I enclose the papers which he brought me back.

‘From this you will see how these matters go on. Extravagant as we are, there is no Officer with us who draws more than one ration, the same as a soldier. He besides draws a ration for every servant not a soldier. Just observe, that for 123 artillerymen and 22 pioneers, making 145 troops, and some of the staff of the garrison, the Spaniards draw 269 rations! each Officer drawing three, five, six, seven, and as far as sixteen rations!

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘Since I addressed your Lordship on the 12th instant, I have received intelligence that the 1st and 4th divisions of the army of Portugal, and part of General Montbrun’s cavalry, as well as the 6th division, are on the Tagus, in the neighborhood of Talavera de la Reyna and Toledo.

‘It is certain that General Bonet evacuated the Asturias at the time I received the reports that he had done so in January, and I understand that he suffered considerably in this operation, as well from the effects of the weather as from the operations of a detachment of the army of Galicia, and of General Porlier’s troops.

‘No movement of importance has been made by any of the troops composing the army of Portugal since I addressed you on the 12th instant.

‘The reports which had been in circulation throughout Spain, that Valencia had not fallen on the 9th of January, as stated in the enemy’s gazettes, have been contradicted, and no doubt is now entertained of that misfortune. It is reported that Marshal Suchet, having left a garrison of 8000 men in Valencia, had marched in the end of January to the relief of Tarragona.

‘The report that that place has fallen still prevails, but I have received no confirmation of it on which I can rely.

‘There is no doubt that the guerrilla chiefs had possession of the town of Soria, as stated in my dispatch of the 12th instant, but the French troops retired to the castle, which the guerrillas could not take, and the latter afterwards evacuated the town.

‘These parties continue to increase, and their operations become every day more important. Saormil has lately interrupted the communications of the army of Portugal, in Upper Castille, near Medina del Campo, and he took about 100 prisoners near that town; and the party of Cuesta attacked a body of French infantry, which crossed the Tietar, and obliged them to retire with considerable loss.

‘My last letters from Cadiz are of the 31st January. The enemy was making no movement of importance on that side.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘I enclose a paper which has been sent to me by Major Dachenhausen, who was lately recommended to me by your Lordship, at the instance, I believe, of General Gwyn. I know nothing of the plan it contains; but I have thought it proper to send it to your Lordship as it has been sent to me.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch from Mr. Wellesley of the 31st January, enclosing two letters from the Secretary of State, Don E. de Bardaxi; one of the 29th January conveying a vote of thanks of the Cortes to the Officers and troops under my command for their conduct at the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo; the other of the 31st January from the same Minister, enclosing a decree of the Cortes, passed at the recommendation of the Regency, by which the Cortes have created me a Grandee of Spain of the first class, and Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I beg your Lordship will lay these letters before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and will request His Royal Highness’ permission for me to accept the honors conferred upon me by the Cortes and Regency of Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Freneda, 19th February, 1812.

‘ I received by the last post your letter marked “secret,” of the 24th January. All my arrangements preparatory to the attack of Badajoz are in train, and I believe getting on well; some of the troops have marched for the Alentejo, and others will follow soon; and I intend to go myself the last, as I know that my removal from one part of the country to the other will be the signal for the enemy that the part to which I am going is to be the scene of active operations.

‘ The train which you proposed to send will not be in time, I hope: but it is as well that we should have it, in case of accidents. I am not unprovided with some means of a good description for this enterprise. The weather has latterly favored us wonderfully.

‘ Pray let us have plenty of horses for cavalry and artillery, and the reinforcements for our infantry, as early as you can. If we should succeed at Badajoz, I propose to push our success early in the year as far as I can.

‘ I enclose the morning state.

‘ Mr. Perceval has told me that I should receive a letter from you on another subject, which has not yet reached me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Freneda, 20th February, 1812, 10 A.M.

‘ I enclose a letter from ———, and its enclosure, which I believe is from the Portuguese ———.

‘ De Lancy has a letter from Offeney, stating that Foy had marched with a detachment by the Puerto de San Vicente on Guadalupe; but he had returned one march. He had not been able to bring either cannon or carriages; and I think that this was a reconnaissance to see whether they could communicate with the 5th corps by that route. There is a report that they were repairing the roads in that direction.

‘ There is nothing new on this side. I am going to Ciudad Rodrigo to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To ——— ———.

‘ SIR, ‘ Freneda, 22d February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 20th. I shall be glad to keep up the correspondence which you mention with Navalmoral, and request you to let me know what will be the expense.

‘ I observe what you have said in your letter of the strength of the second division in the province of Avila, and you will observe how inconsistent that account, which I believe to be true, is with the accounts which you before gave of the total strength of the army of Portugal. I now enclose a list of the divisions and of their Generals, and of the regiments of the army of Portugal, including the divisions of Generals Souham and Bonet, and the cavalry. I request you to inquire how many battalions there are in each of those named regiments at present, and how many men present under arms in each battalion, and where each battalion is; the name of the Colonel of each regiment, and of the chief of each battalion; how the regiments are classed in brigades, and the names of the General Officers command-

ing brigades. You need not be in a hurry about getting this information, but you will consider it to be an object on which I want to have accurate information, and you will get it for me as soon as you can with convenience.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ ——— ———.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. 23d February. Since writing the above, I have received your second letter of the 20th. As the money has been paid by your direction to the person who wrote the letter you enclosed, it shall be refunded by me, but in future you must not disburse such large sums without my orders. I had determined that I would give that person no more money, as he is of no use whatever. ‘ W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 22d February, 1812.

‘ I enclose an extract from the General Orders of the army, containing the proceedings and sentence of a General Court Martial, of which Colonel Inglis is President, on the trial of Lieut. —, of the — regiment, on a complaint of the master of the Golden Lion at Lisbon.

‘ At the same time I enclose an extract of the minutes of the evidence, containing the testimony of Lieut. Wright, 36th regiment, showing the treatment which the Officers of the British army receive in that house.

‘ Notwithstanding that I have confirmed and put into execution the sentence of the General Court Martial on Lieut. —, I must say that the Officers of the British army have, and particularly Lieut. —, reason to complain in being obliged to go to such a house as the Golden Lion, and in being obliged to submit to the insolence and ill treatment of the landlord and his waiters.

‘ I beg you to lay these papers before the Portuguese Government, and to make my request that the police may be directed to warn the master of the Golden Lion, and his waiters, of the necessity of behaving themselves respectfully to the Officers of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Excellency
Charles Stuart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 23d February, 1812, 9 A. M.

‘ In the memorandum which you gave me on Saturday last for the construction of your gabions and fascines at Elvas, you inserted the dimensions of the gabions to be three feet high, exclusive of points, and one foot six inches in diameter. It appears to Colonel Brito, as well as to me, that this is a mistake ; and I beg to hear from you immediately whether you wish that they should be one foot six, or two feet six inches in diameter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel de Brito Mozinho.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 23d February, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have heard from Fletcher ; and I find that he intended that the gabion should be only one foot and a half in diameter ; but as this appears to me to be too small, I beg that they may be made two feet in diameter, till you shall hear further from me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel de Brito Mozinho.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 23d February, 1812.

‘ I received this evening your letter of this day, by Captain Canning. Probably it did not occur to you that a gabion eighteen inches diameter would not cover a man. Every man, even the smallest, occupies twenty inches ; and the gabion ought at least to cover him. Besides, the gabion of one foot and a half in diameter does not contain much more than half the solid space of one of two feet and a half.

‘ Adverting to the reasons first mentioned, I have written to Brito to desire that the gabions might be two feet in diameter ; and I beg to hear from you before the post shall

go on the morning of the 25th, whether you continue to think that they should be one foot and a half.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have just received your letter of the 23d, regarding the march of a company of artificers to Elvas. I have given orders, that if any Officer applies to the Quarter Master General at Lisbon for a route to Elvas for a company of artificers, he is to have it. But who is the Officer to apply. Who is to give him his orders to apply?

‘ W.’

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 23d February, 1812.

‘ I received only this evening your letter of the 18th. I do not know what answer you were to expect from me upon the subject of the Russian 18 pounders. I wrote to the Admiral to express my disappointment; but there was no use in writing to you. You could not mend the matter; and there was no use in discussing with you by letter the resources which occurred to my mind to extricate us from the scrape into which we had got, notwithstanding all the pains I had taken to avoid it.

‘ I do not know whether the Admiral will send you English guns or not. If he should not, we must separate carefully, and mark, the English, the Russian, and the Portuguese shot; and we must use those of each nation in different batteries. The artillery Officers must then calculate upon the windage of the different descriptions of shot in their charges, and the direction and elevation of their guns; and as the shot in each battery will always be the same, there will not be so much difficulty in managing these pieces as we experienced in the last siege, under similar circumstances.

‘ I hope, however, that if the Admiral has them, he will send English 18 pounders.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 23d February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 20th, and I am very sorry that any inconvenience should have been experienced in consequence of any order of mine. As, however, I am responsible for the supply of the British army, and of that part of the Portuguese army which is supplied by the British commissariat, and of that part of the Portuguese army which is not so supplied, it is natural that I should wish to be acquainted with the contents of our magazines before I order that any issue should be made; and adverting to the amount, and the causes of the demands made upon our magazines since December last, it is natural that I should not allow any issues to be made from them without orders from the Commissary General, after consulting my opinion.

‘ The order which has been lately repeated to Mr. Pipon on this subject has been frequently given before. I am not aware of the exact terms in which it was lately given to Mr. Pipon; but as Mr. Pipon was aware from the communication of the paragraph of my letter to you, that it was left to him to make the advance of the grain, or to give the drafts of the money, he might have ventured to begin to make the advance of the grain without waiting for the result of further reference to head quarters. I directed, however, this morning, that the answer to the reference should be given; viz., that he was to give immediately as much of the grain of all descriptions as could without inconvenience be spared from our magazines, and the remainder of the amount of the demand when it should be convenient to us to spare it. I can do no more.

‘ I observe the attempt of Dom M. Forjaz, &c., to throw upon us the inconvenient consequences of wanting this grain, and not having it immediately. If they had the whole of it at this moment in their possession, they could not use it, excepting for sale. *I will lay my life that they will not carry one third of the quantity from the sea coast in six months.*

‘ I know nothing about the supply of money to the

military chest. I am very certain that the Portuguese Government have, in money and kind, received more than their subsidy from the departments of this army in the last year.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

To be submitted to Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ 24th February, 1812.

‘ The British army being now in march towards the Alentejo, for the purpose of attacking Badajoz eventually, it is desirable to consider what plans the enemy may follow, and what are our means of resisting them.

‘ First. They may move their whole force, including the divisions of Souham and Bonet, into Estremadura, leaving Castille and Leon to their fate, as they have done heretofore; or they may move only a part of their force into Estremadura, leaving a part to occupy the principal points in those kingdoms.

‘ Secondly. Leaving the army of the south, and the three divisions of the army of Portugal, now on the Tagus, and the cavalry, to oppose the allied British and Portuguese army in Estremadura in the best manner they can, they may attack the kingdom of Galicia with the remainder of the army.

‘ Or, thirdly, they may attack the frontiers of Portugal by the north of the Douro.

‘ Or, fourthly, they may pass the Agueda by the fords below Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the communication between Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida: or even pass the Coa, and cut off the communication between those places and the interior of the country.

‘ The operation which I have stated in the first instance is that which it is most probable the enemy will follow; and that they will leave the divisions of Bonet and Souham to occupy the kingdoms of Castille and Leon.

‘ It will then become a question, what operation the troops of Galicia shall carry on, which must be decided by the relative force of the allies and of the enemy, and by the state in which the enemy shall leave the towns on the Douro and the

Tormes which they are fortifying, and by the degree of equipment for attacking those works with which General Abadia can provide himself.

‘ If the enemy should adopt this supposed plan, it would be desirable not only that Don Carlos de España should take the field in Castille with all that he can venture to draw from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo ; but that Don Julian Sanchez, Saormil, and all the chiefs of parties of guerrillas should co-operate with him in order to do the enemy as much mischief as possible, and that the troops even in Biscay should be put in motion.

‘ The Portuguese General Officers north of the Douro have under their command of regular troops only small detachments of cavalry. These could not with propriety be moved to a greater distance from the Portuguese frontier ; but the Portuguese General Officers shall have orders to support with their cavalry, within reasonable limits, any offensive operations which it may be thought proper that General Abadia should adopt in the case supposed.

‘ If the enemy should adopt the plan supposed in the second instance, the Portuguese General Officers, Bacellar and the Conde de Amarante, shall have orders to do as much mischief to the enemy’s flank and rear as they can, at least with their cavalry, but not to push their infantry too far forwards. I imagine that if Galicia should be invaded, and General Abadia should be obliged to retreat, his line of retreat would be towards the frontiers of Portugal ; and great care must be taken in that case, that the Portuguese General Officers, by pushing too far into Leon, do not lose their communication with his right.

‘ If the enemy should adopt the line supposed in the third instance, General Abadia would of course annoy the enemy’s flank and rear, while the Portuguese General Officers would oppose them in front.

‘ If the enemy should adopt either of the plans supposed in the second and third instances, Don Carlos’ division with the guerrillas might do a great deal of mischief in Castille.

‘ If the enemy should adopt the plan supposed in the fourth instance, I propose to direct General Bacellar to collect all the militia of the northern provinces of Portugal on the Coa, and to place himself in communication with the

remainder of Don Carlos de España's division, which shall not be in the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo; and to endeavor to protect the magazines on the Douro and the Mondego, and to force the enemy into Lower Beira, if they should persevere in entering Portugal. The advantage which General Abadia could take of this operation would likewise depend upon the extent of the force which the enemy would leave in his front; upon the degree to which the enemy should have fortified his posts on the Douro and Tormes, &c.; and on the degree to which General Abadia can equip himself with artillery to attack those posts.

'If the enemy should adopt this plan, supposed in the fourth instance, Don Carlos would of course destroy the bridges on the Yeltes and Huelva. It appears to me that it would likewise be desirable to destroy that of Barba de Puerco; and particularly, if the weather should be bad, the three bridges at Castillejos.

'WELLINGTON.'

To Colonel de Brito Mozinho.

'SIR,

'Freneda, 25th February, 1812.

'Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received another letter from Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, who is anxious that the interior diameter of the gabions should not be more than one foot and a half, and I request that they may be made accordingly.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel de Brito Mozinho.'

'WELLINGTON.'

To Major General Cooke.

'SIR,

'Freneda, 25th February, 1812.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letters (Nos. 50 and 52) of the 6th and 14th instant, and that marked "private" of the 9th instant.

'I have already in my letter of the 1st instant stated to you my opinion regarding Tarifa. I do not think that Captain Smith's letter throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of S^{ta} Catalina can

be made subservient to the defence of the island depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide only by having a local knowledge of the place.

‘ It is very clear to me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring ; and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon either by the Spanish Government, or by the governor of Gibraltar, you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I made to you in my dispatch of the 15th November. If you should send a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish Government for a purpose connected with the operations of General Ballesteros, I conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such detachment. If you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish Government, it is better not to discuss the question, whether the detachment shall or shall not obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa permanently ; and he is about to improve the defences of the place, which he conceives to be under his orders. The troops sent to Tarifa should therefore be under his orders ; but according to all the rules of His Majesty’s service, the senior Officer should command the whole.

‘ I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the governor of Gibraltar.

‘ I have perused the enclosures in Colonel Lambert’s dispatch of the 6th instant. I have not got Tofino’s plan of Carthagena, and I am not able to judge exactly of the situation of the different places referred to by Captain Roberts. The hill of San Julian, however, is in every point of view a most important post to be secured, not only by a block house, as is proposed by Captain Roberts, but by a good redoubt, capable of containing a garrison of 300 men, or even more, if the ground should be sufficiently spacious.

‘ As it appears that the soil is rocky, I have no objection to Captain Roberts commencing by constructing the block house, which will always be an additional security to the redoubt ; but the objects of our attention at Carthagena should be, not only to defend the existing works, but to

secure the communication of the town with the sea, without which it will be impossible to supply the town with provisions, &c., to last during the time which the works are capable of holding out, when our troops will give the example of a determined defence.

‘It appears to me that there will be time to construct such works as may be necessary for this object at no great expense; and I beg that they may be commenced without loss of time.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Cooke.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Freneda, 25th February, 1812.

‘I received last night your letters of the 12th and 14th. The enclosures are very interesting.

‘I think that Lacy has taken Tarragona. It is generally reported that he had on the 28th of January; and I see by Adam’s letter that he was to attack the place about that time.

‘It is impossible to concert operations between two bodies at such a distance as Ballesteros and I shall be. I expect to be able to invest Badajoz about the 10th. It may be expected that about the 14th or 15th Soult will receive the report, and will prepare to move to support the place. Ballesteros should be prepared to move on Seville at that same time; and should move as soon as he shall find that the enemy have weakened their force at Seville, &c., to such an extent as to give him a prospect of success. He should risk nothing; and should retire when he shall find that the enemy return to Seville in strength.

‘It may be depended upon, that the greatest part of the army, particularly the cavalry, will be brought against us; and, therefore, Ballesteros’ deficiency of cavalry in this expedition will not much signify.

‘You will see by the letter which I gave Castaños, of which I sent you a copy on the 19th instant, that I have recommended that Morillo’s troops should be employed from the Condado de Niebla in the same manner. I believe, but he has not told me, that they are to be employed as I proposed. But even these troops can scarcely act in concert

with Ballesteros. They must both act with celerity, but independently, on the same object; and communicate as soon as they can. But concert at such distances is impossible.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 25th February, 1812.

‘Since I wrote to you on the 23d, I have received the enclosed letter from Mr. Bissett with its enclosures, (1, 2, and 3,) the whole of which I request you to return to me. From a perusal of these papers, it will be seen that there is not much reason to complain of us here at head quarters. All that I know is, that when a question comes before me, I decide it before the post goes out; and always grant these demands, whether for money or supplies in kind, when I have before me the information to enable me to decide upon them.

‘It appears that three demands have been made upon our stores since the month of December. The first demand was a rank job of the Junta de Viveres; but both the first and the second were granted, and the grain in the progress of delivery; then came a demand for money or grain, to which I answered by referring to Mr. Pipon for information whether it would be most convenient to us to give grain or money; upon which letter Mr. Pipon might have acted, *if there was any press for the grain.*

‘In the meantime, however, he received the Commissary General’s directions of the 16th of February, upon which so much has been said. The directions are very proper in themselves, and they must be obeyed, or we cannot carry on the service. Some inconvenience might have resulted from their being received at that particular moment, *if there had been any press for the grain*, and if Mr. Pipon did not choose to act upon my letter to you. But it appears that there was still a remainder on the former demands, which Mr. Pipon had positive orders to issue; and before *we* are made responsible for the consequence of delay, it would be very desirable that Senhor Cardozo should state what quantity he had in his magazines at Lisbon, and what quantity of conveyance he had to take any away from the sea coast.

‘ I observe in the Portuguese authorities in general a very strong desire to have the management of money. I wish it were in my power to gratify them by paying in every month the exact subsidy, and thus to have nothing more to say to them. But as this is not the case, I must go through these details: at all events, I cannot allow any demands upon the British departments to be complied with, unless they come in the regular channel through the head of the department, with all the information on the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 26th February, 1812.

‘ I have just received a letter of the 23d from the Admiral, in which he tells me that he has ordered to Alcacer do Sal ten of the Naiden’s 18 pounders, which are English, quite new, and he thinks will answer your purpose. I hope that you will take them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 26th February, 1812.

‘ The troops of the army of Portugal have made no movement of importance since I addressed you last, excepting a reconnoissance by the troops under the command of General Bonet, from Benavente on Monbuey, and the Puebla de Sanabria, between the 14th and 19th instant; and a movement of the same description by the troops under General Foy, from the neighborhood of Talavera towards Guadalupe, through the Puerto de San Vincente. This last was intended, I believe, to ascertain whether it was practicable to march a column by that route from the Tagus to the Guadiana. Both have returned to their stations.

‘ The repairs and improvements to the works at Ciudad Rodrigo being in great forwardness, and the place being out of danger of being taken, except by regular siege, and the works of Almeida having likewise been repaired as far as is possible at present, and that place having again been

restored as a fortress, I have put the troops in march towards the Alentejo, in order eventually to attack Badajoz.

‘ I have not been able to move them at the period or in the order which I wished; as I have been obliged to send several of the regiments, both British and Portuguese, to get their clothing and equipments at the station to which they were brought by the navigation of the river, not having been able to procure means of land transport to carry what was required to the troops. I trust, however, I shall not feel the inconvenience which might be expected from their having been moved in a manner so contrary to every military principle.

‘ The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are dated the 14th instant.

‘ It appears that the newly appointed Regency are actively employed in equipping a body of troops to reinforce General Ballesteros, and in endeavors to reform the various abuses which prevail in the army.

‘ The troops which had been detached from the army of Portugal into the kingdom of Valencia, in the end of December, under General Montbrun, did not assist in the reduction of the city of Valencia; but marched upon Alicante. General Montbrun, at the head of a detachment of about 5000 men, summoned this place to surrender; and the governor having refused to attend to his offer, he retired on the following day.

‘ Marshal Suchet had left General Harispe’s division in the kingdom of Valencia, and a small garrison in the city, and after levying a very large contribution, he had marched into Catalonia; and I undersand that General Lacy was obliged to raise the siege of Tarragona.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance in the south of Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Freneda, 26th February, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of the dispatch which I wrote yesterday to Major General Cooke, in answer to his

letters of the 6th and 14th instant, copies of which I imagine he will have transmitted to your Lordship.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Dickson, R. A.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 27th February, 1812.

‘ I have this day received your letter of the 22d. I received a letter from the Admiral yesterday of the 23d, in which he informed me that he had sent to Alcacer do Sal ten 18 pounders, English, of the best description, from the Naiden. I beg you to take measures to have them removed to Elvas, even though you should have brought up the Russian guns; if they should arrive before you shall have moved the Russian guns, you will of course have left ten of the Russians.

‘ I think you are in advance of your time; but the equipments from Lisbon, &c., are behind it.

‘ I think it possible, from the prevalence of westerly winds for the last few days, that the communication between Lisbon and Setuval may have been stopped. I intended to have left this on the 1st, and I should have been at Elvas on the 6th; but I shall not now set out till the 2d or 3d, at all events; and not then, unless I should hear from you, that you are likely to be there, and complete on the 8th. It is very important that I should not quit this part of the country till the last moment; and that there should be no delay after I shall arrive at Elvas.

‘ You say nothing about the Engineer’s stores. Colonel Fletcher tells me that the last of them had not left Lisbon on the 19th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Dickson, R. A.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 27th February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th instant, No. 5; and the allied army being in march for the Alentejo, with a view to the object which I communicated to you in a former letter, I propose to set out from hence on the 1st March.

‘ I enclose the draft of a memorandum which I have given to General Castaños, on the probable designs of the enemy during my absence from this frontier ; and on the plans to be adopted by the allies ; and the draft of my instructions to General Bacellar applicable to the same view of circumstances.

‘ I request you to communicate to General Bacellar at Lamego, as well as to the Conde de Amarante, all the intelligence which you may think will be useful to the Officers. In case you should have occasion to make any suggestion to those Officers, I beg that you will attend to the enclosed instructions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir H. Douglas, Bart.

To General Bacellar.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 27th February, 1812.

‘ The allied British and Portuguese army are in march towards the province of Alentejo, with a view to operations to the southward, and it is necessary that I should convey to you instructions regarding your conduct during my absence from this part of the country.

‘ If the enemy should diminish his force in the kingdoms of Leon and Castille, so as to be necessarily on the defensive, and General Abadia, from the province of Galicia, and the Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, from the frontiers of Castille, should undertake any offensive operation against any of the French posts in those kingdoms, the Conde de Amarante should support the operations of General Abadia with his infantry, as far as may be consistent with the instructions which he has already received from Marshal the Conde de Trancoso and me, and with his cavalry, and that under the immediate command of your Excellency, to such extent as may be deemed prudent to advance them, taking care that they have a communication with, and secure retreat upon, his infantry.

‘ If the enemy should retain a sufficient force in Castille and Leon, to be able to act offensively, and should attack Galicia, the General Conde de Amarante is to impede their

progress, and to do them all the mischief he can with his cavalry upon their left flank, and eventually their rear, supporting his cavalry by his infantry; but he must take care not to push the latter too forward, or to risk its retreat upon Portugal. In proportion as the enemy shall advance into Galicia, and you shall find that he intends to establish himself in that kingdom, you will make arrangements to collect the militia of the two northern provinces of the Kingdom of Portugal to the northward.

‘ If the enemy should attack the Kingdom of Portugal by the right of the Douro, instead of attacking Galicia, you will make the arrangements, and adopt the system for their defence, ordered by the instructions of the Marshal Conde de Trancoso in the year 1810. If the enemy, instead of invading Galicia, or the Kingdom of Portugal, on the right of the Douro, should pass the Agueda, below Ciudad Rodrigo, and cut off the communication between that place and Almeida, you will collect the troops in the provinces of Minho, Tras os Montes, and Upper Beira, on the Lower Coa; and you will, as far as in your power, protect the magazines of the allied army on the Douro and the Mondego.

‘ Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo are in a state of defence to insure them against capture by a *coup de main*, and are supplied with provisions to last these garrisons at least during the time that the enemy could possibly remain in the country. In case you should have occasion, under these instructions, to assemble the troops in Upper Beira, I hereby authorize you to make use of the contents of the magazines of the allied army at Lamego and St. João da Pesqueira; but this authority must be made use of only in case of urgent necessity, as it may prove of the utmost detriment to the cause of the allied army, should we not have those magazines hereafter, but whatever you may use of them must be replaced without loss of time.

‘ I enclose a letter for Sir Howard Douglas, who is employed with General Abadia, in which I request that Officer to give you and General the Conde de Amarante constant intelligence of the enemy’s movements, in order to enable you to conform to my instructions. I likewise request the Mariscal de Campo, Don Carlos de España, to communicate with you constantly.

‘ There is a daily post now between Celorico and Lamego, and I have ordered one to be established between Celorico and my head quarters in the Alentejo, and I beg to hear from you constantly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Bacellar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 27th February, 1812.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the draft of a memorandum which I have sent to General Castaños and his answer, being a report to his Excellency from General Giron, the chief of the Staff, on the probable plans of the enemy in this part of the Peninsula, and the measures to be adopted by the allies, upon the march of the allied British and Portuguese army under my command to the south of the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th February, 1812.

‘ I request that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will give directions that Lieutenants Pitts, Jones, and Vetch, Officers of the Royal Engineers, and thirty of the company of Artificers, trained to sapping, may embark and proceed to Villa Real, and proceed thence, according to the enclosed route, to Elvas.

‘ The Commissary General will take measures to have these Officers and men provided on their march.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Cooke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th February, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, No. 53, enclosing observations by Lieut. Colonel Duncan, upon one of the 7th January, which I had addressed to you.

‘ Notwithstanding that I hope the lines of the Isla, and the other fortification depending on Cadiz, will never fall

into the hands of the enemy, I am not satisfied by Lieut. Colonel Duncan's observations, that the information which I desired might be sent to the Secretary of State, cannot or ought not to become matter of professional calculation, because it is the Colonel's opinion that the supply of ammunition "should be without bounds;" or that the Government have not a right to require from me and yourself, and we from the Officers placed under us, such professional information as will enable them to determine whether it is best for Great Britain to maintain the foundries at Cadiz, or to send from thence the articles which these foundries might be expected to supply, if worked at the expense of Great Britain.

'Accordingly I request you again to call Lieut. Colonel Duncan's attention to the information required in my letter of the 7th January. If Lieut. Colonel Duncan cannot or will not make the calculations required, I must and will; and whether he or I make them, I shall consider myself responsible that the works at the Isla and Cadiz are sufficiently supplied for any defence they can be required to make, if they should be supplied according to the calculations which will be sent to England under my orders of the 7th January.

'In order to enable me to make the calculations which I have required (and which Lieut. Colonel Duncan has declined to make, there being yet no answer from the Commanding Officer of Engineers), I request to have a return of the number of pieces of ordnance, stating of what calibres, in the several works in the Isla, including the Caraccas, on the Isthmus and in Cadiz, specifying the measurement of the nation according to which the calibre is calculated.

'Of course you understand that the work at the Spanish foundries is to continue till the Government shall have decided whether they will defray the expense, or send from England the materials manufactured.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General Cooke.'

'WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

'SIR,

'Freneda, 29th February, 1812.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th instant, enclosing one from Don José Pizarro, in regard to

the wants of the place of Ciudad Rodrigo; and I beg that you will inform the Spanish Government that I had already adopted the following measures for the security of that important place:—

‘ The breaches in the *fausse braie* wall have been rebuilt, and the rebuilding of those in the main wall is in progress; and in the meantime three breaches have been repaired in such a manner as to be out of danger of being carried by a *coup de main*.

‘ Various improvements have been made in the works of the place, and in concurrence with the opinion of his Excellency General Castaños, and the Spanish engineers, good works have been constructed on the teson of San Francisco, from which the place can be attacked with the greatest advantage; by which works the teson is secured at least till they will be carried. They are so respectable that they cannot be taken, excepting by a regular attack.

‘ Works are in progress for the improvement of the convents in the suburbs of San Francisco; and a redoubt is in progress to the south of that suburb, which will add to the the security of the place on that side.

‘ These works have been performed by the allied British and Portuguese troops, with the assistance of some Spanish troops in the last week, and I have paid all the expense; and I have this day left in the hands of the governor, Brig. General Vives, the sum of 12,000 dollars, to defray the expense of completing, according to the plan settled, the works which have been commenced, some of which are in a defensible state, and all in a considerable degree of progress. The total expense which will have been incurred, including the sum of 12,000 dollars above mentioned, amounts to about 4,500*l.* sterling.

‘ I have the honor to enclose states of the ordnance, military and Engineer’s stores in the place, besides which, I have ordered there 500 barrels of gunpowder from Almeida, which will be thrown in immediately; and I have sent there 355,000 rounds of musket ammunition.

‘ I have likewise the honor to enclose states of the provisions and medical stores in the place, and of those which I have lodged in it. I have since ordered there 15,000 rations of biscuit, and 5,500 pounds of salt meat, 6000 pounds of

salt fish, and 25,000 pounds of rice. Reckoning the garrison, therefore, at 3000 men, it has already in it provisions for one month. Your Excellency will besides have seen in my correspondence with Don Carlos de España, forwarded in my dispatch of the 19th instant, the measures which had been adopted to place at the disposal of Don Carlos de España provisions for the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo for two months.

‘ If other means should not have been found to supply the garrison before these two months shall have expired, I will endeavor to adopt further measures to supply their wants.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Freneda, 29th February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 29th. It is impossible for me to send a regiment of cavalry to Gibraltar. Considering what I have upon my hands, I doubt whether I have as much cavalry as I shall require, notwithstanding that I have a good deal.

‘ If I were to send a regiment to Gibraltar, it would be under the orders of the governor, to whom I have nothing to say. Any arrangement, therefore, that is made on this subject, must be by the King’s Government.

‘ If I could send a regiment to Gibraltar, and could dispose of it when there (between ourselves), I should doubt the expediency of placing it under the command of Ballesteros. It is very desirable that he should succeed, but one regiment of cavalry will not do much for him one way or other: and having seen the mode in which the Spaniards use their cavalry, and knowing how Ballesteros used some of our hussars, when he had the disposal of them for a moment, I should be desirous of avoiding to trust a regiment to his disposal. The expense of a regiment of cavalry at Gibraltar will be enormous; and as far as I have any knowledge of the scene of its operations, the Sierra de Ronda, the expense of maintaining it in the field still greater. And I doubt its being of much use, even under the best management. The fact is, that the French have so much cavalry, that unless

great masses can be brought against them, it is almost useless, and is very expensive and burthensome, to have more than enough for the common duty of the outposts.

‘ I give no credit to the shells going 5000 toises, which is more than six miles. But the French may certainly have improved upon the mortar, so as to make it throw farther than it did before. It may be depended upon that their efforts in this way are so very expensive that they will be very weak, and our success, or Ballesteros’ at Seville, will put an end to them entirely.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 29th February, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th, containing certain queries from the Superintendent of the Police, on the mode of carrying into execution the law in regard to numbering the means of transport at Lisbon; and I acknowledge that among my other avocations I did not know that I was the interpreter of the meaning of the Portuguese regulations.

‘ The object of the law is to number the means of transport, in order to be able to get at them for the service of the army; and the first question is, whether those are to be numbered which are kept by the Officers of the British army, and by those employed by the British army at Lisbon. Those Officers are allowed certain sums to buy the animals which are deemed necessary to enable them to perform their duty, and they are allowed forage to feed them; and then the magistrate, who is to execute this law, asks, are these animals to be numbered, in order to facilitate their being taken for the service of the army (they being already employed in the service of the army); and the minister supports the notion of taking them by proposing that the whole should be numbered and registered!

‘ I will not insult Dom M. Forjaz by asking whether he numbers Cardozo’s horses and his own, and Marshal Beresford’s, and Admiral Berkeley’s, because I conclude that if he numbers those belonging to the Officers of one nation, he does the same to the Officers of the other; but I

would beg to ask him, whether the horses of the cavalry which may be at Lisbon, and of the police guard, are to be numbered and registered under the law? If the horses and animals in one branch of the public service are not considered liable to be numbered and registered, why should those in another?

‘I should suppose that the law is intended to apply to the horses and animals and means of transport, the property of individuals, not kept for the public service.

‘As for Dom M. Forjaz’ plan of first registering these animals, and then excusing them from service, I know enough of the mode of executing a law in Portugal, to protest against it. It will give rise to constant disputes, and will tend to increase the disunion which is growing fast between the two nations, notwithstanding every effort of mine to prevent it. It will besides, afford ample ground for the evasion of the law by the magistrates.

‘To the second query, I answer, that if anybody, whether English or Portuguese, whether in the service of the army or not, keep means of transport which he is not required to keep by orders of the army, and for which he is not allowed forage by the regulations of the service, such horses and means of transport should be liable to the law for means of transport.

‘I do not understand the third question. If it means the boats belonging to the King’s transports and store ships, &c., I beg to refer you to my answer to the first query for my opinion upon it. If that is not satisfactory, Dom. M. Forjaz had better settle that matter with the British Admiral on the station.

‘If I had any influence with the Portuguese Government, I should recommend that the person who framed these queries should be dismissed from his station. He certainly does not mean to carry into execution the transport laws, and he is not the person who should be at the head of the police in these times.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas, Bart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 1st March, 1812.

‘ I have omitted to reply to your letter of the 28th November, containing your opinion and that of Captain Sir George Collier on the comparative merits of the Bayona Islands and of the Island of Aroza, as points to be occupied by the British Government.

‘ I had yesterday a conversation with General Castaños on that subject; and he appeared to be desirous to occupy the position, to which you refer in your letter of the 28th November, in front of the road leading from San Payo to Pontevedra. Whether he should occupy that position or not, I should be inclined to prefer the Island of Aroza to the Bayona Islands for the depôt; having an intermediate depôt either in the Bayona Islands or in the Peninsula of Pontevedra.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what is the nature and length of the position in front of Pontevedra; and how the flanks of a body of troops occupying it would be secured on the rivers of Pontevedra and San Payo.

‘ Have you formed any notion of the expense to be incurred, and the time which will be required, to secure the Island of Aroza; and by what number of men it should be occupied?

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir H. Douglas, Bart.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Freneda, 1st March, 1812.

‘ I have perused the paper which you transmitted to me in your letter dated the 27th February, and I have examined the plan of the proposed canal from the Sado* to the Tagus.

‘ The proposed canal cannot affect in one way or another the military works on the heights of Almada, and on the left of the Lower Tagus.

‘ Adverting to the nature of the war in which we are engaged, it may be a question how far it is expedient to

* The river which falls into the sea at Setuval, and which, at different parts is called Sado, Sadão, and Setuval.

establish a communication by water, of which the enemy will have the command, between the port of Setuval and the Tagus; and to give the enemy the command of such a resource as that canal would give him for the transport of stores and provisions, for the attack of the works erected for the defence of Lisbon.

‘It does not appear to be at all probable that the canal would be of much use for the defence of Lisbon, as the line is very long, and the right flank by no means strong; and whether it could be occupied or not would depend upon the relative force of the attacking and defending troops. It would be useful to the army if it could maintain itself on the frontier.

‘I say nothing about the expense of the undertaking, or of the expediency of commencing it at present, when the Government are unable to defray the expense of their army, because such observations are useless.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
Charles Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To J. Bissett, Esq., Commissary General.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 3d March, 1812, 4 P. M.

‘I omitted to mention to you this morning that it would be very desirable that somebody, upon whom you can depend, should go to Elvas, in order to keep together there the bullocks and carts which will bring up the ordnance and stores, and have an account of them ready by the time I shall arrive. Otherwise we shall be hard run for means of transport to begin our operations, and much valuable time will be lost in getting the account of what there will be.

‘Mr. Routh will probably be able to arrange this for you.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*J. Bissett, Esq.,*
Commissary General.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Freneda, 3d March, 1812.

‘I have recommended to General Castaños to move General Morillo’s and Penne Villemur’s troops into the Condado

de Niebla during our service in Estremadura, and I think it not improbable that I shall be able to prevail upon him to move them immediately; at least, I propose to try to-morrow at Ciudad Rodrigo, where I am going.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire Mr. Routh to prepare means of feeding them at Jurumenha, Redondo, &c., towards Bejar, and thence to Mertola, where they will cross the Guadiana. They must not go by Villa Viçosa, or touch upon our cantonments. The Juiz de Fora will supply them, upon Mr. Routh giving them previous notice of the arrival of the troops, of which I will apprise you.

‘I propose to leave this on the 6th, and to be at Elvas on the 11th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General Hill.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Freneda, 4th March, 1812.

‘I had intended to move the head quarters from hence on their route towards Elvas, on the 1st instant, but I have been induced to delay the movement, because, owing to the difficulty in procuring means of transport, the stores for the siege of Badajoz are not yet brought up to Elvas, and because I have learnt that the enemy’s troops in all quarters are preparing to move, and that the removal of the head quarters of the army, when they may hear of it, will be the signal for their march. I propose to move, however, on the 6th.

‘No movement of importance has been made since I addressed your Lordship on the 26th of February. Our troops have continued their march, for which the weather has been remarkably favorable.

‘I learn from Cadiz that General Ballesteros defeated, on the of February, a detachment of the enemy under General Maransin, near Malaga. It is reported that General Maransin was killed.

‘I have a report from Sir H. Douglas of the 24th of February, stating that Espoz y Mina had taken the garrison of Huerta on the 3d of January, and that the governor of Pamplona, having sent out a detachment to attack General Mendizabal at Sangüesa, Espoz y Mina and Longa had

joined him, after the enterprise at Huerta, and engaged the French detachment in the valley of Rocaforte, on the 11th of January. They defeated the enemy, and took from them two pieces of cannon, and killed five Officers and 600 men.

‘One of Don Julian Sanchez’ detachments has lately destroyed a small detachment, consisting of an Officer and eighty men, between Alba de Tormes and Salamanca. The Officer was carrying orders, which are very interesting, and show the distress of the enemy.

‘I enclose two which deserve your Lordship’s attention. That in print will point out to you the degree of possession which the enemy have of the country, which they pretend they have conquered and settled. Your Lordship will observe that they cannot send a courier from Valladolid to Bayonne without an escort, consisting of at least 250 cavalry and infantry; and that they can secure the services of the estafette, whom they are obliged to employ, only by placing him in the centre of the escort, and by a rope to the bridle of his horse.

‘The authenticity of this paper will, as usual, be denied by authority, because it is necessary to continue to deceive the world regarding the real situation of affairs in the Peninsula. But I trust that your Lordship will believe that I never transmitted to you any paper which I did not know to be genuine.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General — —.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Freneda, 5th March, 1812, 3 P. M.

‘I propose to set out for the Alentejo to-morrow morning, and General Leith with the 5th division, the greater part of which has already been removed from Ciudad Rodrigo, will have marched from thence on the 9th instant. The General will probably stay there himself for a day or two after the troops, but upon this subject he will communicate with you. I send this letter to him for his perusal.

‘As I am about to undertake an important operation in Estremadura, which will require some time to complete it, I am anxious to take advantage as much as possible of the difficulties which the enemy experience in obtaining

intelligence to gain time. With this view, I have remained so long in this part of the country after the body of the army had marched; and I have detained here the 5th division; and I am desirous that you should remain in this part of the country for some time longer.

‘ I beg you to circulate in the country the report that I am going to hunt on the banks of the Huelva and Yeltes, and you might even have a house arranged for the hounds at Aldea de Yeltes.

‘ The 2d division of the army of Portugal has marched from the province of Avila, through the Puerto del Pico to Talavera de la Reyna; and there are now four divisions of that army on the Tagus. There remain, however, four divisions on the Tormes and Douro; viz., the 3d division at and in the neighborhood of Valladolid, where Marmont’s head quarters are; the 5th division at Salamanca, Alba de Tormes, Penaranda (where there is a small body of cavalry), and Medina del Campo (where the artillery is); the 7th division at Ledesma, and on the road to Zamora, as far as Zamora; and the 8th division at Benavente, and in that neighborhood.

‘ If the enemy should advance upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or should move to cross the Agueda below the town, you will fall back across the Agueda, and thence gradually, taking care not to commit yourself upon Sabugal, and from Sabugal in the same manner, by Penamacor on Castello Branco.

‘ If you should find that Marmont’s head quarters move from Valladolid towards Talavera, or if the 3d or the 5th division should move to the south, or the 7th division, you will march, by easy marches, so as not to injure the horses, by Sabugal, Penamacor, Castello Branco, Portalegre, to Elvas, apprising me of your marches.

‘ The Commissary General leaves in this part of the country an Officer of his department, supplied with money for the wants of the 1st hussars; and measures will be taken to supply the men and horses on the march they will have to make through Lower Beira into Alentejo, upon which a Commissary will receive his instructions from the Commissary General.

‘ I beg you to desire Major Grant of the 11th regiment, who is, I believe, at Tamames, and Lieut. Blanckley, of the

23d regiment, who is at Bejar, to give you constant intelligence of the enemy's movements. Desire the latter to tell the Portuguese Officer who is at Plasencia, likewise to correspond with you.

‘ I have not entered on the defence of this frontier in this letter, because I wish you to consider yourself and the 1st hussars as entirely separated from it, and belonging to the army in the Alentejo, and left on this frontier only for a particular object. I have, however, directed that in case the enemy, upon hearing of my absence from this part of the country, should collect his troops on this side of the Douro, General Bacellar should collect the force now in the northern provinces of Portugal; and in Upper Beira, on the Lower Coa; so as to communicate with Don Carlos de España, and protect our magazines on the Douro and Mondego; both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida being secure from a *coup de main*. I conceive that the enemy can undertake nothing against these places, and they are not likely to pass the Coa in front of a respectable force, leaving these places behind them.

‘ General Bacellar and Don Carlos de España will both press you to remain in this part of the country, in the case supposed of the enemy's movement upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or of his passage of the Lower Agueda. You will, of course, not be in a hurry, and you will give them your countenance as far as may be in your power. But you will tell them that you were left here only for a particular object; and that you have positive instructions for your conduct in the event of the occurrence of the enemy's movement to the Agueda.

‘ One of the corps of guides will set out from Sabugal with letters for me from Don Carlos de España, every morning at 8 o'clock. You should have a letter party in the suburbs of Ciudad Rodrigo, and one at Puebla de Azava, to carry your letters, and those of General Leith, to the detachment of the guides at Sabugal; and the hussar should be dispatched from Ciudad Rodrigo, so that the hussar from Puebla de Azava may reach Sabugal at 8 in the morning.

‘ The hussar from Ciudad Rodrigo should wait at Puebla de Azava, and the hussar from Puebla de Azava should

wait at Sabugal till the letters shall arrive from head quarters, in case there should be any for you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General — —.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose a return of the regiments composing the 3d, 5th, 7th, and 8th divisions “*de l’Armée de Portugal*,” with the names of the General Officers commanding each.

‘ W.’

To Generals Bacellar and Trant.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Freneda, 5th March, 1812.

‘ The Captain General Castaños will pass through Lamego and Oporto, on his way to Juiz in Galicia, in a short time. I request you to pay him every attention which is due to his high rank and situation, and to the important services which he has rendered to the cause of the allied Governments. I beg you to recommend the General to the attention of the military governors and civil magistrates through whose districts and towns he may pass.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Generals Bacellar and Trant.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Superintendent of Transports on the Douro.

‘ SIR,

‘ Freneda, 5th March, 1812.

‘ The bearer, Don Pablo Caballero, is employed by the Commanding Officer of the Spanish troops in Castille, to purchase flour at Oporto, with the intention of removing it by the navigation of the Douro, as far up the river as it may be in his power; and I request you to attend to his requisitions for boats for that service, he paying the usual price for the same.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Superintendent of
Transports on the Douro.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To all Authorities.

‘ Sabugal, 6th March, 1812.

‘ The bearer of this is Mr. Croft*, who is attached to the British Mission at the Court of Lisbon, and is employed by

* Sir John Croft, Bart., K.T.S., who declined all remuneration, even of his expenses, for his services, which were gratefully acknowledged by the British and Portuguese Governments, as also by the distressed inhabitants.

His Majesty's Minister to distribute the bounty voted by Parliament for the relief of the inhabitants of Portugal*. The General or other Officers commanding posts and detachments are requested to give him every assistance in their power, and to provide him with quarters, provisions, and forage.

‘ In the event of troops marching into towns in which this gentleman may be residing for the purpose of executing the duty with which he is entrusted, he is by no means to be molested in his quarters ; but is, on the contrary, recommended to the attention of the General or other Officers commanding the troops.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pedrogão, 7th March, 1812, 2 P.M.

‘ I received this morning, at Sabugal, your letter of the 4th.

‘ We have at Abrantes 600,000 rounds of musket ammunition, and 30,000 of rifle ; and we have 318,000 musket, and 148,000 of rifle, at Elvas. The Light division, and the 5th division, bring with them their ammunition ; and the rifle ammunition, usually in the great reserve, is still with it.

‘ I had, besides, ordered a complete reserve to Abrantes about six weeks ago, so that I hope we shall not want ammunition.

‘ I have heard nothing new since I wrote to you last. I believed I informed you that the 2d division had positively moved from the province of Avila.

‘ I am sorry to hear so bad an account of blankets. From the returns, I had hoped that the troops would have been supplied at Abrantes with everything.

‘ I believe it will be desirable that the 24th regiment should move up ; but if it should be so, I shall send them orders, and let you know.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To — — —.

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 8th March, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th, and that which you enclosed from ——. The 2d division has certainly

* See Letter to Lord Liverpool, 27th October, 1810, vol. vi., pages 547 and 548.

marched from Avila by the Puerto del Pico, and I think it not improbable that Marmont is at Avila, as — says. You may tell — that I shall be happy to hear from his brother, but that I can make him no promises, excepting to represent to the Prince in a favorable view his services, and that I cannot fix the time at which either will receive their pardon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ — — —.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain ———.

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 8th March, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the . You will recollect what I wrote to you when first our correspondence commenced. I held out no hopes of immediate pardon, but, on the contrary, told you that I could obtain pardon for you only after long and important services. You will go to France, or not, just as you please; but if you do go to France, you will do well never to return to Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain ———.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ Portalegre, 10th March, 1812,

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

Half-past 3 P. M.

‘ I enclose a letter from the Secretary of State for yourself, and the copy of one addressed to me, directing me to invest you with the Order of the Bath; the insignia of which I likewise send you. I go to Elvas to-morrow; and if it should be convenient to you to come there on the 12th, I shall be happy to invest you.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you, if you will request the General and Staff Officers of the 1st division, and the Commanding Officers of the two regiments of guards, and Blantyre, to be present on the occasion. I will take care that there shall be quarters for everybody at Elvas.

‘ I enclose the only news which I have received since I left Freneda. I do not believe that Marmont will make an attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo; and if he does, I do not think he can succeed.

‘ I have made arrangements to assemble the militia on the Coa, if the enemy should collect upon the Tormes.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Bring the insignia of the order with you to Elvas.

‘ I have had a sad task to perform with poor Stewart! He is very much afflicted; and it cannot be expected that he should regain any composure for some time. I left him at Niza, and I have endeavored to prevail upon him to go to England.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ Portalegre, 10th March, 1812,
Half past 3 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ I send herewith a letter from the Secretary of State, and the insignia of the Order of the Bath, and the copy of a letter to me directing me to invest you therewith.

‘ I am going to Elvas to-morrow, and as I believe the earliest occasion will be on every account most suitable, I would invest you there on the next day, the 12th, if you can make it convenient to come over.

‘ Pray write to the General and Staff Officers of the 2d division to come over to Elvas to be present on the occasion, and to dine with me, and likewise Generals Hamilton and Long, if they should be near you. I will take care that you shall all be quartered in Elvas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I understand that you wish to know by what road I shall pass to-morrow. By the direct road to Assumar. Bring the insignia of the order with you on the 12th.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Portalegre, 10th March, 1812.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d.

‘ I think the junta of Generals at Cadiz will do but little good. I can let you know what I wish that Ballesteros and others should do, and you can make known my wishes to the Government, without the intervention of any Generals.

‘ General O’Donnell has proposed to me, through Alava, to send a General Officer to Cadiz, to confer with him upon the operations of the armies ; and Lord Liverpool, in a letter which I received this day, has desired me to do the same thing. It appears to me that great inconvenience would result from this mode of doing business, and that the duties of the office of the Ambassador would thereby in some degree be taken out of his hands.

‘ I am very ready to state, upon all occasions, how my plans of operations can be aided by the Spanish troops ; but it must be obvious that these plans must be founded on my own views of the state of affairs. I cannot adopt plans to forward the operations of such a corps as that of Ballesteros’, or even as that of Galicia.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I shall be at Elvas to-morrow.

‘ W.’

To Viscount Melville.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

‘ I received only the day before yesterday your letter of the 10th February*, and head quarters have been marching ever since, and I shall not have time to peruse General Maitland’s paper before the post will go out.

As however it is probable that you will decide upon your measure before the next mail shall reach England, I will not miss this opportunity of stating to you my opinion.

‘ First, that the European army in the East Indies ought to be the King’s.

‘ Secondly, that the three armies ought to continue separate and distinct.

‘ Thirdly, that the native army ought to be the Com-

** Extract of a Letter from Viscount Melville to the Earl of Wellington.*

‘ I am going to do a very unreasonable thing in requesting you, employed as you are, to read the enclosed papers, which are for your confidential perusal. My apology must be the belief that you are not indifferent to the interest and character of our Indian armies, and that you will be perfectly disposed to favor me with your opinion on the suggestion contained in these papers ; the subject is not new to you, and it is beginning to make some stir in this country.’

pany's if the Company should continue to be the sovereign of the territory. It would be impossible to separate this army from the sovereignty, and indeed the great difficulty of transferring the native army to the Crown, and that the Crown would find in keeping it officered, as it must be, by persons exclusively belonging to the native service, have always appeared to me the greatest in the way of the transfer of the sovereignty, or, more properly speaking, of the exercise of the sovereignty, to the Crown.

‘ Fourthly, it is my opinion that the Crown should name both the Governors and Commanders in Chief at all the settlements, and should have a very efficient control over the nomination of members of Council. If the Crown do not appoint the Governor the Crown should not appoint the Commander in Chief. I have not time now to enter into a detail of all my reasons for entertaining this opinion. They are referable principally to the experience I acquired in witnessing, and sometimes being the mediator and reconciler of disputes between the Governor and Commander in Chief. If the latter were appointed by the Crown and the former by the Company, the Commander in Chief would be too strong for the Governor.

‘ Fifthly, it is my opinion that all authority, civil and military, must be vested by the law in the Governor in Council. The law must recognize no other authority in the state. The Company may and ought to instruct the Governor in Council, 1st, to leave all matters of discipline solely and exclusively to the Commander in Chief, and to interfere in them in no manner, excepting when the safety of the state should require it. 2dly, that all recommendations to military appointments, such as the staff Officers of the army to commissions, promotions in the army of persons, civil or military, to fill the departments of the army, and the inferior commands, should be made by the Commander in Chief to the Governor in Council. The Governor in Council should be obliged to record his reasons for dissent. 3dly, the recommendations to superior commands, such as divisions of the army, should be with the Commander in Chief, when the holders of these commands exercise no civil authority or political function; and that in the case of a nomination to a higher command being vested exclusively in the Governor in

Council, without the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, the Governor should be directed to consult with the Commander in Chief in making the selection.

‘ It would be very desirable to leave a latitude by law to the Governor in Council, to promote Officers for meritorious services, at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, out of the usual regular routine, as well as to pass over Officers guilty of misconduct. This might be done by giving the Governor in Council the power to promote such Officers, by brevet, in the first instance, who should succeed to the first vacancies in the rank to which they should have been promoted in the regiment to which they should belong.

‘ In regard to other points, I concur entirely with you. The Court of Directors must be prevented from meddling with or peddling in the discipline of the army. It is a matter of too serious consequence to be allowed to be jobbed at the India House.

‘ You will be the best judge whether this can be effected by the authority of the control of the Crown, or whether the authority of Parliament is necessary.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Viscount Melville.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I have omitted to mention that in whatever way the Commander in Chief is appointed a member of Council, he should have the same power of voting, &c., as other members of Council on all questions.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

‘ I have received your letters of the 12th, 13th, and 19th February, for which I am much obliged to you. I had broken to Charles Stewart his misfortune* before I received Lord Castlereagh’s letters. He is, as you may well believe, dreadfully shocked.

‘ I hope that we shall not require the grain which your Lordship has sent; but I am very much obliged to your Lordship for sending it.

‘ The Portuguese troops at Mafra, &c., are recruits for

* The death of his wife, Lady Katherine Stewart.

the several regiments in the army. They are trained, and will join the army, I hope, soon. They have been kept away till now by the want of knapsacks and other equipments, which have not yet arrived from England. It will not answer to bring recruits to the army till they are quite equipped for the field.

‘I have spoken to Sir William Beresford, and shall speak to General Graham, respecting Shrapnell’s shells. I have seen our artillery produce great effect on the enemy; and I have been induced to attribute this effect to the use of Shrapnell’s shells. But my opinion in favor of these shells has been much shaken lately. First, I have reason to believe that their effect is confined to wounds of a very trifling description; and they kill nobody. I saw General Simon, who was wounded by the balls from Shrapnell’s shells, of which he had several in his face and head; but they were picked out of his face as duck shot would be out of the face of a person who had been hit by accident while out shooting, and he was not much more materially injured.

‘Secondly, from the difficulty of judging of direct distances, and in knowing whether the shell has burst in the air in the proper place, I suspect that an original error in throwing the shells is seldom corrected; and that if the shell is not effectual the first shot, the continuance of the fire of these shells seldom becomes more effectual.

‘I can entertain no doubt, however, that if the shell should be accurately thrown, and burst as it is intended, it must wound a great number of men, but probably none very materially.

‘I am inclined to doubt the expediency of sending to Cadiz an Officer for the purpose mentioned by your Lordship. His duties would supersede those of the Ambassador, through whose medium I have hitherto communicated with the Spanish Government; and your Lordship will observe, from the dispatches of the Ambassador, that I have lately communicated with the Spanish Government on the subject of operations through this channel.

‘I am very anxious to be as much as possible free to carry on any operation, or not, as I may think proper. On former occasions I have explained the variations of the enemy’s force, which might at one time render an operation expe-

dient, and at another very much otherwise; and I should not wish to have my judgment on the line I should adopt in any case fettered by any supposed engagement in which an Officer employed by me to confer with General O'Donnell might have entered.

‘The Spaniards, and O'Donnell in particular, have long pressed for a military convention for the execution of a particular plan of operations. It has always appeared to me, that as I was the only person in the Peninsula who really commanded an army, and that I command it under restrictions and instructions by your Lordship, I ought not to consent to lend myself to such a convention unless I should see an army formed in Spain capable, by its numbers, its equipment, and efficiency, to effect some important object in our common operations. Now there is no such army; and the consequence of entering into such a convention would be, that I should bind myself, for no reason, to perform a certain operation, even after my own judgment should have convinced me that, under your Lordship's instructions, I ought to discontinue it: in other words, I should give, but receive nothing. Accordingly, your Lordship will find, in all my correspondence with the Ambassador, that I state to the Spanish Government the plan which I propose to follow, and suggest that which the Spanish troops should follow to aid my operations; but I do not bind myself to persevere to the last; nor have I suggested any plan to them to aid me, in which it will be necessary for them to persevere so as to endanger the safety of any of their armies.

‘Your Lordship will have seen that I sent the battalion of marines to England some time ago, according to the wish you before expressed upon that subject.

‘I have written to Mr. Perceval regarding my promotion in the Peerage; but I beg your Lordship will accept, and will convey my thanks to the Regent's Government for the favors which have been conferred upon me.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I have written to Mr. Perceval regarding Lord Wellesley's resignation; and I can only say that I am very sorry for it.

‘W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

‘ I enclose the list of names of General Officers of the British and Portuguese army, omitted in the vote of thanks of the two Houses, on the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo. They all belong to divisions which were employed in the siege.

‘ I postpone publishing these votes till I shall hear from your Lordship that the error is rectified.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Viscount Melville.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 13th March, 1812.

‘ Since I wrote yesterday, I have read General Maitland’s and the Duke of York’s papers on the transfer of the army in India to the Crown. The latter relates only to the mode of transfer, which is excellent, if the transfer should be determined upon. The desire to accumulate wealth, and to return to Europe, is natural and praiseworthy in an Officer of the local army in India. A great majority of them can have no other object; and people who have this object exclusively are very apt to forget their duty, and the rules of subordination, when either militate with its attainment.

‘ But I do not agree with those who think that the mutiny at Vellore is to be attributed to the prevalent existence of this spirit among the Officers of the army, nor do I think that the origin of the subsequent mutiny of the Officers ought to be attributed to it. I attribute the mutiny at Vellore to accidental circumstances. One of these was the arrival in the East Indies, just previous to its occurrence, of a new Governor and a new Commander in Chief, many Officers of high rank, and of regiments, recently from England. The Governor and the Commander in Chief were supposed not to be on good terms, or to agree in opinion upon public affairs. This state of things did not tend to increase the respect for authority.

‘ The Officer in command at Vellore was newly arrived, and knew nothing of the native troops; and the Officer in charge of the police of the town did his duty, but badly. I believe it is known that more than one Officer at Vellore

had received notice of what was likely to happen, but they did not attend to the information.

‘If all this be true, and if it be true that there were circumstances in the General Order calculated to create discontent, I believe it will be admitted that the mutiny at Vellore may be attributed to other circumstances besides the spirit of gain among the Officers.

‘I do not know much of the subsequent mutiny of the Officers. I believe that Government never regained its strength after Lord Powis’ government was broken up. The first quarrels of the persons in authority rendered it contemptible, and those of their successors brought it to the ground.

‘Upon the back of all this came General Macdowall’s orders and letters, and his conduct; and it is not astonishing that the Officers mutinied. It is my opinion, from reading the papers, that the supposed fear of losing their emoluments was the pretence for the mutiny instead of the real cause.

‘But, will the measure proposed by General Maitland apply a remedy to the evil? I answer, certainly not. If it be right to call Officers serving with the native troops in India His Majesty’s local army, and to enable them as Colonels to serve the State in all parts of the world, will that diminish among them the desire of gain? I am afraid not. The object of these Officers, after having gone through the period of their service, must still be to return to their own country with some sort of independence, and this is what creates the desire of gain throughout the period of the service in that country.

‘If the measure proposed by General Maitland will not remove the cause which he supposes has occasioned all the evils which have prevailed in the local armies in India, I am afraid it will increase those evils which, in my opinion, have occasioned them.

‘I say that the evil has been the weakness of the government, occasioned by the contending pretensions of the Governor and the Commander in Chief, and by the undue interference of the Company’s authorities at home in the government and patronage abroad. What would become of the government if the Commander in Chief had the whole

army at his back, and obeyed no authority in India? Have Commanders in Chief never advanced extravagant pretensions on the subject of lucre, and advanced those pretensions in such a manner as to endanger the public authority? Let the records be looked at, and see what would have been the consequence, upon more than one occasion, if the army had been entirely and exclusively the King's, and the Commander in Chief had chosen to carry matters to extremities, as he did, having only a part of the army exclusively under his command.

‘If this arrangement is adopted, the Commander in Chief of the army must invariably be the Governor of the settlement, which might be a very proper arrangement; but let it be adopted on its own ground, and not as the consequence of, and prop to, another arrangement, which I am convinced can never be adopted with advantage till the Crown shall take the exercise of the sovereignty into its own hands.

‘I do think it would be a very beneficial arrangement to allow Officers in the service of the Company to exchange into the service of the King, and for the Company's service, as well as for the public, that His Majesty might be enabled to avail himself of the service, in Europe, of Officers who had served the East India Company in India. But this arrangement might easily be effected without expense, and without adopting the whole extent of the plan of General Maitland.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Viscount Melville.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Elvas, 13th March, 1812.

‘I have received your Lordship's dispatch of the 12th ultimo (No. 15), regarding Major General Cooke's arrangements for keeping the Spanish shot foundries in activity; and I beg to refer you to the copy of my letter to Major General Cooke of the 7th January on this subject, which I forwarded to your Lordship on the 8th of that month.

‘There appears to have been some hesitation on the part of Lieut. Colonel ——— of the artillery to furnish the estimates required by my letter, which has induced me to

repeat my directions on this head to Major General Cooke; and I trust that his answer will enable me to form an opinion upon the extent of the assistance to be given to the Spanish Government in ammunition, &c.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 13th March, 1812.

‘ I moved the head quarters from Freneda on the 6th, and arrived here on the 11th instant.

‘ I found everything so far prepared for the siege of Badajoz, that I propose to invest the place on the 16th instant, notwithstanding that all the stores for the siege are not yet arrived.

‘ Owing to the difficulties in procuring means of transport, I have been obliged to detach many regiments, both of the British and Portuguese army, to the rear to receive their clothing and equipments; but I hope that I shall be able to collect the whole before the enemy will be in a situation to interrupt my operations.

‘ Marshal Marmont arrived at Salamanca on the 6th; but the enemy had no intelligence, on which they could rely, of the movement of our army, and it was generally known that I was still in that part of the country. I have intelligence from Ciudad Rodrigo of as late a date as the 10th, at which time the enemy had made no movement.

‘ The 5th division of infantry, under Lieut. General Leith, marched in this direction from thence on the 9th and 10th; but I have ordered the 1st hussars, under Major General ———, to remain in their posts on the Yeltes and Huelva till the General shall be certain, from the enemy’s movements, that they are aware that the allied army have moved.

‘ There are none of the enemy’s troops in the field in Estremadura, excepting that part of the 5th corps not in the garrison of Badajoz, the head quarters of which are at Villa Franca; and a detachment, consisting of about a division, under General Darricau, whose head quarters are at La

rena. I conclude that these troops will retire when our
ops shall advance.

‘The enemy have improved the works of Badajoz very
considerably since the place has been in their possession, and
they have in the place a very sufficient garrison; but I hope
at I shall be able to obtain possession of it.

‘The enemy have made no movement, and I have heard
no operation of importance since I addressed your Lord-
ship last. According to the last accounts, Marshal Soult
is in the lines before Cadiz.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

SIR,

‘Elvas, 14th March, 1812.

‘I have received orders from the Secretary of State to
nvey to you directions to relieve the troops at present
ationed at Tarifa, by a detachment from those under your
mmand at Cadiz; but as I am not aware of the strength
the present garrison at Tarifa, or of the numbers required
r it, I beg you to send there a sufficient force, in their due
roportions of British and foreign troops, under the com-
and of an Officer on whom you can depend.

‘In regard to the defence of Tarifa, I still entertain the
inions which I communicated to you in my letters of the
t and 25th of February; and in the event of your being
the same opinion, I request that you will take measures
secure possession of the island, and that the town may be
nsidered merely as an outpost from it, to be evacuated
hen the state of the enemy’s preparations for attack may
nder the measure necessary.

‘I beg that a plan and description of the works prepared
y the governor of Gibraltar in the town and island of
arifa may be transmitted to me as soon as it may be
ossible, and that you will arrange with Lieut. General
ampbell the relief of the troops which at present garrison
ie place.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

Major General Cooke.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cooke.

'SIR,

'Elvas, 14th March, 1812.

'I have much pleasure in transmitting to you, to be communicated to Colonel Skerrett, the duplicate of a dispatch which I have received from the Earl of Liverpool, conveying the approbation of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of the distinguished conduct of that Officer, and the brave troops under his command, in the successful defence of Tarifa.

'I request that you will acquaint Colonel Skerrett that I did not fail to report, in due course, the events which took place at Tarifa; but, by some accident, my dispatch on this subject had not reached the Earl of Liverpool when his Lordship wrote to me the enclosed letter.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General Cooke.'

'WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

'MY DEAR HENRY,

'Elvas, 14th March, 1812.

'I have nothing to add to my public dispatch, which I enclose. We invest the place on the day after to-morrow.

'Marmont's troops are all ready for a start; but I hope to be strong enough for a stiff affair with him and Soult, and to take the place too. I shall not give the thing up without good cause.

'Ever yours most affectionately,

'The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Austin.

'SIR,

'Elvas, 15th March, 1812.

'I have the honor to inform you that the Conde de Penne Villemur is on his march through the Alentejo with about 4000 cavalry and infantry, by the enclosed route, in order to enter the Condado de Niebla. He will be at Redondo on the day after to-morrow.

'The Commissary General will supply him on his march.

'The object of sending the Conde into the Condado is to draw off the attention of the enemy from the operations in this quarter which are carrying on under my command.

'In case the Conde de Penne Villemur should be obliged

to fall back upon the province of Algarve, it is desirable that you should be provided with means of transporting his troops across the Guadiana; and that you should have collected a magazine, with 24,000 rations of provisions, to supply him during the time which, in that case, he may be obliged to remain within the Portuguese frontier.

‘It would also be very desirable that you should have one or two light boats fitted upon carts, in order to accompany the Conde de Penne Villemur to the Guadalquivir, in case he should think it proper to direct his operations towards and eventually across that river.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Austin.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, K.B.

‘DEAR SIR,

‘Elvas, 16th March, 1812, 12 at noon.

‘I enclose some letters just received from the north, a report from Lieut. Hillier, and one from Toledo, &c.

‘I have desired Sir R. Hill to communicate with you to-morrow by Almendralejo, if he can; to move upon Villa Franca next day, if Bonet should remain there. If he should not, to occupy Almendralejo while you shall be employed in pushing Bonet into the mountains.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir T. Graham, K.B.’

To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.

‘MY DEAR HILL,

‘Elvas, 16th March, 1812, 12 at noon.

‘General Graham marched this morning, and we invest the place on the left of the river this day. I have not been able to go out, which is the reason for delaying it on the right of the river.

‘General Graham will be at S^{ta} Marta to-morrow; and it is very desirable that you should communicate with him by Almendralejo, on your arrival at Merida.

‘If Drouet should have continued at Villa Franca, it is likewise very desirable that you should move on that place early on the 18th, so as to co-operate with Sir Thomas Graham in the attack of the enemy.

‘ Sir Thomas Graham will push the enemy quite back to Llerena if he should not already have withdrawn entirely ; and while he is so employed, you might as well have a part of your troops at Almendralejo, unless indeed Sir Thomas Graham should require your assistance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir R. Hill, K.B.

To Lieut. General Sir R. Hill, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Elvas, 18th March, 1812, 5 P. M.

‘ I have just received a letter from Sir Thomas Graham, from S^{ta} Marta, written last night, in which he tells me that he intended to move upon Feria this day, instead of upon Villa Franca, towards Llerena to-morrow, and on the 20th on Llerena.

‘ I think it probable that Drouet, finding that you were yesterday at Merida, and Sir Thomas Graham at S^{ta} Marta, will have moved at once upon Llerena. However, till Sir Thomas Graham shall return from his expedition on Llerena, it is desirable that you should keep your corps at Villa Franca, and endeavor to communicate with him. If you should find that he does not carry into execution his plan to the extent of going to Llerena, you will obey the instructions in my letter of the 16th. If, as I hope, he will have taken up the line which I pointed out to him upon Drouet’s retreat, I shall then point out a position for you north of the Guadiana.

‘ We broke ground last night, and got on well, notwithstanding the rain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir R. Hill, K.B.

To General Don Carlos de España.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp before Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letters of the 15th, 16th, and 17th instant.

‘ The report which you make of Ciudad Rodrigo distresses me much. I had hoped that, when by the labor of the British and Portuguese troops, and at the expense of the British Government, I had, in concert with General Cas

taños, improved and repaired the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, so that at all events the place was secure from a *coup de main*, and had left money in order to complete the execution of what our troops had not time to complete, I should not have been told by your Excellency, that for want of the assistance of fifteen or twenty British soldiers, who are artificers, and whose services are required for other objects essential to the cause of Spain, the whole business is at a stand. Is it possible that your Excellency can be in earnest? Is it possible that Castille cannot furnish fifteen or twenty stone cutters, masons, and carpenters, for the repair of this important post? How have all the great works been performed which we see in the country?

‘But your Excellency’s letter suggests this melancholy reflection, that everything, as well of a military as of a laborious nature, must be performed by British soldiers, and it becomes my duty to bring this fact distinctly under the view of the allied Governments.

‘I am decidedly of opinion that the enemy cannot attack Ciudad Rodrigo for the want of heavy artillery, and that they cannot get up the artillery which they require till the month of May at soonest. In that period, if I can keep my army collected, I can do much for the cause; and, to enable me to keep my army collected, I require only that the works planned and agreed upon should be continued, for which I have left the money; and that the provisions for which I had given the order upon St. João da Pesqueira on the 16th of February should be thrown into the place.

‘If those provisions are not thrown into the place, it is obvious that, by placing one division between the Coa and Agueda, the enemy will, according to my calculation, in thirty days, and, according to that of your Excellency, in twenty-three days, have possession of the place.

‘I acknowledge, however, that I am a little surprised that there should be provisions in the place to last only for twenty-three days, even including some that your Excellency placed there.

‘I have always reckoned the garrison at 3000 men. Between the 26th January and 17th February there were delivered over to the Spanish Commissary, by Mr. McNair and Mr. St. Remy, 50,000 pounds of biscuit, and 37,500 pounds

of salt meat. There were issued from Almeida, on the 28th of February, 6000 pounds of salt fish, and, on the 10th of March, from the same place, 10,000 pounds of biscuit, and 3,399 pounds of rice; and there were originally in the store at Ciudad Rodrigo 19,800 pounds of flour, and 1000 pounds of biscuit. Reckoning the flour the same as biscuit, there would thus be in the garrison 80,800 pounds of biscuit, and 3,399 of rice. Reckoning one pound of rice equal to two pounds of biscuit, the garrison would have 87,400 pounds of that article, or for twenty-nine days, and for 43,500 pounds of salt meat or salt fish, and plenty of spirits, &c.

‘ Mr. St. Remy was likewise directed to deliver over 5000 pounds of flour on the 10th of March, of which I have not the report.

‘ In addition to this quantity, I gave your Excellency, on the 16th of February, an order upon the magazine of St. João da Pesqueira, only sixteen leagues from Ciudad Rodrigo, for 156,000 pounds of biscuit, and 25,000 pounds of rice; and yet, in one month from that date, that is to say, on the 15th March, your Excellency writes me that the place has provisions only for twenty-three days!!

‘ In writing this letter to your Excellency, I do not mean to make any reproach. I wish only to place upon record the facts as they have occurred, and to show to your country and to my country, and the world, that if this important place should fall, or if I should be obliged to abandon plans important to Spain in order to go to its relief, the fault is not mine.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General*

Don Carlos de España

‘ WELLINGTON.

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